

# The complementary use of game theory for the circular economy

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3 **The complementary use of game theory for the circular economy: A review**  
4 **of waste management decision-making methods in civil engineering**

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11 **Highlights**

- 12 • First study to contrast five decision-making tools with game theory.
- 13 • Game theory is still undergoing consideration for use in the circular economy.
- 14 • Cooperation is a feature too often missing in waste management decision-making.
- 15 • Waste management can benefit from game theory capabilities to resolve conflict.
- 16 • An adapted waste management bargaining example shows the potential of game
- 17 theory.

18

19 **Abstract**

20 Circular economy principles aim to contribute towards sustainability and resilience through  
21 several simultaneous agendas including economic growth, social development and  
22 environmental responsibility. Stakeholders from each perspective have their own interests and  
23 priorities, which often result in conflict. There are several and varied methodologies which  
24 address the decision-making process, however in engineering spheres these techniques are  
25 usually limited to optimising resources, time or costs. Decisions that are comprehensive in  
26 scope and integrated across all affected systems are required to transition towards a circular  
27 economy, effective cross-disciplinary thinking is imperative and cooperation amongst diverse  
28 areas is essential. Game theory is a useful technique when analysing the interactions of  
29 stakeholders with multiple objectives and perspectives. This paper aims to critically review  
30 methodological approaches used in waste management practice and provide a guidance on how  
31 game theory differs from, and is complementary to, the primary decision-making tools available  
32 where cooperation is a feature too often missing. This review seeks to justify the development  
33 of game theory to complement waste management decision-making methods in civil  
34 engineering, where resource consumption and waste management is often voluminous. An  
35 application of game theory to a waste management example illustrates that this methodological  
36 approach is of complementary value. The contribution of this study to circular economy and  
37 solid waste agendas is to emphasise the capability of game theory to help facilitate conflict  
38 resolution, competition, and stakeholder consensus when capturing multiple (sometimes  
39 conflicting) values in line with circular economy principles.

40

41 **Keywords:** circular economy; civil engineering; cooperation; decision-making; game theory;  
42 solid waste

43

44 **List of abbreviations**

ABM	Agent-Based Modelling	GT	Game Theory
CBA	Cost Benefit Analysis	IAM	Integrated Assessment Modelling
CE	Circular Economy	IS	Industrial Symbiosis
CO2	Carbon Dioxide	LCA	Life Cycle Assessment
C&D	Construction and Demolition	MCDA	Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis
DEA	Data Envelopment Analysis	MSW	Municipal Solid Waste
DM	Decision-Making	RDM	Robust Decision-Making
EIP	Eco-Industrial Park	SA	Scenario Analysis
GHG	Greenhouse Gas	SW	Solid Waste

45

46 **1. Introduction**

47 Population growth, and the concomitant increase in the demand for goods and services, is  
48 resulting in the progressive depletion of energy and resources stocks around the globe. Since  
49 the planet is experiencing a growing scarcity in resources and is becoming rich in waste, the  
50 concept of a ‘Circular Economy (CE)’ has emerged from increasing concerns over resource use  
51 efficiency, waste management and materials security (Rogers et al., 2017). CE principles aim  
52 to contribute towards sustainability and resilience through several simultaneous agendas,  
53 including economic growth, social development and environmental responsibility.

54

55 Contributing towards CE transition (and certainly sustainability) implies capturing multiple  
56 types of value (Rogers, 2018). Conflict is expected to arise when stakeholder groups from  
57 different perspectives have their own interests and priorities. An integrative Decision-Making  
58 (DM) process should be able to overcome such barriers to cooperation; this is where Game  
59 Theory (GT) presents a promising potential to facilitate such an enabler to the transition towards  
60 a CE. The aim of this paper is to critically review different techniques in the CE literature. The  
61 review provides guidance on how GT differs from, is both complementary to and able to  
62 enhance, the primary DM tools available within a waste management context in civil  
63 engineering.

64

65 *1.1. Importance of Game Theory for the Circular Economy*

66 Before moving on to explore what is the CE interpretation in this study, it is important to clarify  
67 that civil engineering is referred to as a discipline that consumes vast quantities of resources  
68 and has to engage heavily in waste management, while ensuring that sustainability and  
69 resilience is inherent in its infrastructure, and their operating systems; all of which are critical

70 areas to the CE. Thus, civil engineers have a responsibility to work towards safe, sustainable  
71 and resilient ‘future-proofed’ decisions for waste management within a CE.

72

73 Several recent articles have analysed the CE concept and the evolution of its interpretations:  
74 Heshmati (2015) investigated current circular practices and their implementation;  
75 Lewandowski (2016) classified circular business models into eight categories; Sauv e et al.  
76 (2016) compared the CE with sustainable development and environmental sciences; Lieder and  
77 Rashid (2016) developed a comprehensive CE framework in the manufacturing industry;  
78 Ghisellini et al. (2016) provided an extensive review of research on the CE; Blomsma and  
79 Brennan (2017) investigated the origins of the CE concept; Murray et al. (2017) discussed  
80 differences and similarities between sustainable business models and the CE; and Rizos et al.  
81 (2017) reviewed definitions, processes and impacts of the CE. Research on the topic is  
82 fragmented and interpretation amongst disciplines is varied (Rizos et al., 2017), perhaps  
83 because there is a lack of consensus of what a CE is (or is not); indeed, it has been noted that  
84 the lack of a shared common understanding between stakeholders could lead to a deadlock for  
85 the concept (Kirchherr et al., 2017). There have been recent contributions that seek to mitigate  
86 this situation. Prieto-Sandoval et al. (2018) proposed a consensus by highlighting the symbiotic  
87 relationship between eco-innovation and the CE frameworks. Saavedra et al. (2018)  
88 investigated how Industrial Ecology is embedded in, and contributes theoretically to, the CE.  
89 Korhonen et al. (2018) reviewed the literature on the concept and through an innovative  
90 research approach have concluded that it is an “essentially contested concept”, meaning that  
91 there is consensus on its means and goals, but there is no agreement on its definition, the units  
92 to analyse it or suitable methodologies to address it. Nevertheless, the problem of a lack of  
93 overarching coherence remains.

94

95 Since an objective of this review is to provide arguments for the development of GT in support  
96 of the CE and waste management agendas, it is of great importance to differentiate the  
97 sustainability and CE concepts. Geissdoerfer et al. (2017) have already compared both terms,  
98 and concluded that their conceptual relationships are that “CE is viewed as a condition for  
99 sustainability, a beneficial relation, or a trade-off in literature”. In line with the definition  
100 proposed by Kirchherr et al. (2017), the authors of this paper interpret a CE comprehensively  
101 as follows:

102 A CE is a set of principles and tools which aim to contribute to the planet’s sustainability  
103 by minimising the extraction and degradation of materials, promoting resource and energy  
104 conservation (reduce, reuse, recover and recycle) and driving the regeneration of its input  
105 sources. As such it fosters a willingness to, and facilitates, the repair and upgrade of  
106 products through innovative and systems thinking and embraces waste as a primary  
107 resource, allowing its reintroduction into the consumption system. The CE is inclusive  
108 with the environment, society, governments, companies and academia, and boosts the  
109 development of resilient business models in which various forms of value are captured  
110 through cooperation.

