Blame it on the Norm: The Challenge from “Adaptive Rationality”

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Blame it on the Norm : The Challenge from “Adaptive Rationality”. / Polonioli, Andrea.

In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 44, No. 2, 01.03.2014, p. 131-150.

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@article{8caccfd281a144abb2e7ee950d3ea378,
title = "Blame it on the Norm: The Challenge from “Adaptive Rationality”",
abstract = "In this paper, I provide a qualified defense of the claim that cognitive biases are not necessarily signs of irrationality, but rather the result of using normative standards that are too narrow. I show that under certain circumstances, behavior that violates traditional norms of rationality can be adaptive. Yet, I express some reservations about the claim that we should replace our traditional normative standards. Furthermore, I throw doubt on the claim that the replacement of normative standards would license optimistic verdicts about human rationality.",
keywords = "rationality, heuristics, cognitive biases, adaptive behavior",
author = "Andrea Polonioli",
year = "2014",
month = mar,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1177/0048393113510468",
language = "English",
volume = "44",
pages = "131--150",
journal = "Philosophy of the Social Sciences",
issn = "0048-3931",
publisher = "SAGE Publications",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Blame it on the Norm

T2 - The Challenge from “Adaptive Rationality”

AU - Polonioli, Andrea

PY - 2014/3/1

Y1 - 2014/3/1

N2 - In this paper, I provide a qualified defense of the claim that cognitive biases are not necessarily signs of irrationality, but rather the result of using normative standards that are too narrow. I show that under certain circumstances, behavior that violates traditional norms of rationality can be adaptive. Yet, I express some reservations about the claim that we should replace our traditional normative standards. Furthermore, I throw doubt on the claim that the replacement of normative standards would license optimistic verdicts about human rationality.

AB - In this paper, I provide a qualified defense of the claim that cognitive biases are not necessarily signs of irrationality, but rather the result of using normative standards that are too narrow. I show that under certain circumstances, behavior that violates traditional norms of rationality can be adaptive. Yet, I express some reservations about the claim that we should replace our traditional normative standards. Furthermore, I throw doubt on the claim that the replacement of normative standards would license optimistic verdicts about human rationality.

KW - rationality

KW - heuristics

KW - cognitive biases

KW - adaptive behavior

U2 - 10.1177/0048393113510468

DO - 10.1177/0048393113510468

M3 - Article

VL - 44

SP - 131

EP - 150

JO - Philosophy of the Social Sciences

JF - Philosophy of the Social Sciences

SN - 0048-3931

IS - 2

ER -