

Being a second generation Muslim Woman in the French labour market

Naseem, Jawiria; Adnan, Wifag

DOI:

[10.1016/j.rssm.2019.02.003](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rssm.2019.02.003)

License:

Creative Commons: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs (CC BY-NC-ND)

Document Version

Peer reviewed version

Citation for published version (Harvard):

Naseem, J & Adnan, W 2019, 'Being a second generation Muslim Woman in the French labour market: understanding the dynamics of (visibility of) religion and gender in labour market access, outcomes and experiences in France', *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility*, vol. 61, pp. 79-93.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rssm.2019.02.003>

[Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal](#)

General rights

Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes permitted by law.

- Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
- Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private study or non-commercial research.
- User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of 'fair dealing' under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
- Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.

Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.

When citing, please reference the published version.

Take down policy

While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.

If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate.

Accepted Manuscript

Title: Being a Second Generation Muslim Woman in the French Labour Market

Authors: Jawiria Naseem, Wifag Adnan


PII: S0276-5624(18)30107-0
DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rssm.2019.02.003>
Reference: RSSM 401

To appear in: *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility*

Received date: 12 July 2018
Revised date: 11 December 2018
Accepted date: 3 February 2019

Please cite this article as: Naseem J, Adnan W, Being a Second Generation Muslim Woman in the French Labour Market, *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility* (2019), <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rssm.2019.02.003>

This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.



Being a Second Generation Muslim Woman in the French Labour Market

Understanding the dynamics of (visibility of) religion and gender in labour market access, outcomes and experiences in France

Lead author: Dr Jawiria Naseem, University of Birmingham

Second author: Dr Wifag Adnan, NYU Abu Dhabi

Introduction

'To be honest, I don't really look Pakistani. People often think I am Italian. And so, he never suspected that I was Muslim!'

(Ruksana¹, French Pakistani, airport station agent)

People, as Ruksana says, are none other than her work colleagues. Ruksana made this comment after sharing an incident of religious discrimination by white colleagues in her previous job which led her to stop wearing her headscarf altogether. For Ruksana, removing the headscarf became a strategy to protect herself from further religious discrimination since it allowed a shift in her perceived identity: from a 'problematic' identity (Muslim) to a 'whitened', and presumably, also socially 'more acceptable' identity ('Italian'). This mixed-methods paper aims to examine these very (gendered) identity boundaries of sameness and differences grounded in (visibility of) religion for second generation Muslim women, born and bred in France. The quantitative data uncover how these boundaries impact labour market access and outcomes, while the qualitative data give greater insights into the women's day-to-day experiences once employed. In doing so, the mixed-method approach brings opportunities for a thorough understanding of the different facets of labour market engagement. This position allows us to put forward a more comprehensive definition of economic integration which goes beyond outcomes in, or access to, the labour market (e.g. measured through salaries, work hours) by way of including experiences within the labour market for women who are university-educated and in professional jobs (thus presumably may have achieved successful economic integration). The qualitative data thus offers a route for progressive investigation of the religious factor, but *within* the labour market, with a closer examination of how it may continue to impact second generation

¹ Ruksana is one of the twelve French Pakistani and Algerian Muslim women the lead author interviewed as part of a research on the dynamics of education and the labour market in France and Britain. For further details see Data Collection section. To protect participants' anonymity, all names used are pseudonyms.

Muslim women once *in* employment. Limiting the sample to female descendants of immigrants allows us to simultaneously control for the institutional environment while exploring how differences between various groups of immigrant women can potentially lead to varied labour market outcomes. Based on data from the Trajectories and Origins Survey 2009, the European Social Survey (ESS) (2006-2016) and repeat interviews with twelve French Pakistani and Algerian women², this paper suggests that challenges to economic integration include access/entry to the labour market as well as career progression once in employment. The key concern of this paper is whether or not Muslim women are more susceptible to discrimination, even after accounting for citizenship status and their visibility in a state that confines religious practices to private spaces.

Public discourse concerning Islamophobia and the importance of integrating French Muslims into the Republic, both socially and economically, have been underway for decades (Wieviorka, 2012; Seniguer, 2009). The experience of Algerian Muslims in France is a case in point. Due to its shared colonial history, migrants from Algeria have historically experienced anti-immigrant sentiment which fuelled discriminatory institutional practices across various levels of the French society, including employment (Spire, 2005; Derderian, 2004). These inequalities confined both Algerian men and women in low-paid work and cycles of unemployment, especially after the Independence of Algeria in 1962 (Merckling, 2012; Derderian, 2004). These experiences, however, are not unique: other Muslim migrants such as Pakistanis who, although a relatively younger migrant group in France compared to Algerians, also faced difficulties in accessing employment following its settlement in the late 1970s (Abou-Zahab, 2007). The issue of economic and social exclusion in French society strongly contributed to creating a sense of non-belonging among these Muslim migrants and their families (Wieviorka, 1998, 1994). It also deeply reflects France's anxiety and fear of national cultural alteration and its struggle to come to terms with its growing Muslim population (Rattansi, 2011; Waddington et al., 2009). France's anxiety concerning its Muslim population has been widely exploited by extremist political parties such as the National Front in the name of 'crisis of national identity' (Rydgren, 2007, p169). By promoting anti-immigrant and anti-establishment sentiments, it has prioritised the interests of white French citizens over migrants' interests. Yet, in the wake of the attacks of September 11 2001, the perception of cultural threat from migrants and their families shifted to a threat to national security and identity, making Muslims the 'new' other in France (Cohen, 2009; Deltombe, 2007; Deltombe and Rigouste, 2005; Eatwell, 2002). This contributed to the creation of a strict definition of Frenchness, grounded in whiteness only, challenging rights to French citizenship to groups perceived as inassimilable, such as children of Muslim migrants, born, raised and educated in France (Rattansi, 2011). Similar to their parents, they too are perceived to be a threat to the cultural cohesion in the Republic despite their citizenship status.

The rigid understanding of Frenchness problematises the right of belonging of second generation Muslims, that is to say those young people who are born and bred in France *and* are Muslims (Rattansi, 2011). The motto *Liberté, Égalité et Fraternité* (Freedom, Equality and Brotherhood) which serves to protect all French citizens (Bird, 2008), is now used to strengthen ethnic and religious amalgam since second generation Muslims can presumably never become '*français de coeur*', that is French at heart, or in other words, never emotionally belong to France due to a fixation on religion (Brubaker, 1992, p143). This understanding of the category 'French' removes the intrinsic connection between rights and feelings. Access to rights may produce a

² See details on these survey and interview data under Data Collection section.

sense of equality but may not materialise in feelings of belonging, that are, a sense of value and inclusion as an equal member of society due to how one is perceived in society (Yuval-Davis, 2011; Anthias, 2006; Phoenix, 2001). Creating feelings of belonging, as Anthias (2006) argues, is essential for individuals to feel a sense of inclusion, to respond to exclusion, and to find their positions in society in respect to others.

This is particularly noticeable through the fixation on, and problematisation of, the place of (visible) Muslim women in France. The 2004 headscarf ban in schools and the 2010 face veil ban in public places are two such examples which illustrate how the ‘spread’ and visibility of a supposed Muslim threat is ‘contained’ in the public sphere. The way some French Muslims practice Islam is thus construed as ‘incompatible’ with the French Republic (Hajjat and Mohammed, 2013). These women’s particular position calls for an in-depth examination of their experiences as second generation – that is to say as French – *and* Muslim in France. Indeed, they are entitled to a similar treatment as any other French national and therefore should be able to enjoy similar rights of freedom, equality and brotherhood. Yet, second generation Muslim women’s intersecting (and visible) identities in the public sphere challenge the place of religion in society and understandings of Frenchness so much so that religious identification is used to justify their experiences of social and economic inequalities (Hajjat and Mohammed, 2013; Rattansi, 2011).

The religiosity and visibility of Muslims in France, particularly women who chose to wear the headscarf/niqab, coupled with their low socio-economic status, highlights the importance of this study. According to the 2006-2016 ESS, Muslims report higher degrees of religiosity than people of other faiths (Figure 1). At the same time, Muslims are concentrated in the lowest deciles of the income distribution, where about half of Muslims are in the bottom 30% of the income distribution (Figure 2). Since approximately 75% of the French population rely on labour income, it is crucial that we understand how the mechanisms underlying discriminatory practices are translated to the labour market³. Considering the context outlined above, the question then becomes: how do visible signifiers of religion along with cognitive representations of Muslim women impact the labour market outcomes and experiences of second generation French Muslim women? In answering this question, this paper will focus on the relationship between social and economic inequalities and Islam in France by examining the impact of degree and/or visibility of religion on labour market outcomes and experiences for a group of Muslim women who are French by birth. Throughout our analysis, we discuss an array of factors that may have contributed to the status of Muslim women, including but not limited to the role of discriminatory and exclusionary practices.

Literature Review

*Labour market outcomes of minority ethnic second generations in France*⁴

³ Moreover, the majority of the remaining 25% of the population relies on pension schemes and unemployment insurance, which means that the working age population (18-64) mainly depends on labour income.

⁴ This paper aims to examine how the time and space specific to France produces outcomes in the labour market and experiences within the workplace. Hence, in this section of the literature review we exclusively focus on France’s socio-political and economic specificity which helps contextualise understandings of religion, minority ethnicity and migration within the labour market. France’s Republican ideology restricts the citizen’s identity to his/her citizenship only, thus shutting down any opportunity for the expression of multiple, let alone religious, identities in the public sphere. This, in theory, helps ensure that all citizens are treated equally before the Republic, thus for

Research on second generation French citizens and their labour market participation are mainly focused on the largest minority ethnic groups (i.e. North Africans), offering an intersectional, but limited, read along gender and ethnic lines (e.g. Aeberhardt et al., 2010; Pailhé and Meurs, 2008). Aeberhardt and his colleagues (2010), for example, found that young Maghrebi⁵ women with university education 1) experienced pay gaps compared to white women, 2) were unlikely to be in senior executive positions and 3) had lower employment rates in executive roles by 7 and 18 percentage points compared to white women and men respectively. When employment patterns are compared to other second-generation French citizens, research indicates that French Maghrebi women are still more likely to be in vulnerable economic positions. Pailhé and Meurs (2008), for example, found that French Maghrebi women are more likely to be on temporary/fixed term and part-time contracts compared to both white women and French-born Spanish and Portuguese women. They concluded that the combination of gender and ethnicity was highly significant in these women's professional outcomes. Yet, this analysis overlooked the impact of other axes of differentiation, especially the importance of religious affiliation in a post-9/11 era, as suggested in other studies.

