Fleeting perceptual experience and the possibility of recalling without seeing

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Fleeting perceptual experience and the possibility of recalling without seeing. / Jones, William; Pincham, Hannah; Gootjes-Dreesbach, Ellis Luise; Bowman, Howard.

In: Scientific Reports, Vol. 10, No. 1, 8540, 22.05.2020.

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Jones, William ; Pincham, Hannah ; Gootjes-Dreesbach, Ellis Luise ; Bowman, Howard. / Fleeting perceptual experience and the possibility of recalling without seeing. In: Scientific Reports. 2020 ; Vol. 10, No. 1.

Bibtex

@article{d791cdd5f6634ae08672a16d9cd83d18,
title = "Fleeting perceptual experience and the possibility of recalling without seeing",
abstract = "We explore an intensely debated problem in neuroscience, psychology and philosophy: the degree to which the “phenomenological consciousness” of the experience of a stimulus is separable from the “access consciousness” of its reportability. Specifically, it has been proposed that these two measures are dissociated from one another in one, or both directions. However, even if it was agreed that reportability and experience were doubly dissociated, the limits of dissociation logic mean we would not be able to conclusively separate the cognitive processes underlying the two. We take advantage of computational modelling and recent advances in state-trace analysis to assess this dissociation in an attentional/experiential blink paradigm. These advances in state-trace analysis make use of Bayesian statistics to quantify the evidence for and against a dissociation. Further evidence is obtained by linking our finding to a prominent model of the attentional blink – the Simultaneous Type/Serial Token model. Our results show evidence for a dissociation between experience and reportability, whereby participants appear able to encode stimuli into working memory with little, if any, conscious experience of them. This raises the possibility of a phenomenon that might be called sight-blind recall, which we discuss in the context of the current experience/reportability debate.",
keywords = "Conscious perception, experiential blink, simultaneous type/ serial token model, EEG",
author = "William Jones and Hannah Pincham and Gootjes-Dreesbach, {Ellis Luise} and Howard Bowman",
year = "2020",
month = may,
day = "22",
doi = "10.1038/s41598-020-64843-2",
language = "English",
volume = "10",
journal = "Scientific Reports",
issn = "2045-2322",
publisher = "Nature Publishing Group",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Fleeting perceptual experience and the possibility of recalling without seeing

AU - Jones, William

AU - Pincham, Hannah

AU - Gootjes-Dreesbach, Ellis Luise

AU - Bowman, Howard

PY - 2020/5/22

Y1 - 2020/5/22

N2 - We explore an intensely debated problem in neuroscience, psychology and philosophy: the degree to which the “phenomenological consciousness” of the experience of a stimulus is separable from the “access consciousness” of its reportability. Specifically, it has been proposed that these two measures are dissociated from one another in one, or both directions. However, even if it was agreed that reportability and experience were doubly dissociated, the limits of dissociation logic mean we would not be able to conclusively separate the cognitive processes underlying the two. We take advantage of computational modelling and recent advances in state-trace analysis to assess this dissociation in an attentional/experiential blink paradigm. These advances in state-trace analysis make use of Bayesian statistics to quantify the evidence for and against a dissociation. Further evidence is obtained by linking our finding to a prominent model of the attentional blink – the Simultaneous Type/Serial Token model. Our results show evidence for a dissociation between experience and reportability, whereby participants appear able to encode stimuli into working memory with little, if any, conscious experience of them. This raises the possibility of a phenomenon that might be called sight-blind recall, which we discuss in the context of the current experience/reportability debate.

AB - We explore an intensely debated problem in neuroscience, psychology and philosophy: the degree to which the “phenomenological consciousness” of the experience of a stimulus is separable from the “access consciousness” of its reportability. Specifically, it has been proposed that these two measures are dissociated from one another in one, or both directions. However, even if it was agreed that reportability and experience were doubly dissociated, the limits of dissociation logic mean we would not be able to conclusively separate the cognitive processes underlying the two. We take advantage of computational modelling and recent advances in state-trace analysis to assess this dissociation in an attentional/experiential blink paradigm. These advances in state-trace analysis make use of Bayesian statistics to quantify the evidence for and against a dissociation. Further evidence is obtained by linking our finding to a prominent model of the attentional blink – the Simultaneous Type/Serial Token model. Our results show evidence for a dissociation between experience and reportability, whereby participants appear able to encode stimuli into working memory with little, if any, conscious experience of them. This raises the possibility of a phenomenon that might be called sight-blind recall, which we discuss in the context of the current experience/reportability debate.

KW - Conscious perception

KW - experiential blink

KW - simultaneous type/ serial token model

KW - EEG

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85085390001&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1038/s41598-020-64843-2

DO - 10.1038/s41598-020-64843-2

M3 - Article

C2 - 32444667

VL - 10

JO - Scientific Reports

JF - Scientific Reports

SN - 2045-2322

IS - 1

M1 - 8540

ER -