Epistemology without metaphysics

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Authors

Colleges, School and Institutes

Abstract

The paper outlines a view of normativity that combines elements of relativism and expressivism, and applies it to normative concepts in epistemology. The result is a kind of epistemological anti-realism, which denies that epistemic norms can be (in any straightforward sense) correct or incorrect; it does allow some to be better than others, but takes this to be goal-relative and is skeptical of the existence of best norms. It discusses the circularity that arises from the fact that we need to use epistemic norms to gather the facts with which to evaluate epistemic norms; relatedly, it discusses how epistemic norms can rationally evolve. It concludes with some discussion of the impact of this view on "ground level" epistemology.

Details

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)249-290
Number of pages42
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume143
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 1 Mar 2009