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**A pragmatic investigation into the emotions of pride, shame, guilt, humiliation, and
embarrassment: Lived experience and the challenge to established theory**

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Abstract

This paper investigates what it means to experience the ‘self-conscious emotions’ of pride, shame, guilt, humiliation, and embarrassment and assesses the findings against established theories. Study 1 collected qualitative data on real-world experiences of the emotions as experienced by social workers in England (N=21) and identifies and defines the components that constituted the experiences. Study 2 used vignettes to quantitatively test these concepts in a sample with a similar sociocultural context (N=124). The findings identify specific concepts for each emotion term with the exception of shame, which could not be distinguished from humiliation or embarrassment. This paper provides the first systematic analysis of all of these emotions within one study and has been the first to define the ‘relation-conscious emotions’ of acceptance and rejection as distinct emotions. In defining what it means to experience these emotions, these findings challenge established theories.

Introduction

Pride, shame, guilt, humiliation, and embarrassment are classified as ‘self-conscious emotions’ and have been argued to be highly significant within the social sciences (Cooley, 1902; Lynd, 1958; Goffman, 1959). Yet, while these terms have been studied and theorized for over a hundred years (e.g. Darwin, 1872; Freud, 1905/1962; Lewis, 1971; Scheff, 2000), there remain many contrasting and contradictory statements between authors on what they mean. Such disagreements may make very little difference in everyday communication because we assume we know what someone means when they say, ‘I feel ashamed’, for example. They do make a difference, however, from a research perspective when it comes to making claims from a specific investigation or reviewing the evidence from many studies.

Such academic differences about what these terms mean usually come about because of philosophical and theoretical commitments taken prior to defining the terms. Indeed, such commitments often lead the methodological approach taken to investigate them (see Morgan, 2007), influencing any conclusions drawn and ultimately the theories developed. This paper critically analyzes the main philosophical foundations for emotion theory and locates theories of self-conscious emotions within these. With beliefs about what emotions are prior to investigating them, the majority of research into this group of emotions has tended to rely on some sort of retrospective self-reporting or occasionally the sorting of vignettes (Crozier, 2014). There has been very little systematic research into real-time, real-world, context-specific experiences of these emotions. Furthermore, while there have been many studies into the self-conscious emotions (e.g. Gilbert et al., 1994; Miller and Tangney 1994; Lindsay-Hartz et al., 1995; Tangney and Dearing, 2002; Elshout et al., 2016), it is rare for all of them to be included in the same investigation, limiting claims about the relationship between them.

Given this gap in the research base, and given the competing perspectives on what these terms mean, this paper reports on a pragmatic approach (James, 1907; Dewey, 1929; Mead, 1934) to the

study of the terms pride, shame, guilt, humiliation, and embarrassment. While Menand (1997) argues that pragmatism is an account of the way people think, James (1907:45) argued that pragmatism “is primarily a method of settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be interminable”. Indeed, pragmatism seeks to go beyond discussion of definitions to investigate not just the meaning of signs and symbols but also their practical effects. Pierce (1905) and James (1907) argued that it is the culmination of the meaning, sensations, actions, and effects of a term that make up our total conception of such terms. To undertake such investigations, Emirbayer and Maynard (2010) state pragmatism calls for a return to experience without a commitment to prior ontological positions. Instead, the focus is on actual experience, the beliefs that stand behind that experience, and the consequences that are likely to follow that experience (Morgan, 2007). Given this pragmatic approach, Morgan (2007) argues it may be possible to settle metaphysical disputes by considering what difference it makes to believe one way of thinking over another.

The first study collected qualitative data by using observational methods to explore the pragmatic meaning of the terms in real-world, real-time, experiences of social workers in England. Abductive reasoning was used to convert observations into theories and then assess these theories by moving back and forth between induction and deduction (Peirce, 1903). While there was variation in individual experience, analyzing the culmination of self-conscious emotional experiences categorized with specific emotion terms identified each term to signify different combinations of cognitive, relational, contextual, and attitudinal meanings. While these are defined, they can be considered as ideal-typical conceptualizations, i.e. an abstract concept developed out of experience that can be used to analyze social reality (Weber, 1978). It was hypothesized, therefore, that if these ideal-types indicated the pragmatic meaning of the emotion terms, then others within the same sociocultural group would be able to identify these conceptions as an instance of the proposed emotion. A second quantitative study was undertaken, therefore, to test these emotion concepts within a wider population with a similar sociocultural background (N=124) using vignettes created from the concepts from the first study. Participants were indeed able to identify the emotions as expected,

indicating that the terms have specific meanings, with the exception of shame, which seemed to be a term that was considered to have a wider pragmatic meaning.

This is the first study to use the pragmatic method to study self-conscious emotions and one of the only studies to date to employ participant observation as a method to explore the meaning of specific emotions as used and experienced in context. The findings challenge established theories on these emotion terms as none were able to fully explain and predict lived, and communicated, experience. Furthermore, these findings not only challenge the proposed link between shame and rejection (e.g. Scheff, 2000), and pride and acceptance (e.g. Scheff, 2014), but identifies rejection and acceptance as specific emotions terms in their own right, conceptualized here in contrast to 'self-conscious emotions' as 'relation-conscious emotions'. And further still, these findings are used to consider the usefulness of the philosophical commitments that influenced the construction of established theories on these emotions. To begin, this paper provides an analysis of the different theoretical propositions of these emotions, before detailing the two studies and their findings. The culmination of these findings are then discussed in relation to theorizing pride, shame, guilt, humiliation, and embarrassment.

Conceptions of pride, shame, guilt, humiliation, and embarrassment

While the field of emotion theory is complex, Gendron and Barrett (2009) broadly categorise conceptions of emotions into three differing foundations: emotions as basic entities, as appraisals, or as psychological constructions, to which we can also add social constructions and psychoanalytic models. Each provides a different way of perceiving what an emotion is and, therefore, provides different ways of explaining and predicting emotional experience. While not all theories, or theorists, will fit neatly into such categories, this framing does demonstrate the pertinent issues that emotion theorists have been grappling with for over a century and how established theories on self-conscious emotions can be located within this.

Basic emotion models propose that some emotions are genetically transmitted mechanisms that are hard-wired within every human's brain and are, therefore, distinct and irreducible. Once this mechanism is triggered, a universal pattern of sensations and behaviors follow. Tomkins (1963) was the first to argue that shame was a basic emotion by arguing it was an 'affect' that was 'triggered' from the impediment of enjoyment or interest. His ideas influenced Nathanson (1994), who accepts and promotes Tomkins' view, Elison (2005), who claims shame is a basic emotion elicited by perceived devaluation (rejection) while guilt is a socio-legal condition linked to any basic emotion, and Scheff (2003, 2014), who argues shame and pride relate to a 'bond affect', where threats to a social bond (rejection) trigger shame and secure bonds trigger pride (acceptance). With shame conceptualized as a basic emotion, Tomkins, Nathanson, Elison, and Scheff all argue that embarrassment, humiliation, and guilt (except Elison) are simply different terms for the same emotion. Others, however, claim that self-conscious emotions stem from socialized responses to triggered basic emotions. Gilbert (2003), for example, argues anger is blended with a threat to one's self-representation to produce shame, while guilt is a result of basic emotions blending with sensitivity to the needs of others. Kemper (1987), meanwhile, argues that shame is a socialized response to arousal of the physiological conditions of the primary emotion of anger, with guilt a socialized response from fear, and pride a socialized response from satisfaction. Furthermore, Solms and Zellner's (2012) analysis of Freud's (1905[1962]) psychoanalytic model of emotion, which assumes emotions occur when instinctual drives are blocked from expression, demonstrates his theory assumed biological entities at the core of the experience. Basic emotion theories argue the behavioral response of shame is one of hiding or avoiding and guilt of reparations of the perceived mistake.

