Conceptual Fragmentation and the Rise of Eliminativism

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Authors

Colleges, School and Institutes

External organisations

  • Durham University

Abstract

Pluralist and eliminativist positions have proliferated within both science and philosophy of science in recent decades. This paper asks the question why this shift of thinking has occurred, and where it is leading us. We provide an explanation which, if correct, entails that we should expect pluralism and eliminativism to transform other debates currently unaffected, and for good reasons. We then consider the question under what circumstances eliminativism will be appropriate, arguing that it depends not only on the term in question, but also on the context of discussion and details of the debate at hand. The resultant selective eliminativism is an appealing compromise for various ‘pluralists’ and ‘eliminativists’ who are currently locking horns.

Details

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)17-40
Number of pages23
JournalEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Science
Volume7
Issue number1
Early online date7 Apr 2016
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2017

Keywords

  • pluralism, eliminativism, science, definition, concept