Abstract
This paper presents a model for the endogenous determination of the number of queues in a G/M/s system. Customers arriving at a system where s customers are being served play a game, choosing between s parallel queues or one single queue. Equilibria are obtained for risk-neutral and risk-averse customers. With risk-neutral customers, both a single queue and multiple queues are equilibrium states. When risk-averse customers are considered, there is a unique single queue equilibrium. These results are discussed and suggestions for further research put forth.
Original language | English |
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Journal | 4OR |
Early online date | 17 Apr 2020 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | E-pub ahead of print - 17 Apr 2020 |
Keywords
- Games/group decisions: strategic queueing
- Queues—Applications: strategic interactions
- Queues—Multichannel: determining number
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Management Information Systems
- Theoretical Computer Science
- Management Science and Operations Research
- Computational Theory and Mathematics