Explaining Inserted Thoughts

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Colleges, School and Institutes

Abstract

IT SEEMS TO be impossible for a person to have introspective access to thoughts that are not her own (Campbell 1999). Yet, although first-personal conscious awareness of a particular thought is normally sufficient for being its owner, some schizophrenic subjects report being conscious of thoughts that are not theirs. This suggests that, contrary to philosophical orthodoxy, thought ownership is not a necessary condition for consciously experiencing a thought. Because what schizophrenics report is thus rather difficult to reconcile with standard philosophical conceptions of conscious thought, it would be good to have a clearer picture of precisely how experiences of thought insertion differ from those of ordinary thinking. Developing such a picture is the aim of Patrizia Pedrini’s essay.

Details

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)239-242
Number of pages4
JournalPhilosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology
Volume22
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2015

Keywords

  • thought insertion, schizophrenia, cognitive agency, consciousness