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Managing War-to-Peace Transitions after Intra-State Conflicts: Configurations of Successful Peace Processes

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Abstract:

Examining 50 intra-state peace processes (1989-2006) through fsQCA, we identify three clusters of peace agreements being consistently associated with successful war-to peace transitions: 'an international approach', 'a transitional justice approach', and 'a domestic approach'. Probing these configurations at the case level shows that successful peace processes typically include packages of provisions which trigger *both* cost-increasing *and* fear-reducing mechanisms; that transitional justice provisions and education reform can trigger cost-increasing mechanisms; and that territorial self-governance can substitute effectively foreign involvement in separatist conflicts.

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Introduction

Twenty percent of all civil wars resume in the five years after the conclusion of a peace process. Over a period of ten years, this proportion increases to 40 percent (according to the most reliable evaluation of the figures reported by academic and policy sources, Suhrke and Samset 2007). Exploring the factors linked to successful war-to-peace transitions in intra-state conflicts, a growing body of literature stresses the crucial role of peace processes; negotiated settlements aiming to end violence within a state through

institutional reforms (Bell et al. 2019; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Walsh 2018). Previous research has shown that peace processes succeed only if they entrench the 'credible commitment' of conflict parties (Walter 1997) by easing mutual fears or increasing the costs of a return to violence (Mattes and Savun 2009). In particular, five sets of provisions, if embedded in a peace process, are expected to trigger this virtuous cycle: foreign involvement (Doyle and Sambanis 2000), territorial self-governance (hereafter TSG, Cederman et al. 2015; Kaufmann 1998; Tranchant 2016), power-sharing (Hartzell et al. 2001; Papagianni 2009), transitional justice (Bell 2008; Loyle and Appel 2017; Olsen et al. 2010a), and the reform of education systems (Bush and Saltarelli 2001; Thyne 2006). Despite the general recognition that these provisions "interact in complex ways" (Belmont et al. 2002, 4), we know surprisingly little about the extent to which including these elements (individually or in combination) may contribute to long-term transition out of violent conflict, and how.

To fill this gap, we concentrate on the design of peace settlements asking what configurations of provisions in peace agreements are consistently linked with successful war-to-peace transitions after intra-state conflicts. To address this question, we examine the 50 intra-state peace processes concluded between 1989 and 2006 worldwide. Taking a case-oriented multimethod approach (Beach and Rohlfing 2018; Schneider and Rohlfing 2016), we explore what (combinations of) provisions contribute to successful peace processes. We employ Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA; Ragin 2008; Schneider and Wagemann 2012), and combine this cross-case analysis with evidence from typical and deviant cases to shed light on how specific combinations of provisions trigger cost-increasing or fear-reducing mechanisms. While recognising the tremendous value of a positive notion of peace (i.e., the elimination of the structural and cultural underpinnings of violence), in this study we take an end to the fighting and collective violence over the long-term as a 'good enough' indicator of success (cf. Mac Ginty, 2013).

Our findings offer an important contribution to the study of peace settlements, and on the nature of the relationship between peace processes and successful transition out of civil war at both methodological and policy levels. Regarding the first, we find that QCA is an appropriate method to evaluate the content and outcome of peace processes. Indeed, in our analysis it is apparent that no single condition is necessary for a successful peace process; that the relationship between peace processes and successful transition out of civil war is configurational (i.e., it involves packages of provisions); and that this relationship is equifinal (because we identify three clusters of successful war-to-peace transitions characterised by an international approach, domestic approach and transitional justice approach, respectively). In terms of policy implications, additional evidence from the case narrative generates three important findings for the practice of intra-state conflict management. It shows first that successful peace processes typically address commitment problems through packages of provisions which trigger *both* cost-increasing *and* fear-reducing mechanisms. Second, we find that previous notions of cost-increasing mechanisms need to be expanded to also encompass transitional justice provisions and

education reform. Third, we confirm that specific provisions are mutually substitutable. For example, in separatist conflicts, TSG (which directly addresses the grievances of territorially concentrated groups) is an effective substitute for third-party involvement.

The article is structured as follows: The next section discusses the mechanisms leading to successful war-to-peace transitions and the provisions triggering these virtuous cycles by examining the existing literature. The third section presents the case selection, approach and data. The fourth section discusses the results of our QCA. The fifth and sixth fsections turn to the analysis of typical and deviant case studies. We conclude with the implications of this study for wider research and policy.

Peace Processes and the Termination of Violence: Three Hypotheses

Intra-state peace processes are hard to negotiate and intrinsically precarious. According to the 'credible commitment theory' of conflict management (Walter 1997) this is because conflict parties cannot commit credibly to implement and uphold peace agreements in the long term (Fearon 2004; Flores and Nooruddin 2011; Mattes and Savun 2009). However, previous research suggests that carefully designed peace settlements can address commitment problems, facilitating war-to-peace transitions and decreasing the likelihood of civil war recurrence. Specifically, Mattes and Savun (2009, 742) propose that peace processes can engender a successful war-to-peace transition by triggering one of two virtuous mechanisms: i) mitigate the mutual fears of conflict parties by imposing constraints 'on the parties' ability to renege on the peace agreement', or ii) increase the cost of fighting by making the resumption of violence costlier than the status quo for all the conflict parties.

How to Mitigate Mutual Fears or Increase the Costs of Violence

Our explanatory framework includes five provisions that are typically identified as contributing to successful war-to-peace transitions: power-sharing; transitional justice; education reform; foreign involvement; and TSG. They include measures aiming primarily at the short- to medium-term cessation of violence (power-sharing, TSG and international involvement) as well as measures for long-term conflict transformation (transitional justice and education reform). They also comprise both provisions aiming to establish elite cooperation (such as power-sharing) and initiatives targeting wider society (such as transitional justice). As such, our framework bridges the theoretical and analytical divide between proponents of conflict management (who prioritise the end of direct violence, e.g. Fortna 2003; Hartzell et al. 2001; Walter 1997), and advocates of sustainable pathways to positive peace (who stress the importance of addressing the structural and cultural underpinnings of violence, e.g. Galtung 2012; Novelli and Smith 2011; Ramirez-Barat and Duthie 2016 and to promote statebuilding, e.g. Ghani and Lockhart 2007).

