UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM

University of Birmingham Research at Birmingham

Trusting through the Moscow-Washington hotline

Simon, Eszter; Simon, Agnes

DOI:
10.1093/jogss/ogz062

License:
None: All rights reserved

Document Version
Peer reviewed version

Citation for published version (Harvard):
Simon, E & Simon, A 2020, 'Trusting through the Moscow-Washington hotline: a role theoretical explanation of the hotline's contribution to crisis stability', *Journal of Global Security Studies*. https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogz062

Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal

Publisher Rights Statement:
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Journal of Global Security Studies following peer review. The version of record Eszter Simon, Agnes Simon, Trusting through the Moscow-Washington hotline: a role theoretical explanation of the hotline's contribution to crisis stability, Journal of Global Security Studies, ogz062, is available online at: https://academic.oup.com/jogss/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jogss/ogz062/5697355 and https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogz062https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogz062

General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes permitted by law.

•Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private study or non-commercial research.
•User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of 'fair dealing' under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.

Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.

When citing, please reference the published version.

Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.

If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate.

Download date: 25. Apr. 2024

Eszter Simon and Agnes Simon

Trusting through the Moscow-Washington Hotline: A Role Theoretical Explanation of the Hotline's Contribution to Crisis Stability

Abstract

This article explores how the Moscow-Washington hotline has contributed to crisis stability. Relying on symbolic interactionist role theory, the article argues that the hotline provides leaders with an opportunity to engage in altercasting behavior so as to trust each other temporarily when they use the hotline privately and exclusively and define the situation at hand as a crisis. This function of the hotline is particularly useful when leaders have not managed to develop interpersonal trust between them. This new understanding of the hotline questions the dominant view that it is a communication device only and improves upon its existing symbolic understandings by offering a conceptualization that explains how intentions communicated via the hotline are seen credible. Furthermore, seeing trust as role contributes to trust scholarship in IR by offering a middle-ground between defining trust as interests, which are often ambiguous in crises, and as identity, which is unattainable for adversaries in the short term. We use two historical cases studies, the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War, to illustrate our theoretical claims.

Keywords: Moscow-Washington hotline, role theory, crisis management, trust

Introduction

The Moscow-Washington hotline—a direct communication link (DCL) between the superpower capitals—was established in August 1963. It was intended to remedy the communication problems that President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev had faced during the Cuban Missile Crisis, problems that, on October 27, 1962, had forced Khrushchev to broadcast his reply to Kennedy on Radio Moscow, rather than wait until his message reached the President via diplomatic channels (Beschloss 1991, 524). International Relations (IR) scholarship has treated the hotline as a confidence-building measure that has significantly contributed to crisis stability by reducing the

likelihood of miscalculation, misinterpretation, and inadvertent war stemming from lack of communication and shortage of information (e.g., Gillespie 2012, 151-152; Thacher 1990; Schelling 1984, 57-58; 1996, 60, Ball 1991, 137-138; Plischke 1986a 58). However, the diplomatic communications capabilities of both superpowers surpassed the hotline in speed by the late 1960s (e.g., Kissinger 1979, 909), seemingly making the hotline redundant. Nonetheless, it has remained in use ever since. In fact, with one exception, it has been employed when faster channels of diplomatic communications have been at the disposal of both superpowers. Thus, understanding the hotline as a swift communication tool only offers an incomplete explanation of its use and contribution to crisis stability. After all, the superpowers' ability to communicate does not, in itself, guarantee that they will send each other vital information; nor does it explain why either party would believe information sent via the hotline when the same or similar information sent by other channels would be discarded as not credible.

Accordingly, this article takes a new look at the hotline's contribution to crisis stability. Drawing on symbolic interactionist role theory, we argue that using the hotline can be interpreted as an attempt at altercasting to change distrust-based role-taking to trust-based interaction, and the hotline is a shared symbol of trustor-trustee role-taking. That is, by using this private channel of communication, leaders make use of the hotline's function as a repository of trustworthiness and try to make trust the basis of their interactions, with the objective of counterbalancing any distrust that is present at the interpersonal and interstate levels and that has hindered them from seeing each other's messages as credible. The contribution of this article to IR is both theoretical and empirical. First, as opposed to existing accounts, which see trust as stemming from interests (e.g. Kydd 2007) or identity (e.g. Bilgic 2014), we define trust as role-based. Understanding trust as role emphasizes the 'as-if' nature of trust (Möllering 2006b, 111-112; Lewis and Weigert 1985, 969) and finds a middle ground between interests, which are ambiguous in crisis, and identity, which is unlikely to exist before or develop during a crisis between inimical states. Second, we reinterpret the meaning of the hotline for crisis management. We argue that the hotline's major contribution to crisis management has not been its ability to make communication possible between leaders of inimical states, but the fact that it conveys a symbolic message of trust when it is used. While treating the hotline as a symbol is not

novel in itself (see Egilsson 2003; Jervis 1970; Simon and Simon 2003, 2017), our understanding of the hotline's symbolism provides a better explanation of how the hotline has helped to reduce the likelihood of miscalculation or misinterpretation and, consequently, of inadvertent war, than existing accounts.

In line with comparative-historical methodology (Mahoney and Thelen 2016), we use process-tracing to build our argument and to present rich data regarding the hotline's use in two cases: the Six-Day War (1967) and the Yom-Kippur War (1973). Our case selection is guided by the availability of documents, our research question, and Mill's method of agreement. Although the hotline has been used since the end of the Cold War several times,[1] government documents released so far only allow us to assess its use in the Cold War. As we are interested in the use of the hotline in crises, which we define as "a confrontation of two or more states, usually occupying a short time period, in which the probability of an outbreak of war between the participants is perceived to increase significantly" (Williams 1976, 25), we have only selected cases that satisfy this condition.[2] In the absence of direct confrontations analogous to the Missile Crisis, we analyze indirect crises in which the superpowers were involved through their allies. Each of the selected events represents a crisis that was successfully managed via superpower cooperation. Although studying only cases that share a particular outcome is not generally recommended, it is an appropriate method in the early stages of a research program when the goal is to identify "potential causal paths and variables leading to the dependent variable of interest" (George and Bennett 2005, 23). Finally, the cases are most similar in terms of contextual factors, but, as we shall see, show variation in the use of the hotline.

In order to offer a rich account of both cases, we have used a variety of sources. We have relied primarily on government documents either published in the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series or collected in the Johnson and Nixon Presidential Libraries. Where government

[1] Most recently, President Obama reportedly used the hotline to warn President Putin about Russian interference in elections (Allen 2016).

[2] It is important to note that while the hotline was created for use in crises and our theoretical interest is in such situations, it has not always been used in this spirit. For example, President Carter used the hotline in March 1977 in an attempt to facilitate the SALT II negotiations (Ball 1991).

documentation is lacking, we have used memoirs and secondary sources. When a conflict has arisen between primary and secondary sources or memoirs, we have given preference to the former. However, we admit that the scarcity of Soviet sources has been a challenge, often forcing us to evaluate Soviet behavior through Western sources.

We have divided this article into four parts. We begin by outlining our theoretical explanation of the hotline's contribution to crisis stability. Second, we describe the way we intend to capture role-taking, altercasting, and the conditions—perception of the situation as a crisis, the privacy and exclusivity of leader-to-leader exchanges, and lack of interpersonal trust—under which such altercasting is expected to occur in our case studies. Third, we use our theoretical framework to guide our analysis of the Six-Day War (1967) and the Yom Kippur War (1973). In conclusion, we underline the contribution that our investigation of the hotline's use makes to crisis management, discuss the limitations of our study, and elaborate on the broader theoretical and policy implications of our findings.

A Role-Based Understanding of the Hotline's Crisis Contribution

Despite the use of the hotline as a diplomatic instrument between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia for more than fifty years, it has, in its own right, garnered relatively modest analytical and theoretical interests by IR scholarship (Egilsson 2003; Thacher 1990; Jamgotch 1985; Nanz 2010; Simon and Simon 2003; 2017). Generally, the hotline is offered as an example of a confidence-building measure that lessens the likelihood of inadvertent war as a result of miscalculation and misunderstanding by making communication between leaders possible (e.g., Gillespie 2012, 151-152; Thacher 1990; Schelling 1996, 60, 1984, 57-58; Ball 1991, 137-138; Plischke 1986a, 58). However, the hotline's importance as a communication device declined in the late 1960s, when the speed of both Soviet and American diplomatic communication systems matched or even exceeded that of the hotline (e.g., Kissinger 1979, 909). Nevertheless, Soviet/Russian and American leaders have continued to use it.

A small number of IR researchers have suggested that the hotline has an additional—symbolic—function and, consequently, is useful beyond its technical capabilities; although they

cannot agree as to what this symbolism consists of. “Just by activating the Hotline”, one may convey “urgency” (Egilsson 2003, 16), add emphasis to the message (Jervis 1970, 91), express “cooperative intentions” (Simon and Simon 2003), and/or send a message of “good will” (Simon and Simon 2017). We agree that the hotline’s significance draws on its symbolism; but we find current symbolic accounts lacking. They focus on the hotline’s ability to transmit information quickly and do not consider the problem of signal interpretation. Being technically capable of communicating does not explain why distrustful enemies who were suspicious about each other’s messages received via regular diplomatic channels would find such messages trustworthy once they were sent through the hotline.

