

Peacebuilding Initiatives in Africa

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Peacebuilding initiatives in Africa

Abstract

Since independence, much of Africa has been blighted by repeated cycles of conflict and stability. Africa is a place of enormous variation, but peace has been elusive for many across the continent, particularly following the end of the Cold War in the 1990s. A series of wars driven by poverty, identity, political economy and failing states led to a widespread crisis of governance and a rapid increase in international intervention. Reductions in the security capabilities of states has also led to the growth of trans-national violent groups, particularly those related to Islamic extremism in the Mahgreb, Nigeria and Somalia, but also criminal networks involved with drug and people smuggling. This wide variety of conflicts also generated a wide variety of responses as the international community began to develop ways of combating conflicts through reform of its own peacekeeping capacity. The optimism of the 1992 *Agenda for Peace*, which called for the UN to become the central instrument in the prevention and ending of conflicts, has given way to a more sanguine approach as mixed results have led to diverse outcomes for African countries and Africa's own peace and security architecture. In the end, despite the rapid development of important local and localised bottom-up peacebuilding initiatives, the state remains central to the overarching aims of peace and stability across the continent. It is here where the variations in performance can be found in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction.

Keywords: Peace, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, stability, security, security sector reform

Peace and stability have been somewhat elusive for several parts of Africa since independence. A wave of wars against former colonial powers was further complicated and extended as part of the global Cold War and then, when a wave of optimism swept across the continent in the early 1990s, Africa was hit by a host of succession wars. These conflicts were primarily internal and driven by identity, economic, political or demographic reasons and tended to revolve around corrupt, exclusive or predatory state systems that were failing and yet provided a resource flow. At the same time, the withdrawal of Cold War support further undermined the state, including the ability of state security systems to control and manage non-state groups and opposition to post-colonial state institutions. Many of these wars have continued to blight the continent resulting in widespread displacement and misery as well as casualties.

Africa is a place of enormous variation and so we need to be careful with generalisations under the heading "Africa". African conflicts are no different and range in intensity, cause and process from 'traditional secessionism in the Western Sahel, through to Islamist violence in Mali and Somalia and including revolts against authoritarianism and non-ideological struggles like Southern Sudan. The war in Sierra Leone resulted in around 70,000 deaths with 2.6m displaced, whereas the genocide in Rwanda resulted in an estimated 800,000 dead (Karbo, 2018). These figures, whilst horrific in their own right, further contributed to the degradation of the institutions that were supposed to be maintaining security resulting in weaker states and long-term, drawn-out conflicts in places as diverse as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan and across the Horn of Africa, particularly Somalia. Reductions in the security capabilities of states has also led to the growth of trans-national violent groups, particularly those related to Islamic extremism in the Mahgreb, Nigeria and Somalia, but also criminal networks involved with drug and people smuggling.

All of these different types of conflict (that operate on different scales and attract different levels of global strategic interest) might involve very different types of peacebuilding support, and the international community began to develop ways of combating conflicts through reform of its own,

United Nations (UN) peacekeeping capacity. The 1992 *Agenda for Peace* called for the UN to become the central instrument in the prevention and ending of conflicts and to engage directly in peacebuilding, 'rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war' (Report of UN Secretary General, 1992). Written at a time of international optimism after the end of the Cold War, the impact of stable economic growth, the increase in democratic ideas and the positive effects of globalisation were all held to be bringing the world closer to a more peaceful existence. Peacebuilding, then, was defined as actions taken to support or construct structures and institutions to consolidate peace and prevent relapse in to violence.

The subsequent quarter of a century have brought mixed results for Africa. Whilst some economies have flourished and democratic politics remains on the rise, the fall of dictators like Gaddafi in Libya, the advent of the Arab Spring across North Africa, the foundation of a new state in South Sudan, the continual violence in the DRC, amongst other places, means that the initial positive approach of the UN has given way to renewed pessimism. The UN remains a critical actor across Africa, but the most recent fifteen years in particular have seen a significant increase in the role of African actors and institutions within peacebuilding (Bellamy and Williams, 2015). The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) established a Continental Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in 1993 but its work was restricted largely to border disputes. When the ineffective OAU was replaced in 2002, the new African Union (AU) replaced this mechanism with an entire African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). APSA is distinguished by its explicit interventionist role under Article 4 of the 2002 AU Constitutive Act that seeks to learn from UN inaction following the Rwandan Genocide through both explicitly allowing the AU to intervene when the UN won't, but also explicitly recognising the aim of *Agenda for Peace*, in performing a regional role in complementing UN interventions (Kuwali, 2018).

This chapter outlines the history of formal peacebuilding intervention and how this has changed during this period. It begins by outlining the APSA and how it works in theory. It then moves on to look at the core activities of conflict prevention and peace making; peacekeeping; and post-conflict reconstruction. The chapter then outlines some of the current challenges and issues facing peacebuilding on the continent, particularly those faced by the increasing role of African peacebuilding institutions and the clash between these and the broader role of state building in Africa. The chapter also notes that the history of peacebuilding included here does not fully reflect the multiple initiatives across Africa that take place at the local level. There is just insufficient space for a meaningful survey.

It should be noted that there are a considerable number of bottom up and local peacebuilding initiatives that are currently taking place across Africa. However in this short piece, it would not be possible to do these important developments justice. African peacebuilding consists of multiple levels and actors and all of them remain important in the underlying processes of peacebuilding itself. There is a recognition of the role of traditional approaches in developing social harmony at the local level, but this has yet to be fully recognised within the mainstream literature¹. It is clear from the grey literature in particular, that the use of traditional authorities to restore relationships underlying peaceful societies is critical to long-lasting peace. It is important to note that traditional approaches should not be romanticised, but it is also clear that they have largely been excluded from dominant conflict resolution processes. There is a bewildering array of local initiatives frequently documented in grey literature by African based peacebuilding networks like the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) or the Kofi Annan Centre for Peacekeeping Excellence.²

¹ There are exceptions to this. See for example, Mac Ginty (2010), and Lemay-Hebert and Freedman (2017)

² The Accord website (<http://www.accord.org.za/publications/>) contains an extensive array of conference proceedings, occasional papers and several detailed examinations of local projects. See for example, 'The Complexity of Applying UN Resolution 1325 in Post Conflict Reintegration Processes: The case of Northern Uganda', Grace Mania, 9 May, 2011; 'Southern African anchor state: A renewed strategic commitment to