Above all, our explanatory framework encompasses both provisions commonly presented as instrumental to reducing mutual fears (power-sharing, transitional justice and education reform), and

measures portrayed as key to increasing the cost of violent conflict (foreign involvement and TSG). In fact, a closer analysis of the existing literature suggests that most of these provisions, depending on the form they take, may trigger either mechanism.

The existing quantitative literature presents *power-sharing* as reducing mutual fears and thereby contributing to the resilience of peace processes in countries experiencing civil war and conflict (Hartzell et al. 2001; Mattes and Savun 2009; Walter 1997). Power-sharing describes a number of provisions entrenching the cooperation of former warring parties across state institutions including, inter alia, coalition governments, the proportional sharing of parliamentary seats and proportional civil service appointments (Binningsbø 2013). An important strand of research suggests that over the very long-term power-sharing may cement the cleavages underpinning conflict (Horowitz 2013; Roeder and Rotchild 2005). However, there is widespread agreement that in the short- to medium-term power-sharing reduces mutual fears by encouraging the cooperation of former enemies and giving group elites a stake in the success of the settlement (McCulloch and McGarry 2017). Recent research also suggests that power-sharing engenders a specific political economy of patronage, which may increase the cost of a resumption of violence (Haass and Ottmann 2020). Regardless of the specific virtuous mechanism triggered, Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) convincingly argue that peace processes that institutionalise power-sharing along multiple dimensions – including the political, military and economic realms – are particularly successful.

Transitional justice provisions also impose important constraints 'on the parties' ability to renege on the peace agreement' (Mattes and Savun 2009, 342) by attempting to reform abusive institutions, recover lost truths, provide justice for victims, repair harm to individuals and communities, and prevent future human rights violations. Whereas power-sharing focuses on elite accommodation, transitional justice processes seek to (re)create or invigorate connections between citizens – particularly survivors of atrocity – and their societies, by giving life to four core rights: to truth, justice, repair, and non-recurrence. Transitional justice has long become accepted as a core part of a healthy transition towards democracy (EU Council 2015; UN Secretary-General 2004, 2010). However, only recently have comprehensive efforts been made to assess both its role in peace processes and its impact on sustainable peace (Baker and Obradovic-Wochnik 2016; Bell 2008; Grodsky 2009; Loyle and Appel 2017; Olsen et al. 2010b; Sriram et al. 2009; Yakinthou and Croeser 2016). These efforts have generated a more holistic approach to transitional justice, encompassing also provisions which increase the costs of conflict recurrence (such as security sector reform and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration). They have also uncovered the ambiguous impact of transitional justice initiatives when they disproportionately benefit a particular group of elites at the expense of the population, or of other groups (Kiss 2007; Subotic 2014).

Similarly to transitional justice provisions, *education reform* affects wider processes of societal reconciliation rather than focusing on elite accommodation. This is because education systems are

deeply embedded in patterns of violence, injustice, and exclusion motivating and sustaining violent conflict (Dunlop, 2019; Smith 2010). Identifying education as central to inter-cultural dialogue and peace, UN agencies have led a global commitment to provide quality formal education for all children (UN General Assembly 2015; World Education Forum 2000). An existing body of literature echoes this policy approach, suggesting that education reforms can help entrench peace and provide short- and long-term dividends to the wider population (Dupuy 2009; Novelli and Smith 2011; Thyne 2006). Advocates claim that expanding access to education for formerly marginalised groups can help redress some of the grievances that led to civil war, making a relapse into violence less likely (Ishiyama and Breuning 2012; Ramirez-Barat and Duthie 2016; Thyne 2006).

F*oreign involvement* has also been identified as an effective strategy to increase the costs of relapse into conflict. Positive international pressure contributes to successful war-to-peace transition by signalling external commitment to a peace process and providing additional security guarantees that increase the cost of resumption of violence for all the conflict parties (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). However, foreign actors are involved in peace processes with a wide range of capacities (from monitoring ceasefires, to providing aid or technical assistance, to exerting direct influence in governance and peacekeeping) (Fontana et al. Under Review). In these capacities, qualitative studies have suggested that third parties may also contribute to the reduction of mutual fears by, for example, driving the implementation of transitional justice provision (Bell 2008; Newman 2002). The critical literature, however, underscores that foreign involvement may discourage local ownership of a peace process (Donais 2009; Lemay-Hebert 2009; Westendorf 2018).

Finally, *territorial self-governance* (TSG) encompasses autonomy, decentralisation and federation – individually or in complex multi-level designs (Wolff 2013). In the medium term, TSG makes the resumption of violence costlier than the status quo for all the conflict parties by guaranteeing the security of territorially-concentrated groups, ensuring balanced representation of minorities and allowing for some self-rule (Tranchant 2016; Wolff 2012). Over time, TSG is also deemed to mitigate mutual fears, first and foremost the fear of ethnic cleansing (Kaufmann 1998).

Three Hypotheses on the Design of Successful Peace Processes

As described above, existing research has largely focused on the individual impact of each of the five provisions on mitigating intra-state violence. Despite some studies highlighting negative long-term effects, most evidence points at a positive association between power-sharing, transitional justice, education reform, foreign involvement, and TSG and successful war-to-peace transitions. In contrast, there is less systematic attention to examining peace processes as configurational packages of provisions that 'interact in complex ways' (Belmont et al. 2002, 4), with three important exceptions.

First, prior research has shown that there is no silver bullet to end violent intra-state conflicts. In other words, a successful peace process may be achieved through various provisions, without a single

indispensable instrument. We therefore expect to find that no provision is necessary for the successful transitions to peace.

Second, one strand of literature, mainly rooted in qualitative case studies, suggests that provisions may strengthen each other when combined. For example, some recommend combining power-sharing with transitional justice or TSG into what O'Leary (2005, 35) calls 'complex consociations'. Others see TSG as a 'natural complement' to power-sharing (Wolff 2012, 44). Some suggest that the positive impact of transitional justice is enhanced by power-sharing (McAuliffe 2017) and education reforms (Ramirez-Barat and Duthie 2016). Others point out that education reforms that introduce mother-tongue education for linguistic minorities are particularly beneficial alongside TSG (Fontana 2017), while changes to educational management and financing may help to embed and to legitimise nascent power-sharing institutions (Fontana 2016). Finally, some argue that foreign involvement benefits from robust transitional justice provisions (Bell 2008; Newman 2002) while others suggest supplementing it with power-sharing in 'a mixture of force and institution' (Walter 1997, 361). Against this backdrop, we expect to identify configurational patterns, i.e., packages of provisions which contribute to a successful peace process *in combination*.

