A defence of Owens’ Exclusivity Objection to beliefs having aims

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In this paper we argue that Steglich-Petersen’s response to Owens’ Exclusivity Objection does not work. Our first point is that the examples Steglich-Petersen uses to demonstrate his argument do not work because they employ an undefended conception of the truth aim not shared by his target (and officially eschewed by Steglich-Petersen himself). Secondly we will make the point that deliberating over whether to form a belief about p is not part of the belief forming process. When an agent enters into this process of deliberation, he has not, contra Steglich-Petersen, already adopted the truth aim with regard to p. In closing, we further suggest that proponents of the truth aim hypothesis need to focus on aim guidance, not mere aim attribution, for their approach to have explanatory utility so
underlining the significance of Owens’ argument.


Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)453-457
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Issue number2
Early online date4 Oct 2011
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2013