Calibrating Introspection

Research output: Contribution to journalSpecial issue

Authors

Colleges, School and Institutes

Abstract

The epistemic credentials of introspection are often overestimated by philosophers and psychologists in their theorizing. This point has been argued in recent literature; yet a sceptical position on introspection which recommends its wholesale rejection as a source of knowledge is not credible. We can and do know things about our own minds by introspection. A sensible view on introspection is therefore moderate in its scepticism. It is surprisingly hard, however, to make a principled case for such a position. In this paper, I put forward and defend a moderate scepticism about introspection. I show how this position yields the resources to pin down the scope and content of introspective knowledge. A major attraction of the view is that it provides a strategy for solving a problem which has vexed the scientific study of consciousness from its inception.

Details

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)300-321
Number of pages22
JournalPhilosophical Issues
Volume25
Issue number1
Early online date12 Oct 2015
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2015

Keywords

  • Introspection