Third, studies such as Mattes and Savun (2009) suggest that the five provisions included in our analytic framework may be mutually substitutable. Specifically, the absence of foreign involvement may be mitigated by the inclusion of other provisions that increase the costs of relapse into civil war. We hence expect the relationship between peace processes and war-to-peace transitions to be equifinal, meaning that multiple packages of provisions are associated with an end to violent conflict, with different cases being covered by different explanatory pathways.

Research Design

Population of Peace Processes

Our study is based on 50 intra-state peace processes (see Figure 1).[i] This is the entire population of intra-state peace processes concluded between 1989 and 2003. To identify our cases, we examined the new dataset of 'Political Agreements in Internal Conflicts' (PAIC), which is the largest existing dataset of post-Cold War intra-state political agreements. We selected all the peace processes concluded between 1989 and 2006. The end of the Cold War marks an increasing frequency of violent intra-state conflicts, improved stability of negotiated peace processes, and growing attention to transitional justice and education reforms. We set the cut-off date at 2006 because ten years of stability (2006-2016) allow for the implementation and embedding of transitional justice and education reforms (Joshi et al. 2015). Peace processes that survive for ten years can also be considered as a medium- to long-term success (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003). Next, we selected the most recent peace process addressing each conflict

in the PAIC dataset.[ii] This allows us to avoid overlaps in the outcome while retaining the regional and case variation.

Figure 1: Cases and Start Dates of the Relevant Peace Process



Approach

We make use of QCA to identify associations between peace process provisions and successful war-to-peace transition. As the Appendix explains in more detail, QCA models the associations between explanatory factors and an outcome of interest through set relations that can be interpreted in terms of necessity and sufficiency.[iii] QCA is particularly suitable for our study because it accommodates those configurational and equifinal causal patterns that we expect to characterise the relationship between intra-state peace processes and ultimate war-to-peace transitions. It therefore allows us to provide the first robust exploration of how power-sharing, transitional justice, education reform, foreign intervention and TSG combine in successful intra-state peace processes.

However, set relations do not *per se* imply a causal relationship. To probe the cross-case findings produced by our QCA, we therefore examine typical and deviant cases of peace processes. Typical cases exhibit both a sufficient combination of peace agreement provisions and a successful peace process, so they shed light on how specific (combinations of) provisions trigger cost-increasing or fear-reducing mechanisms. Deviant cases in kind are examples of failed peace processes, which nonetheless display a sufficient combination of provisions; here we would expect to see successful war-to-peace transitions, but we do not. A closer look at these cases provides clues as to the context under which these provisions fail to trigger a virtuous cycle leading to successful war-to-peace transitions.

Examining typical cases and deviant cases in kind allows us to generate some initial findings on the linkages between (individual and combined) peace process provisions and successful transition out of civil war via cost-increasing and/or fear-reducing mechanisms. We also examine some deviant cases in coverage, i.e., peace processes that are not explained by our explanatory model. These cases provide valuable insights about additional conditions relevant for war-to-peace transition omitted from our explanatory framework; first and foremost the issue of implementation.

Data

In order to perform the QCA, we calibrated the raw data into sets (Ragin 2008; Schneider and Wagemann 2012). In the present analysis, we use fuzzy sets that range between 0 (fully out of the set) and 1 (fully in the set), and partial set memberships in between. Table 1 summarises the measures and calibration for the outcome and the explanatory conditions. As outlined above, we hypothesise that all five sets of provisions contribute positively to successful war-to-peace transitions.

Table 1: Operationalisation, Calibration and Theoretical Expectations

Outcome/Condition (Acronym)	***Raw Indicator***	***Calibration Thresholds***				***Theoretical Expectations***
		fully in 1.0	***cross-over 0.5***		***fully out 0.0***	
Successful War-to-Peace Transition (SWPT)	Average battle-related deaths (brd) over 10 years (UCDP 2016)	0 brd	24.9 brd		999.9 brd	---
		fully in 1.0	***more in 0.75***	***more out 0.25***	***fully out 0.0***	
Multidimensional Power-Sharing (MPS)	Provisions on power-sharing across political, military, economy, judiciary, civil service arenas (PAIC, ps_index)	3.5 or higher	2.0 - 3.0	1.5 - 0.5	0	+
Robust Transitional Justice (RTJ)	Provisions on justice, truth, reparations, guarantees of non-recurrence, DDR, security sector reform, and refugee return (PAIC, tj_index)	3.0 or higher	2.5 - 2.0	1.5 - 1.0	0.5 - 0	+
Multidimensional Educational Reforms (MEDU)	Provisions on reforms of curricula, access, management and finance (PAIC, edu_index)	2.0 or higher	1.5 - 1.0	0.5	0	+
Extensive Foreign Involvement (EFI)	Provisions on monitoring, implementation, direct intervention (PAIC, fi_index)	3.0 or higher	2.5 - 2.0	1.5 - 1.0	0.5 - 0	+
Robust Territorial Self-Governance (RTSG)	Provisions on federation, autonomy, decentralisation (PAIC, tsg_index)	1.5 or higher	1.0	0.5	0	+

The outcome set *successful war-to-peace transition (SWPT)* is based on a minimal definition of successful peace processes rooted in a negative concept of peace. In this study, we define 'success' as the absence of relapses into violent conflict in the ten years after the conclusion of a peace process measured via the mean number of battle-related deaths over ten years. Based on well-established indicators (Melander et al. 2016), *SWPT* is then directly calibrated into a fuzzy set with values ranging between 0 (an average of 1.000 battle deaths per year or a full non-success) and 1 (zero battle deaths per year, on average). The 0.5 cut-off point marking the qualitative difference between a successful and non-successful peace process is set at an average of 24.9 battle deaths per year, just below the threshold defining the occurrence of violent conflict.