To improve upon existing symbolic interpretations of the hotline, we draw upon symbolic interactionist role theory, which sees social reality in terms of interaction between two agents—alter and ego—who take roles in accordance with their definition of the unfolding situation rather than as a result of internal psychological mechanisms and past experience (cf. Larson 1997; Brugger, Hasenclever and Kasten 2013). Roles are social positions that consist of expectations towards both oneself (ego) and the other (alter) about the forms of behavior appropriate in particular situations (e.g., Harnisch 2012, 8). Through role-taking, agents assess the general intent of others, and the others’ responses and feelings towards them; and they come to understand what others expect of them (Charon 2001, 114-6). Agents either comply with or act contrary to these expectations, depending on whether they see alter expectations as furthering or hindering their own interests. They may also encourage other agents to modify their role-taking through altercasting: that is, through the conscious changing of their own role (Charon 2001, 115-7, 140; Harnisch 2012, 13; Thies 2015). Normative persuasion, that is linguistic engagement so as “to assess the appropriateness of roles in a situation of uncertainty”, is often a means by which altercasting is attempted (Hanisch 2012, 13). As social objects, symbols play an integral part in this role positioning process by forming the basis of communication between agents. Their meaning is defined by people and they are used intentionally with a knowledge of what they represent (Charon 2001, 41-48).

The Moscow-Washington hotline’s contribution to crisis management lies in its ability to create a shared symbolic understanding about the desirable form of behavior for both actors while

they interact in a crisis. This shared symbolism involves trust-based role-taking by leaders—i.e., the exhibiting of behaviors and emotions associated with trust in their interactions—in the extraordinary situation they are in. Trust, which we understand as a reaction to risk and uncertainty, and define as an actor's (the trustor's) acceptance of vulnerability to another actor (the trustee) as a result of positive expectations regarding the trustor's intentions and behavior towards the trustee (e.g., Booth and Wheeler 2007, 230; Wheeler 2009, 428; Larson 1997, 19; Farrell 2009, 25; Kydd 2007, 11; Urban 2014, 310; Mayer, Davis and Schoorman 1995, 712), facilitates better solutions by encouraging interaction and information-sharing, and by allowing alter and ego to bracket their suspicions about each other's intentions (Rathbun 2018, 698; Larson 1997; Möllering 2006b). The hotline makes it possible for leaders to assume both trustor (ego) and trustee (alter) roles and fosters cooperation between the Soviet Union/Russia and the US by allowing leaders to interpret each other's messages sent through the hotline as trustworthy. While the hotline is not able to abolish the distrust and suspicion that characterize interstate relations, it helps leaders to counteract them by establishing trust temporarily, which makes it possible for them to focus on mutual rather than unilateral gains for the duration of the crisis. In other words, when leaders use the hotline, they engage in altercasting. They opt out of their roles as distrustor and distrustee and deliberately choose to act as if they trusted the other, in the expectation that the other would do the same.

Defining trust (and distrust) as the basis of role-based behavior provides several advantages over existing conceptualizations of trust. It represents a middle ground between the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequentialism (Thies 2013, 5) and, thereby, unites the best of these accounts. While role theory acknowledges the goal-oriented nature of human behavior, it does not reduce trust to interests (cf. Farrell 2009; Kydd 2007; Hardin 1993). Such a departure is necessary, because interests in themselves are insufficient to explain behavior when they are ambiguous (Farrell 2009, 18, 73). Direct and indirect crises between nuclear-armed adversaries are exactly such situations. They involve two major risk factors that lead actors to assume contradictory preferences. Firstly, the desire for survival under a heightened probability of nuclear war and the potential for mutual annihilation provide incentives for cooperation and compromise. Secondly, the risk a crisis poses to the vital interests and values of each side in a situation whose outcome may have far-reaching

consequences for their future relations encourages inimical states to see the risk of war as an opportunity to secure their interests by forcing the other side to back down (Williams 1976, 47-55). The hotline contributes to crisis stability by enabling leaders to assume roles on the basis of their mutual desire for peace.

At the same time, our conceptualization of trust also challenges accounts that see trust (e.g., Wheeler 2018; Bilgic 2014; Urban 2014) and/or role-taking (Wendt 1999) resulting from the development of a common identity, because actors who have problems claiming trust on the basis of common interests are unlikely to demonstrate a more advanced form of trust based on identity. Given that identity-based trust requires time—years or even decades—to develop (e.g., Lewicki and Bunker 1996; Booth and Wheeler 2007, 240), it is unreasonable to expect that actors will acquire it in the short span of a crisis. What actors can do in the short term is to change their role-taking, because role-taking only entails "specific prescriptions for action" in a given situation without necessarily affecting or drawing on identity (Cantir and Kaarbo 2016, 18; cf. Wendt 1999). Seeing trust as a role may raise questions about how much this trust is real, and how much it is only a game of pretense where leaders act 'as if' they trusted (e.g., Hardin 1993). We find this point moot for two reasons. First, all trust requires an 'as if' attitude from the trustor towards social reality: "to trust is to live as if certain rationally possible futures will not occur" (Lewis and Weigert 1985, 969), and as if social vulnerability and uncertainty were favorably resolved (Möllering 2006b, 111-112). Second, the behavioral consequences of truly trusting and acting as if one trusted are indistinguishable.

The kind of trust that a role theoretical approach makes possible through altercasting is situational. Actors, who are assumed to take roles on the basis of their definition of the situation, usually change their role when they find themselves in new and problematic situations (Harnisch 2012, 50). This situation-specific understanding of trust in role theory is in line with the substantial segment of trust scholarship that sees trust as having bandwidth, and as expanding to certain matters within a relationship but not to others (e.g., Guo, Lumineau and Lewicki 2017, 46; Wheeler 2018, 5; Larson 1997, 20). Conceptualizing trust as a situation-specific role expectation also allows for trust and distrust to be concurrently present in a relationship—a phenomenon that has been evidenced in work relationships (e.g., Saunders, Dietz and Thornhill 2014; Lewicki, McAllister and Bies 1998) and

among state leaders who, as individuals representing their states, sometimes oscillate between the interpersonal and interstate domains of their relationship, trusting in the former, but distrusting in the latter context (e.g., Wheeler 2013, 2018; Pavri 2009; Forsberg 1999).

The invocation of the hotline only provides leaders with an opportunity to successfully change their role and interact on the basis of trust when three conditions are met. First, given the situational nature of role-taking, and the original intent behind the creation of the hotline, i.e., to use the DCL "in time of emergency" (Memorandum of Understanding 1963), the hotline is expected to engender trust only in times of crisis. Since symbolic interactionist role theory subscribes to an interpretative and mutually-constitutive understanding of the role-taking process (Charron 2011), crisis is understood as a matter of perception: both actors must define the event at hand as a crisis to warrant the use of the hotline.

Second, the content of hotline exchanges should remain private and exclusively leader-to-leader in their nature. Insulating this channel from the public, domestic opponents, and, to some extent, the bureaucracy, creates space for trust (Hoffman 2006, 8). Privacy allows leaders to leave bad-faith thinking behind by minimalizing in-group pressures to act in a spirit of suspicion (i.e., in accordance with in-group norms) towards a member of an out-group (Brugger, Hasenclever and Kasten 2013; Brugger 2015; Fierke 2009; Mercer 2005, 96-97). Leader-to-leader correspondence and one-on-one meetings may serve the same purpose. Indeed, most Soviet and American leaders in the Cold War corresponded privately and confidentially in an effort to establish their own trustworthiness—that is, their ability, integrity and benevolence (Mayer, Davis and Schoorman 1995)—and to convey to their counterpart their expectations about desirable behaviors (see e.g., *FRUS* 1996; Saltoun-Ebin 2013). Furthermore, one-on-one sessions between Reagan and Gorbachev during the Geneva summit were essential in creating a bond of trust (Wheeler 2018). While privacy does not guarantee trust, its absence likely inhibits the development of trusting behavior. The public correspondence between Khrushchev and Eisenhower demonstrates this point. Their exchanges were simply propaganda tools that emphasized the divisions between the American and Soviet ways of life, strengthening in-group identities and thereby hindering trust development (Plischke 1986b, 189).

Third, the hotline allows leaders to assume trustor-trustee roles when neither interstate nor

interpersonal trust is available. In this, the hotline differs from personal correspondence, face-to-face meetings or even twitter messages (Duncombe 2018), all of which are long-term and time-consuming trust-building tools (Bachman and Inkpen 2011, 283). In contrast to these, the hotline provides trust instantaneously but temporarily; that is, at most, for the duration of the crisis at hand. Of course, trust may evaporate earlier: trust declines when trusting expectations are not fulfilled by the other's behavior.

The uniqueness of the trust that leaders who use the hotline can rely on is due to the fact that the hotline is an informal institution. Institutions are "symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates that provide the 'frames of meaning' guiding human action" (Hall and Taylor 1996, 947) and play an important role in human role-taking (Charon 2001, 111, 202). They offer two distinct solutions when trust is absent. Formal institutional arrangements, such as those of the European Union, attempt to remove uncertainty, that is, the need for trust, from human interactions with the help of detailed rules and rigorous enforcement mechanisms (Farrell 2009, 54-60; Möllering 2005; Brugger, Hasenclever and Kasten 2013). Informal institutional arrangements, on the other hand, draw on agreed-upon but uncodified role expectations. They do not offer a set of control mechanisms, but rather navigate uncertainty about whether trust will be justified by making a moral appeal about what is right (Farrell 2009, 54-60; Elhardt 2015; Lowndes and Roberts 213, 189). They leave the burden of compliance to individual agency, not causing actors to repent their non-compliance through punishment mechanisms, but rather presenting their actions as a direct indication of their trustworthiness. Thus, the hotline is an informal institution that promotes trust as the institutional norm, thereby creating shared expectations about its use, offering actors a template for action, and putting pressure on partners to reciprocate (e.g., Bachmann and Inkpen, 2011; Kroeger, 2011; Möllering, 2006a; Farrell 2009).