For example, in their study of religious discrimination in recruitment practices among second generation Senegalese women, Adida and her colleagues (2010) found that minority ethnic female candidates with Muslim names are less likely to be called for an interview than are white women and minority ethnic candidates with Christian names. They concluded that Muslim minority ethnic female graduates are victims of ethnic and religious penalties. Quantitative studies which focus on Maghrebi women (i.e. Pailhé and Meurs, 2008) fail to account for religion as a possible factor in explaining labour market access and outcomes.

This body of literature is complemented by work which provides insights into differences in labour market experiences among second generation Maghrebi women. The inter-generational study carried out by Merckling (2012) considered the impact of family life on the work of second generation Maghrebi women. She argued that young Maghrebi women, married to Maghrebi men, found themselves in precarious employment situations (e.g. taking part-time and/or fixed-term roles; being under-employed) 'to compensate' for the high unemployment rates experienced by their partner. She also suggested that caring responsibilities further restrict opportunities for professional mobility (e.g. taking on full-time roles). Thus, the intersection of gender, ethnicity and social class produces limited professional opportunities for Maghrebi women. Yet, similar to the quantitative studies, religion remained unaddressed.

Only a limited number of researchers have examined the role of religion in perceptions of labour market experiences. In her independent studies and co-authored articles, Santelli (2008; 2007a with colleagues; 2006a with Boukacem) looked at experiences of discrimination at the recruitment level, as well as experiences of racism within the workplace among second generation Maghrebi men and women. Interviewees reported experiences of religious/ethnic discrimination (especially since 9/11) and experiences of 'ordinary racism', including inferiorisation and negative representation among work colleagues (Santelli, 2008). Although Santelli and her colleagues' work provides useful insights into experiences of, and in,

example, leaving no room for discrimination in the labour market. This engagement with diversity is very unique to France, compared to other western European countries which have also experienced waves of migration from former colonies following WWII. For a detailed discussion of citizenship, integration and migration in France see, Safi (2006) and Wiewiorka (2012).

⁵ The term Maghrebi refers to Algerians, Tunisians and Moroccans, that is to say all three North African countries.

employment as a Muslim French person, the particularity of gender and visibility (discussed in details below), in this case, are left unaccounted for.

Current research on Maghrebi second generations illuminates how different social divisions may impact the labour market outcomes of the group. Yet, these studies (whether qualitative or quantitative) disassociate key axes of differentiation, namely gender and religion. These indeed are central in examining the identity positions and thus subsequent outcomes and experiences in the labour market for second generation Muslim women in the French labour market.

Dynamics of gender and (visibility of) religion among Muslim women in the West

Feminist writers have emphasised the centrality of gender in a new othering process affecting Muslims in the West. Although their work is argued in the context of British society, it provides a theoretical framework for understanding how the image of women in veils has become a physical representation of the Muslim ‘other’, thus producing specific identity positions and experiences (Afshar et al., 2006; Macdonald, 2006; Weedon, 2004; Bullock, 2002). Bullock (2002), for instance, argues that the western image of the veil as being oppressive for women required a missionary duty to relieve and free these said-to-be imprisoned women within their own nation, as a colonial conqueror and today, from their male counterparts in the West. Afshar and her colleagues (2006) further suggest that the perception of Muslim women in western societies has undergone a transformation from being treated as different to being viewed as a threat. This new othering process affects these women in specific ways as they become easy targets for radical groups opposing Islam (e.g. Hopkins et al., 2013). The visibility associated with the headscarf/face veil further brings Muslim women in ‘the full light of the public gaze’, something not experienced, for example, by women who do not wear headscarves/face veils (Afshar et al., 2005, p278).

Building on analyses of these othering processes, many scholars have provided accounts of how the transformation of stereotypes into common knowledge affects Muslim women’s life opportunities (Afshar, 2012; Brah, 2003; Bullock, 2002; Brah and Shaw, 1992). They argue that cultural stereotypes and the perpetuation of racist categorisations affect Muslim women in society as a whole, but also once they enter the labour market where they are confronted by an institutional system in which their racialised identity is used to differentiate between themselves and their white peers. These patronising and stigmatising discourses of otherness are both gendered *and* racialised, positioning the women outside the realm of paid work and constrain their participation in public life altogether. This binary identification process, Weedon (2004) argues, helps to sustain ‘inequalities, exclusions and oppression’ in the labour market (p154). Yet, experiences are not uniform; differences exist within this category of Muslim women as Brah (2003) highlights when suggesting the importance of colonial history in the social construction of Muslim women’s identity and subsequent professional experiences. Considering the intersection of gender *and* (visibility of) religion is thus paramount and cannot be disassociated in examination of outcomes and/or experiences in the labour market.

This paper uses a mixed methods approach to explore the above complexities of identity constructions among second generation Muslim women in the labour market. It enabled an assessment of how visible signifier of religion impact on different labour market stages: access, outcomes and experiences once employed. With the quantitative analysis, we find that among

second-generation French women, Muslims are the least likely to be employed, work the least number of hours and earn the lowest salaries. Point estimates are attenuated and some statistical power is lost when controls are included and estimates are corrected for selection bias. We offer some potential explanations for these results. The qualitative analysis provides insights into how gendered and religious displays of the body continue to construe barriers for economic integration even for university-educated women who are in full-time professional jobs (equivalent to their educational qualifications) in predominantly white work spaces. This paper thus offers a comprehensive examination of how gender and religion intersect in the constructions of both labour market outcomes and experiences for second generation Muslim women in France. By comparing women who are ‘visibly’ Muslim to those who are not, this paper further adds to our understanding of religious identity as a dynamic process.

Data Collection

Sampling Method

The Trajectories and Origins Survey is a survey focused on understanding the living conditions, demographic, religious, social and political challenges that immigrants and their descendants face in France. The data on 22,000 individuals was collected between September 2008 and February 2009 in metropolitan France. The survey was administered by the INED (French Institute for Demographic Studies) and INSEE (National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies). The European Social Survey is an academically driven cross-national survey that has been conducted across Europe since its establishment in 2001. Every two years, face-to-face interviews are conducted with newly selected, cross-sectional samples. The survey measures the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of diverse populations in more than thirty nations. The data used in this study focuses on France only. Rounds 3-8 of the European Social Survey correspond to the even years 2006-2016.

These datasets allow us to explore impact of religious affiliation on labour market outcomes in France along with how discriminatory practices are perceived by Muslims and other groups as well. To make our study tractable, we limit our sample to second generation women, born and bred in France. This is because first generation immigrants are a non-random subset of the population and have several attributes that distinguishes them from stayers in their source countries⁶ as well as other individuals in their destination countries. Depending on the immigrant group, these attributes range from skin colour and degree of religiosity to knowledge of French culture, society and language to financial resources and access to social networks in France. Given the challenges associated with cross-country migration, it is often posited that first generation immigrants are “positively selected” members of the population, as in they are more ambitious, productive, hardworking and determined than most to accomplish their goals (Chiswick, 1978). That said, Borjas (1987) finds that immigrant groups in the US from developed economies are positively selected while those from less developed economies are negatively selected. He also finds that the sign and degree of selection for all groups depends on a variety of factors including the source country’s political system and its income distribution.

⁶ The source country (region) is the country (region) of origin of the migrant or second (or higher) generation immigrant, which is defined as the birthplace of the parents. For example, for a second generation Algerian French woman, although she was born and bred in France, the source country (region) is Algeria (Middle East).

For these reasons, it has become commonplace in several studies to exclusively use second generation immigrants as the sample of interest when wanting to study how variation across national origin affects differences in labour market outcomes. Antecol (2000) is one of the earliest studies that uses second-and-higher generation US immigrants to examine the variation in the labour force participation rates across 34 source countries. For each individual in the dataset, she uses the female labour force participation rate of the source country as a cultural proxy and concludes that culture plays a role in explaining why some groups of second generation women work more relative to men than others. Another popular paper, Fernandez and Fogli (2009), uses data on US-born women with foreign-born fathers to show that source country's female labour supply and fertility rate each have a positive effect on the corresponding outcome for second generation women. This method has become quite popular (see Alesina and Giuliano, 2015 for review) since limiting the sample to second generation immigrants in one destination country allows the researcher to simultaneously vary the source country or region while also controlling for the destination country's institutional environment⁷.

Likewise, we limit our sample to second generation French women to control for institutional factors and social capital, allowing us to investigate the role of ethnicity and religious affiliation in determining an individual's success in the labour market. In contrast to the above-mentioned papers, our aim is not to highlight the relevance of cultural norms but to identify (if any) whether there is at least some suggestive evidence of discrimination in the French labour market. Our approach resembles that of Algan et al (2010), who compare educational and labour market outcomes of natives, first generation and second generation immigrants in the UK, Germany and France. They find that in all three countries, first generation immigrant women experience less favourable outcomes, after controlling for human capital variables, in the labour market relative to natives and that there is some evidence of progress when comparing first-generation and second-generation immigrant women in the UK and Germany. In France, however, they find that most second-generation immigrant groups, notably those from the Middle East and Africa, are outperformed in terms of employment by their first generation counterparts.

Semi-structured interview data

The interview data is drawn from a comparative work in which the largest Muslim minority ethnic groups in France and Britain were selected and then compared. These were Pakistanis in Britain and Algerians in France. For comparative purposes, both groups were examined in each country (i.e. Pakistanis and Algerians in France *and* in Britain). The research was carried out between January 2011 and August 2013 and involved 24 participants (twelve in each country: six in each group), aged between 23 and 45. They worked in Oxford, London, and Paris and its suburbs.

Participants were selected on the basis of their religion (Muslim), ethnicity (Pakistani/Algerian), sex (female), citizenship (French), education level (minimum undergraduate degree) and employment status (i.e. held at least one job post-qualification). As such, all participants were French Muslim women – born to either Pakistani or Algerian migrant parents. They were all university educated (educational qualifications ranging from BAs to

⁷ Obviously, this is not the only method one can use to understand how cultural and social norms affect economic outcomes. For example, Adnan and Miaari (2018) show that across both Arab and Jewish municipalities, the gender wage gap increases with the percentage of nationalist voters per municipality.

