A second look at automatic theory of mind: Reconsidering kovács, téglás, and endress (2010)

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Authors

  • Jonathan Phillips
  • Desmond C. Ong
  • Yijing Xin
  • Samantha Williams
  • Rebecca Saxe
  • Michael C. Frank

Colleges, School and Institutes

External organisations

  • Yale University
  • Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305, USA
  • Department of Clinical Psychology
  • MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

Abstract

In recent work, Kovács, Téglás, and Endress (2010) argued that human adults automatically represented other agents’ beliefs even when those beliefs were completely irrelevant to the task being performed. In a series of 13 experiments, we replicated these previous findings but demonstrated that the effects found arose from artifacts in the experimental paradigm. In particular, the critical findings demonstrating automatic belief computation were driven by inconsistencies in the timing of an attention check, and thus do not provide evidence for automatic theory of mind in adults.

Details

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1353-1367
Number of pages15
JournalPsychological Science
Volume26
Issue number9
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2015

Keywords

  • Automaticity, False belief, Open data, Open materials, Replication, Theory of mind

ASJC Scopus subject areas