111

112 With regard to the last phrase in this definition, the “Circularity Gap Report” by Circle  
113 Economy (2018), identify seven key elements of the CE as potential gaps that need to be filled  
114 and processes that need improved facilitation, amongst them cooperation to create and capture  
115 joint value. This means that to create shared value and transparency, private and public  
116 stakeholders across many different supply chains must work together. Kirchherr et al. (2018)  
117 coded the barriers to CE implementation in the European Union, and highlighted the lack of  
118 enthusiasm of stakeholders to cooperate across the supply chain as a prominent obstacle to  
119 overcome. Veleva and Bodkin (2018) found that many entrepreneurs and corporations in the

120 USA are collaborating in waste reduction and reutilisation business models, despite the lack of  
121 regulations and awareness of the CE paradigm, and proposed an innovative cooperation  
122 framework to advance towards a CE between both groups of stakeholders.

123

124 GT presents potential to facilitate cooperation, for example, to optimise Eco-Industrial Parks  
125 (EIP) (i.e. Industrial Symbiosis (IS)), a key research area and critical enabler for the CE (Boix  
126 et al., 2015). The importance of GT for the CE emerges from the need to overcome conflicting  
127 objectives through cooperation between participants that captures multiple (sometimes  
128 conflicting) value judgements within a negotiation process. In illustrating this concept more  
129 clearly, this paper provides a critical insight into how GT might prove to be a useful technique  
130 for such processes with a particular focus on the waste management sector in civil engineering.  
131 To do this robustly, it is necessary to critically review the primary DM tools that exist within  
132 the waste management sector in civil engineering.

133

#### 134 *1.2. Decision Making tools in waste management within civil engineering*

135 Many tools have been used in engineering to help make informed decisions when facing a host  
136 of sustainability challenges; however, DM tools have mainly focused on optimising resources,  
137 costs, time and so on. The DM tools selected for this review for comparison with GT are: Agent-  
138 Based Modelling (ABM), Multi Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA), Scenario Analysis (SA),  
139 Robust Decision Making (RDM), and Integrated Assessment Modelling (IAM). The relevance  
140 of this paper follows from the requirement of underexplored and new research methods to  
141 provide helpful tools in the understanding of CE decisions.

142

143 Several attempts have been made to review and compare different DM methodologies and/or  
144 against GT, for example: Lee (2017) has already made a strong case in comparing econometric

145 techniques in the bio-energy development and CE research agendas, such as: IAM, linear and  
146 non-linear programming, and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), among others. The  
147 comparison aimed to help select the best technique available given their performance on 11  
148 aspects. In comparison, this review focuses on comparing DM methods against GT based on  
149 its potential complementary role to improve cooperation in the waste management and CE  
150 contexts. Thus they are not included within the scope of this review.

151

152 On the other hand, a review of MCDA studies in the Municipal Solid Waste (MSW)  
153 management context has been performed by Soltani et al. (2015), and found that the  
154 stakeholders with the highest participation are experts and local authorities, followed by local  
155 residents. Kastner et al. (2015) have reviewed and compared literature which related to the use  
156 of ABM or GT as tools in enhancing the use of IS. Soltani et al. (2016) provided a limited  
157 literature review of MSW management studies using GT methods to find solutions to this  
158 particular problem. Sinha (2016) investigated how static and dynamic systems modelling  
159 support the understanding and monitoring of environmental management. The gap addressed  
160 in this paper is that there appears to be no explicit comparison in the CE and Solid Waste (SW)  
161 management literature between all the proposed methodological approaches outlined above.

162

163 The structure of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the method of this review  
164 and covers a background analysis of the available literature on CE and SW and the DM tools  
165 proposed for comparison. Section 3 describes the methodologies and highlights their  
166 advantages and shortcomings during the DM process, in addition, it analyses the relevant  
167 literature using such methodologies on CE and SW. Section 4 compares and contrasts in more  
168 detail the commonalities and differences of the methods with GT, and presents an example in  
169 applying the complementary role of GT to address a DM problem in the CE and waste

170 management context. Section 5 finalises with conclusions and a discussion of future research  
171 needs.

172

## 173 **2. Methodology**

174 Before describing and analysing the differences and commonalities between the methodologies,  
175 a rigorous bibliometric search has been carried out. Data have been gathered by searching the  
176 related topics from the “SCOPUS” database in April 2019. The terms examined included  
177 “circular economy”, “game theory”, “agent based model”, “multi criteria analysis”, , “scenario  
178 analysis”, “robust decision making”, “integrated assessment model”, and each of the methods  
179 in combination with “circular economy” and “solid waste”, as shown in Table 1. It is important  
180 to note that only articles and reviews that mention explicitly the term “circular economy” or  
181 “solid waste” have been considered. Even though there might be publications that could have  
182 used related terms (e.g. sustainable production/manufacturing) and may align well with the  
183 interpretation of CE; it is the lack of complete alignment with CE principles that would  
184 compromise the analysis herein. There is a subtle, but important, difference between the  
185 concepts of sustainability and CE, already addressed by Geissdoerfer et al. (2017).

186

187 **Table 1:** Number of results from bibliometric search.

188

189 It is important to note also that the search was limited to the following criteria:

- 190 1) peer-reviewed journal articles and reviews, as they capture the latest research;
- 191 2) publications in the English language only;
- 192 3) only publications after the year 1999;
- 193 4) the terms searched were included in the title, abstract and/or keywords of the document;
- 194 5) the subject area was limited to engineering, in line with the aim of this review.

195

196 For each of the combinations of CE and SW, and the different methodologies, the publications  
197 arising from the search were reviewed in detail to sieve out unimportant results, i.e. some that  
198 appeared in the search mentioned the concept(s) once only and did not use it as a method, while  
199 some others did not fit the primary purpose of this paper. Once these relevant publications were  
200 reviewed, many pointed to more publications which were important and were also critically  
201 reviewed. The important publications for CE and SW research which used one of the six  
202 methods in Table 1 are presented yearly in Figure 1 and Figure 2 respectively, and further used  
203 to analyse below each methodology capabilities in the following Section 3.

204

205 **Figure 1:** Number of publications per year of the DM methods and CE.

206

207 **Figure 2:** Number of publications per year of the DM methods and SW.

208

209 The fact that the combination of both CE and SW and the six engineering DM tools (the five  
210 existing methodologies and GT) occurs in such small numbers of publications suggests that the  
211 research in this area is still in its early stages. There is an evident need to utilise the  
212 methodologies (ABM, MCDA, SA, RDM and IAM) in alignment with CE principles to  
213 facilitate its development. Section 3 describes and analyses the main properties of these  
214 methods in the CE and SW literature (Table 1 and more relevant publications), with the aim to  
215 set the scene for a deeper and thorough contrast in Section 4.