Appraisal models consider emotions to be defined by the meaning a person attributes to events (Arnold, 1960). Within this perspective, an emotion has antecedents, which trigger a range of evaluations within the perceiver, resulting in a response (Frijda, 1986). While appraisal theories argue there are many components to the experience of an emotion, they place the appraisal as the

central element as they are considered to trigger and differentiate emotional episodes (Ellsworth, 2013; Moors et al., 2013). Tangney and Dearing's (2002) appraisal theory follows the work of Lewis (1971) to propose that shame and guilt are evoked as a result of moral transgressions. Shame is considered to be experienced when a person believes the 'self' is the reason for their moral failure, which results in a desire to hide, escape, or strike back, while guilt is experienced when the person believes the reason is their behavior, which results in a desire to confess, apologize, or repair. While Gausel and Leach's (2011) theory also argues shame results from a negative self-evaluation, they claim shame leads to pro-social behaviors. They suggest that a negative evaluation from another, i.e. rejection, should be distinguished from shame. Tracy and Robin's (2004) appraisal theory argues that embarrassment results from becoming aware of a discrepancy between the public aspects of the 'self', such as one's appearance, and others' evaluations, while they argue that pride stems from a person believing they have lived up to some actual or ideal self-representation and shame that they have failed to live up to such self-representations. While there are many debates between appraisal models (see Sabini and Silver, 1997, as an example), humiliation is often overlooked, or simply considered a form of shame, in such debates. Klein (1991), however, claims humiliation results from the belief that the person has been ridiculed, scorned, or experienced contempt, or other degrading treatment at the hands of others.

At the heart of constructionist accounts of emotions is a relational perspective of human life, where a person is engaged in interactions with their social environment. Rather than claim there are universal ways people feel self-conscious emotions, as basic emotion and appraisal models do, constructionists claim the social context is a central component of the experience. Boiger et al. (2014), for example, found the typical appraisals associated with shame differed between participants from the US, Japan, and Belgium. Harkins (1996), however, claimed that not all cultures and languages have a concept identical in meaning to the English term shame. Different versions of constructionism, however, hold different views on what emotions are. 'Weak' social constructionist theories accept the existence of basic emotions but claim that socialization alters how these are

experienced. Turner (2000), for example, argues that shame and guilt are socially constructed from the primary emotion of sadness with differing amounts of fear and anger producing shame or guilt. 'Strong' social constructionists (e.g. Gordon, 1981) and psychological constructionists (e.g. Barrett, 2006), meanwhile, deny the existence of basic emotions and consider appraisals to be but one component of the experience of an emotion. The basic argument is that over time a person learns culturally specific ways of perceiving, understanding, and communicating about their interactions and emotions are one element of this learning process. Specific dimensions of experience, such as situational cues, social stimuli, bodily sensations, appraisals, and expressive gestures, are learnt as an 'emotion' and categorized with an emotion term.

From such a perspective, self-conscious emotions are defined in relation to others. Gordon (1981) argues shame, pride, guilt, and embarrassment stem from imagining how other people judge our appearance to them. de Rivera and Grinkis (1986) state shame is experienced from the contempt expressed by others. Harré (1990) claims shame stems from realizing others have become aware of a moral infraction and that the person agrees with this judgement, while embarrassment stems from realizing others have become aware of a breach of convention or code of manners and that the person agrees with that opinion. While Pattison (2000) asserts that shame is 'toxic unwantedness' and Elshout et al. (2016) consider humiliation as the experience of feeling powerless, small, and inferior in a situation where one is brought down in front of an audience, which involves appraisals of the situation as unfair and feelings of disappointment, anger, and shame.

While the focus of this paper is on experiences of pride, shame, guilt, humiliation, and embarrassment, the above discussion demonstrates that issues of acceptance and rejection permeate the theories of these emotions, no matter what foundation is used to construct the theory, either to define them as part of self-conscious emotions or in contrast to them.

Researching pride, shame, guilt, humiliation, and embarrassment

It has become somewhat of a dogma in social research that one's ontological position leads one's epistemological stance, which ultimately leads one's methodology and data collection methods (Bryman, 2015). Rather than starting with ontological assumptions, however, pragmatism starts with experience and then asks what this tells us about what methods are necessary to inquire about this experience on a practical level, on the one hand, and what this tells us about epistemological issues on an abstract level, on the other (Morgan, 2007). While pragmatists have traditionally used symbolic interactionism as a methodology (Barbalet, 2009), Emirbayer and Maynard (2010) argue ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967) provides an equally appropriate approach for pragmatic research. What both have in common is the primary position of inquiring about lived experience. Building on such arguments for a study into pride, shame, guilt, humiliation, and embarrassment, we can ask, how do people experience these emotions? And what does this tell us about how best to conceptualize them?

Study 1

Methodology

Participants: After consultation with a number of social work departments in England, one, referred to throughout this paper as 'the Council', agreed to support the research, providing access to individuals operating within a similar cultural context. People within the department were informed of the research and 21 consented to participate. Ethical approval was granted through the University ethical review panel. Experience as a social worker ranged from less than one year to 24 years, age ranged from 24 years to 63 years, there was one male and the rest were female, and there was one Black-Caribbean social worker and the rest were White-British.

Context: The organization provided public services to one large area in England and the social work department provided services to the children and families within the region. The service was organized into teams, with a number of social workers and a team manager, whom had

responsibility for the work within the team. The social workers' role was to work with children and families to improve their situation and ensure children did not suffer harm. Where a child was identified as potentially suffering harm, a multiagency team was brought together to create a plan to help and support the family, coordinated by a chairperson.

The context of social work within England can be seen within the context of wider public sector reform, which has sought to create greater effectiveness, efficiency, and value for money by setting out clear objectives, standards, and indicators for practice that are then audited to make judgements about the quality of the service (Power, 1997). Services are then graded and ranked, with the possibility of being placed in 'special measures' for being perceived to be 'failing'. Consequently, social workers are tasked with ensuring they produce the correct data for the organization to gain a positive inspection result on top of seeking to help and support the families. Social workers were, therefore, not only evaluating themselves and what they do but are being evaluated by others, with judgements being passed on how good their work was or how good they were at doing it. Such a context heightened their self-consciousness while practicing, creating many opportunities to experience self-conscious emotions.

Data Collection: To be able to contextualize the emotional experiences of the participants, publically available documentation on the social work service were collected. I then observed the social workers undertaking their daily work within the office, meetings, and with families who consented to me observing for one to two days per week over a six month period in 2014. I discussed what I had observed or heard with the participants to clarify or gain a better understanding of the experience. Fieldnotes were taken throughout the day according to advice provided by Emerson et al. (2011) in a note book that I carried around with me. In total, I conducted 246.5 hours of observations. Any instance where a participant categorized their experience as pride, shame, guilt, humiliation, and embarrassment, or acceptance or rejection, either at the time, or later in discussion with me, was included in the dataset for this study.

