A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions

Indrajit Ray; A Kar; R Serrano

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2008.11.006

A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions

Indrajit Ray, A Kar, R Serrano

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-person Chicken game, that a social choice function that chooses any particular correlated equilibrium distribution does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity and therefore cannot be fully implemented in Nash equilibrium. Thus, no mechanism that aims to understand a correlated distribution as the unique outcome of Nash equilibrium play can be found. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	189-193
Number of pages	5
Journal	Games and Economic Behaviour
Volume	69
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.11.006
Publication status	Published - 1 May 2010

Keywords

Monotonicity
Correlated equilibrium distribution
Implementation

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10.1016/j.geb.2008.11.006

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abstract = "We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-person Chicken game, that a social choice function that chooses any particular correlated equilibrium distribution does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity and therefore cannot be fully implemented in Nash equilibrium. Thus, no mechanism that aims to understand a correlated distribution as the unique outcome of Nash equilibrium play can be found. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.",

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AU - Ray, Indrajit

AU - Kar, A

AU - Serrano, R

PY - 2010/5/1

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N2 - We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-person Chicken game, that a social choice function that chooses any particular correlated equilibrium distribution does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity and therefore cannot be fully implemented in Nash equilibrium. Thus, no mechanism that aims to understand a correlated distribution as the unique outcome of Nash equilibrium play can be found. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

AB - We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-person Chicken game, that a social choice function that chooses any particular correlated equilibrium distribution does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity and therefore cannot be fully implemented in Nash equilibrium. Thus, no mechanism that aims to understand a correlated distribution as the unique outcome of Nash equilibrium play can be found. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

KW - Monotonicity

KW - Correlated equilibrium distribution

KW - Implementation

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2008.11.006

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2008.11.006

M3 - Article

VL - 69

SP - 189

EP - 193

JO - Games and Economic Behaviour

JF - Games and Economic Behaviour

IS - 1

ER -

A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions

Abstract

Keywords

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