Calibrating Introspection

Research output: Contribution to journalSpecial issuepeer-review

Authors

Colleges, School and Institutes

Abstract

The epistemic credentials of introspection are often overestimated by philosophers and psychologists in their theorizing. This point has been argued in recent literature; yet a sceptical position on introspection which recommends its wholesale rejection as a source of knowledge is not credible. We can and do know things about our own minds by introspection. A sensible view on introspection is therefore moderate in its scepticism. It is surprisingly hard, however, to make a principled case for such a position. In this paper, I put forward and defend a moderate scepticism about introspection. I show how this position yields the resources to pin down the scope and content of introspective knowledge. A major attraction of the view is that it provides a strategy for solving a problem which has vexed the scientific study of consciousness from its inception.

Details

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)300-321
Number of pages22
JournalPhilosophical Issues
Volume25
Issue number1
Early online date12 Oct 2015
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2015

Keywords

  • Introspection