Architecture and Morality

It should be noted here that the very notion of peacebuilding is a disputed one. Whilst there is general agreement that peacebuilding is a long-term project involving the reconstruction of institutional social norms that underpin peaceful societies, beyond that there is very little agreement on what this actually looks like. In practice the historical and indeed the contemporary approach to peacebuilding is reliant on the state as the critical institutional actor. Within Africa this is problematic since the state is seen as interlocutor between local and community approaches and needs and the external pressures of globalisation. The state is seen as mediator, regulator and arbiter of justice at the same time as being the primary area of contestation between groups seeking political and economic power. This is true of the state in the sense that state institutions are expected to act as interlocutors at the same time as they undergo rapid internal change. This produces a series of tensions both within the state and also at the regional level in local, regional organisations like ECOWAS but also in the AU itself. These tensions are frequently manifest in terms of states perceived to be acting in their own interest rather than in a way that may benefit some of their own subjects (for example a minority group); a neighbour; or a more ethereal idea of *Pax Africana*³.

These tensions between state and non-state within geographical spaces, and between states and inter-state entities at regional or international level is something we return to below several times. Indeed, the focus on the state as the main object of peacebuilding has been problematic because the state itself has been so difficult within Africa. Indeed the nature of the state in Africa remains one of the core exigencies of peacebuilding on the continent whether we like it or not. The literature

South African conflict management as a central function of smart power', Priyal Singh, 11 April, 2018; and *Protecting Civilians in African Union Peace Support Operations: Key cases and lessons learned*, Edited by Jide Martins Okeke and Paul D Williams, 29 March 2017. The Kofi Annan Centre also publishes a wide variety of material here: <https://www.kaiptc.org/publications/>. See, for example 'Local Rules?! The practices of conflict resolution by the UN in Liberia', Matthias Neef, KAIPTC Paper 41, 2017. These may be supplemented by materials from some international NGOs, including Conciliation Resources (<https://www.c-r.org/>), Saferworld (<https://www.saferworld.org.uk/>) and International Alert (<https://www.international-alert.org/>).

³ The Kenyan scholar Ali Mazrui originally outlined the idea of a *Pax Africana* in Mazrui (1967)

on peacebuilding also focusses largely on the state either from a liberal viewpoint or a critical one, but this in turn represents the history of peacebuilding which is overwhelmingly state focussed, at least partly because those agencies that undertake huge peacebuilding efforts – notably the UN and latterly the AU – are both organisations of states and therefore have the interests of states at their heart⁴.

There are other important reasons for this. Firstly, in most situations of violent conflict, the maintenance of order, or stabilisation, tends to take precedence over other values. In practice, policymakers on the ground in conflict-affected areas focus on the most pressing immediate issues and these tend to be humanitarian aid and preventing further violence. Decisions taken hurriedly and in these moments of crisis tend to have long-term consequences that are rarely thought out. The maintenance of order, for example, can be subjective and the restoration of authoritarian regimes to maintain order will affect long-term peacebuilding (Hutton, 2014). Secondly, peacebuilding is rarely equal across states and is frequently concentrated in capital cities and urban areas. This again, produces long term consequences and may exacerbate the tensions that brought about conflict in the first place.

A core contention of this chapter is that the history of peacebuilding has been too focussed on the state and state building as a practical approach. The prioritisation of the state is not only reflected in how and when (and by whom) peacekeepers are deployed, but also in the emphasis placed on the construction and maintenance of institutions that are expected to manage violence. In this way much peacebuilding serves to maintain and strengthen existing social structures whilst relying on democracy to bring about change. This ignores peacebuilding as a site of political contestation and negotiation and as a source of tension itself in legitimising some actors over others. This also represents a worldview that does not recognise any alternative to states, or any conception of how peace could exist without states. At the same time, conflict is caused either by states collapsing,

⁴ See, for example Hutton (2014)

lacking capacity or going bad, but there is no dissention from the view that constructing a 'good' state is the best form of peacebuilding. This focus on states as the central actor has consequences, not least a focus on causality and linearity that fail to capture local complexities or the inter-relationships between individuals within the state and non-state actors. Instead much of the literature focusses on making external or externally supported interventions more effective, or alternatively as a form of neo-colonialism that seeks to socially engineer African states in to liberal states. Seldom do analysts focus on local peacebuilding processes without international support like, for example, Somaliland.

It is through this lens of the resurrection of the state that the APSA should be viewed. The AU established a complex set of comprehensive peace instruments that theoretically would provide significant peace management architecture across the continent. The 2002 Protocol on Relating of the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU outlines the general institutional make-up of the APSA. The PSC is a political decision-making body and is supported by the AU Commission which is an oversight and coordinating body; the Council of the Wise which acts as an auxiliary advisory and mediation body; the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) for information gathering and analysis; the African Standby Force (ASF) comprising uniformed services; and the Peace Fund (PF) that provides specialist funding for peace operations. The PSC provides coordination with the AU's other major organs, including the African Commission on Human and people's Rights (ACHPR), and the APSA itself also incorporates protocols for including Africa's regional economic communities (RECs).

All of this architecture requires considerable coordination to maintain security, and all of that coordination requires significant political will, which has been conspicuous by its absence for most of the life of the APSA and remains its core problem. Coupled with an overall lack of funding, this lack of political will extends below governments and in to individual institutions. Lack of coordination and funding limited the effectiveness of earlier AU interventions in Sudan for example. The AU Mission in

Sudan (AMIS) started in 2004 and comprised around 7,500 uniformed personnel by mid-2005. Despite this, it did not manage to contain the violence and in 2007 was merged in to the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). AMIS suffered from the core problems of insufficient funding and lack of capacity, including lack of critical equipment like attack helicopters. It also suffered from a lack of information sharing amongst its constituent elements of observers, protection force and police.

The lack of political will was manifest in lack of action following both the fall of Gaddafi in Libya and also the violent events across Northern Mali. What this also showed was a continual reliance on the international community for resources and materiel, including air support. This comes primarily from Europe or the US sometimes under the umbrella of the UN. Around 90% of APSA operations are externally funded and AU missions are frequently late, unfunded and result in unnecessary risks for the troops on the ground (Vines, 2013; Nagar, 2018). Where they have been more successful is working in conjunction with external organisations like the UN, where African forces have been invaluable, such as AMISOM in Somalia.