216

### 217 **3. Description and Analysis**

218 All the previously mentioned methodologies (ABM, MCDA, SA, RDM and IAM) are useful  
219 for analysis of the DM process itself, yet they do not consider the strategic behaviour of the  
220 actors involved in a negotiation (Madani et al., 2015). In contrast, GT provides a valuable  
221 perspective on how the preferences and decisions of actors have an impact on their opponents'

222 choices, their own further counter-decisions and, the final outcomes of a strategic interaction.  
223 For example, the price for which an item will be sold in an auction might be different if one  
224 participant bids up drastically as a strategy to discourage competitors to offer more, than if two  
225 or more participants bid up gradually until one reaches the maximum perceived value (or value  
226 payable by others) for the item. Another advantage of GT is that it considers the behaviour of  
227 the individuals based on their interests in practice, seeking to reach the system's optimal results  
228 from the individual self-optimising behaviours (Madani et al., 2015).

229  
230 The following sub-sections describe and discuss the properties and characteristics of six  
231 methodologies that purport to study the DM process, trade-offs, objectives and uncertainty  
232 within the broad field of sustainability/CE/SW. The objective of this Section 3 is to set the scene  
233 for Section 4, which presents the deeper and thorough discussion of commonalities and  
234 differences between the studied tools. A brief summary of the relevant literature reviewed is  
235 presented in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2, for the CE and SW contexts respectively. As  
236 mentioned previously, due to a lack of literature reporting on the six methods and CE, other  
237 subject areas within the scope of waste management in civil engineering were searched to  
238 complement the analysis; for example: low-carbon design, water treatment and renewable  
239 energy.

240

### 241 *3.1. Agent Based Modelling (ABM)*

242 ABM simulates the interactions between several independent agents and assesses the impacts  
243 of their actions on a system (Zechman, 2011). ABM is used to observe the system impacts of  
244 the interactions between agents and their behaviours (Macal and North, 2010). The technique  
245 is used to provide simulations of group dynamics derived from the interactions of individual  
246 agents in communities (Kandiah et al., 2017). ABM is a useful technique when: dealing with a  
247 considerable number of agents in a system; the interactions between, and behaviour of, agents

248 is complex; and when the individuals are different from each other (Bonabeau, 2002). The main  
249 properties of an agent in ABM are: (1) it attempts to accomplish a set of goals; (2) the  
250 interactions with the environment and other agents are driven by a specified group of social  
251 rules (Fraccascia et al., 2017); and (3) they can influence other agents' behaviour through  
252 predetermined communication systems (Kandiah et al., 2017). Rather than being defined by the  
253 modeller, the interactions within the agents and the interplay between the environment and the  
254 agents create the complex behaviour of the system (Macal and North, 2010). Agents are able to  
255 learn from the environment and are capable of adapting to varying circumstances and new data  
256 (Silvia and Krause, 2016).

257

258 When studying an economic system, ABM is capable of easily modelling an evolving macro  
259 space derived from the interactions among numerous agents ruled by determined simple actions  
260 (Wang et al., 2017). Rather than attempting to predict the future, ABM explores the different  
261 futures resulting from alternative conditions (Lange et al., 2017). The technique is capable of  
262 understanding the relationship between diffusion processes and customers' purchase decisions  
263 derived from them (Lieder et al., 2017). ABM has also been used to study cooperation in  
264 industrial districts and inside supply chains (Fraccascia et al., 2017). In ABM, the definition of  
265 rules is critical, and a simple change in the rules can have a radical impact on the agents'  
266 behaviour, and on the model outcomes (Bonabeau, 2002).

267

### 268 3.2. *Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA)*

269 MCDA aims to organise the alternatives in a hierarchical way (Hadian and Madani, 2015) and  
270 thereby prioritise the criteria effectively (Zhao et al., 2017). It is an operational assessment  
271 useful to study issues with high uncertainty, multiple interests and conflicting objectives (Wang  
272 et al., 2009). MCDA is able to rank policy alternatives using stakeholder perspectives and

273 cost/benefit information (Ali et al., 2017). MCDA may be used to resolve complicated problems  
274 that are ambiguous and highly uncertain. To rank alternatives it is helpful to use a  
275 complementary weight determination method (Zhao et al., 2017). MCDA is used when several  
276 parameters influence the performance of a task (Sabaghi et al., 2016). The most well-known  
277 application of MCDA is addressing DM problems that are influenced by conflicting criteria  
278 (Santos et al., 2017).

279

280 For example, Kaźmierczak et al. (2019) determined the preferences of the criteria to evaluate  
281 new uses to mining waste alternatives. Pettit et al. (2011) developed a DM framework to  
282 evaluate sustainable urban pollution alternatives and presented an example application in  
283 thermal treatment of MSW. MCDA was chosen to identify sustainable energy from waste  
284 alternatives to meet peak-hour energy demand because of its ability to handle simultaneous  
285 criteria (Abdulrahman and Huisingh, 2018). Some studies combined linear programming with  
286 MCDA to select appropriate landfill sites, for example: Cheng et al. (2003) optimise waste flow  
287 costs by introducing the stakeholders' subjective preferences; Xi et al. (2010) evaluate  
288 alternatives for SW diversion rates and reduction of net system costs.

289

### 290 3.3. *Scenario Analysis (SA)*

291 SA studies how to achieve a set goal in the future (normative) that will happen in an  
292 undetermined (exploratory) manner (Madani et al., 2015), or how to move from an explored to  
293 an aspirational (normative) scenario, also referred to as transitive scenario (Hunt et al., 2013).  
294 This analysis is used to test a range of development strategies and select the best plan by using  
295 optimisation methods (Madani et al., 2015). The analysis aims to identify the most preferable  
296 scenarios considering technical, social, economic, environmental and political criteria (Santos  
297 et al., 2017). Uncertainty in SA is interpreted as a set of plausible future outcomes, in other

298 words the analysis models problems where the uncertain future is the base for DM (Pallottino  
299 et al., 2005). SA should not be confused with predictions; on the contrary, they are plausible  
300 ways in which the future might develop (Hunt et al., 2012a). Valuable insights are provided for  
301 policy-makers when evaluating future implications of current and planned practices (Islam,  
302 2017), for example to analyse the consequences of increasing or decreasing recycling rates  
303 (Jiménez Rivero et al., 2016). To reduce the risk of wrong DM, SA considers the temporal  
304 evolution of statistically independent scenarios to secure a “robust” choice (Pallottino et al.,  
305 2005). This analysis aims to establish the best options by taking into account the short- and  
306 long-term costs and benefits of different expected results (Geng et al., 2010).

307

308 Hunt et al. (2012a) provided an extensive review of methods that derive scenarios, mainly  
309 applied to the case of urban regeneration sites. Hunt et al. (2012b) built on the previous work  
310 and identified four scenario archetypes (i.e. Policy Reform, Market Forces, New Sustainability  
311 Paradigm and Fortress World) that are formed by consistent narratives, which help in the  
312 comprehension of fundamental drivers to accomplish a significant and feasible world change.  
313 Hunt et al. (2011) used an urban futures toolkit to define and better measure the current and  
314 future performance of UK underground space. This extreme-yet-plausible analysis, which has  
315 particular utility in determining the resilience of a proposed policy or action, can be  
316 supplemented by aspirational futures approaches to increase alignment with a city’s, or its  
317 citizens’, needs and wants (Hunt and Rogers, 2015a, 2015b; Rogers, 2018). A complete SA can  
318 be used to investigate cases of extremes. This allows the user to understand how an intervention  
319 might be vulnerable when attempting to deliver the intended solution (Boyko et al., 2012;  
320 Lombardi et al., 2012). In the case of the CE, an example of a positive extreme is looking at a  
321 scenario which leads to absolutely zero waste, yet what needs to be in place for such a scenario

322 to happen is of considerable concern; these are also regarded as the “necessary conditions” to  
323 exist in the future (Rogers et al., 2012).