To operationalize the five sets of peace process provisions identified above, we draw on indicators compiled in the PAIC dataset, which codes peace processes along 90 fine-grained variables across the five dimensions power-sharing, transitional justice, cultural reforms (including education reform), foreign involvement, and TSG. The following paragraphs detail the operationalization of the five explanatory factors.

PAIC systematises the concept of *power-sharing* as encompassing 'provisions for the representation and/or participation of conflict groups in state and non-state institutions' (Fontana et al. Under Review). Therefore, we conceptualize power-sharing along multiple dimensions covering the political, military, economic, judiciary and civil service arenas in order to capture the full breadth of potential power-sharing instruments embedded in a peace settlement. In doing so, we deliberately exclude the territorial dimension, which is captured through TSG. We agree that power-sharing is most effective if embedded in multiple realms, so we aggregate provisions for power-sharing in the political, military, economic, judiciary and civil service arenas into an additive index of multidimensional power-sharing (*ps_index*) ranging from 0 to 7.5.

Our definition of *transitional justice* as 'processes and mechanisms associated with a society's attempts to come to terms with a legacy of abuse' (Fontana et al. Under Review) reflects a recent shift towards holistic approaches to transitional justice (Arthur & Yakinthou 2018). In this view, transitional justice encompasses a broad set of instruments: guarantees of non-recurrence (such as lustration, judicial and institutional reform); right to justice (as with criminal prosecutions); right to reparations (including economic and social reform); right to truth (with, for example, truth-seeking initiatives); security sector reform and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR); and refugee return. These dimensions are combined into an index of robust transitional justice (*tj_index*) ranging between 0 and 9.

Education reform, defined as provisions for the reform of the formal education system, is key to tackling the culture of violence underpinning intra-state conflicts. The existing research underscores three main types of education reforms that may impact on the resilience of peace processes: changes in curricular

content; changes in educational management and/or funding; and the expansion of access to education to previously marginalized groups (Bush and Saltarelli 2001). We aggregate these three dimensions into an index of multidimensional education reform (*edu_index*) ranging between 0 and 4.5.

In an intra-state peace process, we conceptualise *foreign involvement* as 'provisions for assistance and support by a third party' (Fontana et al. Under Review). Specifically, we build an aggregate index from PAIC's variables on monitoring and verification; implementation assistance; and direct intervention (as with peacekeeping operations and/or direct governance). The index of extensive foreign involvement (*efi_index*) ranges between 0 and 4.5.

Finally, the concept of TSG comprises 'provisions for the redistribution of competences and authority to a sub-state level' (Fontana et al. Under Review). Following Wolff (2013) and the PAIC dataset variables, we record three complementary approaches to TSG: federation; autonomy; and decentralization. The resulting additive index of robust TSG (*tsg_index*) ranges between 0 and 4.5.

Configurations of Provisions in Successful Peace Processes

We start the QCA searching for potential necessary conditions. Our analysis shows that no peace agreement provision (individually or in combination) is necessary for successful war-to-peace transitions.[iv] In other words, as we expected and in line with existing research, no provision (or combination thereof) is indispensable for a resilient intra-state peace process.

Table 2: Truth Table for Successful War-to-Peace Transitions

Cases	Conditions					Consistency	PRI	Sufficient
	EFI	**RTSG**	**MPS**	**RTJ**	**MEDU**			
LB89	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	TRUE
MZ92	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	TRUE
ID05	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	TRUE
BI06, CG99	1	0	0	1	0	.942	.922	TRUE
PG98	1	1	0	0	0	.932	.920	TRUE
KH91, KM03, SV90, GW98, HT92, LS99	1	0	0	0	0	.914	.898	TRUE
CI03, LR03, *TJ95*	1	0	1	1	0	.902	.846	TRUE
AO94	1	1	1	0	0	.891	.888	TRUE
AF93, DJ94, GE94, NP06, NI97	0	0	0	1	0	.891	.862	TRUE
ID99	1	0	0	0	1	.889	.883	TRUE
IN03	0	1	0	1	1	.882	.861	TRUE
GB98	0	1	1	0	1	.875	.849	TRUE
AO06, BD97, ML92	0	1	1	1	1	.861	.819	TRUE
PH01	0	1	0	0	0	.835	.789	FALSE
GT94	1	1	0	1	1	.833	.833	FALSE
CO98	0	0	0	1	1	.830	.756	FALSE
MX96, *LK02*	0	0	0	0	1	.788	.713	FALSE

MK01	1	1	1	0	1	.749	.740	FALSE
DZ96, *CF98*, *TD03*, HR95, *GE92*, IN93, MD97, NE94, *RU95*, SN04, *UG02*	0	0	0	0	0	.731	.654	FALSE
CD02, *RW92*, *SL99*	1	0	1	1	1	.690	.545	FALSE
SO04	0	1	0	0	1	.667	.607	FALSE
BA95, *SD02*	1	1	1	1	1	.658	.615	FALSE
-	0	0	1	0	0	-	-	?
-	0	0	1	0	1	-	-	?
-	0	0	1	1	0	-	-	?
-	0	1	0	1	0	-	-	?
-	0	1	1	0	0	-	-	?
-	0	1	1	1	0	-	-	?
-	1	0	0	1	1	-	-	?
-	1	0	1	0	1	-	-	?
-	1	1	0	0	1	-	-	?
-	1	1	1	1	0	-	-	?

Note: Peace processes that are not successful (~SWPT) are deviant cases and highlighted in *italics*. Configurations displaying a consistent subset relation are marked 'TRUE' (consistency cut-off at 0.85); logical remainders are marked '?'.

In a second step, we test for (combinations of) conditions sufficient for successful war-to-peace transitions (see truth table in Table 2). We adopt a high threshold of at least 0.85 consistency and 0.8 PRI due to the skewed set data in the outcome, making it more difficult for provisions to be consistently associated with the outcome. Configurations of provisions that pass the consistency threshold are treated as sufficient and thus included into the further minimisation process, resulting in the intermediate solution presented in Table 3. The model fit of the solution is satisfactory: together, the configurations provide a very consistent explanation for successful war-to-peace transitions (with a consistency score of 0.86), and show a moderately high empirical coverage (0.64).