In practice this has significantly hampered the ASF from developing a stable doctrine of engagement and the AU from developing a consistent approach to intervention. Technically Article 4(h) of the AU Constitution allows the AU to intervene in another state in grave circumstances including genocide and human rights violations. However, the PSC, whilst retaining overall political control of the APSA, cannot take this decision on its own and such a move has to be ratified by the AU Assembly. For example, in December 2015, ahead of the AU Assembly in January 2016, the PSC authorised a 5,000 strong intervention force to prevent further bloodshed in Burundi (MAPROBU). However, the Assembly voted this down, again asserting the principle of state sovereignty over human rights.

Whilst the rest of the APSA organs contain significant professional staff, they tend to suffer from similar issues of lack of resources and also have to operate underneath the political umbrella provided by the AU Assembly. This is also complicated by the relationship with the RECs. Some of

these organisations have a long history of peacekeeping. ECOWAS, for example, deployed troops in to Sierra Leone, Liberia and Cote D'Ivoire throughout the 1990s and 2000s. However, others, particularly in East Africa until recently, have had a policy of non-intervention. Apart from obvious lack of consistency this also illustrates a specific issue of local intervention, namely political interference and local rivalry. An Ethiopian intervention in Somalia, for example, is a highly political move that raises historical animosities and rivalries as well as contemporary issues.

As a UN High Level Panel on Peace Operations stated in 2015: 'UN peace operations have proven to be effective and cost-efficient tools when accompanied by political commitment to peace' (2015). The APSA is, on paper, an effective structure, but a lack of political will, or at least a subordination of bigger, African interests to the interests of individual states and leaders has meant that AU peacebuilding has been limited to working with external forces and to piecemeal interventions. However, as the section below on peacekeeping might suggest, there may be ways out of this dilemma for African solutions to violence on the continent. At the same time, the knowledge that effective interventions may only currently be possible with external intervention, coupled with a desire of some leaders to protect domestic or elite interests creates a set of very different dilemmas and a situation where 'African sovereignty' is used as a deliberate ploy to prevent international intervention and that, in turn, affects the ability of the AU to effectively intervene to prevent human rights atrocities. Nowhere is this clearer than in discussions surrounding the International Criminal Court (ICC), for example.

The next three sections address the core issues of the *Agenda for Peace*; conflict prevention and peacemaking; peacekeeping; and post-conflict reconstruction. These sections provide a history and analysis of the current state of each and are followed by a discussion of how these contribute to the overall peacebuilding topography of Africa.

Women, 1325 and peace building

Firstly, it should be noted that the architecture is also designed to produce a more equal approach to peace building following UN Security Council Resolution 1325, passed in 2000 partly as a result of a decade of peacekeeping failure in Africa itself, along with the Balkans. This failure had highlighted the inability of the international community to end widespread sexual and gender based violence. 1325 was a historic landmark in that it made gender a matter of international security and acknowledged gender differences in the effects of conflicts. It also attempted to address the lack of inclusion of women in peace processes. In 2010 the UN conducted a review of 1325 finding that implementation had been both weak and patchy. In fact the Security Council itself stated that it remained:

‘...deeply concerned about persistent implementation deficits in the women, peace and security agenda, including in: protection from human rights abuses and violations; opportunities for women to exercise leadership; resources provided to address their needs and which will help them exercise their rights; and the capacities and commitment of all actors involved in the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) and subsequent resolutions to advance women’s participation and protection.’ (30 S/RES/2122/2013, p. 1-2)

Partly as a result of continuing worries, the UN launched a Global Study in to the implementation of 1325 (UN, 2015). The findings of the study clearly show the UN’s own concerns over continuing issues, specifically: very few prosecutions in connection to sexual violence in conflict; little seems to have changed on the ground despite a strong normative framework; persistent challenges in peace making where women’s participation remains very low; peace operations are similar with only around 3% military staff being female; only 28% member states have action plans for 1325. New security threats have made the situation worse, with international extremism both threatening women’s lives and increasing militarisation within societies, further constraining women’s inclusion

in peace negotiations. Fifteen years after the implementation of 1325 the UN itself concludes on the sobering note that not much has changed.

Conflict prevention and peace making

In some ways, the conflict prevention and peace making elements of the APSA should be the strongest. If there is a weakness in capacity of African security services and a lack of funding and equipment to support extensive interventions, one might expect an increased emphasis on mediation and prevention of conflicts in the first place. The APSA also has the Council of the Wise and the CEWS to support early mediation and prevention. However, both of these institutional arrangements have proved relatively weak in the past and in some ways, the prevention aspects of the APSA remains the weakest leg of the tripod of prevention, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction.

The growth in mediation efforts in Africa can, again, be traced back to the development of the post-Cold War agenda of which *Agenda for Peace* formed a part. Essentially the desire for increased mediation came about as a result of four factors: Firstly an interest in the role of local and regional actors in the *Agenda for Peace* approach; Secondly, an increase in the involvement of NGOs and other non-formal actors in mediation and discussion – what Susan Nan refers to as ‘track one-and-a-half’ diplomacy; thirdly a recognition that conflict was expensive and that mediation and prevention could be far more cost-effective as well as preventing casualties; and fourthly, the emergence of morality and the R2P agenda (Nan, 2005).

African mediation efforts over the life of the AU have been, at best, mixed, however it is also fair to say that mediation as an international activity also produces mixed results. Despite the existence of the APSA, which includes the Panel of the Wise, various other actors have been involved in mediation efforts including directly appointed envoys (Kenya and Darfur), RECs (SADC in Zimbabwe and IGAD in Sudan) and high level panels (Cote D’Ivoire). Whilst Kenya and Zimbabwe can both be

seen as very positive examples of mediation following violence after elections, failures such as Libya and Cote D'Ivoire point to underlying issues facing mediation in Africa, not least political willingness to reach a peaceful and mediated solution. Indeed, mediation as an approach is frequently criticised as being more of a short term solution rather than something that can directly influence underlying causes of conflict and some scholars criticise mediation as a way of spreading liberal solutions without accompanying institutional and democratic support (Branch, 2011).

Njoki Wamai's analysis of the Kenyan mediation process is instructive in terms of the dilemmas faced by mediators in Africa (Wamai, 2018). The Kenyan mediation was led by a Panel of Eminent African Personalities, in turn led by the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. This group was able to mediate between the political groups in Kenya following a disputed and flawed election and subsequent violence. After 42 days, Annan's team brokered a power sharing deal and ended the humanitarian emergency and political impasse. This successful outcome was lauded as both a triumph for the R2P doctrine and also as an example of an African-led mediation process.

