Endogenous Queue Number Determination in G/M/s Systems

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Authors

Colleges, School and Institutes

Abstract

This paper presents a model for the endogenous determination of the number of queues in a G/M/s system. Customers arriving at a system where s customers are being served play a game, choosing between s parallel queues or one single queue. Equilibria are obtained for risk-neutral and risk-averse customers. With risk-neutral customers, both a single queue and multiple queues are equilibrium states. When risk-averse customers are considered, there is a unique single queue equilibrium. These results are discussed and suggestions for further research put forth.

Details

Original languageEnglish
Journal4OR
Early online date17 Apr 2020
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 17 Apr 2020

Keywords

  • Games/group decisions: strategic queueing, Queues—Applications: strategic interactions, Queues—Multichannel: determining number