Everettian Confirmation and Sleeping Beauty

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Standard

Everettian Confirmation and Sleeping Beauty. / Wilson, Alastair.

In: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 65, No. 3, 03.09.2014, p. 573-598.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

APA

Vancouver

Author

Bibtex

@article{15d4b826ae214dffaafbfc2752037810,
title = "Everettian Confirmation and Sleeping Beauty",
abstract = "Darren Bradley has recently appealed to observation selection effects to argue that conditionalization presents no special problem for Everettian quantum mechanics, and to defend the {\textquoteleft}halfer{\textquoteright} answer to the puzzle of Sleeping Beauty. I assess Bradley{\textquoteright}s arguments and conclude that while he is right about confirmation in Everettian quantum mechanics, he is wrong about Sleeping Beauty. This result is doubly good news for Everettians: they can endorse Bayesian confirmation theory without qualification, but they are not thereby compelled to adopt the unpopular {\textquoteleft}halfer{\textquoteright} answer in Sleeping Beauty. These considerations suggest that objective chance is playing an important and under-appreciated role in Sleeping Beauty.",
author = "Alastair Wilson",
year = "2014",
month = sep,
day = "3",
doi = "10.1093/bjps/axt018",
language = "English",
volume = "65",
pages = "573--598",
journal = "The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science",
issn = "0007-0882",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Everettian Confirmation and Sleeping Beauty

AU - Wilson, Alastair

PY - 2014/9/3

Y1 - 2014/9/3

N2 - Darren Bradley has recently appealed to observation selection effects to argue that conditionalization presents no special problem for Everettian quantum mechanics, and to defend the ‘halfer’ answer to the puzzle of Sleeping Beauty. I assess Bradley’s arguments and conclude that while he is right about confirmation in Everettian quantum mechanics, he is wrong about Sleeping Beauty. This result is doubly good news for Everettians: they can endorse Bayesian confirmation theory without qualification, but they are not thereby compelled to adopt the unpopular ‘halfer’ answer in Sleeping Beauty. These considerations suggest that objective chance is playing an important and under-appreciated role in Sleeping Beauty.

AB - Darren Bradley has recently appealed to observation selection effects to argue that conditionalization presents no special problem for Everettian quantum mechanics, and to defend the ‘halfer’ answer to the puzzle of Sleeping Beauty. I assess Bradley’s arguments and conclude that while he is right about confirmation in Everettian quantum mechanics, he is wrong about Sleeping Beauty. This result is doubly good news for Everettians: they can endorse Bayesian confirmation theory without qualification, but they are not thereby compelled to adopt the unpopular ‘halfer’ answer in Sleeping Beauty. These considerations suggest that objective chance is playing an important and under-appreciated role in Sleeping Beauty.

U2 - 10.1093/bjps/axt018

DO - 10.1093/bjps/axt018

M3 - Article

VL - 65

SP - 573

EP - 598

JO - The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

JF - The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

SN - 0007-0882

IS - 3

ER -