However, as Wamai demonstrates the outcome was the result of a complex interaction between various factors and illustrates a series of underlying issues and dilemmas. Firstly, it does demonstrate that a well-resourced and connected mediation team with respected people inside it, can produce an outcome. At the same time, to suggest that this was purely African is false, given that Anna explicitly used his connections from his UN life to leverage considerable international support, both technically and politically. Secondly, it confirms that a large domestic movement that is willing to allow mediation and that wants a peaceful outcome, is critical to the process. Kenyan civil society and several political groups rallied behind the process to provide the political will that enabled the process to happen. Thirdly, the perceived impartiality of Annan and the team was critical in garnering support for the process but also in developing confidence in the outcome. To Wamai's three issues and dilemmas I would also add the importance of having one diplomatic track for negotiations, or at least a unity of purpose amongst those who were mediating (Wamai, 2018).

Whilst all of these issues and dilemmas may seem obvious, they have been absent in some of the other attempts to mediate in disputes. Notably in Libya, for example, there were several attempts by senior politicians within the AU and beyond (Erdogan from Turkey) to mediate and find a solution, but there was very little agreement amongst them, very little coordination and almost no agreement about the direction the mediation was heading in. As a result the failure of mediation in Libya stands as a serious example of how mediation can go wrong. In all fairness, however, it is also unclear how many of the other factors were also present in Libya and certainly there was no organised group looking for peace that could pressure on both sides, and also no perceived neutral agent acceptable to all parties.

Interestingly, in Kenya, Annan's own standing as an impartial mediator suffered following the intervention of the ICC indicted six high ranking officials for orchestrating the violence, when he became identified with western liberal interventionism. This not only illustrates the perception of liberal interventionism, but also shows the limits of even successful mediation in affecting the post-mediation politics, implying that mediation may be just a way to provide short term accommodation to political elites to overcome immediate problems rather than addressing underlying problems.

Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is a huge subject, but has been one of the most high profile and discussed issues within peace building more generally. Since the end of the Second World War there have been more than ninety peacekeeping missions in Africa, incorporating UN and non-UN approaches. Peacekeeping operations involve the expeditionary use of armed personnel with an explicit mandate to assist in the prevention of armed conflict, or to enforce or implement ceasefires or peace agreements (Bellamy and Williams, 2015). Following the convention used by Williams et al, these can be split in to UN-led, UN-authorized, UN-recognised and non-UN peace operations. UN-led, or 'blue helmet' operations are usually authorised by the UN Security Council and managed by the UN;

UN-authorized missions are those mandated by the UN (usually the Security Council) but managed operationally by a non-UN unit usually a regional organisation, coalition of lead state; UN-recognised operations are welcomed but not mandated by the UN. Non-UN missions are neither mandated nor managed by the UN but meet the generic definition of a peace mission, above.

Peacekeeping has a long history in Africa and a complete list of African peacekeeping missions is provided in Appendix 1. In fact around 80% of all UN peacekeepers are deployed within Africa. At time of writing, there are nine UN missions in Africa shown in Table 1:

Table 1: Current UN Peacekeeping Missions in AFRICA, February 2018⁵

Location	Acronym	Number	Notes
Abyei (Sudan)	UNISFA	4,841	4,802 deployed of which 4,369 are Ethiopian
Central African Republic	MINUSCA	14,109	12,719 military, 2,049 police. Primarily African contingents supplemented by some from Pak and Bang and also 750 from Brazil
Darfur	UNAMID	11,395 military personnel and 2,888 police	11,446 military personnel, 1,154 police advisers, 1,018 formed police unit officers, 700 international civilian staff, 121 United Nations volunteers, and 1,965 national civilian staff. Main contributors: Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gambia, Kenya, Indonesia, Mongolia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Senegal and Tanzania.

⁵ Compiled from UN sources available at <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en>

Democratic Republic of the Congo	MONUSCO	16,683 military, 1368 police, 4,145 civilians	Very wide range of contributors.
Liberia	UNMIL	Reducing	Due to be liquidated 30 April 2018
Mali	MINUSMA	13,228, of which 10,732 are military	More than 50 countries with military personnel and 25 with police
Somalia	UNSOS	Varies	UNSOS is primarily a logistical support mission to AMISOM and the Federal Authorities
South Sudan	UNMISS	17,140 personnel including 12,409 military	Only 7,900 authorised. Notable that India, Rwanda, Nepal, Bangladesh, Ethiopia are top five contributors, but 1,035 Chinese, 855 Mongolians and 341 UK
Western Sahara	MINURSO	470	

In addition, the largest peacekeeping mission in Africa is the UN-recognised AMISOM, the AU operation in Somalia, which currently consists of 22,126 uniformed personnel from Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Sierra Leone. It should also be noted that, although these missions have finished, troops from Senegal, Nigeria, Togo and Burkina Faso have been deployed in Gambia and Guinea-Bissau as part of ECOWAS peacekeeping activities.

Historically Africa has been one of the main foci of peace operations, with over 50% of its conflicts receiving UN related operations. The patterns of African peace operations largely follow two main waves since the end of the Cold War. There was an early wave in the immediate aftermath of the

withdrawal of Cold War support in the early-mid 1990s and then a second wave in the early 2000s. Since the end of the Cold War Williams et al report that the international community has been very likely to deploy a peacekeeping operation, and has become almost standard practice (Bellamy and Williams, 2015). Since 2000 the only major conflict that was not subject to a peacekeeping operation was communal violence within Nigeria. The high incidence of peacekeeping in Africa can partly be explained by the coincidence of increases in numbers of conflicts across the continent at the very time that interventionism was gaining ground, but also because with the end of the Cold War Africa ceased to be an area of geostrategic importance for several major international actors.

In global terms there has been an increase in the number of actors involved in peacekeeping, although the UN remains the overwhelmingly dominant force in this area. As Williams et al point out this may be the result of 'burden sharing' rather than displacement, following the *Agenda for Peace* call for an emphasis on regional actors to support the UN in peacebuilding more generally as demand has steadily increased and the weaknesses of the UN system were exposed in Rwanda, Bosnia, Somalia and Angola in the 1990s (Bellamy and Williams, 2015). However, the increase in the number of actors has been accompanied by centralisation of control in to the hands of the UN and the Security Council in particular. The number of non-UN and UN-authorized missions is relatively low and declining, whereas from an African point of view, UN-recognised missions are largely African in nature, recognising the development and use of the APSA with AU mandates. In fact Africa accounts for between two thirds and three quarters of all such missions since the Second World War.

