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Citation for published version (Harvard):

Cesari, J 2016, Political Islam: From Transnational Movement to Nationalism ... and Back. in L Greenfield (ed.), *Globalisation of Nationalism : The Motive-Force Behind 21st Century Politics*. ECPR Press, Colchester, pp. 167-192.

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Political Islam: from Transnational movement to Nationalism ... and back

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Book Chapter for Liah Greenfeld edited volume, Globalization of Nationalism, forthcoming at ECPR press, 2016

Browsing through the ever growing literature on political Islam at least since the 1970s, we see that the dominant apprehension is that political Islam and its synonymous Islamism are religiously based opposition movements to secular states.

This chapter challenges this dominant approach by arguing that political Islam is better understood as religious nationalism that can be traced back to the building of the nation-states on the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. It will also demonstrate how the global forms of radical Islam embodied today in groups like Al Qaida, Boko Haram or ISIS are the most recent iterations of political Islam that have shifted religious nationalism to religious transnationalism.

As prompted by Fred Halliday (Nation and Religion, 2013, p.43 nationalism refers to two distinct entities. First, it is a set of theories and ideologies forged by Enlightenment philosophers onward. Second, it is a series of investigation into concrete nation-building and identities that can take two opposite forms: a perennial one (Hans Kohn and Hugh Seton-Watson) that states the primordial and unique features of a given national group across historical periods or a modernist (Anderson and Gellner) in which nations are seen as the product of industrial society, history a resource by which elites can mobilize support.

This duality translates into a schizophrenic body of literature with on one hand,

theories and political philosophy loosely connected (if connected at all) to historical and sociological investigations of national identities across countries.

“What we need instead are comparative individual histories that are both written in the light of these general theories and which critically test them against the historical record.”

HallidayP 83

To do so we agree with scholars who do not consider nationalism an ideology, but rather an habitus, ie the sum of memories, emotions, values that align the cultural and political identity of people with a certain territory and institutions that control this territory.

(Rokkan 1975).

Therefore our goal is to shed light on the specifics of Muslim political cultures by exploring the historicity of political Islam and showing its enmeshment with nation-building. Nation-states emerge in Muslim lands on the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. They were the outcome of the importation of western concepts that can be dated back to the insertion of the Ottoman Empire into the Westphalian system of states.¹ In the same vein, as shown by Vali Nasr or Bobby Said,² the adoption of the Western concept of nation-State in Muslim-majority countries was the consequence not only of war or colonial power but also of the inclusion of Muslim polities into the international system. The outcomes of this adoption on the politicization of Islam have been much less examined. To do so, our study analyzes the diffusion of the Nation State concept and in the following, its embodiments in institutions and political practices.

¹ Shmuel, Eisenstadt, *The Great Revolutions and the Civilizations of Modernity*, (Boston: Brill, 2006). Dominic Sachsenmaier, Jens Riedel, and Shmuel Eisentadt, *Reflections on Multiple Modernities: European, Chinese, and Other Interpretations*, (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2001). Nissim Otmazgin and Eyal Ben-Ari, *Popular Culture and the State in East and Southeast Asia*, (New York: Routledge, 2012).

² See Bobby S. Said. *A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism*, Second Ed., New York, Palgrave, 2003.

At the core of Islam's politicization lie the structural changes unleashed by the transition from pre-modern political entity to modern Nation-State. This transition led to the rise of authoritarian "promethean" regimes where State actors imposed upon their societies very invasive social and cultural transformations. The outcome has been the construction of strong monist national ideologies with Islam at their center.

In this regard, an important aspect to consider is the role of the State. Thus, the use of Western terms or Western techniques or cultural styles should not trump us into thinking that some of these countries went through a differentiation between Islam and politics, as it was experienced in Western democracies. Actually, quite the opposite occurred. The use of Western secular techniques in law and the constitutions created a strong connection between Islam and politics, and contributed to redefine Islam *as a political norm* in ways unknown under the Muslim empires.³ My position then, is that the making of Islam as a modern religion, whereby norms, organizations and actors have been defined as Islamic, has been closely related to the making of the modern State.

One of my major conclusions drawn from the data analysis that will be presented in this chapter is that modern religion in Muslim countries is positioned on the platform of the State. The institutionalization of religion occurs through the reconfiguration of relationships between people, property and organizations that were "religious" but

³ Specifically in the Turkish case, Hakan Yavuz explains, "As a result of nation-building and militant secularization, society came to be divided along the now familiar cleavages of Turkish versus Kurdish and state versus society. In contrast, the caliphate, abolished in 1924, had represented an Islamically sanctioned union of multiethnic groups and had recognized ethnic diversity without assigning it any political role. In other words, the caliphate was the symbol of a multiethnic polity and authority; it symbolized the unity of Muslims as a faith-based community and allowed space for diverse loyalties and local autonomy for the periphery."

M. Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 52.

formerly outside the political control of the State apparatus.⁴ The State actions described in the following chapters highlight the efforts by the modern Nation-State to make Islam into both an organizational framework and ideology of practice.⁵ Modernity is thus not constituted by a one-sided State-driven project to discipline people's thoughts, but "multiple projects or, rather a series of interlinked projects"⁶ whereby States and religions reshape each other and, in the process, redefine themselves. While this recalibration of religion by the modern State happened everywhere, in the West its outcome was autonomy of religious institutions from the State, whereas in most Muslim countries, the trajectory has been in the opposite direction. This counter-trajectory is a challenge for the dominant Western theories of secularization and democratization.

The difference between the Western experience and the Muslim countries lies in the institutional arrangement of State-religion relations. In the West, secularism has translated into a legal order that preserves both the right to believe and to not believe, in essence defending their practical equality, even as the balance between competitive sets of beliefs is challenging to maintain, as illustrated by the claims of Christian fundamentalists or the European tensions around Islamic dress codes in public spaces. In Muslim countries on the other hand, the building of the nation-state led to the fusion of Islam and political institutions, in ways that were unknown in the pre-modern era. As a consequence, the "secular age" came to be embodied in a ubiquitous hegemonic version of Islam, even in countries considered secular like Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan and Iraq which will serve as case studies in the analysis that unfolds.

⁴ Yoshiko Ashiwa and David L. Wank, *Making religion, making the state: the politics of religion in modern China*, California, Stanford University Press, 2009, pp.45.

⁵ Ibid, pp.70.

⁶ Ibid, pp.45.

Making the state, making the religion:

Prior to the states, it is possible to detect the diffusion of western concepts of politics during the Ottoman Empire's reign and amidst the rise of Western imperialism. The symbolic moment of this process was the inclusion of the Ottoman Empire within the Westphalian order under the Treaty of Paris in 1856. The treaty itself ended the Crimean War and was the first time the Ottoman Empire participated as "State" in the Westphalian order. Hence, it opened the possibility for non-European polities to be part of the international legal community and form alliances with the west.⁷ In the aftermath of this symbolic inclusion, three disparate factors contributed to the adoption of the Westphalian State system in the Middle East in the first half of the twentieth century: the fall of imperial governments in the region; the rise of local nationalist movements in urban centers such as Cairo, Tunis, Baghdad, and Damascus; and the emergence of States with demarcated territorial boundaries that pursued self-interests and experienced hostile territorial disputes with neighboring States. Pro-western, liberal "civilizationalism" also became the dominant paradigm of the Ottoman modernists and reformists, despite strong internal resistance and protests against the imperialism of Western powers. This opposition was present because of the population's objection to the western critique that the Caliphate was not "civilized" enough to gain the loyalty of its Christian subjects, which subsequently led to two different movements: Pan-Islamism and Pan-Arabism.⁸

Pan-Islamism and Pan-Arabism were reactions to the rise of western liberalization

⁷ Michelle Burgis, "Faith in the State? Traditions of Territoriality and the Emergence of Modern Arab Statehood," *Journal of the History of International Law*, 11 (2009): 40.

⁸ Cemil Aydin, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 32.

rhetoric and imperialist threats in the Ottoman Empire. Pan-Islamism was an intellectual and political movement that viewed the universal Islamic community (*Ummah*) as the ideal basis and source for modern political unity, in which the life and works of the Prophet Mohammed and his first four successors served as the model for such a political project. Towards the end of the Ottoman Empire, a western threat became more acute with the European incursions into Egypt and Tunisia in 1798 and 1881, respectively. These imperialist exploits greatly impacted 19th century reformers, such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897) and his disciple, Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), who urged all Muslims to unite under *al-Wahda al-Islamiyya* (Muslim Unity) in the face of western imperialism in their journal *al-Urwa al-Wuthqa* (The Firmest Bond).⁹ The popularity of the Ottoman Caliphate also increased, as the Caliph was recognized as the head of the Muslim State on diplomatic par with the western powers.¹⁰ Accordingly, the Pan-Islamic ideology refashioned the concept of the Caliph, emphasizing his status as the Prophet Muhammad's vice-regent, in order to buttress the Empire's legitimacy in the international State system.