To collect data on a wider set of self-conscious emotional experiences, a semi-structured diary sheet was given to each member of the team at the end of the day to complete. This asked participants to “describe any situation which made you feel good/bad about yourself today”. From these situations, the participants were asked to describe what they were thinking at the time along with any bodily sensations they felt. Following Scherer’s (2005) social scientific methodology on collecting data on emotions, participants were then asked to write down what word or words they would use to describe how they felt in that situation and then to choose which word or words most closely corresponded to their experience from the following list: pride, shame, guilt, humiliation, embarrassment, acceptance and rejection. Finally, the diary sheet asked participants what behaviors, actions, or attitudes of theirs changed as part of this experience. In total, I collected 99 diary entries.

To further explore the experience of these emotions seventeen social workers and two team managers were interviewed using open questions about their experiences of pride, shame, guilt, humiliation, and embarrassment in practice. Each interview was conducted in an interview room within a Council building. Interviews lasted between 55 and 100 minutes and were recorded on a digital recording device, transferred to a computer, and transcribed verbatim.

Data Analysis

Grounded theory methods were employed, where the analysis and collection of data were undertaken simultaneously. Only emotional episodes that were categorized with the specific terms under study were included in the dataset for analysis. As the data collection phase progressed, these experiences were coded line by line in a Word document (Glaser, 1978), enabling an inductive analysis of these episodes that generated theoretical ideas about patterns and processes, similarities and differences. These inductive ideas were then used to guide subsequent observations and discussions to collect more data that enabled a deductive analysis of these ideas, which included contradictory data (Charmaz, 2006). This ongoing process integrated the diary entries, observations,

and interviews, providing a conceptual analysis of each emotion term. The number of emotional experiences, as categorized by participants, broken down by method of data collection, is provided in table 1. By comparing data with data, data with codes, and codes with codes, categories were created for each emotion term. As consistent with grounded theory methodology, these categories were then considered in relation to a range of theoretical codes considered relevant to these emotional experiences (see Glaser, 1978, 1998, 2005), enabling a conceptualization of each term.

Table 1: Emotional experiences by method of data collection

Emotion Term	Diary Entries	Observations	Interviews	Total
Pride	29	9	10	48
Shame	7	31	17	55
Guilt	16	16	4	36
Humiliation	3	3	1	7
Embarrassment	8	10	11	29
Acceptance	19	6	7	32
Rejection	5	9	3	17

The number of episodes of each emotion as categorized by participants according to data collection method

Limitations: It is acknowledged that the presence of an observer can affect what people say and do. My discussions with participants and completing a diary entry could also alter what a participant thought about an experience and how they discussed it with me. The resulting data and analysis can, therefore, be understood within the context of my interactions and interpretations within the teams, within the Council, at that specific time. What this study does provide, however, is an interpretive analysis of the experiences of pride, shame, guilt, humiliation, and embarrassment among the participants that suggests how these emotions were experienced by these participants within this context.

Findings

No individual experience of an emotion was the same. Each experience had its own nuance and complexity, which could only be understood through the range of data collection methods. The

observations, for example, were not sufficient to analyze the emotional experience of a situation. The discussions about the situations and the diary entries provided the rich detail needed to understand what was part of the experience and how it was understood by the experiencer. Equally, the diary entries and discussions needed to be contextualized and embedded within their social contexts to fully understand the experience. My observations of one private conversation between a social worker and their team manager, termed supervision, for example, did not suggest any particularly strong emotional feelings, yet the situation was recorded in the diary entry by the social worker as follows:

“[Situation:]	In supervision with team manager I wanted to discuss feeling undermined but felt like I wasn’t understood and it took ages to get across my point, I still felt at the end of it that my point wasn’t understood properly.
[Thinking:]	Annoyed – felt a bit worthless and misunderstood. Felt disappointed in my T.M. [team manager] who I always thought I got on with and understood me.
[Bodily sensations:]	I was going hot, then cold – I was tense. I tried to get my point across by using hand gestures
[Categorized as:]	Rejection. Humiliation. Embarrassment. Anger
[Change:]	I tried to defend myself – in future I’m worried I might not address issues which upset me as I felt it backfired and made me look ‘silly’”

While this situation was categorized with multiple terms, not all experiences of humiliation, or indeed embarrassment, were consistent with such an experience. Yet despite the emotional heterogeneity across individual experiences of emotions, a range of components could be identified as significant across the range of experiences. These components were, firstly, whether the experience was positively or negatively valenced; secondly, whether the focus of the experience was an evaluation by the self or by another person; thirdly, whether this evaluation was of the person’s ‘self’ or their behavior; fourthly, whether the person felt personal responsibility for the evaluation; fifthly, the social context in which the episode took place; and sixthly, for some emotions there was a clear change in attitude involved in the experience, whereas for some there was not. Each emotion will be addressed in turn:

Pride: Experiences of pride typically involved a person feeling personally responsible for a situation in which they evaluated themselves positively as a result to living up to some standard they considered important. They were usually reported to involve an increase in confidence and determination in their work, as demonstrated by the following diary entry, which shows a typical experience of pride:

“[Situation:]	Achieving a visit to see a disengaged teenager who has moved out of area. I had to persuade TM [team manager] to keep case open to me, as it is in child's [sic] best interests.
[Thinking:]	Happy, pleased that I had been persistent and patient. Visit went well.
[Bodily sensations:]	Relaxed, lots of smiles.
[Description:]	Felt like I had achieved what others had been unable to – Proud, patient.
[Categorized as:]	Pride
[Change:]	I have learnt that with some service users it is important to adopt different approaches also, to challenge decisions I don't think are in child's best interests”

Acceptance: While some experiences were categorized as pride and acceptance, these could be distinguished. Indeed, while experiences categorized solely as acceptance were positively valenced, the focus was on the actions or perceived intentions of other people, which was seen to encourage social interaction. Typically no changes in behavior or attitude were reported along with feeling accepted, with most people leaving the 'change' section as blank on the diary log, as the following typical entry of acceptance shows:

“[Situation:]	I visited a family who were previously very hostile however are now very cooperative and pleasant. The case will end soon
[Thinking:]	How well the family had progressed
[Bodily Sensations:]	I felt relaxed
[Description:]	I felt accepted
[Categorized as:]	Acceptance”

Shame: Experiences categorized as shame were always considered negative and typically stemmed from a social worker feeling personally responsible for a situation in which they evaluated themselves negatively as a result of failing to meet a standard they considered important. There was no discernible pattern to changes in behavior or attitude in the shame experiences. Some reported

hiding or distancing themselves from others, some reported no changes, while others reported pro-social approach-type behaviors when experiencing shame, as the following diary entry demonstrates:

“[Situation:]	Not addressing an assessment I need to undertake. It is in relation to DV [domestic violence]. Father controlling and monitoring mother’s phone.
[Thinking:]	Oh shit – I have got to deal with this and not leave it any longer. How can this be planned safely. I need to talk to manager. I need guidance so I don’t make a situation worse.
[Bodily Sensations:]	None
[Description:]	I felt shame as I was bloody annoyed with myself
[Categorized as:]	Shame
[Change:]	I had/requested a mini supervision with the manager. I beat myself up over things anyway and I’m my own worst critic”

Rejection: While experiences of shame could involve a negative evaluation of another, this was not a necessary component, as the above diary entry shows. Indeed, where a negative evaluation from another was a feature of the experience this was always categorized as rejection along with other terms such as shame, humiliation, or embarrassment. The negative other-evaluation was experienced as discouraging social interaction, leaving the person to either enforce interaction with them or withdraw, as the following diary entry shows:

“[Situation:]	I came to work this morning feeling anxious about an error from the previous day that I had attempted to rectify which I feel/felt was/is out of my control and had potential disciplinary consequences. I was anxious about the managers uneasy feeling towards a professionals meeting I was having today.
[Thinking:]	I felt responsible for my error, responsible for any potential consequences for me and my team manager as a result of my actions. I felt conscious of what others would think of me and my practice.
[Description:]	I felt tense, emotionally sensitive.
[Categorized as:]	Rejection, Shame, Anxiety
[Change:]	I was (felt) less confident–open up for criticism”

This experience was a complex one of bodily sensations, thoughts about the social context and how she perceived herself, how she was perceived by others, and how she felt about her work as a consequence of the experience. She felt responsible for the negative evaluation she had given herself and the negative evaluation she perceived from her manager and others in her team.

