Domain-specificity and theory of mind: Evaluating evidence from neuropsychology

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Domain-specificity and theory of mind: Evaluating evidence from neuropsychology. / Apperly, Ian; Samson, Dana; Humphreys, Glyn.

In: Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Vol. 9, No. 12, 01.12.2005, p. 572-577.

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@article{161e14a59b8c4a138a8f4fc33e107592,
title = "Domain-specificity and theory of mind: Evaluating evidence from neuropsychology",
abstract = "Humans' unique aptitude for reasoning about mental states, known as Theory of Mind (ToM), can help explain the unique character of human communication and social interaction. ToM has been studied extensively in children, but there is no clear account of the cognitive basis of ToM in adults. Evidence from functional imaging and neuropsychology is beginning to address this surprising gap in our understanding, and this evidence is often thought to favour a domain-specific or modular architecture for ToM. We present a systematic approach to this issue for the paradigmatic case of belief reasoning, and argue that neuropsychological data provide no clear evidence for domain-specificity or modularity. Progress in understanding ToM requires new tasks that isolate potentially distinct components of this complex ability.",
author = "Ian Apperly and Dana Samson and Glyn Humphreys",
year = "2005",
month = dec,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.tics.2005.10.004",
language = "English",
volume = "9",
pages = "572--577",
journal = "Trends in Cognitive Sciences",
issn = "1364-6613",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "12",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Domain-specificity and theory of mind: Evaluating evidence from neuropsychology

AU - Apperly, Ian

AU - Samson, Dana

AU - Humphreys, Glyn

PY - 2005/12/1

Y1 - 2005/12/1

N2 - Humans' unique aptitude for reasoning about mental states, known as Theory of Mind (ToM), can help explain the unique character of human communication and social interaction. ToM has been studied extensively in children, but there is no clear account of the cognitive basis of ToM in adults. Evidence from functional imaging and neuropsychology is beginning to address this surprising gap in our understanding, and this evidence is often thought to favour a domain-specific or modular architecture for ToM. We present a systematic approach to this issue for the paradigmatic case of belief reasoning, and argue that neuropsychological data provide no clear evidence for domain-specificity or modularity. Progress in understanding ToM requires new tasks that isolate potentially distinct components of this complex ability.

AB - Humans' unique aptitude for reasoning about mental states, known as Theory of Mind (ToM), can help explain the unique character of human communication and social interaction. ToM has been studied extensively in children, but there is no clear account of the cognitive basis of ToM in adults. Evidence from functional imaging and neuropsychology is beginning to address this surprising gap in our understanding, and this evidence is often thought to favour a domain-specific or modular architecture for ToM. We present a systematic approach to this issue for the paradigmatic case of belief reasoning, and argue that neuropsychological data provide no clear evidence for domain-specificity or modularity. Progress in understanding ToM requires new tasks that isolate potentially distinct components of this complex ability.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=27944509529&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.tics.2005.10.004

DO - 10.1016/j.tics.2005.10.004

M3 - Article

C2 - 16271505

VL - 9

SP - 572

EP - 577

JO - Trends in Cognitive Sciences

JF - Trends in Cognitive Sciences

SN - 1364-6613

IS - 12

ER -