Thus, in direct resistance to the international norm of the Nation-State, Pan-Islamism became an ideological approach to the political community in the Ottoman lands, and the transnational vision of Pan-Islamic solidarity became a newly conceived geopolitical tool.¹¹ For example, at the onset of the First World War, the Ottoman Empire increased efforts by initiating propaganda that utilized pan-Islamic ideas and fomented Muslim disobedience against the Western colonizers.¹² As a result of the establishment

⁹ Ibid, 61.

¹⁰ Ibid, 33.

¹¹ Ibid, 60.

¹² Ibid, 109-110.

of Muslim States after the Second World War, “A rethinking of the feasibility of political pan-Islam gradually led to a search for alternative propositions, more acceptable to Muslim entities. The political goal of a unitary Islamic State was replaced by a goal of unity in Islamic policies.”¹³ However, Pan-Islamism in the form of calls to recreate the *Ummah* by political leaders, activists, and Islamist ideologues was maintained, recreated, and gradually became associated with the increasingly fundamentalist Salafiyya movement. Additionally, it is important to note that even after World War I, Pan-Islamism was not an ideology of indiscriminate hatred or rejection of the west. The reformulation of pan-Islamism as a categorically anti-western ideology happened after World War II and formed the basis for the anti-modernist and reactionary positions of future Islamist groups, such as al-Qaeda. In this perspective, pansislamism shared with its secular counter parts of panarabism or nationalist movements, the idea that the West had to be emulated. The West politics or culture was not “wrong” or bad, its domination was.

Emerging at the same time as Pan-Islamism, Pan-Arabism was a political movement, which reached its height in the 1960s, and was centered on the idea that all Arab peoples, as a linguistic and cultural community, should unite under one banner. Its origins were in the *al-Nahda* cultural renaissance that took place during the late 19th and early 20th centuries with the revival of Arabic poetry and literature and the rise of the print media.¹⁴ This cultural “awakening”, as a rejection of western cultural norms, was partially a response to the western influence as described above. Politically, Pan-Arabism was first endorsed by Sharif Hussein bin Ali (1908-1917), the Sharif of Mecca, who wanted to gain independence from the Ottoman Empire. In espousing an Arabist political

¹³ Jacob M. Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 249.

¹⁴ Rashid Khalidi, *The Origins of Arab Nationalism*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).

vision, he inspired the Arab Revolts of 1916. As the ideology of Arab nationalism gained popularity across the Middle Eastern province, and the British began to ally with the Arabs, the Ottoman Empire began to slowly crumble.¹⁵ Pan-Arabism inevitably competed with Pan-Islamist ideals, and from then on, political projects diverged between those based on the *Ummah* and those based on cultural and territorial nationalism.¹⁶

As Acharya's localization framework suggests, local actors in Muslim-majority countries resisted external (western) norms because of fears that these new norms could undermine existing beliefs and practices. As a result, both the Pan-Islamic and Pan-Arab movements came to shape resistance to foreign domination in all Muslim-majority countries after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Hence, campaigns of resistance against the west framed and depicted European modernization, along with its nation-building and secularization components, through the lens of Islamic terminology, and came in opposition with an essential Arab identity in the Middle East.

A brief review of the resistance movements in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and Tunisia illustrate this point. Egypt became the core location of the Salafiyya intellectual and political movement, which employs a revived Islamic ethos as a major tool against western imperialism that would influence the whole Muslim world. Mohammad Abduh (1849-1905), a disciple of the "father" of Pan-Islamism, al-Afghani, reinterpreted the basic principles of Islam in the light of modern reason.¹⁷ While arguing that Islamic principles were consistent with modern western rules of logic, Abduh simultaneously promoted an intellectual and cultural program to fight western

¹⁵ Mary C. Wilson, "The Hashemites, the Arab Revolt, and Arab Nationalism," in Rashid Khalidi (eds.), *The Origins of Arab Nationalism*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 204-231.

¹⁶ John Willis, "Debating the Caliphate: Islam and Nation in the Work of Rashid Rida and Abul Kalam Azad," *The International History Review*, 32 (2010): 711.

¹⁷ Christina Phelps Harris, *Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt*, (Stanford: Houton & Co, 1964), 116.

imperialism, rather than a physical war. In 1905, one of Abduh's followers, Shaykh Rashid Rida (1865-1935), founder of the journal *al-Manar*, continued Abduh's legacy, but added a more activist element.¹⁸ Reflecting on the "Golden Age" of Islam when the Caliphate was the sole spiritual and political authority for the entire Islamic community¹⁹ and acknowledging that resurrecting such a Caliphate would be impossible given contemporary realities, Rida called instead for the unity of all Muslims under the leadership of a renewed Caliph.