324

325 SA is often used to complement future predictions: Luo et al. (2019) further complemented  
326 their study with SA to provide recommendations for different optimal scenarios in the waste  
327 household appliance recovery industry. Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) is broadly combined  
328 with SA: Deviatkin et al. (2016) compared the environmental impact of multiple approaches  
329 for utilising deinking sludge; De Figueirêdo et al. (2013) seek to improve the transport and  
330 reduce the carbon footprint of the export melon industry; Friedrich and Trois (2016) calculated  
331 the total Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions of three scenarios for a MSW management system;  
332 Ripa et al. (2017) identified many uncertainties, opportunities to improve and driving factors  
333 for MSW management scenarios; and Fei et al. (2018) contrasted the energy efficiency and  
334 economic and environmental impact of traditional technologies with mechanical-biological  
335 MSW treatment. Also SA was integrated to economic and mathematical models to assess the  
336 profitability of natural gas power plants (Cucchiella et al., 2018). Moreover, MCDA has been  
337 complemented with SA to study the best combination of MSW management strategies for  
338 future 2030 scenarios (Estay-Ossandon et al., 2018).

339

#### 340 *3.4. Robust Decision Making (RDM)*

341 RDM addresses uncertainty based on various future representations instead of solely seeking  
342 an optimal outcome as the main criterion for DM (Lempert and Collins, 2007). Characterisation  
343 is not the main aim of RDM, rather it is to aid decision-makers in managing deep uncertainty  
344 by the identification of robust alternatives (Lempert et al., 2004). RDM is iterative and  
345 analytical, it considers stakeholder engagement and is helpful in “deeply uncertain” situations,  
346 i.e. when the parties ignore or disagree on the consequences of their actions in the model (Hall

347 et al., 2012). Put slightly differently, RDM may be used to assess adaptation alternatives for  
348 highly vulnerable habitats (Darch, 2014) and maintain an expected performance under regular  
349 as well as worst-case scenarios (Sawik, 2014). RDM facilitates reaching consensus when parties  
350 in a DM problem have significant differences in value appreciation and beliefs (Hall et al.,  
351 2012).

352

353 This method is analytical rather than intuitive; to eliminate uncertainty it is systematic and it  
354 attempts to make effective and safe decisions (Croskerry, 2009). RDM is a ‘bottom-up’  
355 approach that aims to identify the vulnerabilities and assess the trade-offs among robust  
356 strategies, whilst performing satisfactorily to the decision-maker (Hadka et al., 2015) and; it  
357 aims to perform adequately for the decision-maker under both favourable and unfavourable  
358 conditions (Sawik, 2014). Eschewing attempts at optimisation, RDM attempts to identify robust  
359 decisions that would maintain a “convincing performance” in a wide range of plausible  
360 scenarios, while highlighting vulnerabilities in a system by exploring combinations of uncertain  
361 scenarios (Matrosov et al., 2013), and provide solutions which are adaptable and insensitive to  
362 the presence of uncertainty (Daron, 2015).

363

### 364 3.5. *Integrated Assessment Modelling (IAM)*

365 IAM is used to combine several disciplinary areas to understand systems linkages and  
366 interactions, and thereby meet many objectives such as sustainability, economic costs and  
367 others (Madani et al., 2015). IAM reports on interactions between endogenous variables (Lee,  
368 2017) and, for example, has been used to exploit knowledge from multiple disciplines to assess  
369 climate change policy alternatives (Weyant et al., 1996). An important advantage of IAM in the  
370 air pollution context is that it provides “quick” simulations without having to repeatedly run  
371 dispersion models (Oxley et al., 2013). In spite of its advantages, IAM is categorised as a

372 complex, and time and large data consuming, method. IAM can integrate stakeholders in the  
373 DM process towards avoiding conflict in search for more sustainable SW management  
374 alternatives (Hornsby et al., 2017).

375  
376 Instead of assessing the effects of suggested policies, IAM aids policy makers in describing  
377 optimal outcomes and as a result decisions (Tol, 1997). Lee (2017) compared it with eight other  
378 econometric methodologies and ranked it last due to its high operating cost and complicated  
379 implementation. In the literature, this method has been mainly applied to climate change policy  
380 studies (e.g. Tol, 1997; Zhu and Ghosh, 2014) and air pollution (e.g. Carnevale et al., 2014;  
381 Oxley et al., 2013; Zhu et al., 2015). IAM can model effects at both regional and local scales  
382 and integrate multiple sub-models, such as energy-economy and climate sub-models, into a  
383 single integrated system to assess policies in several different ways (Zhu and Ghosh, 2014).  
384 IAM considers both impacts and costs of implementing abatement measures to decide on the  
385 best option (Carnevale et al., 2014).

386  
387 *3.6. Game Theory (GT)*

388 The origins of GT can be traced back to the work of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). It  
389 has been used for decades in the social sciences, mainly in economics (Ichiisi, 2014; Myerson,  
390 1991; Nash, 1953, 1951) and politics (Brams, 2004), as well as in evolutionary theory in biology  
391 (Smith, 1982; Vincent and Brown, 2005). GT is a set of mathematical tools (Madani and Hipel,  
392 2011) to study cooperation and conflict derived from the interactive DM process between  
393 intelligent and rational stakeholders (Chew et al., 2009). However, in practice most players  
394 have limited rationality (Li and Fan, 2013). The latter meaning that their decisions are bounded  
395 by incomplete information about the problem, their limited cognitive capacity and/or restricted  
396 time for DM, resulting in barriers to cooperation (Lee, 2011). GT can be used to improve the

397 understanding of stakeholders' relationships (Howard, 2006). Several interactions between  
398 players can be modelled and the outcomes of the negotiations may be predicted (Soltani et al.,  
399 2016). GT is particularly useful in problems where: (1) a small number of agents are involved  
400 in a strategic interaction and there is hidden information and incentives; and (2) there is  
401 awareness between stakeholders that their decisions affect each other's outcomes and their  
402 potential benefits depend upon other's choices (Grimes-Casey et al., 2007).

403

404 In a system where uncertainty and multiple interactions result in complexity, GT is an  
405 appropriate DM technique (Lou et al., 2004). GT is able to predict the most probable results in  
406 situations where participants are concerned with their own priorities and make strategic  
407 decisions based on selfish behaviour (Asgari et al., 2014). GT divides into two main branches<sup>1</sup>.  
408 Cooperative GT is concerned with analysing the DM process when the stakeholders have made  
409 an agreement to cooperate beforehand. This results in outcomes that are closer to optimal for  
410 all involved, while noting that a fair distribution of benefits and costs is of great importance to  
411 maintain stable cooperation. There are many methods used to achieve this, often referred to as  
412 allocation methods. In contrast, non-cooperative GT analyses conflict when stakeholders have  
413 not made a predetermined arrangement to cooperate. It is assumed that players are intent on  
414 maximising their own benefits regardless of what the other participants' decisions may be,  
415 resulting in stable or equilibrium combinations of strategies which are often optimal for  
416 individuals but not for the system.