In contrast to the view that African peacekeeping is being regionalised, the types of deployment across Africa have been wide and varied and are roughly in line with international trends. The one exception to this is the proliferation of UN-recognised activities where interventions take place without UN sanction but with approval. This is partly because there has always been a strong African component to many peacekeeping operations, particularly through regional organisations. However,

it is true that the numbers of African contributions to UN operations as well as the size of the African led operations like AMISOM have been getting progressively larger, with AMISOM being the largest current deployment in Africa and a UN mission existing just to provide it with logistical support (UNSOS).

To this development of 'partnership peacekeeping' where the AU operates in conjunction with the UN, must be placed a second important trend, namely the increase in African contributions. Whereas African troops have always played a significant role, it is clear that these numbers have been increasing. Since 2004, for example, the AU has placed over 60,000 peacekeepers and police and accompanying civilian experts in the four main peace support operations in Darfur, Central African Republic, Sudan and Somalia. This trend is not all positive, however. Firstly, there have been significant issues with recruiting sufficient police and civilians for each operation; secondly, the majority of troops have come from around one fifth of the total AU membership, particularly Burundi, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda; lastly, a core issue is that the AU has been unable to do this without significant external support in terms of funding but also equipment (Hirsch, 2018; Williams, 2018; Wondemagegnehu and Kebede, 2018).

Challenges for peacekeeping in Africa

Peacekeeping in Africa faces a number of critical challenges that are hardening and becoming more complex. The first challenge is implied above and that is lack of funding for such missions. The AU does not have the funds and virtually all peacekeeping missions by the AU are externally funded. In the 2015 budget, for example, only \$8.7million (2.3%) of its \$379 million operational budget was funded by AU states, the rest coming from the international community. The more successful ones also either hand over control to the UN after a short initial period (Mali, Burundi, CAR), operate in parallel (CAR, DRC, Cote D'Ivoire) or operate within a UN framework with direct UN support (AMISOM). This not only allows African initiatives to have access to direct funding but also resources

and expertise. Alongside lack of funds, there is a chronic lack of equipment, including logistical support and helicopters which is badly needed within the sort of operations being mounted. In addition, the history of AU missions shows deficits in intelligence, supply, deployment, command and control, lack of aviation, maritime and armoured units, lack of specialist units including medical, communication and engineering and a lack of reconnaissance capability. With the growth of peacekeeper involvement in conflict itself rather than peacekeeping this pressure will only increase (see below).

If funding is an ever-present across the peacekeeping architecture then the shifting seas of political will remains the other constant. Too often peacekeeping has been seen as a strategy not as an instrument of a broader strategic aim, at least partly because getting agreement on a broader aim has been too difficult. As we saw in the Kenyan example above, in order to succeed peace operations require strong political support, a viable and agreed strategy for a peace agreement, willing local agents and also a common understanding of a sense of direction. However in Darfur, the DRC, South Sudan, Mali and the CAR peace making failed and the peacekeepers were left coping with difficult and complex local conflicts rather than enforcing peace agreements or ceasefires. This reflects a fundamental weakness within the APSA, but also in the international approach to peacebuilding overall, which tends to emphasise training additional peacekeepers at the expense of building up conflict prevention measures and the underlying analysis needed to understand and seek solutions for underlying violence. The limited toolbox open to the AU has also meant an over-reliance on peacekeeping rather than alternatives like targeted sanctions or mediation missions.

In turn this has also led to a difficult set of relationships with states that host peacekeeping. Success relies at least partly on galvanisation of local actors that can place pressure on conflict parties. However, Eritrea, Chad, Burundi and Sudan, the host government has either thrown the peacekeepers out and/or complained bitterly about transgressions of sovereignty. This, of course, raises another thorny issue within African security, specifically who is the *de jure* authority? In Cote

D'Ivoire after the failed 2010 elections, for example, the international community had to decide which of the parties was actually the legitimate authority, or, in effect the host state. This may be fine on paper, but more complex if you are a peacekeeper on the ground caught between rival factions.

Despite the frequent inability of politicians to define a clear way forward, peacekeeping missions are frequently given extremely complex mandates that are getting more difficult. A recent UN operation, the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) not only gives itself a complex title in itself, but mandated twenty-seven priority tasks and fourteen additional tasks. These covered an extremely wide range of activities, ranging from protecting civilians from 'threat of physical violence', through to disarming rebel groups and promoting 'the rapid extension of state authority'. In other words carrying out most peacebuilding activities in addition to peacekeeping itself (Carayannis and Fowles, 2018).

However, the core problem that many African peacekeepers experience in these conditions, and is certainly the case in the largest operation, AMISOM is that they are not there to keep the peace at all, since there is no peace. Increasingly peacekeepers have found themselves carrying out peace enforcement, ranging over a whole variety of military activity including counter-insurgency, war fighting, stabilisation, human rights protection, counter-terrorism, state building and regime defence. All of these activities require significant specialist skills and the blurring of the whole range of peacebuilding activities does not help with clear mandates or legitimate actions within states that are hostile to external intervention.

Leaving aside some of the specialist needs such as atrocity prevention, we have already seen how the AU itself lacks police and civilian expertise in its run of the mill operations, let alone in this type of complex military operation. Beyond this, many African militaries lack the require sophistication or capacity to carry out some of these extremely demanding activities. Counter-insurgency is hard as the UK, US and other Europeans discovered/remembered in Iraq and Afghanistan. These forces

enjoy significant resources and capacity, particularly intelligence, armour and airmobile capability that are lacking within many African militaries. Whilst AMISOM is the most obvious example of this – and is the largest intervention with 22,000 troops involved – the AU has also designated enemy groups to be fought in the CAR, Mali and the DRC, significantly blurring the lines between peacekeeping and fighting wars.

Lastly, the UN has recently experienced a period of introspection as a result of serious accusations made against peacekeepers regarding abuse of civilians during operations – particularly the perennial problem of sexual exploitation and abuse carried out by those charged with protecting the peace – as well as a more general consideration of the needs of future peacekeepers. Indeed, the UN itself recognises that some change in the nature of operational aspects of peacekeeping is necessary and 2105 and 2016 saw a range of new directives issued. These included three reviews of the UN peace operations architecture: the High Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations (HIPPO), the Advisory Group of Experts on Peacebuilding (AGE), and the UN Global Study on Women, Peace and Security (UN document A/70/95-S/2015/446, 2015; Advisory Group of Experts, 2015; UN Women, 2015; Independent Commission on Multilateralism, 2016; The Commission on Global Security, Justice and Governance, 2015; The World Peace Foundation, 2016). These were supplemented by the Independent Commission on Multilateralism and the Commission on Global Security, Justice and Governance, which, in turn led to calls for an African Union review.