Like the narrative surrounding its communicative function, the hotline's trust properties stem from the sensemaking process of the events of October-December 1962. Although this second narrative has been publicly voiced less often, the problem of trust featured prominently in private government communications in October 1962. The crisis and its aftermath were defined as a story of betrayal and trust repair. Communication between Kennedy and Khrushchev was not only

problematic during the Missile Crisis because the two leaders could not communicate with speed, but also because Khrushchev had betrayed Kennedy's trust by making false promises that the Soviet Union would not install missiles in Cuba and had thus contaminated all existing diplomatic channels between them (e.g., *FRUS* 1996, 64, 74; Dobrynin 1995, 84-5). During the crisis, Kennedy and Khrushchev worked out their trust issues while the world teetered on the brink of nuclear war, finally agreeing to resolve the situation on the basis of trust rather than distrust (Gillespie 2012; *FRUS* 1996, 65). They saw the successful execution of the agreement they had reached, in Khrushchev's words, as "an indicator [of] whether it is possible to trust if similar difficulties arise in other geographical areas" (*FRUS* 1996, 83), and any future agreement as dependent on it (Strategy and Tactics 1962). The passing of this test by both leaders paved the way for a serious consideration of risk-of-war measures in Geneva and successful negotiations about a leader-to-leader communication link in June 1963.

In other words, the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated the need for a communication channel through which trustworthy messages could be exchanged, even when regular diplomatic channels had been compromised by deception (Dobrynin 1995, 84-85, 97). Filling this need, the hotline came to provide Kennedy's and Khrushchev's successors with the limited amount of trust, i.e., the belief that neither side wished to start a nuclear war intentionally, the two men could muster by December 1962. Accordingly, the Soviet and American leaders who later relied on the hotline were able to trust each other to have peaceful intentions under the threat of confrontation and under the heightened likelihood of nuclear war. As narrow as the bandwidth and degree of this trust are, it is enough to encourage leaders to choose the cooperative path in a crisis before, or instead of, coercion and escalation. It also saves them from having to resolve their trust issues consciously in the midst of a crisis.

Identifying Alterasting and its Scope Conditions

Our role theoretical framework suggests that use of the Moscow-Washington hotline leads to a switch from distrustor-distrustee role-taking to trustor-trustee role-taking (altercasting) when (1) leaders mutually define the situation as a crisis, (2) hotline exchanges remain private interactions between leaders, and (3) there were problems in the interpersonal trust dimension before the activation of the hotline. In our analysis we trace these conditions.

In considering the first two of these conditions—shared definition of an event as a crisis, and privacy and exclusivity in the use of the hotline—we use government documents, including diplomatic exchanges and private evaluations, to see how leaders defined the situation. The use of such words as 'crisis', 'threat', 'dangerous', or 'unstable' in the context of Soviet-American relations, or regarding the survival of humanity, to describe the event at hand indicates a superpower emergency. We show that both sides came to view the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War as superpower crises. As for leaders' exclusive and private use of the hotline, we rely primarily on US government documents and newspaper accounts to see whether hotline communications preserved their leader-to-leader character, and whether any of them were published, during these wars.

Identifying a presence or absence of trust in its various manifestations requires more careful consideration. Because of politicians' reluctance to express their trust openly, especially trust in an adversary, we use an indirect approach to investigate whether altercasting took place. To see whether role change occurred and leaders took on trusting roles via the hotline, either initially or in their subsequent interactions, we turn to trust-related and distrust-related emotional and behavioral indicators, as identified in the trust literature and listed in table 1. Altercasting would be indicated by a switch from distrust-based to trust-based role-taking or, potentially, the continuation of trust-based role-taking despite the evaporation of trust as identified from other sources and often preceded by the communication of a gap between words and deeds. However, since trustors tolerate some inconsistency in behavior and, indeed, perfect manifestations of trusting role-taking are unlikely given the pressures of interstate distrust, our goal is to show whether trust or distrust dominated in leaders' exchanges.

Regarding the specific issue of interpersonal trust, problems in this dimension may manifest themselves in various ways. For example, interpersonal trust between Soviet (Russian) and American leaders may not have developed prior to the crisis under consideration. Then, interpersonal trust may exist between leaders when the crisis breaks out, but as trust dissipates during crisis interaction, actors may only continue to interact on the basis of trust by activating the hotline. Also, given the situation-specific nature of trust, Soviet and American leaders may be uncertain if the existence of interpersonal trust between them with regard to certain issues and within the normal bounds of interstate relations

would extend to high-stake crisis situations.

Table 1. A list of trust-related feelings and behaviors, and their opposites, as identified in the trust literature

	Trust-related	Non-trust-related
Feelings	Hope Faith Confidence[3] Relative security • feels safe • assured • comfortable Likeability • Good to work with • Chemistry • Positive first impression • Compatible personalities	No hope No faith No confidence Fear Anxiety Suspicion Skepticism Cynicism Wariness Anger (vs disappointment when betrayed)
Behaviors	Open, frequent, and collaborative communication patterns • exchange of information (including sensitive information) • removal of the unknown/misunderstood through giving reasons • describing what is happening • asking for information, help and/or advice Task coordination • coordination of policy (joint vs parallel action) • relying on trustee to implement decisions Consistency between words and deeds Demonstrating benevolence • flexibility (giving away something of value, compromising, being easy to deal with) • going the extra mile • acting with discretion • giving the other alternatives • finding mutually beneficial solutions Having shared identity • shared language • vision/goals • motivation	Avoidance of the other Non-cooperative behavior Pre-emption Hedging Issuing threats Vigilance and watchfulness (behavioral monitoring) Distorting and/or refusing to provide information Attempts to increase control over the other Resisting influence

Source: Lewicki, McAlistair, and Bies 1998; McKnight and Chervany 2001; Currall and Inkpen 2002; Abrahms et al. 2003; Koeszegi 2004; Komiak and Benbasat 2008; Bachman and Inkpen 2011; Nikolova, Möllering, and Reihlen 2015.

[3] We use 'confidence' and 'trust' as synonyms in our analysis, because decision-makers use them interchangeably (Keating and Ruzicka 2014, 757).

Regarding the specific issue of interpersonal trust, problems in this dimension may manifest themselves in various ways. For example, interpersonal trust between Soviet (Russian) and American leaders may not have developed prior to the crisis under consideration. Then, interpersonal trust may exist between leaders when the crisis breaks out, but as trust dissipates during crisis interaction, actors may only continue to interact on the basis of trust by activating the hotline. Also, given the situation-specific nature of trust, Soviet and American leaders may be uncertain if the existence of interpersonal trust between them with regard to certain issues and within the normal bounds of interstate relations would extend to high-stake crisis situations.

To trace the level and nature of trust between US and Soviet leaders prior to their use of the hotline, we rely on two common trust antecedents—trustworthiness (Mayer, Davis and Schoorman 1995) and likeability—and subsequent examples of trusting behavior. As for trustworthiness, we pay attention to all three of its components—competence, integrity, and benevolence—primarily in dyadic interactions between leaders, but, in the absence of such information, we also peruse other sources such as government documents, memoirs, and third-person accounts. While competence—defined here as intellectual ability and preparedness—and integrity are reasonably straightforward to identify, benevolence may take various forms, including self-sacrifice, offers of help, small favors, acts of kindness, and adjusting to others' needs.

We use likeability, or personal fit, to account for the emotional dimension of trust. A good first impression, chemistry, empathy, and indications that a person is good to work with are all manifestations of likeability. For interpersonal trust to be present, favorable positive trustworthiness and likability judgements should be followed by a behavioral demonstration of trust, defined as a move that for an outside observer—but not for the actors involved—may seem risky given earlier interaction within the observed relationship (Nikolova, Möllering, and Reihlen 2015, 237; Lewis and Weigert 1985, 971).

The Hotline in Use

Six-Day War (1967)

The Middle East was one of the acute areas of indirect confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War. The United States strengthened its presence in the Middle East after World War II and allied itself with Israel while trying to remain on good terms with the Arab states to preserve its access to oil. The Soviet Union appeared as a major player in 1955, seeking to challenge US dominance by forging close ties with the Arab states. The acute crisis in 1967 started on May 14, when Egypt evicted the UN's troops from the Sinai Peninsula and replaced them with Egyptian forces. The crisis intensified on May 23 with the Egyptian closure of the Straits of Tiran, which denied Israel access to the Red Sea. Having deemed such behavior an act of war, Israel started fighting on June 5 and immediately forced Soviet allies—Egypt, Jordan and Syria—onto the defensive. The superpowers sought to avoid direct involvement and worked to contain the conflict diplomatically. Under their leadership, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed ceasefire resolutions on June 6, 7, and 9. The besieged Arab states were ready to comply with these resolutions immediately, while Israel failed to abide by them despite declaring its acceptance of them. On June 10, sensitive to the plight of its allies, the Soviets threatened direct intervention. Having occupied the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, and the Sinai Peninsula, Israel stopped fighting soon after the Soviet ultimatum and added US pressure (e.g. Oren 2002).

Premier Alexei Kosygin and President Lyndon Johnson corresponded exclusively via the hotline between June 5 and June 10, 1967, exchanging 19 messages. Both sides respected the leader-to-leader nature of the hotline even though, upon the receipt of Kosygin's first message on June 5, US decision-makers used the DCL to retransmit a letter from Secretary of State Dean Rusk to Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko that had already been sent via regular channels. Beginning this message with "Preliminary to President's arrival" (*FRUS* 2004, 157) flagged it as extraordinary, revealing US decision-makers' awareness that the hotline was reserved for correspondence by leaders. Indeed, Kosygin had unequivocally expected to talk to the President before sending his June 5 message via the hotline, asking several times if President Johnson was at the other end of the line, because he wanted to speak to him directly (e.g. *FRUS* 2004, 245; Oren 2002, 196).