417

418 The nature of GT allows its application in systems design since it covers technical and social  
419 issues through simulation and participants' role-play simultaneously (Grogan and Meijer,  
420 2017). GT is able to find the best allocation of benefits and costs in a system, rather than

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<sup>1</sup> For a deeper introduction to GT and the main differences between cooperative and non-cooperative GT, refer to Cano-Berlanga et al. (2017).

421 optimising for each stakeholder separately, and identify the most stable, balanced and  
422 favourable combination of strategies. Once the results for fair allocation are calculated it is  
423 important to prevent the participants from abandoning the coalition, the application of multiple  
424 stability definitions in a non-cooperative game is helpful (Asgari et al., 2014). By introducing  
425 government constraints and cooperative costs, cooperation is successfully achieved in SW  
426 separation mechanisms (Chen et al., 2018). Additionally, GT has been used to study the effects  
427 of uncertainty from remanufacturing technology and recycled products quality in order to set  
428 recommendations on varying regulatory situations (Tan and Guo, 2019).

429

430 Although there is no review of GT studies applied specifically to technologies that improve  
431 sustainability performance, a few examples with such potential can be cited: road networks  
432 which cooperate through the use of technology to address traffic congestion problems (Klein  
433 and Ben-Elia, 2016), the potential of GT to facilitate the development of smart grids (Saad et  
434 al., 2012) or for selecting optimal technologies in waste-to-energy treatment (Soltani et al.,  
435 2016).

436

#### 437 **4. Results and Discussion**

438 When comparing the methods, it is useful to make explicit the steps involved in each of them  
439 and highlight the commonalities and differences between them. Figure 3 demonstrates in a set  
440 of flowcharts the methodological stages of the approaches. In support of the flowcharts and as  
441 a result of the analysis from Section 3, Table 2 compares the characteristics addressed by each  
442 method. The ticks have been placed based on reference material, which is also discussed below.  
443 In cases where there was insufficient evidence to support this, the authors' opinion has been  
444 used based on the review of the description of the methodologies in the literature. Studies which

445 attempted to combine techniques or introduce GT concepts into the methodology are also  
446 discussed in the comparisons below.

447

448 Table 2 shows that all the methods address uncertainty and DM, though in different ways. Most  
449 of the techniques can deliver optimal outcomes except for RDM, which opts for robustness  
450 rather than optimality. The ranking of alternatives is specifically addressed only by MCDA and  
451 yet, whilst such ranking does not provide an intended starting point for GT analysis, cooperative  
452 GT can allocate stable results through different methods, and every allocation has a higher  
453 stability capacity, they can be ordered according to a fairer distribution of payoffs. The final  
454 superficial observation is that ABM most closely approximates to GT. It must not be overlooked  
455 that there are important differences, as discussed below. Even though the properties addressed  
456 by GT and ABM are broadly similar, the flowcharts in Figure 3 demonstrate that the procedures  
457 are different, and the outcomes vary significantly. While the concepts of GT can be embedded  
458 in the action rules in ABM to program the agents to behave accordingly, contrary to GT, the  
459 aim of ABM is not to analyse the agents' interactions but to evaluate the effect of their actions  
460 in the system simulation. It is therefore of critical importance to make the distinction between  
461 GT and ABM.

462

463 **Table 2:** Characteristics comparison of methodologies.

464

465 While ABM can be programmed with basic GT principles, ABM “is all about the rules”. For  
466 example, Romero and Ruiz (2014) introduced ABM to analyse the transformation of industrial  
467 eco-systems from former industrial areas and sought to enhance their model by using GT  
468 concepts to assess cooperative relationships in bringing about the conversion. ABM – if  
469 elements of GT are coupled in the design – was proposed as one of the three most helpful tools  
470 to study environmental management and social interactions from a dynamic systems approach

471 (Sinha, 2016). ABM is useful when modelling complex systems with large numbers of  
472 autonomous and heterogeneous agents to investigate how their behaviour impacts the system's  
473 outcomes. In contrast, GT analyses the strategic interactions among stakeholders, usually  
474 between two players although models can be upgraded to analyse more participants (Myerson,  
475 1991). An important drawback of ABM is that it models human behaviour and yet factors  
476 difficult to measure and include in the rules are often not considered, such as emotions, complex  
477 psychology and subjective choices. The scope of ABM is not the total system but pitched at the  
478 individual units level, and for this reason ABM usually requires large amounts of data which  
479 then lead to computation and time issues (Bonabeau, 2002).

480

481 Similar to GT, MCDA considers the viewpoints of actors and requires information on  
482 costs/benefits or payoffs. Soltani et al. (2016) acknowledge that MCDA is useful in accounting  
483 for multiple criteria when ranking or optimising alternatives. MCDA selects the optimal  
484 alternatives by ranking them using weighting criteria established subjectively by a single  
485 stakeholder, whereas GT provides the optimal combination of strategies by analysing the  
486 preferred alternatives between multiple stakeholders. One particular advantage is the ability of  
487 GT to complement MCDA when considering conflict and its impact on stakeholders reaching  
488 an agreement.

489

490 Regarding SA, the main difference is that GT provides predictions for a strategic interaction  
491 between participants, whilst scenarios aim to foresight the development of a current problem –  
492 exploring how to move to an extreme or to a desired context, or attempt to predict the future  
493 state from a set of plausible conditions. Uncertainty is interpreted differently in both methods:  
494 for SA it represents a set of feasible future results, whilst for GT it is based on the bounded  
495 rationality of participants which derive from limited-informed decisions. SA fails to analyse

496 cooperation between stakeholders, their interactions and their strategic behaviours to achieve  
497 (frequently) conflicting objectives.

498  
499 In spite of addressing uncertainty as multiple future expectations to provide robust alternatives  
500 and considering stakeholders' interactions, RDM differs from GT in considering their strategic  
501 behaviour, i.e. their ability to predict their counterparts' actions in response of their own  
502 decisions. Both methods facilitate cooperation between participants to reach preferred  
503 outcomes, particularly when there are differences in value perception and objectives. RDM  
504 aims to deliver robust rather than optimal alternatives, which are adaptable and not fragile (or  
505 vulnerable to unexpected external impacts), while GT provides optimal and stable results if  
506 cooperative and non-cooperative analyses are combined.

507

508 **Figure 3:** Methodologies flowchart comparison.

509

510 IAM meets multiple objectives through the integration of several disciplines in its assessment  
511 and it considers the interactions and linkages between participants or sub-models, but not their  
512 strategic behaviour as with GT. IAM delivers optimal decisions by considering implementation  
513 costs, whereas GT considers preferences, payoffs and incentives of stakeholders.

