Abstract
Searle’s Chinese Room thought experiment incorporates a number of assumptions about the role and nature of programs within the computational theory of mind. Two assumptions are analysed in this paper. One is concerned with how interactive we should expect programs to be for a complex cognitive system to be interpreted as having understanding about its environment and its own inner processes. The second is about how self-reflective programs might analyse their own processes. In particular, how self-reflection, and a high level of interactivity with the environment and other intelligent agents in the environment, may give rise to understanding in artificial cognitive systems. A further contribution that this paper makes is to demonstrate that the Church-Turing Thesis does not apply to interactive systems, and to self-reflective systems that incorporate interactivity. This is an important finding because it means that claims about interactive and self-reflective systems need to be considered on a case by case basis rather than using lessons from relatively simple non-interactive and non-reflective computational models to generalise to all computational processes.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Proceedings of AISB Annual Convention 2018 |
Subtitle of host publication | Philosohphy after AI: mind, language and action Symposium |
Publisher | Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of Behaviour (AISB) |
Pages | 25-29 |
Number of pages | 5 |
Publication status | Published - 6 Apr 2018 |
Event | Philosophy after AI Symposium at the 2018 AISB Convention - Liverpool, United Kingdom Duration: 6 Apr 2018 → 6 Apr 2018 |
Conference
Conference | Philosophy after AI Symposium at the 2018 AISB Convention |
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Country/Territory | United Kingdom |
City | Liverpool |
Period | 6/04/18 → 6/04/18 |