The Six-Day War was the first international crisis that President Johnson and Premier Kosygin had faced together, and their relationship was still in its infancy. Neither the collective nature

of the Soviet leadership after Khrushchev's political demise (*FRUS* 2001, 67, 85, 90, 91) nor Johnson's perceived dishonesty facilitated the emergence of trust between them. Although early on the Soviet leadership expressed trust in Johnson, writing on November 4, 1964 that "we trust the word of the President" (*FRUS* 2001, 67), they soon found him duplicitous, preaching peace while threatening to break international agreements. They saw him as an impulsive man who was slow in making decisions, could not calculate his moves to their conclusion, and could lose his cool in a crisis (Dobrynin 1995, 121-122; *FRUS* 2001, 90).

Kosygin had a decidedly better—more trustworthy—reputation in US governing circles. He was seen as able, well-trained, and deliberate, if uncharismatic (*FRUS* 2001, 54, 61, 139), which led the President to address Kosygin repeatedly in the hope of cooperation and the development of personal relations (*FRUS* 1997, 116, 178). Although Kosygin was among those more favorably disposed toward Johnson and expressed a willingness to continue Khrushchev's habit of "friendly and confidential conversations" with him (*FRUS* 2001, 63), their relationship suffered a dramatic breakdown before the Soviet leadership's struggle for the right to correspond internationally was resolved in Kosygin's favor. In February 1965, the United States bombed Hanoi while Kosygin was visiting the North Vietnamese capital. Kosygin, whose good offices the Johnson Administration had recruited to mediate between the United States and North Vietnam, was dismayed by what he saw as an inconsiderate action by the President (Dobrynin 1995, 138-140, 160-161). They only started a private correspondence after the appointment and arrival of Llewellyn Thompson as Ambassador to Moscow: the President used both occasions to propose the establishment of a confidential channel between Kosygin and himself (Letter from Johnson to Kosygin 1966; *FRUS* 1997, 178). Finally relenting on February 27, 1967, Kosygin responded to the President for the first time in two years and agreed to correspond with him confidentially (*FRUS* 1997, 185). However, the war broke out before any further leader-to-leader contacts were made and interpersonal trust could develop.

Initially, the Soviet and American leaderships had defined the situation in the Middle East differently. Since Nasser's remilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula on May 14, the American side had repeatedly voiced its concerns "about the current Middle East crisis" (*FRUS* 2004, 15 fn2, 41; Incoming Telegram 1967a; *FRUS* 2001, 215). Not only was Ambassador Thompson instructed to

express American concerns about further deterioration of the situation urgently and directly to Foreign Minister Gromyko as a response to Nasser's closure of the Gulf of Aqaba on May 23 (*FRUS* 2004, 38), but, in a letter to Premier Kosygin, Johnson also voiced his worries about "the critical situation of the Near East" (*FRUS* 2004, 88).

As opposed to this, in mid-May 1967, the Soviets failed to deem the situation sufficiently urgent to send Soviet diplomats new instructions, to see the necessity for the emergency convening of the UNSC, or to answer President Johnson's May 22 letter quickly (e.g.; Incoming Telegram 1967a; White House Chronology 1968; *FRUS* 2004, 41, 84). However, the closure of the Straits of Tiran caused them to reassess their position. This event rendered Soviet diplomats "greatly worried" (*FRUS* 2004, 58). Kosygin's May 27 letter to Johnson also signaled urgency. He wrote of "extreme tension" that carried the danger of armed conflict with potentially "important consequences for [...] peace and international security" (*FRUS* 2004, 84). The same alarm on the Soviet side was apparent on June 5 as Kosygin and his colleagues expressed "burning urgency" in approaching the hotline (Ginor and Remez 2007, 162).

As the Soviets' definition of the situation changed, so did Kosygin's behavior. Prior to the war it had been based on a strategy of avoidance and coercion. He had postponed answering Johnson's May 22 letter for five days. When he did reply on May 27 (*FRUS* 2004, 84), his letter had expressed anxiety about the situation because it might become "a military one" and opined that a "new hotbed of war must not be permitted to develop". He had put the responsibility for possible Israeli aggression personally on the President, because "Israel will not dare step over the line" without US encouragement, and threatened that, in case of such aggression, the Soviet Union "would render assistance" to the victims. Although he had appealed to the President for parallel action in order to prevent war, he had avoided further interaction, not responding to Johnson's May 28 letter at all.

As the war broke out, Kosygin's willingness to interact with Johnson, as well as his tone, changed markedly toward a more trust-based discourse. As part of this attempt at altercasting, Kosygin desisted from issuing threats and accusations and engaged in normative persuasion, arguing that "the duty of all great powers is to secure the immediate cessation of the military conflict" (*FRUS* 2004, 156). With this, he not only prescribed roles for both of them, i.e., "to exert appropriate

influence" on their allies to effect peace, but, unlike in his May 27 letter in which he had mostly stressed the "you vs. us" division, he also banded the US and USSR together as "great powers" (*FRUS* 2004, 156). Taking a more cooperative approach and repeating Johnson's earlier calls for "parallel efforts" to "use our influence to the full" (*FRUS* 2001, 215; 2004, 88), the Soviet premier asked Johnson to facilitate peace by restraining Israel "since you have all opportunities of doing so" (*FRUS* 2004, 156) and promised that the Soviet Government would also work for peace (*FRUS* 2004, 182). In his response, the President showed that he subscribed to Kosygin's role expectations, writing that "We feel that it is the duty of all great states to secure a speedy end to the military conflict" (*FRUS* 2004, 159). He welcomed parallel appeals for peace and went further to suggest joint action at the UNSC, a suggestion that Kosygin accepted on June 5, stating the Soviet negotiating position—immediate ceasefire and withdrawal behind the armistice lines—and expressing hope that the US would support it in the UNSC (*FRUS* 2004, 173).

In the next few days both leaders continued their roles, behaving in a way they hoped would prevent misunderstandings that could be detrimental to their trustworthiness. On June 6, Johnson highlighted the crucial paragraph in the draft resolution for Kosygin (*FRUS* 2004, 175). Meanwhile, Kosygin found it important to inform Johnson personally about the Soviet government's change of position in pursuing an immediate ceasefire without demanding withdrawal behind armistice lines, even though he could assume the president already knew from other sources (*FRUS* 2004, 182). Aware that the Soviets suffered from slower communications (*FRUS* 2004, 179), the President informed Kosygin of new developments, including the acceptance of a ceasefire resolution on June 6 (*FRUS* 2004, 183). Following the sinking of the *USS Liberty* on June 8, Johnson worked to remove uncertainty from the situation by telling Kosygin what had happened. In order to preempt misperceptions that the US was entering the war, he wrote to Kosygin that "investigation is the sole purpose" of the ship dispatched to the scene (*FRUS* 2004, 212). Johnson's considerateness made "a big impression on the Russians" (*FRUS* 2004, 245) and Kosygin immediately reciprocated, transmitting Johnson's assurances to their client, Egypt. He also notified Johnson of this move, earning Johnson's deep appreciation (*FRUS* 2004, 216, 220).

On June 8, the Soviet and American leaderships faced a different kind of challenge, which,

had it been handled less benevolently, could have undermined the confidential nature of the hotline, its trust properties, and, thus, the delicate, but positive relationship that it had created between Johnson and Kosygin. After the Johnson administration carefully guarded the existence of the President's personal contact with Kosygin "as a matter of policy", and after it declined to comment on the means of leader-to-leader contact when the press inquired on June 7 if the hotline had been activated (White House Press Conference 1967a), the Soviets revealed that they had been talking to the President on the hotline. Presuming—correctly—that the Soviets did so in an attempt to reassure their allies and the public, and had no intention of publishing the content of the messages, the Americans did not call out the Soviets on this move. Instead, they acknowledged the hotline exchanges and deflected press questions about the particulars of use, including the number and nature of the messages exchanged (White House Press Conference 1967b).

The privacy of the messages was not the only question on which public relations interfered. The US was confused about the contradiction between Kosygin's moderate behavior and bellicose Soviet and Egyptian press statements, which accused the US of direct participation in the war. Having failed satisfactorily to resolve the problem at the lower level (Incoming Telegram 1967b), Johnson raised the issue with Kosygin over the hotline on June 6. He found Soviet press charges unhelpful "when our only role has been to press for restraint", and called Egyptian accusations "wholly false", suggesting to Kosygin that he check the position of the US fleet and asking the Soviet leader to "put Cairo right" (*FRUS* 2004, 175). Kosygin's meeting with Egyptian Ambassador Ghaleb revealed that the Soviet leader took Johnson's hotline message about US non-participation at face value. Kosygin refuted the Ambassador's claims about US intervention, because Soviet intelligence had noticed no unusual activities and because "President Johnson had personally warranted against such interference" (Oren 2002, 251).

However, problems concerning the implementation of the ceasefire showed that while the hotline could help leaders to take each other's statements at face value, it could not sustain trust indefinitely in the face of persisting incongruence between words and deeds. Kosygin, for whom the ceasefire was decidedly more urgent as Soviet allies were rapidly losing on the battlefield, raised the issue of Israeli non-compliance on June 8 and expressed his hope that Johnson was working for peace

as "you have already stated" (*FRUS* 2004, 209). At first, he accepted Johnson's assurances about his personal interest in the cessation of hostilities, which was conveyed along with detailed descriptions of US steps taken in the interest of peace and supported by continuing US cooperation over the hotline and in the UNSC (*FRUS* 2004, 188, 193, 209, 213). However, Israel's refusal to stop fighting,[4] despite Johnson's best efforts, reintroduced pre-war Soviet doubts about his integrity and led Kosygin, on June 10, to initiate a dual-track strategy (*FRUS* 2004, 243). On the one hand, he threatened that the Soviet Union would "adopt an independent decision", that "may bring us into a clash, which will lead to a grave catastrophe" if Johnson did not restrain Israel. On the other hand, he expressed his willingness to work for peace and his interest in Johnson's views.