Kwame Akonor, in a recent book on this issue offers five reasons why sexual exploitation takes place within peace operations (Akonor, 2017). Firstly, there is a culture of hyper-masculinity within military culture that frequently makes troops very aggressive, but also defensive of each other in the face of civilian criticism. Secondly, the environments in which peacekeeping operations take place are frequently characterised by extreme poverty, leaving populations open to exploitation of all types. Thirdly, populations in these situations may be more willing to be exploited in return for greater security. Fourthly, the different cultures and norms of the peacekeepers mean that different

troops are likely to behave in non-standard ways in the field; and finally, lack of capacity, evidence gathering and witnesses, even before political will, mean that prosecuting peacekeepers can be extremely difficult.

These five elements combine to produce a very challenging environment for peacekeeping that also speaks to bigger issues. Given the problems facing the prosecution of the UN peacekeepers, one potential answer could be improvement of those prosecutions, but that is never going to be the whole answer. The establishment of a UN tribunal or special investigative court could add to the regulatory regime, but the real answer to these issues lies in returning to the idea of the *Pax Africana*. In part, this is really about internal culture incorporating better leadership, shared training and culture and the establishment of a shared disciplinary code across peacekeepers.

Post-Conflict interventions and building sustainable institutions

Post-conflict peacebuilding in Africa has been dominated, at least at a formal level, by security sector reform (SSR), which has evolved in to a common, and yet contested, form of post-conflict state-building (Hanggi, 2004; Schroeder and Chappuis, 2014). Initially concentrating on a narrow set of security actors, usually military and police, SSR attempts to address issues of citizen and state security through establishing effective civil and/or civilian control over professional security services, whilst at the same time incorporating state and non-state actors in to the security assemblage. SSR literature reflects a long-term change from a focus on narrow, technical approaches and concepts through to far wider concerns encapsulating traditional justice, gender and the nature of justice (Bakrania, 2016). SSR practice recognises that security is necessary for the development of sustainable peace and it therefore constructs effective, affordable and efficient security forces that are subject to the rule of law and democratic control (Andersen, 2011; Schnabel and Born, 2011).

SSR has been subject to considerable changes in focus, not least in starting from a basic assumption that security takes place within a traditional Weberian state framework and this must, therefore, be

the appropriate way in which to measure the success or otherwise of any given mission (Schroeder and Chappuis, 2014). Critical approaches have questioned this, pointing out that there are many competing sources of security that may exist beyond the state, particularly at the local level and that these remain poorly understood (Jackson, 2011). Secondly, this acknowledgement of complex webs of security providers and local sources of security and insecurity recognises the importance of alternative approaches to security provision, including hybrid forms of security organisation. Lastly, since SSR has emerged as an important security approach there has been an increasing debate around concepts of local ownership, specifically who designs, controls and benefits from SSR interventions. Answers to these questions range from an approach that amounts to international trusteeship and leadership through to complete local control of security (Mobekk, 2010).

SSR is a relatively recent phenomenon but is rooted in earlier debates about civil-military relations (Jackson, 2011). It is perhaps different to a number of contemporary academic debates within peacebuilding because it combines an explicitly normative agenda of linking liberal state building with human security. The concept has been driven, at least early in its development, by policy-makers on the ground rather than through analytical depth or an explicit theoretical framework and research has tended to follow policy within SSR. Early development of SSR was driven by the democratisation of Eastern Europe, then South Africa, both of which involved transformation from autocratic or non-democratic regimes to western democracy. The 1994 Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, adopted by the OSCE, required member states to accept democratic control over military and other security forces, a set of principles that were then taken on as 'security sector reform' by the United Kingdom and then by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation (OECD-DAC). As a result of these developments Africa dominates the case history of SSR with the rest of the world well behind in the literature. Policing is by far the most studied area, followed by access to justice, justice sector reform, legal reform and defence. Few studies look at intelligence and even less at border security, even those addressing more than one theme (Jackson and Bakrania, 2018).

Current dilemmas within SSR approaches

It is clear that there are inconsistencies between state building, security and development. There is an (unwritten) assumption that human security can be best served by creating a functioning state that will provide security as a public good and that development will provide benefits to the general population. However, human security in terms of 'freedom from fear' and citizen security in terms of an entitlement to protection by the state, remains elusive for many people and the state's responsibility to protect citizens is yet to be realised. This lack, in turn, may lead to claims of legitimisation of international intervention in failed states (Luckham and Kirk, 2012). The transfer of the political architecture of the liberal state to non-liberal societies in the form of state-building, and by extension SSR, leads to a tension between the pacific nature of liberalism and the question whether those structures really are the political manifestation of the local populations (Jackson, 2011).

These issues have led to three core thematic issues: state-centrism, techno-centrism and local ownership. *State-centrism* has emerged as a fundamental issue in the approach to SSR in places where the formal state may not be the arbiter of security and justice. Whilst virtually all analysts accept that there are problems with the nation state in many of the contexts in which states are failing, there is still a tendency to accept the technocratic parameters of state building. Casting the nation-state as the norm ignores the broadening and deepening of security at all levels, the intra-state nature of much conflict, international conflict actors and also the role of the state itself as participant. There remains an assumption that the right mixture of policies can create a healthy nation-state. Constructing a new state also requires a significant cultural shift in how people relate to structures of authority, including both state and 'customary' authorities, and in several parts of rural Africa even where states have had a functioning core before, during or even after conflict, it may only rarely, or partially have penetrated into the countryside, notably in many African countries

(Jackson, 2007). Many people simply do not receive or have ever received services directly from states.

