Governance regimes, corruption and growth: Theory and evidence

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Governance regimes, corruption and growth: Theory and evidence. / Aidt, T; Dutta, Jayasri; Sena, V.

In: Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 36, No. 2, 01.06.2008, p. 195-220.

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@article{b351e23e26054725bf163e6e64bb0b83,
title = "Governance regimes, corruption and growth: Theory and evidence",
abstract = "We study the role of political accountability as a determinant of corruption and economic growth. Our model identifies two governance regimes defined by the quality of political institutions and shows that the relationship between corruption and growth is regime specific. We use a threshold model to estimate the impact of corruption on growth where corruption is treated as an endogenous variable. We find two governance regimes, conditional on the quality of political institutions. In the regime with high quality political institutions, corruption has a substantial negative impact on growth. In the regime with low quality institutions, corruption has no impact on growth. Journal of Comparative Economics 36 (2) (2008) 195-220. Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, Sidgwick Avenue, Austin Robinson Building, CB59DD Cambridge, UK; University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK; Aston Business School, Aston University, Birmingham, UK. (c) 2007 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.",
keywords = "threshold models, corruption, growth, governance",
author = "T Aidt and Jayasri Dutta and V Sena",
year = "2008",
month = jun,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.jce.2007.11.004",
language = "English",
volume = "36",
pages = "195--220",
journal = "Journal of Comparative Economics",
issn = "0147-5967",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Governance regimes, corruption and growth: Theory and evidence

AU - Aidt, T

AU - Dutta, Jayasri

AU - Sena, V

PY - 2008/6/1

Y1 - 2008/6/1

N2 - We study the role of political accountability as a determinant of corruption and economic growth. Our model identifies two governance regimes defined by the quality of political institutions and shows that the relationship between corruption and growth is regime specific. We use a threshold model to estimate the impact of corruption on growth where corruption is treated as an endogenous variable. We find two governance regimes, conditional on the quality of political institutions. In the regime with high quality political institutions, corruption has a substantial negative impact on growth. In the regime with low quality institutions, corruption has no impact on growth. Journal of Comparative Economics 36 (2) (2008) 195-220. Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, Sidgwick Avenue, Austin Robinson Building, CB59DD Cambridge, UK; University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK; Aston Business School, Aston University, Birmingham, UK. (c) 2007 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

AB - We study the role of political accountability as a determinant of corruption and economic growth. Our model identifies two governance regimes defined by the quality of political institutions and shows that the relationship between corruption and growth is regime specific. We use a threshold model to estimate the impact of corruption on growth where corruption is treated as an endogenous variable. We find two governance regimes, conditional on the quality of political institutions. In the regime with high quality political institutions, corruption has a substantial negative impact on growth. In the regime with low quality institutions, corruption has no impact on growth. Journal of Comparative Economics 36 (2) (2008) 195-220. Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, Sidgwick Avenue, Austin Robinson Building, CB59DD Cambridge, UK; University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK; Aston Business School, Aston University, Birmingham, UK. (c) 2007 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

KW - threshold models

KW - corruption

KW - growth

KW - governance

U2 - 10.1016/j.jce.2007.11.004

DO - 10.1016/j.jce.2007.11.004

M3 - Article

VL - 36

SP - 195

EP - 220

JO - Journal of Comparative Economics

JF - Journal of Comparative Economics

SN - 0147-5967

IS - 2

ER -