Relegating hedging to other channels,[5] Johnson continued in his trust-based role over the hotline, which Kosygin reciprocated, allowing them to work out their differences and alleviate the emerging distrust between them. The President started by reaffirming his commitment to peace and informed Kosygin that the US was exerting additional pressure on Israel, which seemed to be complying (*FRUS* 2004, 246). Kosygin responded in kind, refraining from further threats, simply stating instead that "your information concerning military actions" by Israel "is not borne out" and asking Johnson to redouble his efforts (*FRUS* 2004, 247). After Johnson acknowledged US vulnerability resulting from the eviction of US diplomats a few days earlier, explaining "we have no means of reaching [the] Syrian Government", he asked for Kosygin's help in communicating with Damascus, which Kosygin complied with (*FRUS* 2004, 246, 254). As the fighting was coming to an end, the parties concluded their hotline correspondence in the hope of further cooperation. Kosygin expressed his desire to "maintain contact with you on this matter" (*FRUS* 2004, 254), while Johnson talked of his hope that they could devote their future efforts to the "achievements of lasting peace" (*FRUS* 2004, 255).

---

[4] The president tried personally to effectuate Israeli compliance with the ceasefire resolution and was annoyed when Prime Minister Eshkol's promises proved empty (Oren 2002, 262, 290).

[5] He ordered the Sixth Fleet to sail towards the battle front (*FRUS* 2004, 243, 246; Oren 2002, 298) although the actual order was transmitted too late to influence on the Soviet position (Ginor and Remez 2011, 306).

Yom Kippur War (1973)

The 1973 Arab-Israeli war was started by Egypt and Syria on October 6, the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur. The Soviet Union had voiced its disapproval and discouraged the Arab states from fighting, believing—correctly—that they would lose against Israel and hoping to avoid confrontation with the United States and to preserve the gains of détente. Once the war broke out, both superpowers followed a dual-track policy, resupplying their allies while negotiating with each other to end to the war. An agreement became urgent for the Soviet Union after October 15 as the tide of war turned in Israel's favor, but was less urgent for Washington, which believed that the best way to gain dominance in the region and squeeze out the Soviet Union was to see its ally win although without the total destruction of Egyptian forces. The text of a UNSC resolution, calling for a ceasefire and subsequent negotiations, was agreed in Moscow on October 21 between General Secretary Brezhnev and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and approved by the UNSC the next day. However, Kissinger's subsequent trip to Israel and Israeli refusal to comply with the UNSC resolutions made the Soviets suspicious about US intentions despite a US-Soviet agreement to pass a second UNSC resolution on October 23. On October 24, the Soviet Union issued a threat of unilateral intervention in order to secure a ceasefire unless Israel stopped fighting. This prompted the United States to escalate the conflict by raising its state of military readiness to DEFCON 3. The crisis was resolved quickly thereafter. The Soviets backed down and, as a result of US pressure on Israel, the ceasefire materialized by October 26 (Israelyan 1997, Morse 2015).

Unlike their predecessors, when the war broke out Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev enjoyed a trusting relationship. Although initially each leader had been distrustful of the other (Dobrynin 1995, 201, 232; *FRUS* 2006, 182), two years of preparatory work by Ambassador Dobrynin and then-National Security Advisor Kissinger had removed much of the suspicion regarding Nixon's aggressive anti-Communism and Brezhnev's ability to lead, and in August 1971 made it possible for Nixon and Brezhnev to start developing trust between them (Dobrynin 1995, 202, 233; *FRUS* 2011a, 152, 170). Their correspondence, which entailed 55 pre-war messages, was the means by which they first established outcome expectations—i.e., a peaceful and stable world and mutually

beneficial solutions—and set behavioral standards of frank and business-like—rather than ideologically motivated—conduct (e.g., *FRUS* 2011a, 309, 324; 2006, 6, 19, 39 Tab B, 40, 103 attachment; Oral message from Brezhnev 1971).

The summits in 1972 and 1973 and the months in between were crucial in developing and cementing the two leaders' mutual trust. Their impromptu meeting at Brezhnev's request at the beginning of the Moscow summit was the first token of trust on Nixon's part, when he met Brezhnev in private despite the warnings of Secretary of State Rogers about the dangers of such a meeting (Memorandum for the President 1972). Nixon followed this up by successfully soliciting Brezhnev's help in presenting the Basic Principles Agreement as if it had been agreed on during the Moscow summit, and not through the secret Kissinger-Dobrynin channel, so that Nixon's relationship with his Secretary of State remain unharmed (*FRUS* 2006, 257). The President also promised that he would act neither "privately nor publicly against the interests of the Soviet Union" (*FRUS* 2006, 299). Brezhnev made a gesture of goodwill himself after Nixon's pragmatic and business-like performance had convinced him that he could "do business with Nixon" (Dobrynin 1995, 261), and offered his personal help with finding an end to the Vietnam War, thereby, putting his prestige among his colleagues on the line. More importantly, he unquestioningly accepted Nixon's claim that the President's private messages—and not public statements made for the US domestic audience—represented official policy (*FRUS* 2006, 299). As a result, Soviet puzzlement over contradiction in US policies (e.g., *FRUS* 2011a, 324, 2006, 53, 110) disappeared from their subsequent exchanges.

Both men continued to demonstrate their trust after the Moscow summit. Each stopped monitoring the other's behavior, intensified the sharing of often sensitive information (Letter from Brezhnev 1973b; Letter from Nixon 1973a; *FRUS* 2011b, 10; Dobrynin 1995, 267; *FRUS* 2015, 300 fn8; Oral message from Brezhnev 1973a), and took on a much warmer and more personal tone in their correspondence. For example, Brezhnev benevolently congratulated Nixon on the signing of the Paris Peace Accords that ended the Vietnam War without mentioning his own role in it (Letter from Brezhnev 1973a). Meanwhile, Nixon occasionally added handwritten personal messages to his letters and showed great care for Brezhnev's comfort and health during their second meeting in Washington DC in July 1973 (e.g., Letter from Nixon 1972a, 1972b; *FRUS* 2006, 120, 2011b, 125). During this

second summit, they demonstrated both a "curious personal chemistry" (Dobrynin, 1995, 312) and an unquestioning understanding of each other, which, for example, paved the way for what they believed was a uniform interpretation of the Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement (*FRUS* 2011b, 127).

Brezhnev and Nixon were in agreement about the seriousness of the Middle East situation both before and after the eruption of the war. In the pre-war period, Nixon deemed the Arab-Israeli conflict "a matter of highest urgency" and "the most acute threat to general peace" (*FRUS* 2006, 6; 2011b, 132). Similarly, Brezhnev believed that the Middle East was a place where "great dangers are in wait of us" because the "explosive" situation could endanger improving Soviet-American relations (*FRUS* 2006, 257; 2011b, 132; 2011c, 117). Once war broke out, both leaders understood that it could lead to a worsening of the relationship between their countries, and, accordingly, defined the war as an emergency (*FRUS* 2011c, 18, 194, 204). Nixon described the situation as "very serious", while Brezhnev called the Middle East a "source of constant danger" (*FRUS* 2011, 120[6]). They also agreed that the Arab-Israeli war posed an "explosive problem" (*FRUS* 2011c, 217; Letter from Brezhnev 1973c).

Given the trust between them, the two leaders used the established channels to find a solution to the war although their subordinates had considered the use of the hotline right before the outbreak of hostilities. When the Americans learnt that an Arab offensive was imminent, Kissinger contacted Dobrynin to inquire about the impending war and, in an extraordinary gesture, he also suggested to Dobrynin that he should contact Moscow via the hotline and prove "he had nothing to hide" (Kissinger 1982, 451). Respecting the leader-to-leader nature of the communication link, Dobrynin decided to call Moscow through the White House switchboard to insist on a lack of Soviet involvement in the decision of the Arab states to fight (Kissinger, 1982, 451; Israelyan, 1997, 21). General Secretary Brezhnev and President Nixon were in constant direct contact during the war and messaged each other 30 times in October 1973. Twenty-two of these messages (10 letters and 12 oral messages) were sent via regular diplomatic channels, which by then were faster than the hotline, and

[6] Brezhnev's letter is also the source for the content of Nixon's letter.

eight were transmitted via the direct communications link. Five hotline messages were exchanged on October 23 and three on October 26-27.

Starting the dialogue on October 6, Nixon proclaimed US interest in peace and, assuming Soviet interests concurred, asked Brezhnev to use his influence on Egypt to prevent war (Israelyan 1997, 36; Dobrynin 1995, 294). The General Secretary reciprocated by confirming the Soviet desire for peace and by promising further contacts "for the coordination of positions" (*FRUS* 2011b, 138). Accordingly, he contacted Nixon again on October 7, 8 and 10, sharing information about contacts with their Arab allies and stating the Soviet preference for a general settlement (*FRUS* 2011b, 139, 2011c, 120, 149). Thus, each found their expectations of early contacts and a demonstration of cooperative intentions confirmed, notwithstanding the occasional disappointment in certain aspects of the other's policies. Nixon was unhappy that Brezhnev had failed to inform him of the Arab plans for war while Brezhnev expressed disappointment that Nixon had not heeded his pre-war calls for a general settlement in the Middle East (*FRUS* 2011c, 120, 122; Israelyan 1997, 36-37). The fact that they could voice these disagreements without negative consequences speaks to the strength of their interpersonal trust in the early stages of the war.

