Contractualism as restricted contractualism
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
Authors
Colleges, School and Institutes
Abstract
Metaethics is dominated by views according to which moral claims are made true by either non-natural or natural properties or they express desire-like attitudes. It has been suggested that constructivism is a fourth alternative, but it remains opaque how it differs from the other views. This article first describes a clear constructivist theory based on Crispin Wright's anti-realism. It then specifies an argumentative strategy that can be used to argue against constructivist views about practical reasons. The last sections of the article finally explain how reasons and contractualism can be used to construct a new viable metaethical constructivist position about right and wrong.
Details
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 571–579 |
Number of pages | 9 |
Journal | Topoi |
Volume | 37 |
Issue number | 4 |
Early online date | 16 Feb 2017 |
Publication status | Published - Dec 2018 |
Keywords
- Contractualism, Constructivism, Practical reasons, Right and wrong, Metaethics