Techno-centrism is a reflection of lack of understanding of the political nature of state building. Whereas much SSR literature refers to its political nature, it concentrates on technocratic approaches to the construction of states rather than the politics of what is being constructed, with 'politics' relegated to the role of activities designed to undermine the process of SSR rather than *doing* SSR. This is reinforced in practice through many interventions being frequently carried out by international bureaucrats, or in SSR, by military officers whose concerns are primarily technical (i.e., teaching people to shoot straight) rather than political (i.e., teaching them who to shoot at). Technocratic approaches to SSR represent a form of anti-politics machinery both in terms of their disregard for local political sensitivities, but also in their relentless application and reapplication. As Richmond (2009) points out, the contemporary peacebuilding consensus assumes that there is an agreed underlying set of norms and that all interventions in support of this will receive the support of agents engaged in peacebuilding. A key element of this consensus is to create standards, benchmarks and frameworks for creating a pacific world that constitute a specific type of knowledge that can then be transferred to conflict zones as international norms. This knowledge is accompanied by a set of practices designated by technical terminology as 'tools', 'indicators', 'templates' or 'instruments' that can be considered apolitical and objective ways to represent reality (Körppen, 2011). Critically, these technical benchmarks can also be 'measured', making them attractive to international donors.

Lastly, *local ownership* remains a critical unresolved issue in all of this and yet remains critical. Whilst clearly SSR could privilege compliance with international state rules, and this may be in line with the desires of some potential local owners, it raises the question of how local ownership can be exercised if these local owners do not want to comply with international norms? Local ownership may be contested and SSR tends to see local ownership as exercised by those who accept broad

liberal state policies and structures. The use of customary power structures also facilitates the exercise of hidden transcripts of power that trap the dominant as well as the weak within the same web of socialised roles and behaviour.

The literature is divided on the issue of local ownership and even what it means, even if there is some agreement that at its centre, there is an issue of agency (Donais, 2008). Local ownership is either over-romanticised or seen as a problem to be overcome, reflecting a wariness about local ownership and local owners. They may not be representative, they may not be willing to be inclusive and they may be an elite, but they may be the real owners and unwilling to relinquish control. International involvement in strengthening security institutions may cement the positions of ruling groups, and it may be naive to assume that such local owners would accept programmes designed to change or dilute their own power. Note that discussions about local ownership also tend to assume that the international community is capable, willing or even able to act as one international community, whereas in reality, particularly in Africa, this is a shifting coalition of actors across a very wide range of approaches and philosophies (Bliesemann de Guevara and Kühn, 2011). At the same time, humanitarian space is hybrid—a site of contention between international agencies pursuing neoliberal orthodoxies of a putative global governance and local groups resisting these impositions. In African SSR, the international community is an extraordinarily broad church. At its core are state institutions, both local and international, including state donors, the military and the police. However, there are also significant contributions by international NGOs and organisations, the UN, APSA and other multilateral donors, and also those engaged in activities as diverse as human rights promotion and demining. Discussion of one, singular ‘international community’ within SSR is problematic. The overwhelming direction of SSR programming is determined by this unwieldy coalition which is difficult to stop. If SSR is to shift away from purely internationally-led approaches to more inclusive programmes, then the literature implies that we lack sufficient knowledge. Specifically, there is an absence of empirically informed localised interventions that start with realistic political analysis (Mannitz, 2014).

The overwhelming reaction to failures and shortcomings in SSR has been to develop new versions of existing technocratic solutions, increase funding or to improve communication, despite evidence of limited impact. SSR peacebuilding approaches in Africa need to move away from these approaches and reflect wider changes within the literature on state building and peacebuilding, particularly ideas around hybridity and non-state actors (Mac Ginty, 2010). The practical approaches and categories deployed by the international community within SSR need to be coupled with a measure of humility in terms of the ambitious aims of some peacebuilding programming and an acknowledgement that not only are there issues with international blueprints introduced in t significantly different societies, but also that the international community lacks the knowledge of how to adapt them in order to improve post-conflict peacebuilding.

Conclusions

This chapter has attempted to bring together several aspects of a huge subject. Taking the idea of *Pax Africana* is a useful approach in charting the ability of local and comprehensive institutional developments in Africa through the APSA in tackling the ongoing conflicts across the Continent. One of the core features of the peacebuilding topography has been the increasing use of partnership approaches between external agents and local, African partners, particularly the increasingly sophisticated APSA framework. The AU has led on several conflict initiatives and peace operations, and has been most successful where it has initially intervened and then handed over to the UN (Mali) or when it has operated under the auspices of the UN itself as a recognised operation (AMISOM). Overall, whilst some African countries have always been a willing partners in UN peacekeeping, for example, this pool of willing partners has been growing slowly and remains limited in terms of the limited capabilities of local militaries. At the same time, the ability of the AU or the RECs to launch independent peace operations is severely limited by lack of funding and military resources and there remains an overall continuing reliance on the external actors for critical

support, particularly as peacekeeping gradually turns in to peace enforcement and war fighting as with AMISOM.

There remain several issues with increasing African participation in future peacebuilding as well as with the international community. Recent developments in terms of UN failings and abuse of civilians have led to a reconsideration of the disciplinary framework within which peacekeepers work, and this in turn will lead to an increased emphasis on gender sensitive approaches to peacebuilding, which should bleed through in to consideration of how to work with local agents and political structures that are firmly rooted in traditional or customary social hierarchies that may discriminate along gender lines. At the same time, lack of knowledge about local systems means that international interventions tend to go along technocratic lines but retain a set of normative assumptions about what states should be, what they should look like and how they should be controlled.

In the end, though, the failure keep the peace cannot be blamed on the international community, which tends to intervene after conflicts. The weakness of mediation approaches and even intervention in humanitarian disasters across Africa tends to be hampered by either a lack of political will, or the deliberate use of political will to achieve some other aim, not least the setting of a precedent of intervention and thereby risking one's own regime. This has been seen over Libya and also Burundi in recent years. Indeed, even where there is agreement on intervention, too frequently the idea is to send peacekeepers in to impossible situations because mediation may not be an immediate option due to perceived bias (Sudan). However, the picture is not all negative and the APSA is gaining ground. There are more African peacekeepers than ever and still more are being trained. There are skill gaps in policing, skilled roles and intelligence, but these gaps can be filled. For these peacekeepers to be successful, however, requires further development of political solidarity and a determination that violence is not an acceptable way to deal with local conflicts.