Humiliation: Humiliation was a negatively valenced experience that typically involved another person intentionally treating them badly. With the involvement of another person the situation was necessarily public, although it often involved more than just two people, as the following example demonstrates:

“She said at that time an email went round with a list of all the social workers names on with the number of cases they had and the names were colour coded, red (too many cases), amber (case load was too high), and green (caseload was ok). She said her name was on the top of the list and that she was told that she had too many cases because of her time management so she had to photocopy her diary and account for every minute of her time. She spoke with a slightly raised voice and spoke quickly and forcefully. She said ‘it was the most humiliating experience of my professional life’ and said ‘it feels like being punched’” (fieldnotes)

While there were only a small number of experiences of humiliation, they were all associated with some form of resistance to the imposed negative evaluation, as one participant said “it makes me more defensive”. This defensiveness was not always explicit, however. While this was sometimes a direct defense of their identity or behavior to the person treating them negatively, it was at times a defense to others outside of the situation, such as to colleagues in the safety of their team room.

Guilt: Typically guilt related to experiences where the person perceived their actions to have transgressed a moral boundary. For example, a social worker could feel guilty for not being busy and feeling relaxed, as this contravened the accepted cultural standard for a social worker that provided the message within the Council that they should be busy, as demonstrated by the following diary entry:

“[Situation:]	That I wasn’t so busy today in the office. I felt guilty.
[Thinking:]	I can think! I’m not rushed off my feet. I can get my paperwork done. Felt guilty for taking advantage of the lull.
[Bodily sensations:]	Relaxed.
[Feeling:]	Guilt”

More typically, however, experiences of guilt involved a focus on how their actions had transgressed the moral boundary of disadvantaging or harming another person and most often involved a desire

to repair or make amends. While this was often a negative experience, it was not necessarily so, as this diary entry shows:

“[Situation:]	This afternoon I had to inform a young mum that her partner was a DV [domestic violence] perpetrator who has other children subject to CP [child protection] plans
[Thinking:]	How the mum would take this information and the impact that this will have upon the relationship and child. The mother was initially very angry with me but then explained that this was because she was upset. I felt sad for the mother
[Bodily Sensations:]	I felt tense at the beginning of the conversation but relaxed and was able to offer mum some reassurance. The situation was displeasurable
[Categorized as:]	Guilt. Important
[Change:]	Because I felt that my role was important in safeguarding both mother and baby I was able to explain the next step to mum calmly. I felt guilty for upsetting her with the information”

This diary entry was classified as a positive experience by the social worker because she considered what she was doing as important and therefore it felt good. She felt guilty because she had transgressed the moral boundary of upsetting the mother. Indeed, there were other instances in which participants categorized their experience as guilt and pride.

Embarrassment: Experiences of embarrassment did not usually involve a negative self-evaluation.

The focus was on how other people viewed them and how this related to how they thought they should be viewed. This self-discrepancy could be a positive experience, as demonstrated by the following interview with a social worker who had been praised by a family she was working with:

“Interviewer:	how does it feel to get that sort of feedback?
Social Worker:	I dunno? Good. Embarrassing...
Interviewer:	what’s embarrassing about it?
Social Worker:	...there’s a stigma around the fact that social workers are really bad and you shouldn’t like them...I do worry when people do like me, when there’s one family that, she absolutely hated me, now she really quite likes me and she’ll talk to me now and I think, ‘am I doing this right because you’re meant to still hate me’ and I think ‘maybe it’s me?’” (interview)

While it felt good to be praised, this exposed a discrepancy between being liked and wanting to be a good social worker, which, to her, should not be liked. The positive exposure that some situations

provided meant embarrassment was a term used in the diary entries to categorize some experiences alongside pride and acceptance. Embarrassment was also, however, used to indicate a negative experience of a self-discrepancy, as the following diary entry demonstrated:

“[Situation:]	Experiencing a migraine at 4am resulted in me not feeling well. I needed to go to a core group meeting in [place]. I went to the family home where the meeting [sic] are usually held, however the venue had been changed without my knowledge. I therefore was 45 mins late for the meeting I needed to make a decision about attendance given I did not know the area
[Thinking:]	A feeling of how can I make this right
[Bodily Sensations:]	Tightness in the shoulders and neck
[Description:]	Demoralized. Unprofessional due to poor communication
[Categorized:]	Embarrassment
[Change:]	I took a deep breath. Found the telephone number of the other social worker attending the meeting advised her of the situation. Provided an update ensured she has all relevant info ensured she would pass on my apologies I felt it appropriate not to disturb a meeting 45 mins late”

While this social worker thought she was perceived as unprofessional, she did not feel personally responsible for the situation, blaming poor communication on the reason for this self-discrepancy. There was no discernible pattern of behavioral responses or changes in attitude associated with experiences categorized as embarrassment.

Summary

Experiences of these emotions were complex, individually specific, and contextual. On the one hand there was variability not only between the categories, e.g. experiences of shame and guilt were qualitatively different, but also within the categories, e.g. not all experiences of shame were the same. Indeed, some experiences contained defined cognitive content but no change in the experience of bodily sensations or some strong cognitive content and bodily sensations but no perceived effect on the person’s actions. Furthermore, there were experiences which, when observed, did not suggest any emotional experience yet were recorded in the diary entries as emotional.

On the other hand, however, there were a set of components that were common to experiences categorized with the same term, which made them an instance of the emotion and distinguished them from the other terms. These common components can be used to create a set of ideal-typical emotion concepts. Weber (1978) developed the notion of ideal-types to provide an analytical tool to express a hypothetical, abstract concept that can be used to analyze social reality. Freund (1969) argues that ideal-types clarify the most important elements of empirical reality, which Weber (1978) believed could be used to ascertain similarities and deviations in concrete cases. These ideal-typical emotion concepts that have been identified from this study are outlined in table 2.