Table 3: Results of the Sufficiency Analysis

Intermediate Solution	Overall consistency: .86 | coverage: .64		
	Consistency	*Raw Coverage*	*Unique Coverage*
Essential Prime-Implicants			
1. EFI*~MEDU	.86	.39	.04
2. RTJ*~MEDU	.85	.34	.07
3. ~EFI*MPS*RTJ	.88	.15	.01
4. ~EFI*RTSG*RTJ	.89	.13	.02
5. ~EFI*RTSG*MPS*MEDU	.89	.11	.02
Substitutable Prime-Implicants			
6.a EFI*~MPS*~RTJ	.90	.25	.02
6.b EFI*~RTSG*~RTJ	.93	.26	.03
6.c EFI*~RTSG*~MPS	.91	.27	.02

Note: We apply the standard notational system in QCA: * for the logical AND, ~ refers to the absence of a condition.

At first sight, the combination of provisions in successful peace processes appears extremely complex. The model consists of six combinations of provisions that are strongly connected with successful peace processes, and that cover 23 out of 32 cases of successful war-to-peace transitions.[v] For the last

configuration of provisions, multiple substitutable terms exist (6a-6c) (Baumgartner and Thiem 2017; Schneider and Wagemann 2012). Yet, a closer look reveals that the six configurations show a strong systematic overlap, which is why the solution can be further simplified as illustrated in Figure 2. Through this further simplification, it becomes apparent that the successful peace processes cluster into three groups. Each cluster displays a distinct package of provisions that are sufficient for a successful war-to-peace transition.[vi]

Figure 2: Three Clusters of Peace Processes



We label the first cluster '*international approach*', because all peace processes share extensive foreign involvement irrespective (or in the absence) of other provisions.[vii] It covers 13 of the 32 successful war-to-peace transitions in our cases, corroborating the existing literature's emphasis on foreign involvement as a key factor in conflict management (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). However, this cluster also contains three deviant peace processes: Cambodia, Burundi, and Tajikistan each experienced continuing violence despite including provisions for extensive foreign involvement.

The second cluster includes peace processes with robust transitional justice provisions. We therefore label it '*transitional justice approach*'. It describes eight out of 32 successful war-to-peace transitions, but also includes three deviant cases of continuing violence (Afghanistan, Burundi, and Tajikistan). As shows, this cluster intersects with the international approach, confirming the literature suggesting that

in selected contexts international involvement may facilitate steps towards transitional justice and vice versa (Bell 2008; Newman 2002; UN Secretary General 2010).

We call the third cluster '*domestic approach*', as it pertains to peace processes which do not explicitly include provisions for extensive foreign involvement but instead are characterised by different combinations addressing domestic factors. This cluster describes six successful peace processes and no deviant cases. The '*domestic approach*' describes a unique set of cases with no overlap with the other two clusters (see Figure 2). This suggests that it may be particularly suited to a specific type of cases, which are fundamentally different from those addressed through the international approach and the transitional justice approach, as will be further explored below.

Overall, the QCA findings confirm that no individual peace agreement provision is necessary for successful war-to-peace transition, but rather different designs are associated with the end of violent conflict. The presence of three distinct clusters of successful peace processes also underscores that some specific packages of peace process provisions do have added value. This complexity is most evident for the domestic cluster, which is unique in the distinct set of cases it describes. However, the overlap between the international and transitional justice clusters also suggests that these approaches may be complementary. Finally, the domestic cluster corroborates that some (packages of) provisions are mutually substitutable. In the third cluster, the absence of foreign involvement is mitigated by other provisions. In particular, the domestic approach exhibits two beneficial combinations of provisions: robust transitional justice combined with either multidimensional power-sharing or robust TSG; and TSG, power-sharing and education reform. We next probe the plausibility of these three clusters in the underlying cases.

Three Approaches to War-to-Peace Transition

It is widely accepted that provisions for foreign involvement help transition out of conflict by making the resumption of violence costlier than the status quo for all the conflict parties. A close examination of those cases uniquely covered by the *international approach* cluster (see **Error! Reference source not found.**) underscores three ways in which foreign involvement increases the cost of violence.

First, peace processes designate international actors with crucial military responsibilities, including responsibilities for peacekeeping. For example, in Guinea Bissau's peace process, international actors are tasked with deploying military observers and inter-positional forces, monitoring the withdrawal of foreign troops and guaranteeing the border with Senegal. Similarly, in El Salvador's peace process, the UN is in charge of supervising the ceasefire.

Second, foreign involvement triggers cost-increasing mechanisms by establishing and upholding a timeline for political transition. In El Salvador, the UN is responsible for public order in the event of a

crisis. In Haiti, the UN was in charge of convening the political dialogue and of assisting the return of the President. Most obviously, in East Timor the UN Secretary-General is granted ultimate responsibility to decide whether to hold an independence referendum, and the UN mission is to support and verify the electoral process. Provisions for direct reporting to the UN Secretary-General or the UN General Assembly (embedded in the peace processes of El Salvador, Haiti and East Timor) also enhance the credibility of political transitions in the eyes of all the conflict parties.

Third, foreign involvement increases the costs of violence by offering financial incentives to comply with the peace process through international aid and assistance. This includes the creation of a UN Security Council trust fund to collect contributions for the independence referendum in East Timor, as well as emergency assistance and the promise to lift of the existing embargo and sanctions in post-election Haiti. The availability of concrete dividends of peace, in the form of financial assistance, is a powerful incentive for continued participation in the process for all the conflict parties and their constituencies.

In sum, the within-case evidence in this cluster confirms the crucial function of foreign involvement in increasing the costs of violence, thereby overcoming commitment problems. However, a deeper look at these peace processes shows that international involvement may also play an important role in triggering fear-reducing mechanisms. For example, international actors are often in charge of initiating and overseeing transitional justice provisions. Most apparently, in El Salvador the UN was in charge of promoting and monitoring human rights standards; collecting allegations of abuse, investigating and redressing them; and monitoring and assisting the work of the truth commission. This finding may explain the substantial overlap between the international and transitional justice approaches ( ). It suggests that foreign involvement is particularly beneficial when combined with fear-reducing provisions, such as measures to promote transitional justice. This echoes debates within the critical transitional justice and peacebuilding literatures, which accept that international involvement helps in the short-term, but also highlight its problematic long-term effects (Lemay-Hebert 2009; Olsen et.al. 2010a; Sharp 2014; Yakinthou 2018).