This trust also allowed Brezhnev to make a major concession on October 10. Hoping that "coordinated actions of the USSR and the US" would facilitate a ceasefire, he promised that the Soviet Union would not veto a joint ceasefire resolution in the UN, despite Egyptian objections, and expected Nixon to reciprocate by desisting from his earlier interest in Arab-Israeli withdrawal behind the armistice lines (*FRUS* 2011c, 149). Although Nixon's position did not change, he reaffirmed his commitment to détente on October 13, asking Ambassador Dobrynin to "tell the general secretary that [...] I will keep my side of the bargain" (Dobrynin, 1995, 296). He mollified Brezhnev with a conciliatory letter and a public declaration that the pursuit of a ceasefire and lasting peace was official US policy (*FRUS* 2011c, 182, 194; Nixon 1973). Furthermore, in harmony with his desire expressed on 7 October in a phone conversation with Kissinger to stop the war, Nixon also implored Kissinger—in vain—on October 14 to "offer something" to the Soviets and to tell Dobrynin that "Brezhnev and Nixon will settle" (*FRUS* 2011c, 122, 180).

Uncertain about Nixon's desire to compromise, and with no progress toward a solution even

after a week had passed, Brezhnev openly discussed the desirable form of behavior, opining that "with the degree of confidence established between the Soviet leaders and the President, it is necessary to exercise a more weighed approach to the questions that arise" (Oral message from Brezhnev 1973b). Nixon, whose pre-occupation with Watergate made his involvement in the crisis uneven, responded positively to this altercasting move and hastened to reaffirm his commitment to finding a joint solution, promising that he would "engage himself fully to help produce a just and honorable settlement" (*FRUS* 2011c, 204) and expressing his confidence that "if you and I work together on this explosive problem, we can find a solution" (*FRUS* 2011c, 217). To prove his point, he sent Kissinger to Moscow to negotiate with full presidential authority, a fact that he confided to Brezhnev before Kissinger's arrival (*FRUS* 2011c, 217). Nixon's response and the successful negotiation of a ceasefire agreement reinforced Brezhnev's belief that "Nixon feels a deep respect […] for me personally" (Israelyan 1997, 125, 128).

The implementation of the ceasefire resolution, just as in 1967, provided an insurmountable challenge for trust between the leaders and compelled Brezhnev to turn to the hotline for the first time during the crisis, prompting the exchange of five hotline messages on October 23. In his first hotline message (*FRUS* 2011c, 246), Brezhnev expressed his shock over Israeli non-compliance and, alluding to US involvement, told Nixon pointedly that "Why this treachery was allowed by Israel is more obvious to you". However, in line with the trust the hotline still afforded him, he expressed his belief that "on your part […] everything will be done in order that the Security Council decision and our understanding with you will be implemented". Nixon responded with haste, taking full responsibility for Israeli actions and informing Brezhnev that the United States had demanded an immediate ceasefire from Israel. He also promised the Soviet leader that the US "will not permit" the historic settlement "you and I have achieved […] to be destroyed" (Hotline message from Nixon 1973a), and consented to a second UNSC resolution despite having reservations about some parts of the text (Hotline message from Nixon 1973b). These actions seemed to remove doubts about Nixon's intentions (Hotline message from Brezhnev 1973; Israelyan 1997, 152-153), and the two leaders' correspondence continued outside the hotline.

However, continued fighting from Israel caused Brezhnev to openly question Nixon's

integrity. “What is happening” and “What is behind all this?” he asked, and pointed out that “hardly have we […] received from you very solemn assurances” concerning the implementation of the new ceasefire agreement, “when gross defiance occurs” (*FRUS* 2011c, 262). Nixon’s response, in which he made the unfounded claim that Israel had ceased fighting, failed to remove the Soviet leader’s increasing doubts about his trustworthiness, which even presidential compliance with Brezhnev’s request to detail US actions taken toward a ceasefire could not redress (Letter from Nixon 1973b; Israelyan 1997, 167). Nevertheless, Brezhnev still had enough trust in Nixon to expect that his desperate call for sending a joint Soviet-American peacekeeping force—or a Soviet only contingent in the case of no US interest in a joint venture—to the Middle East to save the Egyptian third army would be interpreted within the framework of trust and not as a threat (Israelyan 1997, 168, 173; Dobrynin 1995, *FRUS* 2011c, 267).

Nixon’s responses increased rather than alleviated Brezhnev’s doubts about the President’s trustworthiness. First, the US increased military readiness to DEFCON 3. Second, the President’s response, for which Brezhnev had to wait eight hours, showed no urgency, conveying a lack of concern for Brezhnev’s problems. Third, Nixon not only demonstrated a defiant anti-Communist behavior at his October 26 press conference, but also summarized—even if in general terms—the content of Brezhnev’s October 25 letter publicly (Nixon 1973). Such indiscretion regarding their personal correspondence, combined with Nixon’s hardline behavior at the same event, called into question his adherence to the two leaders’ earlier agreement on prioritizing private over public communications. A “crisis of confidence” emerged, Brezhnev wrote retrospectively on October 28, as a result of “the whole exchange of messages during a week[’s] time” and of deceitful action taken under presidential auspices, which had undermined “the personal and mutual confidence between us” (*FRUS* 2011b, 149; 2011c, 285; Israelyan 1997, 179-188, 203-204, Dobrynin 1995, 303-304).

Late on the evening of October 26, a confused Brezhnev finally turned again to the only channel where a trust-based interaction was still the norm and where he could expect—correctly—that the confidentiality of his messages would be respected: the hotline (e.g. *FRUS* 2011b, 193; Nixon 1972). In his message, refraining from issuing (further) threats, and engaging in normative persuasion instead, Brezhnev asked the President to honor American promises to act jointly, and expressed the

hope that a peaceful solution could be found. At the same time, he pointed out existing problems concerning US integrity and benevolence, expressing his surprise at the DEFCON 3 decision and his dismay at the Americans' public pressuring of the Soviet Union. He suggested that any further delay would result in "the most serious doubt" about US motives (*FRUS* 2011c, 288). This elicited two urgent and swift hotline responses from Nixon on October 27. At 1 a.m., he assured Brezhnev that the US "will continue to make every effort" to achieve a full ceasefire and that it would relay the request for non-military cargo to be allowed to reach the surrounded Egyptian army, while putting the blame for escalation on Brezhnev (*FRUS* 2011c, 290). Seven hours later, he reported, in what was the last direct leader-to-leader contact of the crisis, that Israel had allowed a convoy of supplies to reach the Egyptian third army and that the fighting was almost over. He finished by expressing his hope that "we continue to work closely with you in resolving the Middle East crisis" and with a promise to relay any further developments to Brezhnev as they occurred (*FRUS* 2011c, 292). After the fighting ended, the two leaders focused on mending their relationship. On November 10, Nixon apologized personally through Ambassador Dobrynin for his behavior and, for the first time, openly talked about his domestic problems, which earned him Brezhnev's forgiveness and sympathy (Dobrynin 1995, 305-307).

Conclusion

In this article, we have questioned the usefulness of seeing trust as stemming from a common identity or common interests and presented instead a new conceptualization of trust as role. We have also shown how this interpretation of trust could be fruitfully applied to understanding the role of one factor—the Moscow-Washington hotline—in crisis decision-making by the superpowers. All this has allowed us to offer the hotline, and with it, trust, as an additional explanation for the resolution of the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, beyond all those factors whose importance has already been explored in connection with the two conflicts: deterrence, the balance of superpower interests, the regional balance of conventional military power between the superpowers, the balance of strategic weapons, and the effective control of regional allies (mostly Israel) (e.g., Williams 1976; Lebow 1987; Bar-Zohar 1970; Gerges 1997; Oren 2002; Betts 1987; Wehling 1997). Hence, while our new

conceptualization of trust and its application to these historical cases enrich the understanding of these crises, we do not wish to suggest that trust or the use of the hotline are the only factors that explain superpower behavior during these wars.

Nonetheless, the findings of this article question the current wisdom that regards the hotline as a communication device only, and point to the hotline's significance in helping Soviet and American leaders to change their roles and role expectations in relation to each other, so as to exhibit trusting behavioral patterns, at least initially, in their interactions via the hotline. Our cases have shown that when leaders respect the confidentiality of messages exchanged, adhere to the exclusively leader-to-leader character of the hotline, and define the situation as a crisis, they are able to draw on the thin layer of trust that the hotline provides. Moreover, the hotline as an informal institution has proven particularly useful in generating trust, albeit temporarily, in situations where interpersonal trust between leaders is problematic and interstate trust does not exist.

At the same time, our article has also uncovered how third parties may have a strong influence on trusting relationships, regardless of whether these relationships are rooted in interpersonal trust or fostered by the hotline. In both crises, Israel's behavior was a substantial reason for the evaporation of leader-to-leader trust. Additionally, in 1973, Kissinger's behavior also cast a shadow on Nixon's trustworthiness. The consequences of Kissinger's machinations for the Nixon-Brezhnev relationship also demonstrate the potential dangers of excessive delegation in a nuclear crisis. While it is easy to delegate authority, the cognitive and emotional characteristics of trust are considerably more difficult to transfer from one person to another. Thus, arguably, Nixon, who trusted Brezhnev, would have come to a different conclusion about Brezhnev's October 25 letter than Kissinger, who did not trust the Soviet leader, and the escalation of the crisis brought on by the DEFCON 3 decision could have been avoided. Moreover, as the durability of Brezhnev's trust in Nixon and Kosygin's trust in Johnson demonstrate, trust based on experience is more robust and may withstand stronger pressures than trust that relies on an informal institution. This suggests that the good will exhibited through the hotline is fragile and will not withstand incongruence between words and deeds for long. Thus, if leaders wish to preserve its long-term usefulness, they should use it with honesty and restraint, having regard for the conditions we have discussed.