514

515 Table 2 suggests that GT's most important attribute is its ability to study the strategic behaviour  
516 of actors. This is because cooperation is essential to the successful implementation of  
517 circularity, and GT can be applied both in cooperative and non-cooperative modes to provide  
518 different essential perspectives on the issue. One lesson that flows from this is that instead of  
519 thinking that sustainability is only achievable if policy-makers enforce the equal sharing of  
520 environmental costs, business model leaders should understand the importance of improving

521 their businesses by being proactive in comprehending sustainability better than their  
522 competitors (Robèrt and Broman, 2017) and sharing this understanding amongst the actors.  
523 This discussion reinforces the idea that when stakeholders adopt competitive (non-cooperative)  
524 behaviour, they aim to maximise their own benefits and this will most likely lead to non-optimal  
525 outcomes for the system as a whole (Lou et al., 2004). To encourage cooperation, apart from  
526 incentives and fees imposed by a third-party, the stakeholders may send clear cooperative  
527 signals to their competitors to show explicitly their will to cooperate (Madani, 2010).

528

529 Given the limited number of publications that refer to a combination of methodologies and CE,  
530 it is instructive to mimic some work which used GT in DM in sustainability research. For  
531 example: Lozano (2011) used GT to help company leaders identify the influencing role they  
532 play on other stakeholders to move towards sustainability; Pineiro-Chousa et al. (2016) used  
533 GT to integrate three dimensions of reputation management as a sustainability driver (i.e.  
534 reputation is viewed by the entrepreneurs as a risk source, a competitive advantage or a strategic  
535 asset); and Taboada-González et al. (2017) valorised recyclables in two domestic waste  
536 generation scenarios and used GT to identify the best strategy of the municipality to minimise  
537 landfill-derived carbon emissions.

538

539 One final observation is that strategies of individual actors are commonly unknown to others,  
540 which results in conflict (Lou et al., 2004). In spite of the multiple benefits from cooperation,  
541 one of the most prominent barriers to cooperation are the stakeholders' conflicting interests  
542 (Chew et al., 2011). The study and practice of CE could benefit from the use of techniques  
543 incorporating GT elements. GT advocates the study of cooperation and conflict of  
544 participants/stakeholders. Since cooperation is a feature too often missing in CE and waste

545 management DM, the successful implementation of CE could be facilitated if GT is adopted as  
546 another methodological approach.

547

#### 548 *4.1. Application example of GT to a DM waste management problem*

549 To illustrate the complementary potential of GT to its peer-methods in DM in waste  
550 management within civil engineering, an example is provided on how GT can be used in  
551 advancing CE principles by building on the application from Karmperis et al. (2013). This  
552 application used three DM methods (i.e. Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), LCA and MCDA), and  
553 combines them with GT principles to find the most optimal solution to a waste bargaining  
554 problem.

555

556 There are many well-known GT models, for example: prisoner's dilemma, snowdrift, battle of  
557 the sexes, peace-war, tragedy of the commons, stag hunt, etc. The purpose of the example  
558 presented below is to explain in simple terms, how GT can be used as a complementary  
559 technique to study cooperation in a bargaining situation between an agent (City Council) and a  
560 service provider (waste management operator). Other well-recognised GT models include: the  
561 Stackelberg (1937) models address the competition between two or more companies, usually  
562 studying the market leader and a follower in sequential games; also the incentives to collude  
563 and form a monopoly or to not cooperate and remain in an oligopoly, open market, etc; the  
564 Cournot (1897) model studies two manufacturers determining on how much to produce, given  
565 their costs, demand and the market price of a product. They decide simultaneously and  
566 independently from each other. These and other models can certainly focus on many waste  
567 management and CE cases, however, these applications fall beyond the scope of this review.

568

569 The example assumes that there is a negotiation between the member of a City Council,  
570 representing the citizens, and the manager of a waste recycling firm to agree on the service fee.  
571 With the CBA tool, it is calculated that the operating cost of the waste recycling treatment plan  
572 is £100/tonne, and through MCDA weighting methods, the willingness to pay of the citizens  
573 for the service is estimated to be £150/tonne. Both organisation representatives know the cost  
574 is less than £150/tonne and the value to be paid is greater than £100/tonne. There is a surplus  
575 of £50/tonne which should be divided between them, i.e. an agreement on the service fee is then  
576 needed.

577

578 It is assumed that individuals are both rational players, they will always wish to maximise their  
579 utility value. Likewise, it is assumed they are both intelligent – they have the same information,  
580 they understand the situation and can make inferences about it. The boxes in Table 3 show the  
581 payoffs of their decisions given by the decisions of their counterparts: the value on the left is  
582 the payoff for the waste recycling company and the value on the right is the payoff for the City  
583 Council. These values represent the £50/tonne surplus to be shared by the stakeholders. If both  
584 individuals agree to divide the surplus, each will receive a £25/tonne payoff. If one agrees and  
585 the other disagrees, the agreeing player will receive £50/tonne whilst the other will receive no  
586 share. On the other hand, if both stakeholders disagree, then the outcome would be  $(d1, d2) =$   
587  $(0, 0)$ .

588

589 **Table 3:** Waste management service fee negotiation model.

590

591 **Figure 4:** Solution of the waste management service fee negotiation model with GT

592 approach.

593

594 Stability in this context means that the state is highly unlikely to change due to a lack of  
595 incentives to deviate strategies to get better payoffs. If the state of the game is  $(d1, d2)$ , the City  
596 Council would have incentives to deviate to strategy  $u$  as it would get a preferred surplus  
597 (£50/tonne), likewise the waste recycling company is incentivised to change its strategy to  $u$ .  
598 Both states  $(d1, u2)$  and  $(u1, d2)$  are considered to be unstable for the waste recycling firm or  
599 the City Council respectively, as if they deviate their strategies, they would get the same  
600 £25/tonne payoff if they move to the state  $(u1, u2)$ , respectively. It is then observable that the  
601 state  $(u1, u2)$  is stable for both players, as deviating would mean obtaining a less preferred  
602 payoff for the City Council  $(u1, d2)$   $(50, 0)$  or for the waste recycling firm  $(d1, u2)$   $(0, 50)$ . State  
603  $(u1, u2)$  is known as a Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1951). It is a solution concept on GT which  
604 states that the participants have no incentives to get a better payoff from deviating strategies  
605 unilaterally; as opposed to a Pareto optimal which states that players have maximised their  
606 utilities and cannot get a better payoff without decreasing those of others. Thus, a Nash  
607 equilibrium is regularly not Pareto efficient. This happens often in other GT models such as the  
608 prisoner's dilemma, contrary to the example above where the solution is both a Nash  
609 equilibrium and also Pareto efficient.

610

611 As shown in Figure 4, both stakeholders have symmetric utility functions, then for the surplus  
612 division negotiation:  $(u1, u2) = (25, 25)$  is the Nash bargaining solution, i.e. £125/tonne is the  
613 service fee that should be agreed upon to be paid. It is clear that the GT example presents  
614 potential to improve cooperation towards a CE waste management as it helps in the fair  
615 allocation of benefits and costs between stakeholders, in this case a City Council representing  
616 the citizens and a waste management firm.