PhDs) and all in professional jobs at the time of their recruitment for the research. All French participants were employed in the private sector (marketing, finance, banking, real estate, dentistry and aviation) except one, who was self-employed (food industry). There were all in employment at the time of their recruitment. Visibility of religion was not part of the initial sample selection. However, as the recruitment of participants progressed, there were: 10 women who wore the headscarf and 14 who did not. This aspect was subsequently included for comparison across groups. Table A shows all French participants' socio-economic characteristics.

During the time of the research, participants were interviewed twice to examine changes in employment. Questions related to employment covered topics of experiences of first job post-graduation, relationships with colleagues and perceptions of being a highly-qualified French Muslim woman in a professional job.

For the purpose of this paper, only interview data collected with French women is discussed. More specifically, data with two (of three) French women who wear the headscarf is presented alongside one participant who does not wear the headscarf. The inclusion of the third participant in the analysis below serves two purposes: 1) this participant was the oldest French participant in the study, thus in a position to share experiences which span over 45 years and 2) the experiences of the other French participants were jointly reflected in the experiences of this one participant. The focus is on French Muslim Pakistani and Algerian women, who are university-educated and in professional roles.

The examination of this data does in no way suggest generalisability of these women's experiences to all Muslim French Pakistani and Algerian female second generation. The aim here is to offer a conceptual understanding of the ways in which gendered and religious displays of the body may work to produce identity constructions in spaces which are predominantly white.

Quantitative Results: The European Social Survey and Trajectories and Origins Survey

Before we turn to the quantitative analysis on the labour market differences between second generation Muslim women and their non-Muslim counterparts, descriptive statistics and stylized facts are presented from both datasets to understand the context of Muslims living in France.

Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the key outcome and control variables used in the quantitative analysis by religious affiliation. In total, there are six religious affiliations: Muslims, Catholics, Christians, other Christians, Jews, and those with no religious affiliation. The data shows that Jewish women have the lowest female labor force participation rate of 61%, albeit the sample is small, followed by Muslim women (66%) while Catholics have the highest rates at 81%. There is less variability in the employment rates, where all groups have employment rates of 88% or more, while the corresponding rate for Muslim women is 76%. Muslim women also work at least 2 fewer hours per week than their counterparts and earn relatively low salaries. That said, Christians earn the lowest monthly salaries, despite having among the highest number of weekly hours worked. The fact that Christians and Muslims earn the lowest salaries is especially intriguing in view of the stylized fact that these two religious groups have a disproportionately high number of visibly religious (e.g. wearing a veil, yarmulke,

or cross) women--39% and 31% respectively--relative to other groups. We will revisit the relationship between being visibly religious and labor market outcomes in the quantitative analysis.

Muslim and Jewish women have the youngest populations, which may partially explain having relatively low marriage rates and fewer children. The distribution of education by religious affiliation highlights that Muslim women are mostly concentrated in the middle of the distribution, attending Vocational Schooling more than any other category, while being the least likely to receive a four-year college degree. Additionally, Christians have the lowest educational attainment on average, where a quarter of the students only have a primary school degree. The last few rows display the mother's birthplace. Note that Muslims and Other Christians are the only groups where less than a quarter of the sample is married to a native French (someone who is third generation or higher) man. These statistics suggest that there are stark differences among members of religious groups, in terms of both their labor market outcomes as well as the pre-market context in which they emerge.

Perceptions of Employed Muslims by Religious Affiliation

While the consequences of discrimination are likely to affect one's life in a myriad of ways, this paper is primarily concerned with its consequences in the labour market. Furthermore, analysing discrimination at the workplace is not limited to wage/salary differentials and differences in employment/participation rates (though the quantitative analysis in this paper is dedicated to understanding these aspects) between various subgroups since discrimination between subgroups can take place in a subtler manner, even after the individual has been employed. For example, the ESS questionnaire includes two questions, for those who are gainfully employed, about the nature of their jobs.

- *If Employed, are you allowed to Decide how Daily Work is Organized? [Autonomy]*
- *Are you allowed to Influence Policy Decisions about Activities of Organization? [Power]*

Figures 3 and 4 respectively report the extent to which employees have autonomy and power in their jobs. Figure 3 shows that Muslims consistently report having less autonomy in how work is organised on a daily basis. Likewise, Figure 4 demonstrates that relative to the French population in general, the overwhelming majority of Muslims have little influence or power regarding the policy decisions of their respective organisations.

Since the sample sizes of second-generation French women in the ESS do not allow us to understand the perceptions related to discriminatory practices experienced by those who have gained employment, we turn to the Trajectories and Origins (TaO) survey. Since the TaO is focused on studying minority populations in France, the sample size of our primary group of interest—second generation Muslim women—is 1,338, allowing us to address the intersectionality of ethnicity and religion through the examination of various sources of discrimination. When asked, “*Do you think you could one day be a victim of racism in France, even if this has never happened to you personally?*”, approximately 80% (1074 individuals) of second-generation Muslim women answered “Yes”.

Table 2 reports how second-generation immigrant women, who are also employed, interpret exclusion. Note that the sample is further restricted to university-educated women in order to harmonize this group with those in the qualitative section. To view responses for the full

sample of second-generation Muslim women, see Appendix Table 1⁸. These estimates are displayed separately by religious subgroup and include all of those who were concerned with or experienced any form of discrimination, regardless of whether one or more sources of discrimination are mentioned. Muslim women are primarily concerned with being discriminated against due to their nationality of origin⁹. This is followed by name, skin colour and appearance, all of which are attributes that are difficult or impossible to hide from an employer. Religious affiliation is ranked fifth, which might be due to the relatively small sample size of employed and educated Muslim women or more likely, related to the fact that religious affiliation can be less conspicuous than other markers, depending on how Islam is practiced. It is clear from the table that among second generation college-educated and employed women, Muslims are much more anxious about becoming victims of discrimination (and have chosen several markers) relative to other religious groups and the non-religious group.

In summary, responses to the above-mentioned questions from the ESS questionnaire demonstrate that among employed individuals, Muslims report having significantly less influence in decision-making as well as little or no autonomy in the workplace, relative to the French population in general. Since the ESS only provides a cursory overview of employee relations in the context of a diverse work environment, the qualitative analysis serves to complement this analysis by presenting an in-depth examination of interactions with white co-workers. Using the TaO questionnaire to study second generation Muslim women in particular, we find that nationality is by far, the most commonly cited form of (experienced or perceived) discrimination, among those who are employed and college-educated. Other markers of identification such as name and skin colour are more commonly cited only when respondents choose more than one form of discrimination that they have experienced or are anticipating. Given the level of intersectionality at play here, the quantitative analysis separately investigates the role of religion and the role of ethnic origin in determining labour market access and outcomes.

Methodology for Regression analyses

Given the complexities associated with cross-country migration and differences across immigrant groups in the relative costs and benefits of emigrating to France, we limit the sample of interest to women who are descendants of immigrants (born and bred in France) to control for exposure to French society, culture, language, as well as the overall institutional environment such as access to public, health and political services. Additionally, everyone in our sample must have at least one foreign-born parent, i.e. third generation French (or more) are excluded. This is crucial to our analysis since one can argue that third generation immigrants are better positioned than first and second-generation women to work in French society due to being better integrated or having higher social capital. Furthermore, if religious affiliation and/or ethnicity are

⁸ The results in Table 1 of the Appendix indicate that employed and college-educated individuals do not necessarily report higher rates of (experienced or perceived) discrimination or different sources of discrimination from those commonly anticipated in the general Muslim population.

⁹Keep in mind that all women in this sample are second-generation French Muslim women. That is, they are born and bred in France. Thus, when they report that they have experienced or are anxious about experiencing discrimination due to nationality, it is presumed that they mean their nationality of origin or source country (see footnote 5).

correlated with the likelihood of being a first generation, second generation or third generation immigrant, the results are likely to be biased. Thus, limiting our sample to second generation immigrants allows us to think about how religious affiliation, visibility of religious practices, ethnicity and other markers, affect individual's economic outcomes in the labour market. The sample of working age (18-64) second generation immigrant women residing in France consists of 5,234 women.

In the first analysis, we investigate the role of origin on labour market outcomes (Table 3). Due to the small sample sizes for some countries of origin, individuals' national origins are grouped together to form 'region of origin' categories. There are six regions of origin¹⁰ in addition to the reference group: second generation immigrants with one parent born in France and one foreign-born parent. The source region is identified by the birthplace of the individual's father (mother) in odd (even) numbered columns in Table 3¹¹. In the second analysis (Table 4), in order to investigate how religious affiliation influences labour market outcomes, the source regions are replaced with five religious groups in addition to the reference group (no religious affiliation): Muslim, Catholic, Christian, Other Christian and Jewish.

In both analyses, we estimate a probit model (with no controls) to capture the degree in which variation across source regions and religious affiliations among second generation women affects the likelihood of individuals' labour force participation rates and employment rates conditional on participation. Labour force participants include all employed or working individuals as well as those who are unemployed and are searching for work. Average marginal effects are computed in order to facilitate the interpretation of the results. OLS models are estimated to identify how differences across second generation immigrant groups influence weekly hours and (ln) monthly salary, conditional on employment. In summary, there are four outcome variables: two binary variables, labour force participation and employment, and two continuous variables, weekly hours and (ln) salary.

Standard controls are included to isolate the effect of ethnicity/religious affiliation on the outcome variables. Specifically, if the covariates of interest are correlated with variables that influence the likelihood of success in the labour market, then our parameters are biased. For example, if being Muslim is correlated with a low level of educational attainment in the data and education is not controlled for, then a negative coefficient cannot be interpreted as the extent to which second generation Muslim women are discriminated against in France since (at least part of) the negative effect is driven by a low level of educational attainment among Muslims. Thus, after estimating the raw effects of ethnicity and religious affiliation we control for age, age squared, two dummies for marital status (married, other), number of children, and eight dummies for educational attainment (none, primary, lower secondary, lower vocational, higher vocational, higher secondary, two-year college, more than two-year college). Reference groups include those who have zero years of schooling, no children and are divorced, widowed, or single. In addition, we control for selection effects¹² for three outcome variables—employment, weekly hours

¹⁰ These regions include Middle East/North Africa/Asia, Africa, EU-15, Eastern Europe, Other European countries, and Other (which primarily consists of North/South America and Australia).

¹¹ The reference group in all specifications are second generation females with one parent (fathers in odd numbered columns and mothers in even numbered columns) born in France.

