Defence of a basic voluntary act requirement in criminal law from philosophies of action

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Standard

Defence of a basic voluntary act requirement in criminal law from philosophies of action. / Child, John.

In: New Criminal Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 4, 27.11.2020, p. 437-470.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

APA

Vancouver

Author

Bibtex

@article{1429e89fba364b8e910fad751923e8ca,
title = "Defence of a basic voluntary act requirement in criminal law from philosophies of action",
abstract = "When looking to identify the basic ingredients of criminal responsibility, reference is standardly made to a voluntary act requirement (VAR). We blame a defendant (D) for what she has done or (perhaps) failed to do where such doing or failing to do is proscribed by law; we do not punish mere thoughts or character. However, despite the continued appeal of the VAR in abstract principle, the precise definitions and restrictions entailed within it are not always clear, and its usefulness in preventing inappropriate criminalisation is openly (and in many cases correctly) challenged. Principally, and crucially, the VAR has received sustained attack in recent years from critics within the philosophies of action, highlighting its descriptive and normative shortcomings. It is contended that such criticism is misplaced. This article provides defence to a stripped-back definition of the VAR, distinguishing the general definition of action in philosophy from the definition of action within the criminal law, and seeking to identify and preserve a doctrinally workable model of the latter.",
keywords = "Voluntary Act requirement, Conduct, Agency, Automatism",
author = "John Child",
year = "2020",
month = nov,
day = "27",
doi = "10.1525/nclr.2020.23.4.437",
language = "English",
volume = "23",
pages = "437--470",
journal = "New Criminal Law Review",
issn = "1933-4192",
publisher = "University of California Press",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Defence of a basic voluntary act requirement in criminal law from philosophies of action

AU - Child, John

PY - 2020/11/27

Y1 - 2020/11/27

N2 - When looking to identify the basic ingredients of criminal responsibility, reference is standardly made to a voluntary act requirement (VAR). We blame a defendant (D) for what she has done or (perhaps) failed to do where such doing or failing to do is proscribed by law; we do not punish mere thoughts or character. However, despite the continued appeal of the VAR in abstract principle, the precise definitions and restrictions entailed within it are not always clear, and its usefulness in preventing inappropriate criminalisation is openly (and in many cases correctly) challenged. Principally, and crucially, the VAR has received sustained attack in recent years from critics within the philosophies of action, highlighting its descriptive and normative shortcomings. It is contended that such criticism is misplaced. This article provides defence to a stripped-back definition of the VAR, distinguishing the general definition of action in philosophy from the definition of action within the criminal law, and seeking to identify and preserve a doctrinally workable model of the latter.

AB - When looking to identify the basic ingredients of criminal responsibility, reference is standardly made to a voluntary act requirement (VAR). We blame a defendant (D) for what she has done or (perhaps) failed to do where such doing or failing to do is proscribed by law; we do not punish mere thoughts or character. However, despite the continued appeal of the VAR in abstract principle, the precise definitions and restrictions entailed within it are not always clear, and its usefulness in preventing inappropriate criminalisation is openly (and in many cases correctly) challenged. Principally, and crucially, the VAR has received sustained attack in recent years from critics within the philosophies of action, highlighting its descriptive and normative shortcomings. It is contended that such criticism is misplaced. This article provides defence to a stripped-back definition of the VAR, distinguishing the general definition of action in philosophy from the definition of action within the criminal law, and seeking to identify and preserve a doctrinally workable model of the latter.

KW - Voluntary Act requirement

KW - Conduct

KW - Agency

KW - Automatism

UR - https://ssrn.com/abstract=3329182

U2 - 10.1525/nclr.2020.23.4.437

DO - 10.1525/nclr.2020.23.4.437

M3 - Article

VL - 23

SP - 437

EP - 470

JO - New Criminal Law Review

JF - New Criminal Law Review

SN - 1933-4192

IS - 4

ER -