Table 2: Emotion concepts

	Valence	Focus of Experience	Object of Evaluation	Personal Responsibility	Social Context	Change in attitude
Pride	Positive	Self-Evaluation	Self or Behavior	Yes	Living up to a personal standard	Increased confidence
Acceptance	Positive	Other-Evaluation	Self or Behavior	No	Social interaction encouraged by others	-
Shame	Negative	Self-Evaluation	Self	Yes	Failing to meet a personal standard	-
Rejection	Negative	Other-Evaluation	Self or Behavior	No	Social interaction discouraged by others	-
Guilt	Positive or Negative	Self-Evaluation	Behavior	Yes	Moral transgression / consequence of action	Desire to make amends
Humiliation	Negative	Other-Evaluation	Self	No	Intentional public devaluing	Desire to defend self from public devaluation
Embarrassment	Positive or Negative	Other-Evaluation	Self or Behavior	No	Publically exposed self-discrepancy	-

Study 2

Study 1 defined the experience of pride, shame, guilt, humiliation, embarrassment, acceptance, and rejection of the participants from a pragmatic perspective, i.e. identified the common components that constituted the experiences. If these emotion concepts did indeed relate to an understanding within that group of what these emotion terms mean, the corollary was that a person should be able to clearly identify these concepts as an instance of the emotion. It was, therefore, hypothesized that these concepts would predict how those within a similar sociocultural context would categorize self-

conscious emotional episodes (H1). In other words, an ideal-typical experience of shame would be categorized as shame. This is in contrast to some basic emotion theories (Tomkins, 1963; Scheff, 2000) that propose there would be no difference, other than intensity, between shame and the other negatively valenced experiences, or that shame equates to rejection and pride to acceptance (Scheff, 2014). Equally, this would be in contrast to some appraisal models (Tangney and Dearing, 2002) that propose shame and guilt are so intertwined that people do not experience them separately and use the terms interchangeably. Indeed, many appraisal theories define shame and guilt as moral emotions (e.g. Tangney and Dearing, 2002; Tracy and Robins, 2004), while study 1 suggested that an ideal-typical experience of shame related to failing to meet personal standards, rather than moral transgressions. Failing to meet a standard could, of course, be a moral issue but it is not necessarily so. It was, therefore, hypothesized that shame would be less distinguishable from guilt as a result of a moral transgression as this would be a deviation from the ideal-typical experience of shame and closer to an ideal-typical experience of guilt (H1a). Finally, many basic emotion models and appraisal theories consider shame to be a public experience. Indeed, this is what Tangney et al. (1996) found in their analyses of personal narratives of shame. The findings from study 1 contradict such propositions, as failing to meet a personal standard may have been evoked while in public but it was very much experienced as private. It was, therefore, hypothesized that shame would be considered a private experience, rather than a public one (H1b).

Study 1 also identified that people can categorize their experience with more than one emotion term. A person may say, for example, that they felt embarrassment, shame, and humiliation. It is possible, as many basic emotion theories argue, that these are simply different terms for the same emotional experience. If these emotion concepts meaningfully relate to distinct experiences, however, it was hypothesized that one emotion would be felt more strongly than others, and that the difference between them would be significant (H2), if that experience closely resembled an ideal-typical emotion concept. A person may say they feel humiliated and embarrassed, for example, but if the experience closely resembled to the concept for humiliation, a person would feel

humiliation much more strongly than embarrassment. Support for these hypotheses would provide evidence for a broad consensus on what these emotion terms mean within the sample.

Methodology

Participants: Students within the department of social policy and social work at the University of Birmingham, UK, were asked to participate, providing a population of a broadly similar sociocultural background to the population in study 1. One hundred and twenty four students agreed. Twenty percent were male, 79% were female, and 1% non-binary. Age ranged from 18 to 55 years old ($M=24.38$, $SD=8.04$). One hundred and seven participants were enrolled on an undergraduate programme and 17 on a postgraduate programme.

Procedure and measures: The vignette approach was considered appropriate to investigate the hypotheses. Vignettes are short descriptions of situations that contain the relevant information about the phenomena under study that participants then evaluate (Rossi and Anderson 1982). The emotion concepts of study 1 were translated into vignettes, in a third person narrative, using gender neutral names, so the focus of the participants' evaluation of the situation was their idea of experiences of shame, etc., rather than the specifics of whether they would experience the emotion in that specific context. The vignettes are provided in table 3.

Table 3: Vignettes of emotion concepts

Emotion	Vignette
Guilt (consequence focus)	Alex has been friends with Cameron since childhood. They have a close friendship and care about one another. Cameron has a really big opportunity and asks Alex to do something really important for her/him the next day to help out. Alex has a really busy and stressful day at work and forgets. Alex then worries about the consequence for Cameron and feels bad about forgetting. However, Alex knows this is very unusual for her/him and believes this is a genuine mistake. Even still, Alex decides s/he really needs to make it up to Cameron and decides to go over to Cameron's house that night to apologize.
Shame	Riley is at University and likes to think of her/himself as a very clever person. S/he is also known by her/his fellow students as a very clever person. Riley has a very important exam coming up for a job s/he really wants and Riley has been studying hard for it. Riley feels ready for the exam when the day comes.

	Private	None of her/his fellow students know s/he is going for this exam. Riley gets the results sent to her/him in the post and opens them on her/his own. Riley reads that s/he got a very low score. Riley finds it hard to believe at first but then thinks this must be because s/he is not clever enough and has been fooling her/himself all her/his life about how clever s/he is. Riley starts to feel hot and begins to hear her/his heart race. In that moment Riley feels very small
	Public	All of Riley's fellow students know s/he is going for this exam. Riley's results get sent to her/his college and s/he opens them with her friends around her. Everyone sees that Riley has a very low score. Riley finds it hard to believe at first but then thinks this must be because s/he is not clever enough and not only has s/he been fooling her/himself all her/his life about how clever s/he is, but now everyone knows. Riley starts to feel hot and begins to hear her/his heart race. In that moment Riley wants the ground to open up and swallow her/him.
Moral Transgression		Riley believes s/he is a very moral person and is known by her/his friends and family as so. Riley works in a shop and one day a new laptop is delivered. Riley can't find any record of one being ordered and there is no paperwork to verify this delivery. After two days of no one claiming it, Riley is sure it was delivered by mistake and Riley takes it home.
	Shame	Riley can't help but feel bad about this and thinks s/he must be a terrible person for taking something that isn't hers/his. Riley starts to feel very hot and feels her/his heart racing. Riley hides the laptop in her/his house and doesn't tell anyone about it.
	Guilt	Riley can't help but feel bad about this and thinks s/he must try harder to return it to the person it belongs to. Riley takes it back to the shop the next day and contacts the delivery company. Eventually Riley finds the person it belongs to and apologizes that s/he did not get it to them sooner.
Embarrassment		Alex is walking and chatting outside with friends when Alex trips up. Alex's friends laugh and make a friendly joke of it. Alex thinks s/he looked silly for a moment and starts to feel hot and s/he blushes. Alex makes a joke of it and they laugh and continue walking and chatting together.
Humiliation		Alex believes s/he is a very competent worker. S/he has to present some information in a meeting at work. Alex's boss and many other people s/he does not know very well are in this meeting. In the middle of Alex's presentation Alex's boss tells Alex s/he has got it all wrong and is incompetent. Alex believes this to be unjust and unfair. Alex tries to say something but her/his boss won't let Alex speak and tells Alex to leave. Alex thinks her/his boss was being nasty and made her/him look bad on purpose. Alex feels devalued and degraded and felt her/his heart pound and her/his muscles tense. Alex doesn't think s/he has done anything wrong and actually did her/himself proud in the meeting. S/he can't stop thinking about how badly s/he was treated and wants retribution.
Rejection		Alex is in a relationship with Drew and things have been going really well. One day Drew says to Alex that they need to talk. Drew tells Alex that s/he is making Drew very unhappy in the relationship and that s/he no longer wants to be with Alex. Drew ends the relationship. Alex feels emotional pain, starts to feel hot, and her/his heart starts racing.
Pride		Riley is at University and likes to think of her/himself as a very clever person. S/he is also known by her/his fellow students as a very clever person. Riley has a very important exam coming up for a job s/he really wants and Riley has been studying hard for it. None of her/his fellow students know s/he is going for this exam. Riley feels ready for the exam when the day comes. Riley gets the results sent to her/him in the post and opens them on her/his own. Riley reads that s/he got a very high score. Riley feels pleased and smiles to her/himself
Accepted		Alex is at University and is doing ok, although Alex wishes s/he was doing better. Alex also wishes s/he had more friends. One day Frankie comes up to Alex and asks her/him if s/he wants to go out with Frankie and her/his friends later. Alex feels warm inside and pleased to be asked. S/he says