¹² Note that the selection equation in the employment specification is a probit model where labour force participation is regressed on a set of covariates. For weekly hours worked (ln salary), the selection equation is a probit model where the dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 for those who report positive weekly hours (positive salary) and 0 otherwise. For all three outcome variables, the selection equations include the following covariates: age, age squared, two dummies for marital status (married, other), number of children, and eight dummies for

worked and (ln) salary. Since participating in the labour force is a choice variable, the sample of people included in the employment regressions (whether employed or unemployed) is likely a non-random subset of the entire sample. This is because those who chose to participate in the labour force may differ in their attributes from the inactive group in a way that leads to omitted variable bias in the main equation¹³. Similarly, those who reported positive weekly hours worked or a positive salary are likely different from those who are out of the labour force as well as those who are unemployed.

Regression Analysis I: Source Regions and Labour Market Outcomes

Col (1)-(4) of Panel A in Table 3 suggest that second generation female immigrants are less likely to join the labour force if their source region is the Middle East/Asia¹⁴. Moreover, this group is much more likely to experience high unemployment rates when the mother's birthplace is used to identify its members rather than their father's birthplace. It is likely that the differences in odd and even numbered specifications result primarily from households that consist of marriages where the husband and the wife are of the same regional origin but a different order generation¹⁵. When controls and selection effects are included (Panel B), the estimates for labour force participation and employment are less economically and statistically significant¹⁶. For other variables of interest, such as hours worked and monthly (ln) salary, there appears to be no effect of being Middle Eastern on these outcomes, with or without controls.

Note that immigrants of African descent experience the lowest labour force participation rates among all immigrant groups. However, these rates are reduced significantly when selection effects and controls are included, suggesting that most of the differences in FLFPR between second generation African immigrants and other immigrants can be explained by differences in observable characteristics. Another set of results that stands out concerns descendants of Eastern European immigrants, who earn the lowest salaries, but in the presence of controls and selectivity-corrected estimates, salary differentials are eliminated for French-born daughters of female Eastern European immigrants. One explanation maybe that descendants of Eastern

educational attainment (none, primary, lower secondary, lower vocational, higher vocational, higher secondary, two-year college, more than two-year college)

¹³ The omitted variable here arises from the possibility that employed women have a higher propensity to work not just due to observable characteristics but unobservable ones as well, and thus by excluding the unemployed and those who are out of the labour force, the parameters are biased. Technically, if ε_i is the error term in the wage regression, u_i is the error term in the probit employment regression, X_i are the individual covariates in the wage regression, Z_i are the individual covariates in the probit model, W_i is the wage, and E_i is a binary employment variable, then the parameters of interest can be estimated using $E(W_i | E_i=1, X_i) = \beta X_i + E(\varepsilon_i | E_i=1)$.

Heckman(1979) argued that the last term is the omitted variable, which is only included because selection is accounted for. Without selection, the wage regression is simply $E(W_i | X_i) = \beta X_i + \varepsilon_i$. Under joint normality between the error terms, it can be shown that $E(\varepsilon_i | E_i=1) = E[(\varepsilon_i | u_i > -Z_i\gamma)] = \rho_{\varepsilon u} \sigma_\varepsilon \lambda_i(-Z_i\gamma)$ where $\rho_{\varepsilon u}$ is the correlation between the two error terms, σ_ε is the standard deviation of the wage error term, and λ_i is the inverse mills ratio. In other words, the omitted variable is the inverse mills ratio $\lambda_i(-Z_i\gamma)$ which is computed for everyone in the sample using a probit model, even those who are not included in the main equation. Then the inverse mills ratio is included as a regressor in the main equation.

¹⁴ The majority of women in this group were from Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco.

¹⁵ For example, the father is a second-generation Moroccan immigrant, born and bred in France, and the mother is a Moroccan immigrant.

¹⁶ The point estimates for employment for the Middle East/Asia group is marginally significant (p value is 10.6).

European immigrants have lower reservation wages and are thus, more likely to experience a combination of high employment rates accompanied by low salaries.

Demographic and Human Capital Controls

The remaining figures in Panel B of Table 3 highlight the importance of demographic and human capital controls on labour market outcomes. The results show that divorced/widowed/single women are just as likely to join the labour force as married women but conditional on employment, work approximately 2 more hours. Additionally, although the number of children a woman has considerably decreases the likelihood of participating in the labour force, once selection effects (and controls) are included, the number of children does not have an effect on other outcome variables. Accounting for the number of children, married women have the lowest unemployment rate. With respect to education, there is no monolithic relationship between the number of years of schooling and labour force participation. For example, those who are most likely to participate in the labour force have only attended primary school, while those who are the least likely have a high school diploma. In contrast, employment rates and salaries have a consistently positive relationship with educational attainment, where the premium increases with each level. Weekly hours have a U-shape relationship with educational attainment, where those at the low and high end of the education distribution work longer hours and those with a higher secondary diploma work the least number of hours. Finally, age seems to only have an effect on FLP rates and a marginally significant effect on salaries.

Regression Analysis II: Religious Affiliation and Labour Market Outcomes

We now turn to our main results in Table 4 where we investigate the degree in which one's religious affiliation influences labour market outcomes. Additionally, all models include a dummy variable for whether the individual self-reports being visibly religious (e.g. wearing a veil, yarmulke, or cross) and interaction terms between each religious group and being visibly religious. The first four columns report AME of a probit model for labour force participation and employment, while the next four columns report OLS results for weekly hours worked and ln salary. Odd numbered columns do not include controls while even-numbered columns report selectivity-corrected estimates and include controls.

The results show that visibly religious Muslim women are less likely to enter the labour force by 23%, the most economically significant figure for any particular group (column 1). Visibly religious Non-Muslim women of all other faiths are less likely to enter the labour force by 17%. When controls are included, being Muslim was no longer statistically or economically significant, but being visibly religious continues to reduce labour force participation by 13% (column 2). This finding is quite crucial since it indicates that after accounting for differences in education, age, marital status and number of children, there is a trend among visibly religious women to participate less in the labour force. The relatively low labor force participation rates of visibly religious women may be attributed to a range of factors, ranging from strong religious or ideological convictions about family ties, community and gender roles (Alesina and Giuliano, 2010) to discriminatory practices experienced by visibly religious women, or a mere combination of the two where each factor reinforces the other. An example of the latter scenario is one where visibly religious women associate employment with a higher cost than their counterparts—due to a discriminatory work environment and/or a home or community

environment that is not conducive to employment—which in turn drives up their reservation wages¹⁷ relative to their counterparts. A higher reservation wage among visibly religious women would explain lower labor force participation rates.

With respect to employment, Muslim women experience the highest unemployment rate of all groups. Specifically, they are 9% more likely to be unemployed than the non-religious group (column 3). Intriguingly, the relatively high unemployment rate of Muslim women is not affected by whether or not they are visibly religious. Moreover, these results are not sensitive to the inclusion of controls and selectivity correction (column 4). These results are somewhat consistent with the aforementioned descriptive statistics. Specifically, under the condition that Muslim women are discriminated against by prospective employers and co-workers and that their perceptions (as described earlier) are reasonably accurate, second-generation Muslim women—regardless of their visibility—experience discrimination first and foremost based on nationality (56%), which is then followed by name (15%) and skin colour (10%). That said, it is not obvious that these conditions hold. In fact, barriers of entry to employment for Muslim women can be a result of several complex issues in France. For example, it is well known that many Muslims live in enclaves or (majority) Muslim communities, which may create hurdles for Muslims to integrate with the French population and form the social networks necessary to gain employment. Moreover, the headscarf ban in public schools may incentivize some parents to enrol their daughters in private Islamic schools, some of which are overcrowded and have poor quality. Thus, in the French context, the pre-market conditions of Muslim women are likely to play a vital role in their diminished access to employment.

We now turn to the results in col (5)-(8), where the outcome variables are conditional on gaining employment. Muslim women work two fewer hours per week than non-Muslims, even in the presence of proper controls (col 5-6). It is outside the scope of this paper to determine whether a lower number of work hours per week is primarily due to personal choices made by Muslim women to attain work-life balance by self-selecting into occupations with a short workday or unfair practices where Muslims are excluded from high quality full-time employment. In view of the descriptive statistics that Muslims are less likely to report that they have autonomy and decision-making authority on the job, it is likely that Muslim women struggle to secure high quality jobs, which are usually full-time positions.

Finally, Muslims and Christians, who are visibly religious earn considerably lower salaries than their counterparts. When controls are included, the parameters of interest are no longer statistically significant. Thus, (visibly religious) Christians and Muslims in France possess attributes or were exposed to pre-market conditions that are generally associated with earning a low salary in France. Bearing in mind the descriptive statistic that these two groups are the least likely to attend college, these findings are not surprising. However, the stark difference between the point estimates in col(7) and (8) highlight that the controls and selectivity correction can account for a significant portion of the penalty associated with being a visibly religious Muslim or Christian. The three findings, visibly religious women are less likely to participate in the labor force, Muslims and Christians are more likely to be visibly religious than other women and visibly religious Muslim and Christian women suffer a high penalty (approximately 52-55%) in their unadjusted salaries, produce a number of implications. For example, to the extent that visibly religious women have higher reservation wages, either due to cultural reasons or relative hostility in the work place, it is likely that visibly religious women are more likely to work out of necessity than labor market attachment or career progression. Since those working out of

¹⁷ The reservation wage is the lowest wage in which an individual is willing to work.

necessity are usually from a relatively low level of socio-economic status, this would help explain the substantial difference between adjusted and unadjusted salaries in Table 4.

In summary, although the results show that among second generation women, Muslim women experience: the lowest labor force participation rates, the highest unemployment rates, the least number of working hours and the lowest salaries, when controls and selection-corrected estimates are produced, barriers to entry into employment (and perhaps full employment) seem to be the most salient problem. When it comes to examining choice variables such as the decision to participate in the labour force, Muslim women (visibly religious or not) are comparable to non-Muslim second generation immigrant women. This suggests there are mechanisms in play that factor into the decision to participate (or not) in the labor force for visibly religious women that are not captured by our analysis. Two contenders are cultural norms and the discouraged worker effect¹⁸.

