Du-Vote: Remote Electronic Voting with Untrusted Computers

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution


Colleges, School and Institutes

External organisations

  • HP Laboratories, Bristol, UK
  • Cornell University, USA


Du-Vote is a new remote electronic voting protocol that eliminates the often-required assumption that voters trust general-purpose computers. Trust is distributed in Du-Vote between a simple hardware token issued to the voter, the voter's computer, and a server run by election authorities. Verifiability is guaranteed with high probability even if all these machines are controlled by the adversary, and privacy is guaranteed as long as at least either the voter's computer, or the server and the hardware token, are not controlled by the adversary. The design of the Du-Vote protocol is presented in this paper. A new non-interactive zero-knowledge proof is employed to verify the server's computations. Du-Vote is a step towards tackling the problem of internet voting on user machines that are likely to have malware. We anticipate that the methods of Du-Vote can be used in other applications to find ways of achieving malware tolerance, that is, ways of securely using platforms that are known or suspected to have malware.


Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Publication statusPublished - 13 Jul 2015
Event2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) - Verona, Italy
Duration: 13 Jul 201517 Jul 2015


Conference2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)