Finally, the unique deviant case in this cluster, Cambodia, sheds light on the conditions under which provisions for foreign involvement fail to put an end to violent conflicts. In this case, critical implementation gaps led to a weak rule of law and flawed checks-and-balances (USIP 2017). This suggests that the relationship between the text of peace processes and war-to-peace transition is necessarily mediated (at least in part) by implementation of these pacts (Joshi et al. 2015).

Table 4: International Approach - Typical and Deviant Cases

Typical Cases		**Deviant Cases**	
Unique to this Cluster	*Shared with TJ Cluster*	*Unique to this Cluster*	*Shared with TJ Cluster*

Comoros (2003), El Salvador (1990), Guinea Bissau (1998), Haiti (1992), Lesotho (1999), Mozambique (1992), Papua New Guinea (1998), Angola (1994), Indonesia (1999)	Congo (1999), Indonesia (2005), Ivory Coast (2003), Liberia (2003)	Cambodia (1991)	Burundi (2006), Tajikistan (1995)

The '*transitional justice approach*' corroborates recent findings that post-conflict justice enhances the stability and success of peace processes (e.g., Loyle and Appel 2017). Peace processes belonging to this cluster (see Table 5) combine provisions increasing the cost of violence (such as development aid to conflict-affected areas and rehabilitation programmes for former combatants and affected populations) with measures to reduce fear (such as DDR and truth commissions). Nicaragua's 1997 peace process is notable in this sense: it includes a commitment to redevelop conflict-affected areas, provisions for truth-seeking, initiatives for dialogue forums, extensive DDR, and governmental commitment to facilitate trials and investigations of human rights abuses. In the case of Nepal, the costs of violence are increased through refugee and IDP return alongside rehabilitation programmes for the war's most vulnerable victims, including women and former child combatants. These are combined with fear-reducing measures, such as a truth and reconciliation commission. Even where truth-seeking is not mapped, as in Djibouti, refugee return and reparations are combined with fear-reducing measures such as DDR.

Afghanistan, Burundi and Tajikistan are deviant cases in this cluster. Focusing on Afghanistan, which is the unique deviant case, we can derive some insights on when transitional justice measures fail to sustain a successful peace process. Afghanistan's 1993 peace agreement includes both fear-reducing mechanisms (the re-training and reintegration of armed and security forces) and cost-increasing mechanisms (a fund to support the families and dependants of victims of the war). However, these instruments are heavily combatant-focused, and largely exclude victims and the broader society. This suggests that successful peace processes need to increase the costs of conflict and reduce fears for all actors involved, including victims and broader society, in line with Mattes and Savun's (2009) argument.

Table 5: Transitional Justice Approach - Typical and Deviant Cases

Typical Cases		**Deviant Cases**	
Unique to this Cluster	*Shared with International Cluster*	*Unique to this Cluster*	*Shared with International Cluster*
Djibuti (1994), Georgia (1994), Nepal (2006), Nicaragua (1997)	Congo (1999), Indonesia (2005), Ivory Coast (2003), Liberia (2003)	Afghanistan (1993)	Burundi (2006), Tajikistan (1995)

The '*domestic approach*' finally describes six cases without any overlap with the other two clusters. Immediately it becomes apparent that this approach is particularly appropriate to address separatist strife (all cases are separatist conflicts, with the exception of Lebanon; see Table 6). We focus on the cases of Angola, Bangladesh, Mali and India, which conform fully to the domestic approach, to explore

how these pacts trigger cost-increasing or fear-reducing mechanisms.[viii] Most obviously, peace processes increase the costs of violent struggle by granting TSG to the region affected by conflict. For example, Angola's Cabinda province and Bangladesh's Chittagong Hills are granted local management of funding and tax revenues, and Mali's Northern provinces are provided with more control over local authorities and development capacities. The costs of violence are also increased through transitional justice and education reforms, which redress the socio-economic grievances that led to conflict. These measures include free education, scholarships, financial reparations measures or designated quotas for people from conflict-affected areas (as in the Chittagong Hills, Bangladesh and Mali); mapping the available land and transferring land to peasants, (in the Chittagong Hills); or establishing development funds for conflict-affected areas (in Mali). TSG and education reforms appear as particularly effective instruments to mitigate the absence of foreign involvement in these contexts, as they directly respond to the separatist grievances of the conflict parties.

It is notable that provisions increasing the cost of fighting are always combined with measures aiming to reduce fears in this cluster of peace processes. Fear-reducing mechanisms are triggered by three sets of provisions. First, TSG is complemented with power-sharing across multiple dimensions at the local and regional levels (as with the Chittagong Regional Council, Cabinda's mixed military commission, the Chittagong Hills' commission on land disputes, Mali's ceasefire implementation and truth commissions and its designation of seats for internally displaced persons in the regional and national assembly). Second, these peace processes establish mechanisms to investigate past abuse and prevent its recurrence, most obviously through truth commissions but also through the retraining and integration of ex-combatants into existing or reformed army and security forces (as with the extensive provisions for DDR in Cabinda and Mali). Third, all these peace processes address the cultural grievances of populations involved in violent conflict through education reform, ranging from expanding primary and secondary education (in Cabinda and Mali), to transferring educational decision-making to local and regional actors. This responds directly to the grievances of conflict groups, and provides a potential peace dividend for the affected populations.

This overview reconfirms that the relationship between peace processes and successful war-to-peace transitions is characterised by complex and equifinal relationships. Most apparently, the absence of extensive foreign involvement can be mitigated by alternative measures, including TSG, but only in the case of separatist conflicts. Moreover, the within-case narratives above suggest that peace processes are particularly effective when they include provisions triggering both cost-increasing and fear-reducing mechanisms. Specifically, TSG appear a very effective 'natural complement' (Wolff 2012, 44) to measures reducing mutual fear (such as power-sharing, transitional justice and education reform) as suggested by the qualitative literature on power-sharing and TSG (O'Leary 2005; Wolff 2012). As in other clusters, cases in the domestic cluster show that most of the provisions, depending on the form they take, may trigger either cost-increasing or fear-reducing mechanisms.

