A Compromised Peace? The Effect of Power-Sharing Arrangements on Post-War Violence

Research output: Working paper/PreprintWorking paper

Colleges, School and Institutes


How does power-sharing between government and rebels affect the use of violence by political actors outside of peace agreements? To address this puzzle, I propose a political economy model of power-sharing and post-war violence. Power-sharing regulates elites' access to state resources and thus determines whether government and rebels can successfully suppress post-war rebellions. Personalized power-sharing gives elites privileged access to state resources, facilitates effective counter-insurgency strategies, and thus decreases post-war violence. In contrast, structural power-sharing limits elites' access to resources and their ability to prevent armed challenges resulting in higher levels of post-war violence. I test these propositions with a quantitative analysis of peace agreements in Africa and Asia signed between 1990 and 2006. The statistical findings lend support to my theoretical reasoning.

Bibliographic note

Published in SocArXiv Papers


Original languageEnglish
Publication statusPublished - 7 May 2018