The results concerning the disadvantaged position of Muslims in France's labour market is consistent with the descriptive statistics and the stylized facts in the ESS, which show that Muslims report less autonomy and decision-making authority throughout their employment experience¹⁹. The analysis also highlights the consequences of being visibly religious, which is consistent with the descriptive analysis of the TaO where second generation women (especially Muslims) cite several ways in which they perceive discrimination, including nationality, name, skin color, appearance, and religious affiliation. Although nationality was the most commonly cited form of discrimination, experienced or anticipated by second generation women, region of origin did not have a strong effect on labour market outcomes. Through a qualitative lens, the next part of this paper precisely examines this intertwined relationship between gender, religion and ethnicity and how individuals characterise the discrimination and racism they experience within the workplace.

Qualitative Results: Dynamics of gender and religious identifications in producing experiences of racism and discrimination in the workplace

As highlighted in the above discussion, second generation Muslim women are much more anxious than women of any other religious group about becoming victims of discrimination. This finding was also evidenced in the stories participants told in relation to countering potential discrimination and/or racism. All French Pakistani and Algerian participants interviewed shared feelings concerning the necessity to hide their religious beliefs and practices so as to avoid being 'othered' but especially, to escape discrimination. Many of these women used a very strong lexical field associated with crime, as if they were guilty of being Muslim. In discussions of how their religious identity needs to be kept secret in the workplace, many French women used the following verbs repetitively: 'hide', 'escape', 'suspect', 'remain invisible', 'keep secret', 'catch' and 'find out'.

This way of expressing their feelings was particularly noticeable in Ruksana's interviews. Ruksana is Pakistani and works as an airport station agent. She shared an experience in a previous jobs role that she qualified as religious discrimination. She explained how she hid her religious identity from her co-workers; for example, during Ramadhan, she avoids co-workers

¹⁸ The discouraged worker effect is when workers do not search for jobs because they have lost hope in finding one, and can result from declining economic activity where the worker lives, feelings of exclusions, a lack of skills, etc.

¹⁹ Remember that those figures are based on the ESS, which includes all Muslims of working age—men, women, natives, first and second-generation immigrants.

during lunchtime so not to ‘raise any suspicions’ and to ‘hide to break her fast’. She explained how, before arriving to work, she would remove her headscarf discreetly. The above-mentioned religious discrimination relates to an offer of a permanent job following the end of her fixed-term contract. However, the verbal offer never materialised because, as Ruksana believes, a male colleague found out she was Muslim:

‘To be honest, I don’t really look Pakistani. People often think I am Italian. And so, he never suspected that I was Muslim. Sometimes people think I am Spanish. So, hmm he really didn’t suspect that I was Muslim. I was waiting for the bus and he saw me; he was on his bike and he saw me. When I got to work that morning, I noticed the change, immediately. When I got there, he saw me again and I noticed everyone. It was like ‘we are not giving her the permanent job anymore’. There is no need for words; one look is enough to convey the message. The atmosphere, that morning, it was no longer the same. It had completely changed. [...] It was more like ‘you, you stay there and we, we stay here’. You’re frozen out straight away.’

It may be that an opportunity for permanent role was no longer available within her company. However, the image of the Muslim woman in veil is known to be a key feature in producing menacing identities that need to be ‘eliminated’. Afshar and her colleagues’ (2006) argued that the ‘image of the covered’ is threatening, reinforced by a process of ‘demonization’ of Muslim women (p169). In the above case, the threat was ‘neutralised’ by not making Ruksana permanent. Ruksana explained that she was never offered the permanent role as promised and she left after the end of her fixed term contract. Yet, this experience remained difficult to challenge since it was unspoken and invisible. The perceived discrimination is subtle. She was not given a permanent position but only promised one; being on a fixed-term contract, she neither had a guarantee of renewal nor a permanent offer in the first place. However, it was the subsequent interaction (or lack of it) with her co-workers, following the incident, that drew Ruksana to make this association.

The way our body and appearance is perceived, and subsequently our identity, is bound to the spatial imagination of the people we interact with (Leroux, 2008). For Ruksana, it was her re-defined identity that caused this outcome. The knowledge of her faith (through the covering of her hair) worked to shift her perceived non-Muslim body (note her perception before the incident as Italian) to a Muslim body. Boundaries were redrawn (initially part of the ‘we’ then a binary divide ‘you’/‘we’). Ruksana became the ‘other’ within the workplace and became socially marginalised (note references to the changed atmosphere and feeling of being suddenly ‘frozen out’). This shows how borders within the social imaginary of the “Self” are not fixed but constantly evolve as the knowledge of the ‘other’ changes (Said, 1979). In this instance, according to Ruksana, it was the gendered display of her religion, that is the visibility of her religion on her body through the covering of her hair that played a decisive part in her othering rather than her ethnicity per se (i.e. it was acceptable for Ruksana to be Italian but not a *Muslim* Italian). Her ethnicity seems to be more manageable or indeed less identifiable than the visibility of her religious affiliation. The way Ruksana made sense of her experience reflects the earlier TaO analysis in several ways, which showed that ethnicity (or nationality, to use the survey’s terminology) is the most relevant marker for discrimination followed by religious affiliation. According to her, without the headscarf, many people think she is Italian, which is not a

problematic identity (or at least less problematic). Unlike religious affiliation which requires some effort or commitment for visibility (i.e. wearing a headscarf) nationality does not entail much effort (e.g. such as being Italian in the above example).

Ruksana's strategy to remove the headscarf before arriving at work reflects her attempt to socially integrate in her workplace (despite economic inclusion) and negotiate her place and identity in the spatial imagination of her co-workers. This is consistent with the perception of second-generation Muslims, who despite being born and bred in France, are questioned regarding their participation and engagement with the wider society, a discourse experienced by their migrant parents (Rattansi, 2011). Yet, this attempt to integrate is one that bears a sense of guilt (note the repetition of 'suspected' and 'saw me'). Ruksana concluded her story by telling that, following this incident, she reluctantly stopped wearing the headscarf to protect herself from religious discrimination and ensure her work opportunities are never affected again.

Experiences of everyday racism were very overt (such as through jokes and comments). In one case only, Seedra, an Algerian participant who wears the headscarf and works as an accountant, experienced overt discrimination due to the visibility of her religion. She explained how her firm's director openly told her that he will not promote her because she would then be 'in contact with clients which [he] does not want her to do, due to [her] wearing the headscarf'. In the reported words of her director appointing Seedra 'prove[d] that women in [the] headscarf can work, but that stops there'. To counter this assumption (i.e. that her headscarf will be a barrier in senior roles), Seedra feminises her 'covered' body with 'western' accessories that is purposely dressing 'à la française', wearing high heels, being up-to-date with new fashion styles, wearing make-up and jewellery. Seedra's experience provides a further understanding of how appearance is altered among second generation Muslim women as discussed in the first quantitative section. Seedra does not alter her appearance for religious or cultural reasons but precisely to present herself as 'white-friendly' *despite* wearing the headscarf. In doing so she presumably crosses the boundaries of ethnic, gender and religious identification.

In addition to being 'white-friendly' in appearance, she also acts in a 'white-minded' way. For example, Seedra shared how, when her colleagues routinely ask her about her views on different matters such as homosexuality, she 'lies about [her] beliefs' and gives answers that are, according to her, in line with her colleagues' views. She attempts to negotiate her othering, from negative to positive. By continuously hiding her real opinions which draw on her religion, she creates a new and contextual subject position; her dis-identification is used to regain control of her representation. She attempts to convey the image of a confident and open-minded co-worker and not the 'woman in veil' (and therefore the submissive and victimised woman) in the office in the hope this would enable her to move into senior roles. It could be argued that Seedra could change jobs. However, she is well-aware of the difficulties she will experience in securing a new role elsewhere and how, even if she succeeds, she will have to start from the bottom.

Comparing Ruksana and Seedra's experiences it is clear that visibility of religious affiliation is not necessarily a barrier in accessing paid employment. However, progression, in both cases was subject to the level of acceptance of this visibility and this experience was common to other participants.

Farida, who works as a real-estate agent, was also denied a promotion which she qualified as both religious and racial discrimination, but hers was a subtler experience. Unlike Seedra and Ruksana, Farida does not wear the headscarf. She also dresses in ways that are perceived to be associated with women in the west (such as wearing mini-skirts and boots). She was also the oldest French participant in the study. She was born in France and grew up in the

Parisian banlieues during the 70s, at a time of heightened racial tensions following the end of the Independence of Algeria in 1962 (Derderian, 2004). Her lived experiences span over more than 40 years where she witnessed the change in ethnic and social relations in France. For her, ‘the problem is not going to be racism; today, it’s more going to be discrimination’. Despite our initial conversation about anonymity and confidentiality, Farida needed to be reassured again (which I did) and then, she narrated a previous experience of discrimination while she worked as a civil servant:

‘Oh! Yes! Yes! No, I just want to tell you (pause) I don’t want people at work to know that I talked about discrimination. But you know I’ve experienced it first-hand. There is this girl, really nice, who joined the company way after me but she got promoted and I wasn’t. Initially, my manager told me that she is going to put forward my file for promotion and everything. I was so happy. I waited two years. And soon after [the new girl] arrived, I found out she got promoted and not me. There was this person I knew in HR. She told me that my manager never sent my file! I didn’t do anything. I just moved departments! Never got promoted! Two years! People continued to arrive after me and got promoted and nothing for me! Because I am not French-French? I am Muslim?’

It could be argued that the new colleague was well-qualified for the promotion or that Farida’s job performance did not justify a promotion. However, it is the intangible fact of being lied to and being undermined for two years (note the reference to other new colleagues being promoted over her) that led Farida to draw the conclusion of discrimination. Although she claimed to have done nothing, Farida did take action by moving internally. As highlighted in the quantitative analysis, access to employment is a major barrier for Muslims in the French labour market. The internal move had a negative impact on Farida’s career progression but, nevertheless, it protected her from potential long-term consequences such as unemployment. Changing jobs, moving departments and even quitting were strategies that many women deployed in order to escape or stop their experiences of racism and/or discrimination but undoubtedly the women’s career progression suffered as a result of these, which may explain the lower salaries second generation Muslim women receive, found in the earlier quantitative results Unlike Seedra, Farida, for example, changed departments but had to build again a job performance which would make her eligible for a promotion. More than disappointment, her frustration was perceptible during the narration of this experience (note the exclamation marks, emphases on ‘never’, ‘two years’ and ‘nothing for me’).

