Endogenous Queue Number Determination in G/M/s Systems

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Standard

Endogenous Queue Number Determination in G/M/s Systems. / Alves, Vasco.

In: 4OR, 17.04.2020.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

APA

Vancouver

Author

Bibtex

@article{99dd101cfffb4ecd9c0233b0316b46cc,
title = "Endogenous Queue Number Determination in G/M/s Systems",
abstract = "This paper presents a model for the endogenous determination of the number of queues in a G/M/s system. Customers arriving at a system where s customers are being served play a game, choosing between s parallel queues or one single queue. Equilibria are obtained for risk-neutral and risk-averse customers. With risk-neutral customers, both a single queue and multiple queues are equilibrium states. When risk-averse customers are considered, there is a unique single queue equilibrium. These results are discussed and suggestions for further research put forth.",
keywords = "Games/group decisions: strategic queueing, Queues—Applications: strategic interactions, Queues—Multichannel: determining number",
author = "Vasco Alves",
year = "2020",
month = apr,
day = "17",
doi = "10.1007/s10288-020-00437-y",
language = "English",
journal = "4OR",
issn = "1619-4500",
publisher = "Springer",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Endogenous Queue Number Determination in G/M/s Systems

AU - Alves, Vasco

PY - 2020/4/17

Y1 - 2020/4/17

N2 - This paper presents a model for the endogenous determination of the number of queues in a G/M/s system. Customers arriving at a system where s customers are being served play a game, choosing between s parallel queues or one single queue. Equilibria are obtained for risk-neutral and risk-averse customers. With risk-neutral customers, both a single queue and multiple queues are equilibrium states. When risk-averse customers are considered, there is a unique single queue equilibrium. These results are discussed and suggestions for further research put forth.

AB - This paper presents a model for the endogenous determination of the number of queues in a G/M/s system. Customers arriving at a system where s customers are being served play a game, choosing between s parallel queues or one single queue. Equilibria are obtained for risk-neutral and risk-averse customers. With risk-neutral customers, both a single queue and multiple queues are equilibrium states. When risk-averse customers are considered, there is a unique single queue equilibrium. These results are discussed and suggestions for further research put forth.

KW - Games/group decisions: strategic queueing

KW - Queues—Applications: strategic interactions

KW - Queues—Multichannel: determining number

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85083836837&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s10288-020-00437-y

DO - 10.1007/s10288-020-00437-y

M3 - Article

JO - 4OR

JF - 4OR

SN - 1619-4500

ER -