	yes and they swap numbers so they can keep in touch
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Participants were then presented with a list of emotion terms, i.e. shame, guilt, humiliation, embarrassment, and rejection for negatively valenced scenarios, and pride and acceptance for positively valenced experiences. They were then asked (1) to tick one of these that they thought best described what they thought the protagonist in the vignette would feel and (2) to rate the strength of each emotion they believe the protagonist would feel in the scenario on a rating of 1 (very little) to 5 (a lot). The questionnaire was provided on paper to participants in class as part of standard teaching activity. Participants were invited to complete the questionnaire and if they agreed for their results to be part of the study they returned their questionnaire. Ethical approval was granted through the University's ethical review process.

Data Analysis

The data was collated and inputted into SPSS version 24. Descriptive statistics were generated for the population and categorization for each vignette. To perform statistical analyses on the ratings of the strength of feeling for each emotion in the vignettes, an ANOVA with repeated measures was used. This is used to compare group means where the participants are the same in each group (Field, 2013).

Results

Table 4 presents the data for the term chosen as the most appropriate label for the scenario together with the data associated with repeated measures ANOVAs of the participants' ratings for the emotions.

Table 4: Participants' categorization and ratings for each scenario

Vignette		n	Guilt	Shame	Embarrassment	Humiliation	Rejection	F
Guilt (consequence focus)	Categorization	124	118 (95.2%)	4 (3.2%)	2 (1.6%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
	Rating	117	M=4.65 SD=0.56	M=2.81 SD=1.09	M=2.54 SD=1.06	M=1.74 SD=0.90	M=1.39 SD=0.73	299.71*
Guilt (moral transgression focus)	Categorization	121	86 (69.4%)	23 (18.5%)	10 (8.1%)	2 (1.6%)	0 (0%)	
	Rating	111	M=4.06 SD=1.01	M=3.00 SD=1.26	M=2.40 SD=1.24	M=1.76 SD=1.02	M=1.18 SD=0.61	158.269*
Shame (private)	Categorization	124	1 (0.8%)	46 (37.1%)	25 (20.2%)	32 (25.8%)	20 (16.1%)	
	Rating	111	M=1.72 SD=1.00	M=3.78 SD=1.22	M=3.84 SD=1.00	M=3.71 SD=1.11	M=2.97 SD=1.42	76.90*
Shame (public)	Categorization	124	0 (0%)	4 (3.2%)	54 (43.5%)	60 (48.4%)	2 (1.6%)	
	Rating	111	M=1.70 SD=1.02	M=3.45 SD=1.81	M=4.50 SD=0.71	M=4.26 SD=0.99	M=2.36 SD=1.23	172.612*
Shame (moral transgression focus)	Categorization	120	72 (58.1%)	49 (39.5%)	0 (0%)	3 (2.4%)	0 (0%)	
	Rating	115	M=4.51 SD=0.69	M=4.17 SD=0.91	M=2.48 SD=1.23	M=1.74 SD=0.97	M=1.23 SD=0.59	343.634*
Embarrassment	Categorization	124	1 (0.8%)	2 (1.6%)	105 (84.7%)	16 (12.9%)	0 (0%)	
	Rating	114	M=1.11 SD=0.50	M=1.82 SD=1.06	M=4.17 SD=0.88	M=3.11 SD=1.23	M=1.51 SD=0.87	315.428*
Humiliation	Categorization	124	0 (0%)	3 (2.4%)	5 (4.0%)	82 (66.1%)	34 (27.4%)	
	Rating	115	M=1.28 SD=0.69	M=2.32 SD=1.26	M=3.77 SD=1.02	M=4.41 SD=0.89	M=3.87 SD=1.17	216.370*
Rejection	Categorization	116	8 (6.5%)	1 (0.8%)	1 (0.8%)	3 (2.4%)	103 (83.1%)	
	Rating	106	M=2.25 SD=1.34	M=2.50 SD=1.18	M=2.59 SD=1.20	M=2.99 SD=1.11	M=4.74 SD=0.67	107.367*
Vignette		N	Pride		Acceptance		F	
Pride	Categorization	117	107 (86.3%)		10 (8.1%)			
	Rating	108	M=4.74 SD=0.66		M=3.43 SD=1.17		88.671*	
Acceptance	Categorization	116	4 (3.2%)		112 (90.3%)			
	Rating	107	M=2.73 SD=1.04		M=4.77 SD=0.49		351.735*	

* < .001

Guilt: The guilt scenario that focused on the detrimental effects of the person's actions on another was categorized as guilt by 118(95%) participants, showing a clear trend within this group. This was further supported by participants' ratings for the strength of feeling for each emotion using a

repeated measures ANOVA. Mauchly's test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated, $\chi^2(9, N=117)=30.91, p < .001$, while the Greenhouse-Geisser correction estimated ϵ as 0.89, therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity ($\epsilon=0.92$). The results show that there was a statistical difference between the mean ratings of the emotions ($F(3.686, 427.523)=299.707, p < .001$). Post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction revealed that the mean guilt rating ($M=4.65, SD=0.56$), which was rated as the strongest emotion felt, was statistically significantly different to the mean rating of shame ($M=2.81, SD=1.09, p < .001$), embarrassment ($M=2.54, SD=1.06, p < .001$), humiliation ($M=1.74, SD=0.90, p < .001$), and rejection ($M=1.39, SD=0.73, p < .001$).

Where the primary focus of the guilt scenario was the moral transgression, rather than the consequence of their actions, however, fewer participants' categorized the vignette as guilt ($N=86$), although this was still a majority (69%). A repeated measures ANOVA was used and Mauchly's test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated, $\chi^2(9, N=111)=29.19, p=.001$, while the Greenhouse-Geisser correction estimated ϵ as 0.90, therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity ($\epsilon=0.94$). The results determined that there was a statistically significant difference between the mean ratings of the emotions ($F(3.747, 412.141)=158.269, p < .001$). The post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction showed the mean guilt rating ($M=4.06, SD=1.01$), the highest rated emotion, to be statistically significantly different from shame ($M=3.00, SD=1.26, p < .001$), embarrassment ($M=2.40, SD=1.24, p < .001$), humiliation ($M=1.76, SD=1.02, p < .001$), and rejection ($M=1.18, SD=0.61, p < .001$). From the results of both the guilt vignettes we can conclude that guilt is a distinguishable self-conscious emotion and that the proposed emotion concept from study 1 defines the identifiable components of a typical experience of guilt within this sample.

