Another defence of Owens's exclusivity objection to beliefs having aims

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Standard

Another defence of Owens's exclusivity objection to beliefs having aims. / Sullivan-Bissett, Ema; Noordhof, Paul.

In: Logos & Episteme, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2017, p. 147-153.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Harvard

APA

Vancouver

Author

Bibtex

@article{e282810994d1418f89dba3594075daaf,
title = "Another defence of Owens's exclusivity objection to beliefs having aims",
abstract = "David Owens objected to the truth-aim account of belief on the grounds that the putative aim of belief does not meet a necessary condition on aims, namely, that aims can be weighed against other aims. If the putative aim of belief cannot be weighed, then belief does not have an aim after all. Asbj{\o}rn Steglich-Petersen responded to this objection by appeal to other deliberative contexts in which the aim could be weighed, and we argued that this response to Owens failed for two reasons. Steglich-Petersen has since responded to our defence of Owens{\textquoteright}s objection. Here we reply to Steglich-Petersen and conclude, once again, that Owens{\textquoteright}s challenge to the truth-aim approach remains to be answered. ",
keywords = "Belief, Aim, Truth, Deliberation",
author = "Ema Sullivan-Bissett and Paul Noordhof",
year = "2017",
doi = "10.5840/logos-episteme20178110",
language = "English",
volume = "8",
pages = "147--153",
journal = "Logos & Episteme",
issn = "2069-0533",
publisher = "European Institute of Romania",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Another defence of Owens's exclusivity objection to beliefs having aims

AU - Sullivan-Bissett, Ema

AU - Noordhof, Paul

PY - 2017

Y1 - 2017

N2 - David Owens objected to the truth-aim account of belief on the grounds that the putative aim of belief does not meet a necessary condition on aims, namely, that aims can be weighed against other aims. If the putative aim of belief cannot be weighed, then belief does not have an aim after all. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen responded to this objection by appeal to other deliberative contexts in which the aim could be weighed, and we argued that this response to Owens failed for two reasons. Steglich-Petersen has since responded to our defence of Owens’s objection. Here we reply to Steglich-Petersen and conclude, once again, that Owens’s challenge to the truth-aim approach remains to be answered.

AB - David Owens objected to the truth-aim account of belief on the grounds that the putative aim of belief does not meet a necessary condition on aims, namely, that aims can be weighed against other aims. If the putative aim of belief cannot be weighed, then belief does not have an aim after all. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen responded to this objection by appeal to other deliberative contexts in which the aim could be weighed, and we argued that this response to Owens failed for two reasons. Steglich-Petersen has since responded to our defence of Owens’s objection. Here we reply to Steglich-Petersen and conclude, once again, that Owens’s challenge to the truth-aim approach remains to be answered.

KW - Belief

KW - Aim

KW - Truth

KW - Deliberation

U2 - 10.5840/logos-episteme20178110

DO - 10.5840/logos-episteme20178110

M3 - Article

VL - 8

SP - 147

EP - 153

JO - Logos & Episteme

JF - Logos & Episteme

SN - 2069-0533

IS - 1

ER -