This frustration was further heightened as she associated this unfair treatment to her ethnicity and religion. After further probing, Farida explained that the new colleague was white and non-Muslim. The reference to ‘French-French’ resonates with the earlier discussion regarding the intertwined perception of whiteness and French citizenship. The expression ‘French-French’, used by all participants at one point or another, is to be read as ‘white French’. This is particularly important since Farida, like the other participants, *are* French citizens. The way Farida made sense of her experience reflect the earlier quantitative findings. Indeed, Farida specifically frames her experiences as related to her religion (i.e. Islam) and ethnicity (i.e. non-

white), which are two sources of identification deemed problematic in French society (as discussed earlier). She precisely picks up on the intersectional nature of her experience grounded in both identity positions.

Moreover, her attempt to ‘erase’ or at the least ‘reduce’ the impact of her ethnicity by way of dressing in non-traditional and/or religious feminine attire did not hide away her religious identity. It is possible that her Arabic/Muslim sounding name gave away her ethnic and religious identity. She considered that her identification as a minority ethnic and Muslim woman (despite her clothing choice) put her at a disadvantage. This led to a strong sense of inequality. This perception of inequality was however more accentuated in the discourses of Algerian participants than the Pakistani participants. This is one key difference between French Pakistanis and Algerians in this study regarding the way in which the women perceived their rights, or indeed the denial of their rights, as French citizens.

French Algerian women expressed a stronger entailment to, what they defined as, their country and were also more vocal about unfair treatment than their Pakistani counterparts. This sense of injustice is linked to their deep-rooted belief in the French slogan *Liberté, Egalité et Fraternité* which did not apply to the women, being constantly ‘othered’ by the people they interact with (at work and outside). In comparison, many French Pakistani women were more accepting of oppression (like Ruksana) and unfair practices such as removing the headscarf at work or settling for ‘minimum’ inclusion (such as not fighting othering practices or racist remarks as long as one has a job). This difference in attitude towards French society is linked to Algeria’s colonial past with France. The Algerian War of Independence impacted tremendously the perception of Algerians in France as compared to the other group. This is noticeable in government reports which explicitly describe Pakistanis in France as the ‘model minority’ compared to Algerians (Moliner, 2009). Yet, similarity grounded in religion worked to produce comparable processes of racialisation and subsequent experiences of discrimination which highlights how religious identification visible or not, beyond ethnicity, weakened the women’s professional careers. Indeed, Farida, who did not wear the headscarf, experienced challenges in her attempt to develop her career, similar to Seedra who did wear the headscarf. Note that these results corroborate the quantitative findings, which show that Muslim women, visible or not, experience adverse labour market outcomes relative to their non-Muslim counterparts.

Being in professional jobs, these women have achieved a modicum of economic integration. Yet, experiences of being treated unfavourably due to the gendered and/or religious displays of their bodily appearance contributed to many of the Pakistani and Algerian participants’ sense of social and emotional exclusion at work. Put simply, their professional inclusion did not warrant their social and emotional inclusion in the workplace or even their equal treatment for career progression. In addition, the way the women made sense of their experiences strongly reflected the findings using the ESS and TaO datasets. Indeed, the women view their experiences at the intersection of their gender, ethnicity and/or religion. In other words, religion alone is not viewed as source of racism and/or discrimination.

Concluding discussion

This paper discussed labour market inequalities in the form of access, outcomes and experiences among second generation Muslim women in France. It built on the understanding of French citizenship as fixed, grounded in whiteness and disassociated with Islam, and on the degree of visibility of religion. Using the TaO questionnaire, we find that ethnicity (or nationality

to use the survey's terminology) is by far, the most commonly cited form of (experienced or perceived) discrimination. Other markers of identification such as name, skin colour, appearance and religious affiliation continue to be relevant, but are more commonly cited only when respondents choose more than one form of discrimination that they have experienced or are anticipating. In the regression analysis, second-generation French women were categorized by their region of origin (birthplace of the father/mother) in the first analysis and by religious affiliation in the second analysis. Although nationality was the most commonly cited form of discrimination, region of origin did not have a strong effect on labour market outcomes, except for lower participation rates for those whose source region is the Middle East/Asia. By contrast, when categories of source regions were replaced by those of religious affiliation, Muslim women were the least likely to gain employment, worked the least number of hours and earned the lowest salaries. The results for employment and work hours are robust to the inclusion of controls, while the point estimates for the regressions on salaries are more pronounced for visibly religious Muslim and Christian women. Differences between adjusted and unadjusted salaries suggest that pre-market conditions of visibly religious Muslims in the French context—including but not limited to lower educational attainment, residential segregation coupled with low(er) quality housing and schooling, and lower social capital or smaller networks—play a vital role in shaping outcomes once in employment. Moreover, the descriptive statistics on the degree in which second-generation women perceive, experience and anticipate discrimination implies that the divisive language, laws and practices in the public schools and spaces of France create an atmosphere of exclusion (and possibly fear) for Muslims in the workplace.

It is important to note that when it comes to examining choice variables such as the decision to participate in the labour force, Muslim women (visibly religious or not) are comparable to non-Muslim second generation immigrant women. For all groups, being visibly religious reduce labor force participation rates by approximately 13%. It is likely that these results are driven by a combination of factors, including socio-religious norms regarding gender roles and family ties, and the institutional features of France, such as the headscarf ban in public schools and other attempts to remove religiosity from public spaces.

The findings of the qualitative analysis provided a more in-depth understanding of these institutional features. The intersection of gender and religious identifications triggered negative social interactions in terms of a fixation on religion for both the women who wear headscarves and, those who do not. Thus, the commonality of experiences of everyday religious racism and othering among Pakistani and Algerian women highlight the continuous negativity associated with Islam in line with a 'European-wide anxiety' about Muslim immigrants and their children (Modood et al., 2006, p18). Second generation French Pakistani and Algerian women continuously needed to navigate their identity as French Muslims. They had to achieve a less 'problematic' (e.g. Italian) or more 'acceptable' social position. Some participants considered relocating themselves in the labour market (i.e. by changing jobs); others performed more acceptable identities (e.g. 'white-minded' Muslim woman) in anticipation of discrimination and/or racism.

The ethnic factor was particularly significant in the ways in which the participants accepted existence of unfair treatment which barred their career progression. Their professional skills were weighed against the (visibility of) their ethnic and/or religious identities and not the

qualifications they gained and/or their work experiences. Their racialised identities, driven by a rigid association of whiteness and French citizenship, produced unfair treatment within their workplace which served to sustain the imaginative and cultural values in the minds of the participants' colleagues. These values were materialised through the contestation of the women's presence and indeed progression in their workplaces *as* Muslim. Their bodily appearance (i.e. wearing headscarf, skin pigmentation) and opinions (i.e. regarding religious beliefs and practices) were used to 'other'. The meaning associated to French citizenship (exclusive of Islam), certain professional jobs (such as interacting with clients) and certain sectors (such as civil service) continuously form the foundation for the production of distance and difference despite sameness through citizenship. The gendered display of the women's religious affiliation further heightened the extent to which they were blocked in their professional development.

By bringing together the quantitative analysis on "access to" and "outcomes in" employment and qualitative analysis on progression in employment, this paper provides a comprehensive picture of the dynamics at play in the French labour market for second generation French Muslim women. It showed how the gendered identities of second generation Muslim women in France, grounded in (visibility of) their religion, can hinder (1) labour market access, (2) create vulnerable employment outcomes compared to non-Muslim women and (3) even lead to further challenges once in employment by experiencing limited opportunities for professional progression. The similarity in Pakistani and Algerian women's experiences further suggests that racialised identity constructions are not limited to well-established groups (i.e. Algerians) but that these identities entail negative experiences regardless of the numerical status of the minority ethnic group in France.

Limitations and recommendation for future research

Limitations

Although the ESS and TaO surveys provide us with a unique opportunity to explore the relationship between the visibility of religious affiliation and labor market outcomes among second-generation immigrant women, it was difficult to incorporate particular features that would allow us to better understand how the French labor market functions. For example, firm level data of employed and previously employed individuals, including industry affiliation, sectoral affiliation (public, private, international), and the size, age and location of the firm permit researchers to explore questions focused on the demand side of the labor market such as which industries and firms are likely to employ particular groups and whether these employment patterns reflect barriers to upward mobility in the workplace. Many of these features are typically included in datasets comprised of labor force surveys but since France rarely allows for the data collection on religious affiliation and birthplace of parents, it was not possible to include demand side variables on a regression for our sample of interest. Furthermore, data on work attitudes and gender roles, along with specific human capital variables such as actual labor market experience, reservation wages and wages of the head of household may shed light on differences revealed in the analysis, especially on the outcome of female labor force participation rates. Likewise, longitudinal data that tracks respondents' outcomes over time may help explain persistent employment gaps among Muslim women, and address the role of transitions from one state of

(un) employment to the other (e.g. part-time employment to unemployment, full-time employment to part-time employment, etc).

Another limitation relates to the characteristic of the interview participants. Having been recruited through snowballing technique, it was not possible to ensure an equal number of women who wore headscarf and those who did not; nor was it possible to recruit participants working in similar sectors (i.e. all private sectors or all public sectors) which would have offered greater contextualisation and see differences and commonalities across spaces.

Recommendations

All interview participants were the eldest in their families. They explained how based on their own experiences they made sure to support their younger siblings so that, unlike them, they can navigate the labour market by avoiding the ‘pitfalls’ they experienced. Future work could thus examine the differences and similarities in professional experiences across siblings. Another avenue for research relates to the examination of generational changes. The growing third generation, who would have at least one parent born and bred in France, may benefit from support that the second generation could not enjoy, due to being the ‘bridge’ generation (i.e. bridge between them and the migrant generation). Inter-generational changes over three generations (or more) may help illuminate whether or not religious signifier remains a decisive factor in shaping professional experiences (from an individual perspective as well as a societal one). Some researchers have theorized that the residential segregation of Muslims in Europe created obstacles for their social and political integration, thereby reducing their capacity to form strong social networks and creating barriers for formal wage employment and high-end entrepreneurial activities. Future work may address the role of residential segregation in shaping differences in employment outcomes or career trajectories for first, second and third generation immigrants.

