Children's sensitivity to their own relative ignorance: Handling of possibilities under epistemic and physical uncertainty

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@article{e2e713f9e2844b418c66f0e1257ec0e5,
title = "Children's sensitivity to their own relative ignorance: Handling of possibilities under epistemic and physical uncertainty",
abstract = "Children more frequently specified possibilities correctly when uncertainty resided in the physical world (physical uncertainty) than in their own perspective of ignorance (epistemic uncertainty). In Experiment 1 (N=61), 4- to 6-year-olds marked both doors from which a block might emerge when the outcome was undetermined, but a single door when they knew the block was hidden behind one door. In Experiments 2 (N=30; 5- to 6-year-olds) and 3 (N=80; 5- to 8-year-olds), children placed food in both possible locations when an imaginary pet was yet to occupy one, but in a single location when the pet was already hidden in one. The results have implications for interpretive theory of mind and {"}curse of knowledge.{"}",
author = "Elizabeth Robinson and M Rowley and Sarah Beck and Daniel Carroll and Ian Apperly",
year = "2006",
month = nov,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1111/j.1467-8624.2006.00964.x",
language = "English",
volume = "77",
pages = "1642--1655",
journal = "Child Development",
issn = "0009-3920",
publisher = "Wiley",
number = "6",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Children's sensitivity to their own relative ignorance: Handling of possibilities under epistemic and physical uncertainty

AU - Robinson, Elizabeth

AU - Rowley, M

AU - Beck, Sarah

AU - Carroll, Daniel

AU - Apperly, Ian

PY - 2006/11/1

Y1 - 2006/11/1

N2 - Children more frequently specified possibilities correctly when uncertainty resided in the physical world (physical uncertainty) than in their own perspective of ignorance (epistemic uncertainty). In Experiment 1 (N=61), 4- to 6-year-olds marked both doors from which a block might emerge when the outcome was undetermined, but a single door when they knew the block was hidden behind one door. In Experiments 2 (N=30; 5- to 6-year-olds) and 3 (N=80; 5- to 8-year-olds), children placed food in both possible locations when an imaginary pet was yet to occupy one, but in a single location when the pet was already hidden in one. The results have implications for interpretive theory of mind and "curse of knowledge."

AB - Children more frequently specified possibilities correctly when uncertainty resided in the physical world (physical uncertainty) than in their own perspective of ignorance (epistemic uncertainty). In Experiment 1 (N=61), 4- to 6-year-olds marked both doors from which a block might emerge when the outcome was undetermined, but a single door when they knew the block was hidden behind one door. In Experiments 2 (N=30; 5- to 6-year-olds) and 3 (N=80; 5- to 8-year-olds), children placed food in both possible locations when an imaginary pet was yet to occupy one, but in a single location when the pet was already hidden in one. The results have implications for interpretive theory of mind and "curse of knowledge."

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=33750908268&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2006.00964.x

DO - 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2006.00964.x

M3 - Article

C2 - 17107451

VL - 77

SP - 1642

EP - 1655

JO - Child Development

JF - Child Development

SN - 0009-3920

IS - 6

ER -