Table 6: Domestic Approach - Typical and Deviant Cases

Typical Cases		Deviant Cases	
Unique to this Cluster	*Shared with Other Clusters*	*Unique to this Cluster*	*Shared with Other Clusters*
Angola (2006), Bangladesh (1997), India (2003), Lebanon (1989), Mali (1992), United Kingdom (1998)			

Unexplained Cases of Successful War-to-Peace Transition

As mentioned, our QCA model explains 23 out of 32 cases of successful war-to-peace transitions. The nine unexplained cases (deviant cases in coverage) are: Bosnia and Herzegovina (BA95); Guatemala (GT94); Croatia (HR95); India (IN93); Moldova (MD97); North Macedonia (MK01); Mexico (MX96); Niger (NE94); and Senegal (SN04). Can we draw any implications with regard to omitted conditions from the successful peace processes that are not part of any of the identified clusters?

The most surprising unexplained cases are Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sudan, two contexts in which peace processes provided for extensive foreign involvement, robust TSG, multidimensional power-sharing, robust transitional justice, and multidimensional education reform. In other words, in these two cases we would strongly expect success. However, their outcomes were very different – the end of violent conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the continuation of violence in Sudan. The existing literature suggests that the robust international commitment to Bosnia and Herzegovina's peace process as exemplified by the Bonn powers of the Office of the High Representative was a decisive factor in upholding stability and preventing a relapse into violence (Bieber 2006; Pinkerton 2016). Also, quantitative data suggests that the agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina was implemented more extensively than Sudan's peace process (Peace Accords Matrix, 2020). These factors – related to the implementation rather than the design of the peace process – were absent in Sudan, where the international community was criticised for its minimal and, at times, detrimental involvement (Aegis Trust et al. 2011; Carolan 2020; Kupferberg and Wolff 2015; Woodrow Wilson International Centre 2008).

A similar pattern can be observed in peace processes that do not include substantial provisions across any of our five conditions. Here, we would expect failed war-to-peace transitions, but actually several peace processes resulted in substantial reduction of violence (as in Croatia, India (1993), Moldova, Niger, and Senegal). For example, Croatia's 1995 Erdut Agreement stands out as a successful case where despite the apparent lack of detail, the international community played a crucial role in bringing the parties to the table, as well as mediating and incentivising implementation (Galbraith 1997). Other non-successful peace processes in this configuration such as the Central African Republic, Chad, and Chechnya lacked similarly positive external pressures guiding their consistent implementation.

Taken together, the successful cases of war-to-peace transition that are not part of any of the identified clusters underline the importance of strong international commitment to peace processes and underscore the role of robust implementation of peace agreement provisions, indicating a substantial gap between *de jure* and *de facto* aspects of peace processes. Whilst this study has focused on *de jure* peace processes, it would be interesting to further probe the relevance of the international approach, domestic approach and transitional justice approach, focusing on the implementation of the provisions mapped in selected typical peace processes. This exercise would be particularly important because of the apparent 'disconnect [in peace agreements] between the desirability of an objective… and the feasibility of its implementation, as measured by the capacity of the government and the international community' (Ghani and Lockhart 2007, 296).

A preliminary examination of the available large-scale implementation data suggests that the comprehensive agreements associated with typical cases of successful peace processes are more likely to have been implemented than other comprehensive agreements. Considering the 28 comprehensive agreements included both in our analysis and in the Peace Accords Matrix (2020) it becomes apparent that about 70% of the comprehensive agreements associated with typical peace processes (successful and belonging to one of the three clusters) have an implementation score above 75%, compared with less than 40% of non-typical peace processes. Data in the Peace Accords Matrix (2020) also indicates that the focus of implementation is consistent with three clusters focusing on international, transitional justice and domestic provisions. The provisions for third-party intervention were almost fully implemented in all uniquely typical cases belonging to the international approach,[ix] as were the transitional justice provisions of uniquely typical cases belonging to the transitional justice approach.[x] The implementation of specific provisions is less consistent in the typical cases belonging to the domestic approach, with only half of the available cases displaying extensive implementation of the relevant provisions for TSG, power-sharing, transitional justice and education reform.[xi]

Conclusion

In this study, we examined the most recent intra-state peace processes concluded between 1989 and 2006 worldwide with the goal to identify which (packages of) peace agreement provisions are consistently associated with successful war-to-peace transitions. The results of the QCA confirm that the relationship between peace processes and the end of violent intra-state conflict is configurational and equifinal. Specifically, we identified three clusters of provisions strongly linked to successful peace processes: an international approach, a transitional justice approach, and a domestic approach. Our findings corroborate the existing literature in identifying extensive foreign involvement as being particularly beneficial for long-term transition out of violent conflict in a wide set of cases. In its absence, we find that a combination of multiple domestic-focused provisions (TSG, power-sharing,

transitional justice and education reform) serve as a substitute in explaining the end of violence. Finally, transitional justice provisions, often portrayed as a complementary mechanism, may in fact be key to transitions in some intra-state conflicts.

A closer look at the underlying cases reveals a series of important implications for the theory and practice of intra-state conflict management. First, we show that successful peace processes typically include packages of provisions that *both* increase the costs of violence *and* mitigate mutual fear. It appears that the *combination* of cost-increasing and fear-reducing measures is key to overcoming the commitment problems at the heart of civil war resumption.

In some cases, both of these mechanisms are triggered through a single set of provisions. For example, in El Salvador, Haiti and East Timor, the involvement of foreign actors *both* increased the costs of violence by way of their military responsibilities, their upholding of a political transition, and their provision of aid; *and* mitigated mutual fear, for instance, by promoting transitional justice provisions. In Nepal and Nicaragua, transitional justice was particularly beneficial because it triggered both cost-increasing *and* fear-reducing mechanisms through a combination of development programmes, truth-seeking, and DDR, as well as engaging all conflict actors, including governments, combatants, victims and broader society (as confirmed by the deviant case of Afghanistan). This validates the emphasis of the qualitative literature on fine-grained and case-based analysis.