Admittedly, the measurement of trust continues to present a challenge for IR scholarship. Even though some might argue that what we refer to as trust is simply greater cooperation, we see trust and cooperation as closely related, but different concepts. While greater trust is likely to result in greater cooperation, not all cooperation is trust-based. A gamble—that is, risk-taking prompted by overlapping interests—or coercion—i.e., outcomes imposed by the stronger party—may also lead to cooperation (Keating and Ruzicka 2004; Milner 1992; Rathbun 2018; Hoffman 2002). It follows then that the achievement of mutual gains based on trust is a special form of cooperation (Hoffman 2002; Keating and Ruzicka 2014). Thus, the presence of cooperation is, in itself, a poor indicator of trust (Hoffman 2002). Unfortunately, all other operationalizations of trust (e.g., trust in discourse, the voluntary assumption of vulnerability, the absence of hedging and oversight procedures, and general—as opposed to detailed—agreements) offered by IR scholarship remain imperfect for various reasons (see Keating and Ruzicka 2014 for details). Therefore, we have taken a multidimensional approach, tracing trust and its preconditions, trustworthiness and likability, with the help of behavioral, discursive, and emotive indicators. The fact that this has allowed us to distinguish between trust- and distrust-based attempts at cooperation—Kosygin's June 10 threat exemplifying the latter—makes us fairly confident in our claims regarding trust.

Overall, our findings regarding the hotline lead us to conclude that it is possible for leaders of mutually distrustful states to carve out space for trust. Nonetheless, we wish to caution against seeing trust as an all-purpose solution to adversarial interstate relationships. When misplaced, it can easily result in exploitation and deceit either by the trustee or by a knowledgeable third party. Thus, leaders should not enter trusting relationships—whether these are based on an institution or on experience—indiscriminately, but only when such a move is warranted. The question of when leaders should trust each other—in their personal meetings or their correspondence—and how trust develops via different forums are questions that future research should investigate. Future researchers should also look at whether trust-based interaction via the hotline can spill over into two leaders' interpersonal relationship or whether it will remain temporary and strictly situational. Finally, given that there are eight other leader-to-leader hotlines, it will also be important for future research to investigate if these lines show any commonalities in their establishment and use.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Juliet Kaarbo, Nicholas Wheeler, Stefan Wolff, the anonymous reviewers and the editors of JoGSS, participants of the Second Foreign Policy Symposium at the University of Edinburgh, and members of the Trust in World Politics working group at the University of Birmingham for their helpful comments.

Bibliography

Abrahms, Lisa C., Rob Cross, Eric Lesser, and Daniel Z. Levin. 2003. "Nurturing interpersonal trust in knowledge-sharing networks." *The Academy of Management Executive* 17 (4): 64–77.

Allen, Nick. 2016. "Barack Obama used nuclear 'red phone' to warn Putin about Russian hacking of US election." *The Telegraph*, December 21. Accessed June 13, 2018. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/12/21/barack-obama-used-nuclear-red-phone-warn-putin-russian-hacking/.

Bachmann, Reinhard, and Andrew C. Inkpen. 2011. "Understanding institutional-based trust building processes in inter-organizational relationships." *Organization Studies* 32 (2): 281–301.

Ball, Desmond. 1991. "Improving Communications Links between Moscow and Washington." *Journal of Peace Research* 28 (2): 135–159.

Bar-Zohar, Michael. 1970. *Embassies in Crisis: Diplomats and Demagogues behind the Six-Day War*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Beschloss, Michael R. 1991. *The Crisis Years. Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963*. New York: Edward Burlingame.

Betts, Richard K. 1987. *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Diplomacy*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.

Bilgic, Ali. 2014. "Trust in world politics: converting 'identity' into a source of security through trust-learning." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 68 (1): 36–51.

Booth, Ken, and Nicholas Wheeler. 2007. *The Security Dilemma Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*. Basingstoke: PalgraveMacmillan.

Brugger, Philipp, Andreas Hasenclever, and Lukas Kasten. 2013. "Theorizing the Impact of Trust on Post-Agreement Negotiations: The Case of Franco-German Security Relations." *International Negotiation* 18 (3): 441–469.

Brugger, Philipp. 2015. "Trust as a discourse: Concept and measurement strategy – First results from a study on German trust in the USA." *Journal of Trust Research* 5 (1): 78–100.

Cantir, Cristian, and Juliet Kaarbo. 2016. "Unpacking Ego in Role Theory." In *Domestic Role Contestation, Foreign Policy, and International Relations*, edited by Cristian Cantir and Juliet Kaarbo, 1–22. Oxon, UK and New York: Routledge.

Charon, Joel M. 2001. *Symbolic Interactionism. An Introduction, an Interpretation, an Integration*. Seventh Edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Currall, Steven C., and Andrew C. Inkpen. 2002. "A multilevel measurement approach to trust in joint ventures." *Journal of International Management Studies* 33 (3): 479–495.

Dobrynin, Anatoly F. 1995. *In confidence: Moscow's ambassador to America's six cold war presidents (1962-1986)*. New York: Times Books.

Duncombe, Constance. 2018. "Twitter and transformative diplomacy: social media and Iran–US relations." *International Affairs* 93 (3): 545–562.

Egilsson, Haraldur Þór. 2003. "The Origins, Use and Development of Hot Line Diplomacy." Discussion Papers in Diplomacy 85, *Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'*.

Elhardt, Christoph. 2015. "The causal nexus between trust, institutions and cooperation in international relations." *Journal of Trust Research* 5 (1): 55–77.

Farrell, Henry. 2009. *The Political Economy of Trust. Institutions, Interests, and Inter-Firm Cooperation in Italy and Germany*. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.

Fierke, Karin M. 2009. "Terrorism and trust in Northern Ireland." *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 2 (3): 497–511.

Forsberg, Tuomas. 1999. "Power, interests and trust: explaining Gorbachev's choices at the end of the Cold War." *Review of International Studies* 25 (4): 603–621.

FRUS is *Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States.*

FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume VI. Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges. 1996. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office.

FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XI. Arms Control and Disarmament. 1997. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XIV. Soviet Union. 2001. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XIX. Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967. 2004. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume XIII. Soviet Union, October 1970-October 1971. 2011a. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume XIV. Soviet Union, October 1971-May 1972. 2006. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume XV. Soviet Union, June 1972-August 1974. 2011b. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume XXIII. Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969-1972. 2015. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume XXV. Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973. 2011c. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennet. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Gerges, Fawaz A. 1997. *The Superpowers and the Middle East. Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Gillespie, Alex. 2012. “Dialogical dynamics of trust and distrust in the Cuban Missile Crisis.” In *Trust and Conflict: Representation, Culture and Dialogue*, edited by Ivana Markova and Alex Gillespie, 139–155. New York: Routledge.

Ginor, Isabelle, and Gideon Remez. 2007. *Foxbats over Dimona: The Soviets’ Nuclear Gamble in the Six-Day War*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

———. 2011. “Too Little, Too Late: The CIA and US Counteraction of the Soviet Initiative in the Six-

Day War, 1967." *Intelligence and National Security* 26(2-3): 291-312.

Guo, Shiau-Ling, Fabrice Lumineau and Roy J. Lewicki. 2017. "Revisiting the Foundations of Organizational Distrust." *Foundations and Trends in Management* 1(1): 1-88.

Hall, Peter A. and Rosemary C. R. Taylor. 1996. "Political Science and Three New Institutionalisms." *Political Studies* 44 (5): 936–957.

Hardin, Russell. 1993. "The street-level epistemology of trust." *Politics & Society* 21 (4): 505–529.

Harnisch, Sebastian. 2012. "Role theory: operationalization of key concepts." In *Role Theory in International Relations. Approaches and Analyses*, edited by Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank, and Hanns W. Maull, 7–15. Oxon, UK and New York: Routledge.

Hoffman, Aaron M. 2002. "A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations." *European Journal of International Relations* 8 (3): 375–401.

Hoffman, Aaron M. 2006. *Building trust. Overcoming Suspicion in International Conflict*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

"Hotline message from Brezhnev to Nixon, October 23". 1973. *RN Library*, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 10, MOLINK Hotline Wash/Moscow 1973-1974 1/2.

"Hotline message from Nixon to Brezhnev, October 23." 1973a. *RN Library*, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 69, Dobrynin/Kissinger Vol. 20 2/5.

"Hotline message from Nixon to Brezhnev, October 23." 1973b. *RN Library*, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 10, MOLINK Hotline Wash/Moscow 1973-1974 2/2.

"Incoming Telegram, Department of State, from New York, May 19." 1967a. *LBJ Library*, NSF, NSC Histories, Box 17, Middle East Crisis May12-June 19, 1967, Vol. 1.

"Incoming Telegram from the American Embassy in Moscow to the Secretary of State, June 6, 8:06 a.m." 1967b. *LBJ Library*, NSF, NSC Histories, Box 23, Middle East Crisis May 12-June 19, 1967, Vol. 15.

Israelyan, Viktor. 1997. *Inside the Kremlin during the Yom Kippur War*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Jamgotch, Nish Jr. 1985. "Crisis Communications and The Hot Line." In *Sectors of Mutual Benefit in U.S.-Soviet Relations*, edited by Nish Jamgotch Jr., 8–21. Durham: Duke University Press.