Appendix 1: Peacekeeping Operations in Africa

African peace operations 1946-2018				
UN-led	UN-Authorised	UN-recognised	OAU-AU	Non-UN/Other
Mission	Location	Start date	End date	Deployed size
ONUC	Congo	Jul-60	Jun-64	19,830
International Observer Team in Nigeria (OTN)	Nigeria	1968	1970	6
Somali Observer Force	Uganda, Tanzania	Oct-72	Nov-72	Unclear
Inter-African Force	Zaire	Jun-78	1979	2,645
Nigerian Peacekeeping Force	Chad	Mar-79	Jun-79	800
Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF)	Rhodesia/Zimbabwe	Dec-79	Mar-80	1,319
OAU Peacekeeping Force 1	Chad	Jan-80	Mar-80	550
OAU Peacekeeping Force 2	Chad	1981	1982	2,600
Monitoring Observer Group	Uganda	1985	1986	Unclear

Observer Commission from ANAD (and Benin)	Mali and Burkina Faso	Jan-86	Jan-86	16
UNAVEM I	Angola	Dec-88	Jun-91	70
UNTAG	Namibia	Apr-89	Mar-90	7,500
ECOMOG	Liberia	Aug-90	1999	12,040
Joint Verification Commission (JVC)	Mozambique	1990	1992	30
MINURSO	Western Sahara	Apr-91	ongoing	245
OAU Mission to Western Sahara	Western Sahara	1991	1991	Unclear
UNAVEM II	Angola	May-91	Feb-95	350
OAU Military Observer Team (MOT)	Rwanda	Apr-91	Sep-92	15
OAU Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) I	Rwanda	1991	1993	57
ONUMOZ	Mozambique	Dec-92	Dec-94	8,125
UNOSOM I	Somalia	Apr-92	Mar-93	4,270
UNITAF	Somalia	Dec-92	May-93	37,000
UNOMIL	Liberia	Sep-93	Sep-97	303
United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR)	Rwanda	Jun-93	Sep-94	81
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) I	Rwanda	Oct-93	Jun-94	2,500

UNOSOM II	Somalia	Mar-93	Mar-95	28,000
OAU Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG)II	Rwanda	Aug-93	Nov-93	70
OMIB	Burundi	Dec-93	Jul-96	47
UNASOG	Chad, Libya	Apr-94	Jun-94	9
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) II	Rwanda	May-94	Mar-96	5,500
Commonwealth Peacekeeping Assistance Group	South Africa	Feb-94	Apr-94	33
UNAVEM III	Angola	Feb-95	Jun-97	4,220
MONUA	Angola	Jun-97	Feb-99	3,000
MISAB	Central African Republic	Feb-97	Apr-98	1,100
ECOMOG	Sierra Leone	1997	2000	14,000
OMIC	Comoros	Aug-97	Apr-99	20
MINURCA	Central African Republic	Apr-98	Feb-00	1,350
UNOMSIL	Sierra Leone	Jul-98	Oct-99	217
ECOMOG	Guinea-Bissau	Jun-98	Apr-99	750
MONUC-a	DR Congo	Nov-99	2002	4,378
UNAMSIL	Sierra Leone	Oct-99	Dec-05	17,670

OAU Observer Mission	DR Congo	Nov-99	Nov-00	43
UNMEE	Ethiopia-Eritrea	Jul-00	Jul-08	4,200
OLMEE, AULMEE	Ethiopia-Eritrea	2000	2008	43
Operation Palliser (UK)	Sierra Leone	May-00	Sep-00	1,300
Operations Basilica, Silkman (UK)	Sierra Leone	2000	2005	250
SAPSD	Burundi	Oct-01	2009	754
OMIC 2	Comoros	Nov-01	Feb-02	14
CEN-SAD	Central African Republic	Dec-01	Jan-03	300
JCM and IMU	Sudan	Jan-02	Jun-05	24
ECOMICI	Ivory Coast	Sep-02	2004	1,500
Operation Licorne (France)	Ivory Coast	Sep-02	ongoing	4,000
FOMUC (ECCAS)	Central African Republic	Dec-02	2008	380
OMIC 3	Comoros	Mar-02	May-02	39
MINUCI	Ivory Coast	May-03	Apr-04	76
MONUC-b	DR Congo	2003	Jun-10	22,016
ECOMIL	Liberia	Sep-03	Oct-03	3,600

UNMIL	Liberia	Oct-03	ongoing	16,115
Operation Artemis/IEMF	DR Congo	Jun-03	Sep-03	2,205
AMIB	Burundi	Apr-03	May-04	3,250
ONUB	Burundi	May-04	Dec-06	5,770
ONUCI	Ivory Coast	Feb-04	Jun-17	10,954
AMIS	Sudan	Jul-04	Dec-07	7,700
MIOC	Comoros	Mar-04	May-04	41
UNMIS	Sudan	Mar-05	Jul-11	10,519
EUSEC-CONGO	DR Congo	May-05	ongoing	50
EU Support to AMIS 2	Sudan	Jul-05	Dec-07	50
EUFOR-RD	DR Congo	Jun-06	Nov-06	2,275
AMISEC	Comoros	Apr-06	May-06	1,260
AMISOM	Somalia	Feb-07	ongoing	22,126
MAES	Comoros	May-07	Dec-08	356
MINURCAT	Chad	Sep-07	Dec-10	5,525
Operation Democracy in the Comoros (AU)	Comoros	Mar-08	Dec-08	1,800

EUFOR-Chad	Chad	Feb-08	Mar-09	3,700
UNAMID	Sudan	Dec-07	ongoing	21,600
MICOPAX	Central African Republic	Jul-08	Dec-13	730
EU SSR	Guinea-Bissau	Jun-08	Sep-10	33
MONUSCO	DR Congo	Jul-10	ongoing	22,016
EUTM Somalia	Somalia-Uganda	Apr-10	ongoing	Unclear
UNMISS	South Sudan	Jul-11	ongoing	12,409
UNISFA	Sudan (Abyei)	Jun-11	ongoing	5,325
MISSANG-GB (Angola)	Guinea-Bissau	Mar-11	Apr-12	200
ECOMIB	Guinea-Bissau	May-12	ongoing	629
AFISMA	Mali	Dec-12	ongoing	9,620
Operation Serval (France)	Mali	Dec-12	Jul-14	4,000
EUTM Mali	Mali	Feb-13	ongoing	450
MINUSMA	Mali	Apr-13	ongoing	12,640
Operation Sangaris (France)	Central African Republic	Dec-13	Oct-16	2,500
MISCA	Central African Republic	Dec-13	Sep-14	5,142

MINUSCA	Central African Republic	Sep-14	ongoing	12,719
Operation Barkhane (France)	Chad	Jul-14	ongoing	3,000
UNSOS	Somalia	Nov-15	ongoing	Unclear

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