In contrast, in the domestic cluster, which included cases such as Cabinda, the Chittagong Hills and Mali, different sets of provisions are combined to increase the cost of violence – most typically, through TSG – *and* reduce mutual fears through power-sharing, education reform and transitional justice. Our work therefore helps identify complementary provisions that are beneficial to war-to-peace transitions, such as TSG, power-sharing and education reform (in the domestic cluster, corroborating, for instance, Fontana 2017; O'Leary 2005; Wolff 2012); foreign involvement and transitional justice (in the overlap between the international and transitional justice approaches, see also Bell 2008; Newman 2002; UN Secretary General 2010).

Second, our case-based analysis suggests expanding previous notions of the provisions triggering cost-increasing mechanisms to also encompass some transitional justice measures, as well as education reform (see also Shah 2019). As mentioned, most of the provisions examined here may mitigate fear or increase the costs of violence depending on the specific form they take in the peace accord. Thus, in cases such as the Chittagong Hills and Mali, peace processes included regional development programmes, incentives for refugee and IDP return, and scholarships and free education; provisions explicitly designed to benefit victims and people from the conflict-affected areas. We therefore can argue that specific measures associated with robust transitional justice and multidimensional education reforms may strengthen peace processes where extensive foreign involvement is not possible.

Third, the within-case analysis confirms that certain peace process provisions may be mutually interchangeable, as proposed by Mattes and Savun (2009). Specifically, in separatist conflicts (domestic cluster), extensive foreign involvement can be substituted effectively by TSG, a mechanism that directly addresses the grievances of territorially concentrated groups. This validates grievance-based explanations of civil war (Gurr 2000, 2012; Cederman et al. 2015), and underscores that flexible and locally appropriate pathways out of violence need to tackle the specific grievances of conflict parties. In this sense, our findings suggest that the 'credible commitment model' of civil war management should be adjusted to account for context-specific grievances.

Our findings, and their implications for the design of future peace agreements, should be further investigated and tested through systematic large-scale studies and detailed case analyses to determine where, when and how successful war-to-peace transitions occur. Indeed, a series of questions remain to be answered. The analysis of unexplained cases teased out some crucial questions around the issue of implementation. Moreover, generally, implementation is based on the most recent peace process. However, in some cases (such as Burundi) implementation is based on a previous accord which remains most prominent and best known (the 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement). As a result, probing the relevance of the three clusters against the most prominent political agreement through an in-depth qualitative study would further advance this research agenda. Related to this point, a more systematic test of the causal mechanisms for each cluster (including analysis on the constituencies they impact, their sequencing and their potentially asymmetric effect on conflict actors) is essential to promote better, evidence-based thinking on how to mitigate intra-state conflict.

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Endnotes

[i] We define peace processes as packages of peace agreements which *together* are intended to ameliorate the same conflict situation. Thus, each agreement in the peace process explicitly refers to the others in its text and they all address the same

conflict (as identified by the relevant UCDP conflict ID). As a consequence, a peace process may encompass a variety of substantial accords, including ceasefires, partial agreements and/or comprehensive agreements. It may also encompass agreements signed between the government and different rebel groups/splinter groups, as long as they all aim to address the same conflict situation and explicitly refer to each other in the text. The start date of each peace process is the date of conclusion of its first agreement. A list of all the peace processes (including their constituent agreements) is provided in the Appendix (section 1).

[ii] By selecting the most recent peace process we do not consider provisions detailed in other (previous) phases of the peace negotiations. Due to the lack of data on the outcome measure (battle-related deaths), we had to exclude the peace processes in South Africa, the Solomon Islands and Togo from our analysis.

[iii] For a brief introduction to the technical details and analytic protocol of QCA, see the Appendix (section 2). We refer the interested reader to textbooks (e.g. Ragin 2008; Schneider and Wagemann 2012) for a detailed exploration of QCA. All analyses were conducted in R using the packages 'QCA' (Dusa 2018), and 'Set Methods' (Medzihorsky et al. 2018). Replication material and data are provided in the supplementary appendix and files.

[iv] The results presented in section 4.1 in the Supplemental Appendix show that no (combination of) condition passes the 0.9 consistency threshold commonly accepted as the benchmark for a consistent superset relation.

[v] The nine unexplained cases (deviant cases in coverage) are: Bosnia and Herzegovina (BA95); Guatemala (GT94); Croatia (HR95); India (IN93); Moldova (MD97); North Macedonia (MK01); Mexico (MX96); Niger (NE94); and Senegal (SN04).

[vi] Robustness tests and further results from other solution strategies can be found in the Appendix (section 4 and 5). Additional analyses clustered by time and region show that the three clusters (international, transitional justice and domestic) are largely robust on the global scale and for the whole time-period covered. However, there are regional emphases on specific approaches. Details on the regional and time-clustered results are available in the Appendix (section 6) but should be approached with caution: due to the limited numbers of peace processes in each cluster, models are less stable than the overall analysis reported in this paper.

[vii] It is common in QCA for different solution terms to include both the presence and the absence (~) of explanatory factors. This reflects the fact that the presence or absence of a specific condition may impact differently depending on the wider context. We find that the absence of foreign involvement (~EFI) in the domestic approach is conceptually meaningful. In contrast, in the other two clusters, the absence of other conditions has no theoretical resonance (see Bara 2014, 702 for a similar rationale).

[viii] In contrast, Lebanon and the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland) exhibit *de facto* high levels of foreign involvement in preparing the context for negotiations, bringing conflicting parties to the negotiating table and even designing the agreements. Thus, we refrain from including them into our discussion of typical cases.

[ix] Implementation data is available for the following uniquely typical cases of the international approach: Guinea-Bissau (1998); Indonesia (1999); Mozambique (1992); Papua New Guinea (1998); Angola (1994) (Peace Accords Matrix 2020).

[x] Implementation data is available for the following uniquely typical cases of the transitional justice approach: Djibouti (1994); Nepal (2006) (Peace Accords Matrix 2020).

[xi] Implementation data is available for the following uniquely typical cases of the domestic approach: Northern Ireland (1998); Mali (1992); Lebanon (1989); Bangladesh (1997); India (2003) (Peace Accords Matrix 2020).