617

618 **5. Conclusions**

619 The review of literature on the CE reveals that many interpretations of the concept have been  
620 proposed, although the authors generally highlight the importance of cooperation between  
621 stakeholders as a key enabler. This supports the overarching conclusion that the concept of a  
622 CE provides the opportunity for a wide range of stakeholders (governments, companies,  
623 consumers and cities) to jointly work towards designing more sustainable, resilient and  
624 inclusive business models (Palafox et al., 2017). Even though the issue of “conflict of interest”  
625 is not the key engineering factor, it should be addressed to inform the DM process. The  
626 contribution of GT for the CE and waste management research agendas has been established  
627 based on the ability of the technique to study cooperation and facilitate stability when business  
628 models are designed to capture multiple types of value in line with CE principles for waste  
629 management.

630

631 When analysed alongside comparable methods, it is evident from the literature that GT is not  
632 the most-often used technique in DM in engineering. In comparison, there are few studies which  
633 investigate the application of CE principles, and the movement towards a CE, using the  
634 proposed techniques, and very few consider a combination of two or more of them. The number  
635 of publications on CE has been increasing at an accelerating rate, which suggests that the area  
636 is still developing and unsaturated.

637

638 This paper is the first to have critically reviewed and compared five DM methodologies  
639 commonly used in waste management and civil engineering (i.e. ABM, MCDA, SA, RDM and  
640 IAM) against, or in combination with GT, and provided evidence for why it could play a  
641 potential role in the DM process in moving to a CE. While GT might seem superior to some  
642 reviewed tools, others are preferable according to the characteristics examined, which is why it

643 could contribute if used in parallel in DM in waste management in civil engineering. In this  
644 regard, GT can borrow ideas used in sustainability for use in the CE agenda, as mentioned in  
645 Section 2.

646

647 Future research should compare the empirical results of distinct methodologies applied to DM  
648 towards a CE. As this paper proposes, it is important to apply more GT models in waste  
649 management in civil engineering DM, particularly when transitioning to a more sustainable  
650 approach such as a CE. To transform civil engineering and waste management to design circular  
651 processes, the consideration of many perspectives and dimensions – indeed, all stakeholder  
652 groups involved – is required. In this respect, GT presents the potential to improve the  
653 understanding of the negotiation process when adopting circularity in waste management civil  
654 engineering thinking. Future research should seek to use primary data to provide empirical  
655 evidence for the use of GT in the CE and SW agendas.

656

657 Cooperation is a feature too often missing in CE waste management DM and it has not yet been  
658 addressed sufficiently. GT is useful for situations where conflict derives from different  
659 stakeholders' priorities and value perceptions. GT is still undergoing consideration or use in the  
660 CE. In the context of implementing CE in waste management, many disputes and partnerships  
661 should be expected; for example, deciding whether recycling or incinerating waste is the best  
662 strategy for the environment, citizens, local authorities or business owners. Certainly, many  
663 factors come into play – land space, investments, infrastructure, technologies available, local  
664 environmental concerns, social attitudes, etc. – in the DM process, which could represent  
665 barriers or opportunities for cooperation. Embedding GT concepts and elements into DM  
666 methodologies to study waste management and CE would be valuable.

667

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673

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<b>Method</b>	<b>Author(s)</b>	<b>Application</b>	<b>Country / Region</b>
ABM (Section 3.1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lieder et al. (2017)</li> <li>• Wang et al. (2017)</li> <li>• Tong et al. (2018)</li> <li>• Luo et al. (2019)</li> <li>• Yazan and Fraccascia (2019)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Studied the behaviour of customers towards accepting new CE business models.</li> <li>• Designed a model to measure the vulnerability and impacts of economic fluctuations on coal IS networks using three networks.</li> <li>• Evaluated the behavioural change of local residents when a recycling program is started in the community.</li> <li>• Analysed the behavioural trends of the waste household appliance recovery industry.</li> <li>• Simulated the mechanisms in which firms distribute the economic benefits obtained from adopting IS.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stockholm, Sweden</li> <li>• China</li> <li>• Beijing, China</li> <li>• China</li> <li>• N/A</li> </ul>
MCDA (Section 3.2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sabaghi et al. (2016)</li> <li>• Li and Zhao (2016)</li> <li>• Zhao et al. (2017)</li> <li>• Strantzali et al. (2019)</li> <li>• Kaźmierczak et al. (2019)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Considered five parameters influencing the disassembly process of an aircraft at its end-of-life.</li> <li>• Evaluated the performance of eco-industrial thermal power plants and integrate the preferences of decision-makers on performance criteria.</li> <li>• Proposed a framework to evaluate comprehensive benefits of EIP from a CE point of view.</li> <li>• Developed a DM model to logistically optimise the liquified natural gas imports in cryogenic tanks.</li> <li>• Assessed the potential new uses of mining waste.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Quebec, Canada</li> <li>• China</li> <li>• China</li> <li>• Greece</li> <li>• Silesia, Poland</li> </ul>
SA (Section 3.3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Deviatkin et al. (2016)</li> <li>• Niero et al. (2016)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Compared the environmental performance of different scenarios for the deinking sludge process.</li> <li>• Analysed 20 different scenarios for renewable energy and recycled content for aluminium cans based on LCA.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Finnish-Russian border</li> <li>• United Kingdom</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cucchiella et al. (2018)</li> <li>• Cong et al. (2019)</li> <li>• Luo et al. (2019)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evaluated the profitability of natural gas grid plants based on mathematical and economic models.</li> <li>• Proposed a method to determine the viability of recyclable end-of-use products in the design stage.</li> <li>• Complemented their analysis on the waste household appliance recovery industry and proposed different policy suggestions for optimal scenarios.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Italy</li> <li>• N/A</li> <li>• China</li> </ul>
RDM (Section 3.4)		– No relevant publications were found for CE research using an RDM approach.	
IAM (Section 3.5)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lee (2017)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reviewed and compared nine methods when seeking to advance the bio-energy development research agenda.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• N/A</li> </ul>
GT (Section 3.6)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Tan and Guo (2019)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Studied the effect on different regulatory situations from the uncertainty arising from the quality of recycled products and remanufacturing technology.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• China</li> </ul>

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1089 **Appendix 2:** Previous research using the compared DM methodologies in the SW context.