References

- Abou-Zahab, M. 2007. "Migrants pakistanais en France." *Hommes & Migrations* (1268-1269):96-103.
- Adida, C., Laitin, D., & Valfort, M.-V. 2010. Les Français musulmans sont-ils discriminés dans leur propre pays? : French-American Foundation.
- Adnan, W., & Miaari, S. H. (2018). Voting patterns and the gender wage gap. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 146, 222-247.
- Aeberhardt, R., Coudin, E., & Ratherlot, R. 2010. Les écarts de taux d'emploi selon l'origine des parents: INSEE.
- Afshar, H. (2012). The politics of fear: what does it mean to those who are otherized and feared? *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 36(1), 9-27.
- Afshar, H., Aitken, R., & Franks, M. (2005). Feminisms, Islamophobia and Identities. *Political Studies*, 53(2), 262-283.
- Afshar, H., Aitken, R. and Myfanwy, F. 2006. "Islamophobia and women of Pakistani descent in Bradford." In *Muslim Diaspora*, edited by Haideh Mohgissi, 167-185. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Alesina, A., & Giuliano, P. (2010). The power of the family. *Journal of Economic growth*, 15(2), 93-125.
- Alesina, A., & Giuliano, P. (2015). Culture and institutions. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 53(4), 898-944.
- Algan, Y., Dustmann, C., Glitz, A. and Manning, A. (2010). "The Economic Situation of First and Second generation Immigrants in France, Germany and the United Kingdom." *The Economic Journal* 120 (February): F4-F30.
- Antecol, H. 2000. An examination of cross-country differences in the gender gap in labour force participation rates. *Labour Economics*, 7(4), 409-426.
- Anthias, F. 2006. "Belongings in a Globalising and Unequal World." In *Sage Studies in International Sociology*, edited by N. Yuval-Davis, K. Kannabiran and U. Vieten, 17-31. London: Sage.
- Borjas, G. J. 1987. Self-Selection and the Earnings of Immigrants. *The American Economic Review*, 531-553.
- Brah, A. (2003). 'Race' and 'Culture' in the gendering of Labour Markets. In H. Afshar & M. Maynard (Eds.), *The dynamics of 'race' and gender* (pp. 151-171): Taylor & Francis e-Library.
- Brah, A., & Shaw, S. (1992). *Working Choice*: Department of Employment.
- Brubaker, R. 1992. *Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany*. London: Harvard University Press.
- Bullock, K. (2002). *Rethinking Muslim Women and the Veil*. London: The International Institute of Islamic Thought.
- Chiswick, Barry R. 1978. "The Effect of Americanization on the Earnings of Foreign-Born Men," *Journal of Political Economy*, 86, 897-921.
- Cohen, M. 2009. "Jews and Muslim in France: Changing Response to Cultural and Religious Diversity." In *Legal Practice and Cultural Diversity*, edited by R Grillo, R Ballard, A Ferrari, A Hoekema, M Maussen and P Shah, 219-236. London: Ashgate.
- Deltombe, T. 2007. *L'Islam Imaginaire*. Paris: La Découverte.
- Deltombe, T, and Rigouste, M. 2005. "L'ennemi intérieur." In *La fracture coloniale*, edited by Nicolas Bancel, Pascal Blanchard and Sandrine Lemaire, 191-198. Paris: La Découverte.
- Derderian, R. 2004. *North Africans in Contemporary France*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Eatwell, R. 2002. "The Rebirth of Right-Wing Charisma? The Cases of Jean-Marie Le Pen and Vladimir Zhirinovskiy." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 3 (3):1-23.

- Fernandez, R., and Fogli, A. 2009. "Culture: An Empirical Investigation of Beliefs, Work, and Fertility." *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics* 1(1): 146-77
- Hajjat, A, and Mohammed, M. 2013. *Comment les élites françaises fabriquent le "problème musulman"*. Paris: La Découverte.
- Heckman, J. 1979. "Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error," *Econometrica*, 46. 931-961.
- Leroux, D. "Imaginative Geographies: Some Theoretical Considerations." *Theoretical Musings*. 2008.
- Macdonald, M. 2006. Muslim Women and the Veil. *Feminist Media Studies*, 6(1), 7-23.
- Merckling, O. 2012. *Parcours professionnels de femmes immigrés et de filles d'immigrés*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Modood, T., Triandafyllidou, A. and Zapata-Barrero, R. 2006. *Multiculturalism, Muslims and citizenship : a European approach*. 1st ed. New York: Routledge.
- Moliner, C. 2009. Invisible et modèle ? Première approche de l'immigration sud-asiatique en France Paris: Ministère de l'Immigration, de l'Intégration, de l'Identité nationale et du Développement solidaire.
- Pailhé, A., & Meurs, D. (2008). Descendantes d'immigrés en France. *Travail, genre et sociétés*, 20(2), 87-107.
- Phoenix, A. 2001. "Practising feminist research: The intersection of gender and "race" in the research process." In *Feminism and race*, edited by K. K. Bhavnani, 203-219. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rattansi, A. 2011. *Multiculturalism : a very short introduction, Very short introductions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rydgren, J. 2007. "The Sociology of the Radical Right." *The Annual Review of Sociology* 33:241-62.
- Safi, M. (2006). Le processus d'intégration des immigrés en France. *Revue française de sociologie*, 47(1), 3-48.
- Said, E. 1979. *Orientalism*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Santelli, E. (2008). Etre musulman après le 11 septembre. *Diversité urbaine*, 8(2), 135-162.
- Santelli, E., & Boukacem, D. (2006a). Des cadres d'origine étrangère face aux discriminations. Paris: FASILD.
- Santelli, E., Boukacem, D., Gardon, E., & Invernizzi, A. (2007a). Les cadres d'origine étrangère face aux discriminations. *Migrations Etudes*, 137, 1-12.
- Seniguer, H. 2009. "La laïcité à l'épreuve de l'Islam et des musulmans." *Revue d'éthique et de la théologie morale*, 254 (2):63-96.
- Spire, A. 2005. "D'une colonie à l'autre." In *L'esclavage, la colonisation et après*, edited by P Weil and S Dufoix, 387-409. Paris: PUF.
- Waddington, D., Jobard, F. and King, M. eds. 2009. *Rioting in the UK and France*. Devon: Willan Publishing.
- Weedon, C. 2004. *Identity and culture, Issues in cultural and media studies*. Maidenhead: England.
- Wieviorka, M. 1994. *Racisme et exclusion*. edited by Christine Barats: Quarderni.
- Wieviorka, M. 1998. *Le Racisme*. Paris: La Découverte.
- Wieviorka, M. 2012. *Une société fragmentée?* Paris: La Découverte et Syros.
- Yuval-Davis, N. 2011. *The Politics of Belonging*. London: Sage.

Table A: Socio-economic characteristics of all French interviewees

Name	Age	Degree specificities and skill diplomas	Occupation	Contract type
FRENCH PAKISTANIS				
<u>Mahy</u>	24	Higher National Certificate in Management (2-year university degree)	Programme Administrator	Fixed-term/Full-time
Reema	25	Master's in HR Administration	HR administrator	Permanent/Full-time
<u>Ruksana</u>	25	Higher National Certificate in transport and logistics	Airport station agent	Permanent/Full-time
Sonia	28	Higher National Certificate in Secretarial Studies	Airport Station agent	Permanent/Full-time
Sana	32	Technical BA in Management and Social Engineering	Head of Technique Management	Permanent/Full-time
Meena	34	BA in Medical and Social Sciences	Private dental assistant	Permanent/Full-time
FRENCH ALGERIANS				
<u>Seedra</u>	26	Master's in Corporate Finance	Accountant	Permanent/Full-time
Fatima	27	Technical BA in Banking	Bank adviser	Permanent/Full-time
Naima	32	Master's in Education	Advisor to mayor Head of community and youth organisation	Volunteer Permanent/Full-time
Zara	33	Master's in Accountancy	Patisserie owner	-
Anissa	35	Technical BA in HR Administration	HR administrator	Permanent/Full-time
Farida	42	Master's in Literature	Real-estate assistant	Permanent/Part-time

Note: all names are pseudonyms; underlined names highlight participants with headscarves.

Table 1—Descriptive Statistics on Second-Generation Muslim Women by Religious Affiliation

	MUSLIMS	CATHOLICS	CHRISTIANS	OTHER	JEWS	NONE
				CHR		
LABOR FORCE	0.66	0.81	0.74	0.70	0.61	
PART						0.76
EMPLOYED	0.76	0.90	0.94	0.90	0.96	0.88
HOURS	33	35	37	37	37	
WORKED						35
NET SALARY	1172	1525	1130	1662	1750	
(EUROS)						1451
VISIBLY	0.31	0.19	0.39	0.17	0.29	
RELIGIOUS						0.01
AGE	29	38	36	35	31	35
MARRIED	0.38	0.45	0.42	0.41	0.35	0.37
NUMBER OF	0.99	1.28	1.25	1.12	1.18	
CHILDREN						1.14
NO EDUCATION	0.11	0.11	0.06	0.08	0.15	0.10
PRIMARY	0.01	0.05	0.25	0	0	0.03
LOWER	0.10	0.10	0.06	0.04	0.15	
SECONDARY						0.10
LOWER	0.27	0.20	0.11	0.25	0.07	
VOCATIONAL						0.19
HIGHER	0.17	0.11	0.09	0.15	0.04	0.12

VOCATIONAL						
HIGHER	0.11	0.12	0.15	0.10	0.19	
SECONDARY						0.12
TWO-YEAR	0.12	0.11	0.12	0.10	0.10	
COLLEGE						0.12
> TWO-YEAR	0.11	0.20	0.16	0.29	0.30	
COLLEGE						0.20
BIRTHPLACE OF MOTHER						
FRANCE	0.08	0.37	0.30	0.08	0.27	0.43
MIDDLE						
EAST/ASIA	0.84	0.16	0.13	0.14	0.69	0.18
AFRICA	0.05	0.02	0.05	0.09	0	0.03
EU-15	0	0.24	0.21	0.05	0.01	0.16
EASTERN						
EUROPE	0	0.01	0.15	0.26	0.02	0.05
OTHER EUROPE	0	0.03	0	0.13	0	0.01
OTHER	0.01	0.17	0.17	0.25	0.01	0.14
OBSERVATIONS	1333	1678	262	124	68	1863

Notes: Trajectories and Origins Survey (2009). Weights are used to calculate the means for the variables.