Shame: Shame was used by 46(37%) participants to categorize the shame in private vignette. It was, however, categorized as humiliation by 32(26%), embarrassment by 25(20%), and rejection by

20(16%) participants. This result was reflected within the repeated measures ANOVA. Again Mauchly's test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated, $\chi^2(9, N=116)=52.11$, $p < .001$, while the Greenhouse-Geisser correction estimated ϵ as 0.82, therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity ($\epsilon=0.85$). This determined that while there was a statistical difference between the mean ratings of the emotions ($F(3.391, 389.985)=76.901$, $p < .001$), the post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction revealed the mean shame rating ($M=3.78, SD=1.22$) to be only statistically significantly different to guilt ($M=1.72, SD=1.00$, $p < .001$) and rejection ($M=2.97, SD=1.42$, $p < .001$). It did not show a statistically significant difference between the mean shame rating and that of embarrassment ($M=3.84, SD=1.00$, $p=1.00$) or humiliation ($M=3.71, SD=1.11$, $p=1.00$).

The same scenario became less recognizable as shame by the participants as it moved from being a private experience to being a public one. Only 4(3%) participants categorized this vignette as shame, while 60(48%) categorized it as humiliation and 54(43.5%) as embarrassment, a finding reflected within the repeated measures ANOVA. Mauchly's test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated, $\chi^2(9, N=111)=25.76$, $p=.002$, while the Greenhouse-Geisser correction estimated ϵ as 0.88, therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity ($\epsilon=0.92$). The results determined the mean ratings differed statistically significantly between the emotions ($F(3.661, 402.760)=172.612$, $p < .001$), while the post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction revealed the mean shame rating ($M=3.45, SD=1.81$), which was higher than the mean of guilt ($M=1.70, SD=1.02$) and rejection ($M=2.36, SD=1.23$), was statistically significantly different from both (guilt $p < .001$ and rejection, $p < .001$). The mean of shame was, however, lower than that of embarrassment ($M=4.50, SD=0.71$) and humiliation ($M=4.26, SD=0.99$) which was shown to be a statistically significant difference to both (embarrassment $p < .001$ and humiliation $p < .001$).

Where the vignette focus was a moral transgression, more participants categorized this experience as guilt ($N=72$, 58%) than shame ($N=49$, 40%). This finding was repeated in the repeated measures

ANOVA, where Mauchly's test showed the assumption of sphericity had been violated, $\chi^2(9, N=115)=56.76, p < .001$, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction estimated ϵ as 0.83, so degrees of freedom were corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity ($\epsilon=0.85$). This determined that the mean ratings differed statistically significantly between the emotions ($F(3.409, 388.683)=343.634, p < .001$). Yet while the post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction revealed that the mean shame rating ($M=4.17, SD=0.91$) was statistically significantly different to embarrassment ($M=2.48, SD=1.23, p < .001$), humiliation ($M=1.74, SD=0.97, p < .001$) and rejection ($M=1.23, SD=0.59, p < .001$), it was lower than the mean for guilt, which was shown to be a statistically significant difference ($M=4.51, SD=0.69, p=.024$). The results from these three shame vignettes have not identified a clear experience of shame, distinguishable from embarrassment and humiliation.

Embarrassment: The embarrassment vignette was categorized as embarrassment by 105(85%) of the participants. This result was reflected in the repeated measures ANOVA. Mauchly's test showed the assumption of sphericity had been violated, $\chi^2(9, N=114)=45.10, p < .001$, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction estimated ϵ as 0.86, so degrees of freedom were corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity ($\epsilon=0.89$). The results showed the mean ratings of the emotions differed statistically significantly ($F(3.550, 401.117)=315.428, p < .001$). The post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction determined that there was a statistically significant difference between the mean embarrassment rating ($M=4.17, SD=0.88$) and the mean ratings for shame ($M=1.82, SD=1.06, p < .001$), guilt ($M=1.11, SD=0.5, p < .001$), humiliation ($M=3.11, SD=1.23, p < .001$), and rejection ($M=1.51, SD=0.87, p < .001$). From this we can conclude that embarrassment is a distinguishable self-conscious emotion and that the proposed emotion concept from study 1 defines the identifiable components of a typical experience of embarrassment within this sample.

Humiliation: The humiliation vignette was categorized as humiliation by 82(66%) of the participants, while 34(27%) of participants categorized it as rejection. The ratings of strength of feeling of the

different emotions for the scenario, however, revealed humiliation to be anticipated as the strongest emotion by the participants using a repeated measures ANOVA. Again Mauchly's test showed the assumption of sphericity had been violated, $\chi^2(9, N=114)=61.52, p< .001$, and the Greenhouse-Geisser correction estimated ϵ as 0.79, so degrees of freedom were corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity ($\epsilon=0.81$). The results identified a statistically significant difference between the mean ratings of the emotions ($F(3.247, 366.915)=216.370, p< .001$). The post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction revealed a statistically significant difference between the mean humiliation rating ($M=4.41, SD=0.89$) and that of shame ($M=2.32, SD=1.26, p< .001$), guilt ($M=1.28, SD=0.69, p< .001$), embarrassment ($M=3.77, SD=1.02, p< .001$), and rejection ($M=3.87, SD=1.17, p=.007$). From this we can conclude that humiliation is a distinguishable self-conscious emotion and that the proposed emotion concept from study 1 defines the identifiable components of a typical experience of humiliation within the sample.

Rejection: The rejection vignette was categorized as such by 103(83%) of participants. The participants' ratings were subject to a repeated measures ANOVA and Mauchly's test showed the assumption of sphericity had been violated, $\chi^2(9, N=109)=52.19, p< .001$, and the Greenhouse-Geisser correction estimated ϵ as 0.79, so degrees of freedom were corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity ($\epsilon=0.82$). The results determined that mean scores differed statistically significantly between the emotions ($F(3.279, 344.319)=107.367, p< .001$) and the post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction revealed a statistically significant difference between the mean rejection rating ($M=4.74, SD=0.67$) and that of shame ($M=2.50, SD=1.18, p< .001$), guilt ($M=2.25, SD=1.34, p< .001$), embarrassment ($M=2.59, SD=1.20, p< .001$), and humiliation ($M=2.99, SD=1.11, p< .001$). From this we can conclude that rejection is a distinguishable emotion and that the proposed emotion concept from study 1 defines the identifiable components of a typical experience of rejection within the sample.

Pride and Acceptance: The pride vignette was categorized as pride by 107(86%) of participants. The repeated measures ANOVA identified the mean scores between the emotions to differ statistically significantly ($F(1, 107)=88.671, p< .001$), while the post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction showed a statistically significant difference between the mean rating for pride ($M=4.74, SD=0.66$) and the mean rating for acceptance ($M=3.43, SD=1.17, p< .001$). As there were only 2 emotions to rate for this vignette, sphericity was met, similarly for the acceptance vignette. The acceptance vignette was categorized as acceptance by 112(90%) participants. The repeated measures ANOVA showed the mean ratings to be statistically significantly different between the emotions ($F(1, 106)=351.735, p< .001$) and the post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction identified a statistically significant difference between the mean acceptance rating ($M=4.77, SD=0.49$) and that of pride ($M=2.73, SD=1.04, p< .001$). From these results we can conclude that pride and acceptance are distinguishable emotions and that the proposed emotion concepts from study 1 define the components of a typical experience of these emotions within the sample.