<b>Method</b>	<b>Author(s)</b>	<b>Application</b>	<b>Country / Region</b>
ABM (Section 3.1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Shi et al. (2014)</li> <li>• He et al. (2017)</li> <li>• Nguyen-Trong et al. (2017)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identified the sources of concern in single-stream recycling programs and simulate its alternatives.</li> <li>• Investigated private operators' selfish behaviour which led to competition in the MSW treatment markets.</li> <li>• Modelled the optimisation of collection services of MSW.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Florida, USA</li> <li>• Singapore</li> <li>• Hagiang, Vietnam</li> </ul>
MCDA (Section 3.2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cheng et al. (2003)</li> <li>• Xi et al. (2010)</li> <li>• Pettit et al. (2011)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrated MCDA and linear programming to optimise the selection of a landfill site and the waste flows costs.</li> <li>• Revealed the most favourable alternative for landfill site selection.</li> <li>• Introduced a DM framework to assess alternatives of sustainable urban pollution management.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regina, Canada</li> <li>• Beijing, China</li> <li>• N/A</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Soltani et al. (2015)</li> <li>• Demesouka et al. (2016)</li> <li>• Angelo et al. (2017)</li> <li>• Abdulrahman and Huisinigh (2018)</li> <li>• Kapilan and Elangovan (2018)</li> <li>• Feyzi et al. (2019)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reviewed in detail MSW management studies focusing on the stakeholder perspective.</li> <li>• Addressed the issue of numerous environmental and social criteria to be considered in landfill siting.</li> <li>• Reduced the number of admissible food waste treatment choices by including the LCA of differing satisfying alternatives.</li> <li>• Evaluated energy from waste alternatives to meet sustainability criteria and meet the overstressed energy demand.</li> <li>• Used geographical information in combination with MCDA to show the least harmful place to site landfill.</li> <li>• Evaluate sustainability-based criteria to select the most appropriate site for SW incineration power plants.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• N/A</li> <li>• Thrace, Greece</li> <li>• Rio de Janeiro, Brazil</li> <li>• Egypt</li> <li>• Coimbatore, India</li> <li>• Rasht, Iran</li> </ul>
SA (Section 3.3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Geng et al. (2010)</li> <li>• Lu et al. (2012)</li> <li>• Hong et al. (2013)</li> <li>• De Figueirêdo et al. (2013)</li> <li>• Friedrich and Trois (2016)</li> <li>• Jiménez Rivero et al. (2016)</li> <li>• Ripa et al. (2017)</li> <li>• Islam (2017)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Simulated waste management strategies to compare their CO2 emissions and investment costs.</li> <li>• Identified critical indicators that affect the outputs of MSW management.</li> <li>• Evaluated the feasibility of sustainable energy generation scenarios based on current technologies and their limitations.</li> <li>• Analysed the exporting industry of melon in order to reduce its carbon footprint and improve its transport.</li> <li>• Calculated the Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions derived from three MSW management scenarios from an LCA approach.</li> <li>• Compared different gypsum waste recycling scenarios for Construction &amp; Demolition (C&amp;D) waste arising from the construction industry.</li> <li>• Recognised driving aspects, potential improvements and critical issues of predictive scenarios of MSW management.</li> <li>• Analysed the different impacts on GHG emissions and carbon flow of five combinations of waste management strategies.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Kawasaki, Japan</li> <li>• N/A</li> <li>• South Korea</li> <li>• Low Jaguaribe and Açú, Brazil</li> <li>• Durban, South Africa</li> <li>• European Union</li> <li>• Naples, Italy</li> <li>• Bangladesh</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Estay-Ossandon et al. (2018)</li> <li>• Rezaei et al. (2018)</li> <li>• Fei et al. (2018)</li> <li>• Santos and Magrini (2018)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Predicted the evolution of MSW management system until 2030 under three different future scenarios.</li> <li>• Discussed the economic performance of energy from waste technologies and the appropriate selection between incineration and gasification from MSW.</li> <li>• Contrasted the economic and environmental performance and energy efficiency of mechanical-biological treatment and other MSW technologies.</li> <li>• Studied the potential agro-IS network to be developed with the connection of IS and bio-refineries in traditionally agricultural areas.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Canary Islands, Spain</li> <li>• Iran</li> <li>• Changzhou, Jiangsu, China</li> <li>• Norte Fluminense, Brazil</li> </ul>
RDM (Section 3.4)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Kucukvar et al. (2014)</li> <li>• Edwards et al. (2018)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assessed the recycling, landfilling and incineration strategies for C&amp;D waste materials.</li> <li>• Compared multiple food waste management systems to rank the best performance in terms of environmental impact.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• USA</li> <li>• Australia</li> </ul>
IAM (Section 3.5)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Wu et al. (2016)</li> <li>• Hornsby et al. (2017)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assessed environmental effectiveness by integrating CO2 emissions, exergy and energy analyses in a steel and iron IS network.</li> <li>• Integrated the participation of stakeholders and scientists in a DM toolkit towards more sustainable SW management solutions.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• China</li> <li>• Naples, Italy</li> </ul>
GT (Section 3.6)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Grimes-Casey et al. (2007)</li> <li>• Karmperis et al. (2013)</li> <li>• Soltani et al. (2016)</li> <li>• Chen et al. (2018)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Found that the decision of the bottler to choose between refillable and disposable bottles is related directly to the expected behaviour of the customer, rather than replacement costs, the product itself, or other characteristics.</li> <li>• Reviewed LCA and MCDA models and introduced the waste management bargaining game to support DM in the SW context.</li> <li>• Performed a study including GT to choose the optimal option from a set of energy from waste alternatives.</li> <li>• Studied the mechanisms in which individuals and local governments successfully cooperate towards SW separation.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• USA</li> <li>• N/A</li> <li>• Vancouver, Canada</li> <li>• China</li> </ul>

1091 **Tables**

1092 **Table 1:** Number of results from bibliometric search.

Search term	Number of results found in "SCOPUS"
"Circular Economy" AND Game Theory	1
"Circular Economy" AND Agent Based Model	3
"Circular Economy" AND Multi Criteria Decision Analysis	6
"Circular Economy" AND Scenario Analysis	4
"Circular Economy" AND Robust Decision Making	0
"Circular Economy" AND Integrated Assessment Model	1
"Solid Waste" AND Game Theory	4
"Solid Waste" AND Agent Based Model	3
"Solid Waste" AND Multi Criteria Decision Analysis	8
"Solid Waste" AND Scenario Analysis	11
"Solid Waste" AND Robust Decision Making	2
"Solid Waste" AND Integrated Assessment Model	3

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1094 **Table 2:** Characteristics comparison of methodologies.

Characteristic	Methodology					
	GT	ABM	MCDA	SA	RDM	IAM
Conflictive objectives	✓		✓ <sup>3</sup>		✓	
Cooperation	✓	✓			✓ <sup>6</sup>	
Decision making	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Foresight	✓			✓	✓ <sup>7</sup>	
Optimisation	✓	✓	✓	✓ <sup>5</sup>		✓ <sup>8</sup>
Rank alternatives			✓ <sup>4</sup>			
Stakeholders' interactions	✓	✓ <sup>2</sup>				✓ <sup>1</sup>
Strategic behaviour	✓ <sup>1</sup>					
Uncertainty	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

1095 <sup>1</sup> (Madani et al., 2015), <sup>2</sup> (Zechman, 2011), <sup>3</sup> (Santos et al., 2017), <sup>4</sup> (Ali et al., 2017; Hadian  
 1096 and Madani, 2015; Zhao et al., 2017), <sup>5</sup> (Geng et al., 2010), <sup>6</sup> (Hall et al., 2012), <sup>7</sup> (Matrosov et  
 1097 al., 2013), <sup>8</sup> (Tol, 1997).

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
1099

1100 **Table 3:** Waste management service fee negotiation model.

Waste Recycling Company	City Council	
	Disagree (d1)	Agree (u1)
	Disagree (d2)	Agree (u2)
	0 , 0	0 , 50
	50 , 0	25 , 25

1101


1102 **Figures**



1103


1104 **Figure 1:** Number of publications per year of the DM methods and CE.

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
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1107 **Figure 2:** Number of publications per year of the DM methods and SW.



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1109 **Figure 3:** Methodologies flowchart comparison.



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1111 **Figure 4:** Solution of the waste management service fee negotiation model with GT  
 1112 approach.

1113 *Source:* Adapted from Karmperis et al. (2013).

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