Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
Colleges, School and Institutes
According to traditional forms of act-consequentialism, an action is right if and only if no other action in the given circumstances would have better consequences. It has been argued that this view does not leave us enough freedom to choose between actions which we intuitively think are morally permissible but not required options. In the first half of this article, I will explain why the previous consequentialist responses to this objection are less than satisfactory. I will then attempt to show that agents have more options on consequentialist grounds than the traditional forms of act-consequentialism acknowledged. This is because having a choice between many permissible options can itself have value.
|Number of pages||26|
|Early online date||28 Apr 2014|
|Publication status||Published - 1 Sep 2014|
- Normative Ethics, Consequentialism, Moral Freedom