Table 2—Second-Generation College Educated Employed Women

discrimination based on:	Muslim	catholic	other Relig	no Religion
name	0.40	0.05	0.06	0.05
Skin color	0.40	0.13	0.14	0.15
accent	0.02	0.01	0.11	0.02
Religious Affiliation	0.32	0.06	0.10	0.02
nationality	0.72	0.18	0.07	0.21
Appearance	0.37	0.11	0.18	0.15
other	0.03	0.08	0.01	0.07
Number of observations	88	408	113	354

Notes: Trajectories and Origins Survey (2009). The table above displays the percentage of second-generation college educated and employed women, who reported being concerned with each type of discrimination, regardless of whether they mentioned one or more sources of discrimination. The table categorizes the sample size into four subgroups: Muslims, Catholics, those who belong to any other religion and those without a religious affiliation. Survey weights are used to compute the means of dummy variables in the survey.

Figure 1




Figure 2




Figure 3




Figure 4




Table 3—Source Regions and Labor Market Outcomes among 2nd generation female Immigrants

Panel A: No Controls	Average Marginal Effects (Probit)				OLS			
	LF (1)	LF (2)	Empl (3)	Empl (4)	Hours (5)	Hours (6)	Ln(salary) (7)	Ln(salary) (8)
Middle East/Asia	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.09*** (0.03)	-0.61 (1.04)	-0.08 (1.18)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.06)
Africa	-0.16*** (0.04)	-0.16*** (0.05)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.81 (0.89)	-1.43 (1.12)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.06)
EU-15	0.05 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.20 (0.83)	-0.68 (1.00)	0.00 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)
Eastern Europe	-0.02 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.08)	0.05 (0.03)	2.21 (3.20)	0.65 (1.76)	-0.18* (0.11)	-0.24* (0.12)
Other Europe	0.15*** (0.05)	-0.08 (0.18)	0.04 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	2.32 (2.49)	-3.29 (3.51)	0.21 (0.14)	-0.06 (0.19)
Other	0.05 (0.04)	0.04 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.28 (1.20)	1.34 (0.98)	0.07 (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)
Constant					35.15*** (0.68)	35.11*** (0.89)	7.18*** (0.04)	7.17*** (0.05)
Source Region:								
Father's BPL	X		X		X		X	
Mother's BPL		X		X		X		X
Observations	5,234	5,234	3,769	3,769	3,083	3,083	3,114	3,114
Panel B: With Controls & Selection								
Middle East (and Asia)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.11 (0.98)	0.05 (1.25)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)
Africa	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.97 (0.87)	-1.47 (1.30)	0.03 (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)
EU-15	0.00 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.00 (0.03)	0.12 (0.71)	-0.63 (0.96)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)
Eastern Europe	0.05 (0.07)	0.04 (0.09)	0.01 (0.05)	0.06 (0.04)	3.09 (3.21)	0.65 (1.73)	-0.12* (0.07)	-0.00 (0.10)
Other Europe	0.04 (0.06)	-0.14 (0.18)	0.05 (0.06)	0.00 (0.08)	1.97 (2.09)	-2.08 (2.58)	0.11 (0.09)	-0.09 (0.13)
Other	0.04 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.67 (1.12)	0.95 (1.00)	0.03 (0.04)	0.07** (0.04)
Married	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.05** (0.03)	-0.04 (0.04)	-1.83** (0.74)	-1.97*** (0.73)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)

No. Children	-0.10*** (0.01)	-0.10*** (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.61 (0.51)	-0.50 (0.48)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Primary	0.19** (0.09)	0.19** (0.09)	-0.27 (0.24)	-0.27 (0.54)	7.43*** (2.05)	6.57*** (1.99)	-0.09 (0.21)	-0.08 (0.20)
Lower Sec	0.07 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)	0.10 (0.08)	0.09 (0.24)	3.02** (1.35)	2.71* (1.40)	0.21** (0.10)	0.22** (0.09)
Lower Voc	0.09* (0.05)	0.09* (0.05)	0.12 (0.10)	0.11 (0.27)	3.27** (1.55)	3.30** (1.60)	0.09 (0.09)	0.07 (0.09)
Higher Voc	0.17*** (0.05)	0.16*** (0.05)	0.16 (0.11)	0.14 (0.32)	3.67*** (1.39)	3.88*** (1.40)	0.12 (0.09)	0.11 (0.08)
Higher Sec	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.06)	0.21* (0.11)	0.19 (0.33)	1.79 (1.91)	1.65 (1.90)	0.22** (0.11)	0.23** (0.10)
2 year College	0.14*** (0.05)	0.13*** (0.05)	0.21* (0.12)	0.19 (0.34)	5.20*** (1.28)	5.13*** (1.33)	0.34*** (0.09)	0.33*** (0.09)
>2 yr College	0.07 (0.06)	0.07 (0.06)	0.20* (0.11)	0.18 (0.30)	6.03*** (1.51)	5.94*** (1.49)	0.52*** (0.11)	0.52*** (0.10)
Age	0.09*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.32)	-0.07 (0.39)	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Age (squared)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)
Constant					30.89*** (5.76)	32.40*** (7.64)	7.55*** (0.34)	7.50*** (0.34)
Source Region:								
Father's BPL	X		X		X		X	
Mother's BPL		X		X		X		X
Observations	5,234	5,234	5,234	5,234	5,234	5,234	5,234	5,234
Selected Obs	---	---	3,769	3,769	3,083	3,083	3,114	3,114

Source: Trajectories and Origins 2009. The sample for all columns is restricted to second generation immigrants of France (at least one foreign-born parent) of working age, 18-64. The source region of the second-generation immigrant is determined by the father's birthplace in odd numbered columns and determined by the mother's birthplace in even numbered columns. The reference group in odd (even) numbered columns are second generation females with the father (mother) born in France, who have zero years of schooling, no children and are divorced/widowed/single. In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable equals 1 for those who are participating in the labor force and 0 other wise. In columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable equals 1 for those who are employed and 0 for those who are unemployed. Col (1)-(4) report average marginal effects of a probit model. In columns (5) and (6) the dependent variable equals the number of hours usually worked per week for only those reporting positive work hours and in columns (7) and (8), the dependent variable equals the natural logarithm of the monthly salary in 2008 Euros. The figures reported in columns (5), (6), (7) and (8) are estimated using OLS. In Panel A, there are no controls for estimating the effect of the immigrant's source region on labor market outcomes while Panel B includes several covariates. Col (3)-(8) of Panel B account for selection 1.) into the labor force (for col (3)-(4)) and 2.) working a positive number of work hours (col (5)-(8)). The covariates of the selection equation include age, age squared, 8 education dummies, marital status and number of children. (Standard errors are reported in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).

Table 4—Religious Affiliation and Labor Market Outcomes in France

	Average Marginal Effects (Probit)				OLS			
	LF (1)	LF (2)	Empl (3)	Empl (4)	Hours (5)	Hours (6)	Salary (7)	Salary (8)
Visibly Religious	-0.17*	-0.13**	-0.23**	-0.22*	-6.75**	-6.50**	-0.37**	-0.18
	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(3.01)	(3.19)	(0.16)	(0.11)
Muslim	-0.06*	-0.02	-0.09***	-0.08***	-2.40*	-1.99*	-0.18***	-0.07
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(1.24)	(1.13)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Christian	0.02	0.06	0.11**	0.13**	0.80	0.14	-0.15***	-0.08
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(1.20)	(1.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Catholic	0.05	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.34	0.44	0.05	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(1.03)	(1.11)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Other Christian	-0.04	-0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.76	0.68	0.14**	0.05
	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(1.02)	(1.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Jew	-0.08	-0.04	0.09	0.04	3.71*	4.04**	0.28***	0.17***
	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(1.99)	(1.73)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Muslim*Visible	0.04	0.09	0.21**	0.21*	6.50**	6.47*	0.28	0.16
	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(3.31)	(3.45)	(0.17)	(0.13)
Christian*Visible	0.06	-0.02	0.17	0.19	8.47**	7.45**	0.22	0.02
	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(3.91)	(3.66)	(0.20)	(0.17)
Catholic*Visible	0.14	0.10	0.31***	0.31**	5.42	4.92	0.32*	0.17
	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(3.32)	(3.40)	(0.17)	(0.12)
Other Ch* Visible	0.04	-0.05	0.25*	0.22	11.41*	9.36	0.49*	0.13
	(0.20)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(6.30)	(5.94)	(0.27)	(0.15)
Jew*Visible	-0.03	0.11	---	0.89***	-3.12	-4.01	0.09	0.00
	(0.19)	(0.12)		(0.22)	(5.61)	(5.46)	(0.27)	(0.18)
Controls/Sel		X		X		X		X
Constant					35.26***	33.47***	7.17***	7.49***
					(0.54)	(7.10)	(0.03)	(0.35)
Observations	5,226	5,226	5,226	5,226	5,226	5,226	5,226	5,226
Selected Obs	---	---	---	3,755	---	3,083	---	3,114

Source: Trajectories and Origins 2009. The sample for all columns is restricted to second generation immigrants (at least one foreign born parent) of France of working age, 18-64. Even numbered columns include the following controls: age, age squared, three dummies for marital status (married, single, other), number of children, eight dummies for educational attainment (none, primary, lower secondary, higher vocational, higher vocational, higher secondary, two year college, more than two year college). The reference group in all specifications are second generation females with one parent born in France, who have zero years of schooling, no religious affiliation, no children, and are divorced/widowed/single. For definitions of dependent variables and information on models used

to estimate results, see Table 2 or text. (Standard errors are reported in parentheses*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$).

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

Appendix Tables

Table 1—How do Second-Generation Muslim Women Interpret Discriminatory Behavior?

discrimination source	1 Source	2 sources	3 sources	>3 sources	All
name	0.10	0.30	0.50	0.78	0.34
Skin color	0.15	0.31	0.49	0.75	0.35
accent	0.00	0.01	0.04	0.21	0.05
Religious Affiliation	0.07	0.33	0.57	0.84	0.37
nationality	0.56	0.78	0.95	0.98	0.66
Appearance	0.06	0.24	0.42	0.78	0.30
other	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.07	0.03
observations	219	334	280	241	1074

Notes: Trajectories and Origins Survey (2009). The table above displays the percentage of second-generation Muslim women who are anxious about becoming victims of discrimination based on name, skin color, accent, religious affiliation, nationality, appearance, or other reason. The table categorizes the sample size into four types: those who marked only one type of discrimination that they are concerned with, two types, three types and more than three types. The last column reports the percentage of people in the full sample of second generation Muslim French women (1074 respondents) who reported being concerned with each type of discrimination, regardless of whether they mentioned one or more sources of discrimination. Survey weights are used to compute the means of dummy variables in the survey.