Jervis, Robert. 1970. *The Logic of Images in International Relations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Keating, Vincent Charles, and Jan Ruzicka. 2014. “Trusting relationship in international relationships: No need to hedge.” *Review of International Studies* 40(4): 753-770.

Kissinger, Henry A. 1979. *White House Years*. Boston: Little, Brown.

———. 1982. *Years of Upheaval*. Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown.

Koeszegi, Sabine T. 2004. “Trust-building strategies in inter-organizational negotiations.” *Journal of Managerial Psychology* 19 (6): 640–660.

Komiak, Sherrie Y. X., and Izak Benbasat. 2008. “A two-process view of trust and distrust building in recommendation agents: a process-tracing study.” *JAIS* 9 (12): 727–747.

Kroeger, Frenz. 2011. “Trusting organizations: the institutionalization of trust in interorganizational relationships.” *Organization* 19 (6) 743–763.

Kydd, Andrew H. 2007. *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Larson, Deborah W. 1997. *Anatomy of Mistrust: U.S.-Soviet Relations during the Cold War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Lebow, Richard Ned. 1987. *Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

“Letter from Brezhnev to Nixon, January 27.” 1973a. *RN Library*, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 72, Brezhnev-Nixon Exchanges.

“Letter from Brezhnev to Nixon, May 26.” 1973b. *RN Library*, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 68, Country Files-Europe-USSR Dobrynin-Kissinger, Vol. 17.

“Letter from Brezhnev to Nixon, October 20.” 1973c. *RN Library*, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 39, HAK Trip Files.

“Letter from Johnson to Kosygin, December 29.” 1966. *LBJ Library*, NSF, Head of State correspondence, Box 7, USSR, Kosygin Correspondence 10/17/67-8/27/68, Vol. 1.

“Letter from Nixon to Brezhnev, February 2.” 1973a. *RN Library*, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 72, Brezhnev-Nixon Exchanges 1/2.

"Letter from Nixon to Brezhnev, October 24. 1973b. *RN Library*, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 69, Dobrynin/Kissinger Vol. 20 2/5.

"Letter from Nixon to Brezhnev, September 8." 1972a. *RN Library*, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 74, Moscow summit 1/8.

"Letter from Nixon to Brezhnev, September 21." 1972b. *RN Library*, NSC Files, President's Trip files, Box 495, Dobrynin to Kissinger, Vol. 13.

Lewicki, Roy, and Barbara B. Bunker. 1996. "Developing and maintaining trust in work relationships." In *Trust in organizations: Frontiers of theory and research*, edited by R. M. Kramer and T. R. Tyler, 114–139. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Lewicki, Roy J., Daniel J. McAllister, and Robert J. Bies. 1998. "Trust and distrust: new relationships and realities." *The Academy of Management Review* 23 (3): 438–458.

Lewis, J. David, and Andrew Weigert. 1985. "Trust as a social reality." *Social Forces* 63 (4): 967–985.

Lowndes, Vivien, and Mark Roberts. 2013. *Why institutions matter: The New Institutionalism in Political Science*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mahoney, James, and Kathleen Thelen. 2016. *Advances in comparative-historical analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mayer, Roger C., John H. Davis, and F. David Schoorman. 1995. "An integrative model of organizational trust." *The Academy of Management Review* 20 (3): 709–734.

McKnight, D. Harrison, and Norman L. Chervany. 2001. "While trust is cool and collected, distrust is fiery and frenzied: a model of distrust concepts." *Americas Conference on Information Systems (AMCIS)*. Accessed August 18, 2016. http://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2001/171.

"Memorandum for the President from William P. Rogers, May 18." 1972. *RN Library*, NSC Files, President's Trip files, Box 475, President's Moscow Trip [May 1972], part 4

"Memorandum of Understanding between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link." 1963. *US Department of State, Diplomacy in Action*. Accessed: May 5, 2013. https://www.state.gov/t/isn/4785.htm

Mercer, Jonathan. 2005. “Rationality and Psychology in International Politics.” *International Organization* 59 (1): 77–106.

Milner, Helen. 1992. “International Theories of Cooperation: Strengths and Weaknesses.” *World Politics* 44 (3): 466–496.

Möllering, Guido. 2005. “The Trust/Control Duality: An Integrative Perspective on Positive Expectations of Others.” *International Sociology* 20 (3): 283–305.

———. 2006a. “Trust, institutions, agency: towards a neoinstitutional theory of trust.” In *Handbook of Trust Research*, edited by Reinhard Bachmann and Akbar Zaheer, 355–376. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.

———. 2006b. *Trust: Reason, Routine, Reflexivity*. Bingley, UK: Emerald.

Morse, David R. 2015. *Kissinger and the Yom Kippur War*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland.

Nanz, Tobias. 2010. “Communication in Crisis. The ‘Red Phone’ and the ‘Hotline’.” *BEHEMOTH A Journal on Civilisation* 3 (2): 71–83.

Nikolova, Natalia, Guido Möllering, and Markus Reihlen. 2015. “Trusting as a ‘leap of faith’: trust-building practices in client-consultant relationships.” *Scandinavian Journal of Management* 31 (2): 232–245.

Nixon, Richard M. 1973. “The President’s New Conference.” October 26. *The American Presidency Project*. Accessed: January 5, 2018. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-84.

Oren, Michael B. 2002. *Six days of war: June 1967 and the making of the modern Middle East*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

“Oral message from Brezhnev to Nixon, October 15.” 1971. *RN Library*, NSC Files, President’s Trip files, Box 497, Exchange of Notes between Dobrynin and Kissinger Vol. 1.

“Oral message from Brezhnev to Nixon, July 19.” 1973a. *RN Library*, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 71, Country Files-Europe-USSR, Box 68, Dobrynin-Kissinger, Vol. 19.

“Oral message from Brezhnev to Nixon, October 17.” 1973b. *RN Library*, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 69, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 20 5/5.

Pavri, Tinaz. 2009. “Can we talk? Communications during Crises in the India-Pakistani Conflict.” *The*

Round Table 98(403): 473-481.

Plischke, Elmer. 1986a. *Diplomat in Chief. The President at the Summit*. New York: Praeger.

———. 1986b. “Eisenhower's ‘Correspondence Diplomacy’ with the Kremlin—Case Study in Summit Diplomatics.” *Journal of Politics* 30 (1): 137–159.

Rathbun, Bryan C. 2018. “Trust in International Relations.” In *Social and Political Trust*, edited by Eric M. Uslaner, 687–705. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Saltoun-Ebin, Jason, ed. 2013. *Dear Mr. President: Reagan/Gorbachev and the Correspondence that ended the Cold War*. N.p.: Createspace.

Saunders, Mark NK, Graham Dietz, and Adrian Thornhill. 2014. “Trust and distrust: polar opposites, or independent but co-existing.” *Human Relations* 67 (6): 639–655.

Schelling, Thomas C. 1984. “Confidence in crisis.” *International Security* 8 (4): 55–66.

———. 1996. *Arms and Influence*. London, UK and New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Simon, Agnes, and Eszter Simon. 2003. “Forródrót a hidegháborúban [The Hotline in the Cold War].” *AETAS* 19 (3-4): 76–84.

Simon, Eszter, and Agnes Simon. 2017. “The Soviet use of the Moscow-Washington Hotline in the Six-Day War.” *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 15 (3): 284–305.

“Strategy and Tactics, cca. October-November.” 1962. *JFK Library*, NSF, Staff Files (#4), Series 7, Carl Kaysen, Box 367, Disarmaments, Subjects, Basic Documents #1, October-November 1962.

Thacher, Colonel Stephen L. 1990. “Crisis Communication between Superpowers.” *Study Paper, US Army War College*. Accessed: February 5, 2013. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA222248.

Thies, Cameron. G. 2013. *The United States, Israel, and the Search for International Order*. New York and London: Routledge.

Thies, Cameron G. 2015. “The US and China: Altercast roles and changing power in the 20th century.” In *China’s International Roles*, edited by Sebastian Harnisch, Sebastian Bersick and Jorn-Carten Gottwarld, 97–109. Oxon, UK and New York: Routledge.

Urban, Michael Crawford. 2014. “The curious tale of the dog that did not bark: Explaining Canada’s

non-acquisition of an independent nuclear arsenal, 1945-1957." *International Journal* 69 (23): 308–333.

Wehling, Fred. 1997. *Irresolute Princes: Kremlin Decision Making in the Middle East Crises, 1967-1973*. New York: St. Martin Press.

Wendt, Alexander. 1999. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: CUP.

Wheeler, Nicholas J. 2009. "Beyond Waltz's Nuclear World: More Trust May be Better." *International Relations* 23 (3): 428–445.

Wheeler, Nicholas J. 2013. "Investigating Diplomatic Transformations." *International Affairs* 89(2): 477-496.

Wheeler, Nicholas J. 2018. *Trusting Enemies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

"White House Chronology, Middle East War." 1968. *LBJ Library*, NSF, NSC Histories, Box 20, Middle East Crisis May12-June 19, 1967, Vol. 8.

"White House Press Conference with George Christian, June 7, 11:40 am." 1967a. *LBJ Library*, NSF, NSC Histories, Box 19, Middle East Crisis May 12-June 19, 1967, Vol. 7.

"White House Press Conference with George Christian, June 8, 4:35 pm." 1967b. *LBJ Library*, NSF, NSC Histories, Box 19, Middle East Crisis May 12-June 19, 1967, Vol. 7.

Williams, Phil. 1976. *Crisis Management: Confrontation and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age*. London: Martin Robertson.