An Argument For an End to The Analytical/Critical Divide

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An Argument For an End to The Analytical/Critical Divide. / Byrne, Gavin.

In: Jurisprudence, Vol. 4, No. 2, 07.05.2015, p. 204-234.

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@article{6f78f8f893cc4232aaec44c6e0a0f55c,
title = "An Argument For an End to The Analytical/Critical Divide",
abstract = "The perceived split between 'analytical' and 'critical' traditions in mainstream philosophy is deeply outmoded and no longer relevant. In legal philosophy it persists. This article argues for an end to any treatment of one or other tradition as radically 'other'. It traces the division to a misunderstanding of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger and its repercussions for normative legal theory. It demonstrates that a truly Heideggerian account of adjudication leads to similar normative conclusions to those of Ronald Dworkin. It further demonstrates that Heidegger's conception of 'practical philosophy' is similar to that of John Finnis. The article concludes with some remarks about the broader implications for how we treat key figures in the history of ideas in all of our theoretical engagements. ",
author = "Gavin Byrne",
note = "Forthcoming 2013, some minor amendments to be made prior to publication but otherwise accepted. ",
year = "2015",
month = may,
day = "7",
doi = "10.5235/20403313.4.2.204",
language = "English",
volume = "4",
pages = "204--234",
journal = "Jurisprudence",
issn = "2040-3313",
publisher = "Hart Publishing",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - An Argument For an End to The Analytical/Critical Divide

AU - Byrne, Gavin

N1 - Forthcoming 2013, some minor amendments to be made prior to publication but otherwise accepted.

PY - 2015/5/7

Y1 - 2015/5/7

N2 - The perceived split between 'analytical' and 'critical' traditions in mainstream philosophy is deeply outmoded and no longer relevant. In legal philosophy it persists. This article argues for an end to any treatment of one or other tradition as radically 'other'. It traces the division to a misunderstanding of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger and its repercussions for normative legal theory. It demonstrates that a truly Heideggerian account of adjudication leads to similar normative conclusions to those of Ronald Dworkin. It further demonstrates that Heidegger's conception of 'practical philosophy' is similar to that of John Finnis. The article concludes with some remarks about the broader implications for how we treat key figures in the history of ideas in all of our theoretical engagements.

AB - The perceived split between 'analytical' and 'critical' traditions in mainstream philosophy is deeply outmoded and no longer relevant. In legal philosophy it persists. This article argues for an end to any treatment of one or other tradition as radically 'other'. It traces the division to a misunderstanding of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger and its repercussions for normative legal theory. It demonstrates that a truly Heideggerian account of adjudication leads to similar normative conclusions to those of Ronald Dworkin. It further demonstrates that Heidegger's conception of 'practical philosophy' is similar to that of John Finnis. The article concludes with some remarks about the broader implications for how we treat key figures in the history of ideas in all of our theoretical engagements.

U2 - 10.5235/20403313.4.2.204

DO - 10.5235/20403313.4.2.204

M3 - Article

VL - 4

SP - 204

EP - 234

JO - Jurisprudence

JF - Jurisprudence

SN - 2040-3313

IS - 2

ER -