Summary

As hypothesized, the emotion concepts identified from study 1 did predict how those within a similar sociocultural context categorized the vignettes. With the exception of shame, the vignettes could clearly be identified as an instance of the predicted emotion both through categorization (H1) and through strength of feeling on the rating scale (H2). Not only were pride, shame, guilt, humiliation, and embarrassment considered distinct experiences, but pride and acceptance, and shame and rejection, were considered different types of experience. The vignette for shame (private), however, produced some interesting findings. On the one hand, the vignette developed from the concept identified in study 1 was categorized by most people as shame. On the other hand, this was only 37 per cent of people, suggesting the vignette was not as clear an instance of shame as the other vignettes were for their respective emotion terms. Furthermore, there was no difference in the strength of feeling as measured by the rating scale for shame, humiliation, or embarrassment,

suggesting this was not considered an experience of shame above the latter emotions. The introduction of a physical audience, meanwhile, reduced shame as the most highly chosen term to categorize the vignette and increased humiliation and embarrassment as both the chosen category and strength of feeling. This, at least, does not support a link between the participants' understanding of an ideal-typical experience of shame being a public experience and supports the link between shame being considered a private affair (H1b). Further still, deviating from the ideal-typical experience of shame from study 1 by focusing on a moral transgression resulted in the vignette being categorized as guilt, with guilt being considered to be the most intense emotion felt in that situation, no matter what the thought or action within the experience. Not only does this further support guilt's link with moral transgressions but it also supports the idea that shame was understood within the group to be more an issue of failing to meet a personal standard (H1a).

Discussion

These studies contribute to our understanding of these emotions by deepening our knowledge of how they are experienced, which, in turn, challenges how they are conceptualized within established theories. To start, an experience of an emotion was constituted by a range of components. While not all of these components were necessary for a person to categorize their experience with one of the emotion terms, an emotion term could not be reduced to a single component. What people meant, therefore, when using a specific term was that their experience was broadly consistent with their understanding of what the term meant. This finding suggests a difference between individual emotional experience and social agreements about what specific emotion labels mean. People can feel differently but categorize their experience with the same label. Given a broad enough set of individual experiences we can identify the social meaning attached to such experiences. In more complex situations, individual experience is not able to be categorized neatly with one label but rather a range of terms is needed, such as by saying I feel ashamed and guilty. This did not mean

there was no difference between the social understanding of the terms shame and guilt, just that that individual experience was not accurately described by a single term in that instance.

Generally, the labels represented different types of experience, which is a finding that supports some established basic emotion theories (e.g. Kemper, 1987; Gilbert, 2003) and some appraisal theories (e.g. Tangney and Dearing, 2002), while challenging some basic emotion theories that claim otherwise (e.g. Tomkins, 1963; Nathanson, 1994; Scheff, 2000) or constructionist theories that do not provide sufficient descriptions about these distinctions (e.g. Gordon, 1981). The exception to these emotions being easily identifiable as distinct concerned the concept of shame in relation to humiliation and embarrassment. Study 2 confirmed that the concepts derived from study 1 relating to humiliation and embarrassment were distinct. It also confirmed that the concepts for humiliation and embarrassment could be distinguished from shame. The concept of shame, however, could not be distinguished from those of humiliation and embarrassment. It is possible that study 1 did not identify the concept of shame adequately or that study 2 was not faithful to the concept from study 1. Notwithstanding such methodological limitations, these results pose a question about the collective understanding of shame, at least within this sample. It is possible that while the other emotions are more clearly identifiable, shame is a more ambiguous term related to personal failures. Indeed, it is possible that much of the academic debate about the precise experience of the emotion stems from shame being a term for a more general experience. What we can conclude from these findings, however, is that, within this population, shame involved a negative self-evaluation due to feeling personally responsible for failing to meet some important personal standard. While this supports some established basic emotion (e.g. Gilbert, 2003) and appraisal theories (e.g. Lewis, 1971), it also challenges appraisal (e.g. Tangney and Dearing, 2002), constructionist (e.g. Harré, 1990) and basic emotion theories (e.g. Turner 2000) that limit experiences of shame to moral transgressions.

An important finding in relation to the experience of these emotions relates to shame, pride, acceptance, and rejection. While there were experiences that were classified as pride and acceptance, and others shame and rejection, these studies demonstrated they were distinguishable experiences, having different social contexts, personal roles, and foci. From a pragmatic perspective, therefore, these studies suggest it is useful to conceive of rejection and acceptance as distinct emotional experiences that relate to the state of the relationship, rather than a focus on the self. A person can feel rejected and not feel that this is because there is something wrong with them (and, therefore, feel shame). Equally, a person can feel accepted and not feel that this is due to some personal achievement (and, therefore, feel pride). So while pride and shame are experienced in relation to others, they are inherently 'self-conscious' emotions. Equally, therefore, we can make a distinction between them and acceptance and rejection by saying that while these emotions involve the self, they can be more usefully defined as 'relation-conscious' emotions. While this distinction was clear in these data, it challenges long standing basic emotion (e.g. Scheff, 2000, 2014; Gilbert, 2003; Elison, 2005) and constructionist theories (e.g. de Rivera and Grinkis, 1986; Pattison, 2000) on these emotions, while supporting some appraisal theories (e.g. Tangney and Dearing, 2002; Gausel and Leach, 2010).

By focusing on real-time, context-specific, lived-experience, these findings have identified that while there is some support for some aspects of established theories, there are no theories that can fully explain and predict how these emotions were experienced by the participants and their wider understanding of these terms. From a pragmatic perspective (Morgan, 2007), this finding has two implications. The first relates to how these emotions have been defined within established theories. Most theories have defined these emotions at an individual level of analysis, seeking to identify the biological, physiological, psychological, or other individual attribute that produces the experience. Such an approach has, however, been critiqued by some, such as Barrett (2006), to argue that this results in conceptualizations of emotional experience that are too restrictive to account for the variation in emotion experience. Furthermore, others, such as Averill (2012), argue that this

approach also denies the social forces that help to create such individual emotional experiences. Other theories, therefore, define these emotions at a social level of analysis, seeking to identify the social interactions and processes that produce the experience. This approach has also been critiqued by some, such as Barbalet (2001), who argues that this defines emotions as social representations without identifying them as such, which again minimizes the variability in actual experience. The findings in this paper, based on a return to experience, have identified the need to be explicit about both, so we are able to understand how social concepts are created, maintained, and changed, while, at the same time, structuring, shaping, and defining individual emotional experience. While there remain questions about how to define shame as a distinct experience from humiliation and embarrassment, study 1 clearly defined the social representations for the other emotions. They, therefore, provide a more detailed social concept for the analysis of individual experience and social interaction.

The second implication of these findings relates to the ontological foundations of how these emotions have been conceptualized. This paper has identified and defined, for the study population, what it means to experience pride, guilt, humiliation, embarrassment, acceptance, and rejection, while also problematizing tight definitions for shame. Pragmatically, the experience of these emotions involved cognitive and biological processes in relation to social processes that created the standards through which individuals came to evaluate themselves in the moment and provide the possibilities for action. All of these components were experienced as the emotion and some elements could not be distinguished as somehow separate from the 'real' emotion. This conclusion contrasts with foundationalist arguments of basic emotion, and some appraisal and weak constructionist, theories, instead, supporting anti-foundationalist arguments made by strong constructionist, and some appraisal, theories.

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