Claims of Legal Authorities and 'Expressions of Intentions': The Limits of The Philosophy of Language

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (peer-reviewed)

Standard

Claims of Legal Authorities and 'Expressions of Intentions': The Limits of The Philosophy of Language. / Rodriguez-Blanco, Veronica.

Law and Language: Current Legal Issues. ed. / Michael Freeman; Fiona Smith. Vol. 15 Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2013. p. 79-99.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (peer-reviewed)

Harvard

Rodriguez-Blanco, V 2013, Claims of Legal Authorities and 'Expressions of Intentions': The Limits of The Philosophy of Language. in M Freeman & F Smith (eds), Law and Language: Current Legal Issues. vol. 15, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 79-99.

APA

Rodriguez-Blanco, V. (2013). Claims of Legal Authorities and 'Expressions of Intentions': The Limits of The Philosophy of Language. In M. Freeman, & F. Smith (Eds.), Law and Language: Current Legal Issues (Vol. 15, pp. 79-99). Oxford University Press.

Vancouver

Rodriguez-Blanco V. Claims of Legal Authorities and 'Expressions of Intentions': The Limits of The Philosophy of Language. In Freeman M, Smith F, editors, Law and Language: Current Legal Issues. Vol. 15. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2013. p. 79-99

Author

Rodriguez-Blanco, Veronica. / Claims of Legal Authorities and 'Expressions of Intentions': The Limits of The Philosophy of Language. Law and Language: Current Legal Issues. editor / Michael Freeman ; Fiona Smith. Vol. 15 Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2013. pp. 79-99

Bibtex

@inbook{6fa8a0417b8f4f9eb68b91e672c240b5,
title = "Claims of Legal Authorities and 'Expressions of Intentions': The Limits of The Philosophy of Language",
abstract = "Legal authorities make requests, give orders and commands and they claim that these requests, orders and commands will be done in either a morally correct (Alexy R., The Argument from Injustice ) or morally legitimate (Raz J., The Authority of Law) manner or both. How should we understand these claims? Can we reconstruct such claims in light of the speech-act theory? According to the speech-act theory (Austin J.L., How to do Things with Words; Searle, J., Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language), by saying something I am performing an act. Thus, making an assertion, giving an order and promising to do something are all ways of performing an act. Following the core tenets of the speech-act theory, we might argue that by requesting, commanding or ordering {\textquoteleft}X ought to ɸ{\textquoteright} legal authorities are performing an act (performative act); we could also argue that by claiming moral legitimacy and moral correctness legal authorities are making claims about how these performative acts will be carried out. I advance arguments to criticise this reconstruction of claims of legal authorities and in doing so will show the limits of speech-act theory for illuminating the phenomenon of intentional actions and its connection to the authoritative nature of law. Furthermore, I also argue that the claims of legal authorities should be understood as {\textquoteleft}expressions of intentions{\textquoteright}, but that such expressions should be understood beyond a mere linguistic phenomenon. I argue, hence, that such expressions have a deeper level and that they are closely intertwined with 1) the intentions with which we act and 2) intentional actions.",
keywords = "Expressions of Intention, Elisabeth Anscombe, Speech Act Theory, Authoritative Claims, Legal Philosophy, Philosophy of Practical Reason",
author = "Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco",
year = "2013",
month = jan,
language = "English",
isbn = "978-0199673667",
volume = "15",
pages = "79--99",
editor = "Michael Freeman and Fiona Smith",
booktitle = "Law and Language: Current Legal Issues",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
address = "United Kingdom",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Claims of Legal Authorities and 'Expressions of Intentions': The Limits of The Philosophy of Language

AU - Rodriguez-Blanco, Veronica

PY - 2013/1

Y1 - 2013/1

N2 - Legal authorities make requests, give orders and commands and they claim that these requests, orders and commands will be done in either a morally correct (Alexy R., The Argument from Injustice ) or morally legitimate (Raz J., The Authority of Law) manner or both. How should we understand these claims? Can we reconstruct such claims in light of the speech-act theory? According to the speech-act theory (Austin J.L., How to do Things with Words; Searle, J., Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language), by saying something I am performing an act. Thus, making an assertion, giving an order and promising to do something are all ways of performing an act. Following the core tenets of the speech-act theory, we might argue that by requesting, commanding or ordering ‘X ought to ɸ’ legal authorities are performing an act (performative act); we could also argue that by claiming moral legitimacy and moral correctness legal authorities are making claims about how these performative acts will be carried out. I advance arguments to criticise this reconstruction of claims of legal authorities and in doing so will show the limits of speech-act theory for illuminating the phenomenon of intentional actions and its connection to the authoritative nature of law. Furthermore, I also argue that the claims of legal authorities should be understood as ‘expressions of intentions’, but that such expressions should be understood beyond a mere linguistic phenomenon. I argue, hence, that such expressions have a deeper level and that they are closely intertwined with 1) the intentions with which we act and 2) intentional actions.

AB - Legal authorities make requests, give orders and commands and they claim that these requests, orders and commands will be done in either a morally correct (Alexy R., The Argument from Injustice ) or morally legitimate (Raz J., The Authority of Law) manner or both. How should we understand these claims? Can we reconstruct such claims in light of the speech-act theory? According to the speech-act theory (Austin J.L., How to do Things with Words; Searle, J., Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language), by saying something I am performing an act. Thus, making an assertion, giving an order and promising to do something are all ways of performing an act. Following the core tenets of the speech-act theory, we might argue that by requesting, commanding or ordering ‘X ought to ɸ’ legal authorities are performing an act (performative act); we could also argue that by claiming moral legitimacy and moral correctness legal authorities are making claims about how these performative acts will be carried out. I advance arguments to criticise this reconstruction of claims of legal authorities and in doing so will show the limits of speech-act theory for illuminating the phenomenon of intentional actions and its connection to the authoritative nature of law. Furthermore, I also argue that the claims of legal authorities should be understood as ‘expressions of intentions’, but that such expressions should be understood beyond a mere linguistic phenomenon. I argue, hence, that such expressions have a deeper level and that they are closely intertwined with 1) the intentions with which we act and 2) intentional actions.

KW - Expressions of Intention, Elisabeth Anscombe, Speech Act Theory, Authoritative Claims, Legal Philosophy, Philosophy of Practical Reason

M3 - Chapter (peer-reviewed)

SN - 978-0199673667

VL - 15

SP - 79

EP - 99

BT - Law and Language: Current Legal Issues

A2 - Freeman, Michael

A2 - Smith, Fiona

PB - Oxford University Press

CY - Oxford

ER -