These ideas strongly influenced the activism of Hassan al Banna (1906-1949), the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. From its inception in 1928, the Brotherhood's objective was to provide an Islamic alternative to the influence of western culture and politics. Al-Banna borrowed from Abduh and Rida the idea that Islam could be a tool of intellectual resistance to western culture and imperialism.²⁰ At the time of its creation, the Brotherhood's objectives competed with more secular nationalist agendas. This was especially true when, as a sign of King Faruq's (1936-1952) Pan-Islamist ideals, an alliance between the monarchy and the Muslim Brotherhood took place in the 1940s to counter the nationalist and secular Wafd party.²¹

However, the Muslim Brotherhood also went through several phases of conflict with various nationalist groups and leaders of the Nation-State over the course of the following decades. During and after World War II, the Muslim Brotherhood society created a private military apparatus to support the Arab revolts against the British colonial presence and allied with Germany, which led to accusations of disloyalty against

¹⁸ Ibid, 130.

¹⁹ Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori., *Muslim Politics*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 31.

²⁰ See Part Two, Chapter 2 for development of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian context.

²¹ Richard Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 16.

the Brotherhood by King Faruq. The conflicts with the State increasingly intensified under Gamal Abdel Nasser (1956-1970) and his successors.²²

In Syria, the creation of the Ba'ath Party in 1956 was the direct outcome of the political influence of Pan-Arabism. At this time, this was the “creed of all political activists” in the region, and the founders of the Ba'ath Party, Michel Aflaq (1910-1989) and Salah Bitar (1912-1980), came to embody this broad-based territorial-nationalist movement and reiterated the threat of cultural and political westernization to the Pan-Arab ideal. This political project led to tentative unifications such as the United Arab Republic (1958-1961) between Egypt and Syria. The positions of the early Ba'athist leaders with Islam were ambiguous. On the one hand, Aflaq was a secular Christian, but on the other hand, he considered Islam as an integral component of the Arab nation.²³ As Aflaq envisioned it, Arabism was an ideology “whose Spirit is Islam.”²⁴ Despite this inclusion of Islam in the Pan-Arabist ideals, the party's political and governing structures were secular.

Similarly, In Iraq, the Ba'ath Party gained power due to the widespread belief in Pan-Arab nationalism, in addition to popular resistance to foreign influences on the government and the strong desire to break the power of the oppressive, ruling elite.²⁵ Such circumstances eventually led to the rise of Saddam Hussein in 1979 as Head of State and the construction of Iraq as a unified Arab nation (see chapter three). As biographer Felicia Okeke-Ibezim describes, “Saddam [saw] himself as a proud Arab

²² See Part Two for the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak.

²³ Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, *The Future of Iraq?: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 66.

²⁴ Ibid, 66.

²⁵ John F. Devlin, “The Baath Party: Rise and Metamorphosis”, *The American Historical Review*, 96 (1991): 1404.

nationalist... the defender of Holy Islam...[and] a valiant knight leading the Arabs into a battle against the infidel.”²⁶ Thus, Saddam implemented policies that emphasized Arab unity, such as his Arab National Charter in 1980, to increase co-operation towards common goals in the Arab world. Further, with the change of governance in nearby Iran in 1979 and the subsequent Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the Ba’ath Party agenda faced competition from the Pan-Islamist agenda of the Iranian Islamic Republic. As a result, Saddam’s agenda increasingly downplayed Islamic identities in order to foster a nationalism that distinguished Arab Iraq from its neighboring Islamic republic in Iran.

The creation of Pakistan, in contrast, is based on the idea of a political refuge for Muslims, but Pan-Islamism was not the main source of inspiration for the partitioning of the Indian subcontinent. Nevertheless, prior to the movement for independence from the British-ruled India, several pan-Islamist movements, led by poet-philosopher Mohammad Iqbal (1877-1938) and Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948), gained significant support in India. First, Sayyid Ahmad Raza Khan Bareilvi (1856-1921) created a populist Islamic revivalist movement in the late 1800s. Formally termed the *Ahl e Sunnat wa Jama’at*, this movement had both Sunni and Sufi origins, and it was known for its more “liberal” perspective on Islam in the sense that it upheld the idea of intercession between the Divine and humans against the more puritan Wahabis and Deobandis groups.²⁷ This revivalist trend was followed by the pro-Ottoman Khilafat movement, led by Maulana Mohammad Ali (1878-1931) and Maulana Shaukat Ali (1873-1938), which declared the allegiance of Indian Muslims to the Ottomans during a conference held in Karachi in July

²⁶ Felicia Okeke-Ibezim, *Saddam Hussein: The Legendary Dictator*, (New York: Ekwike, 2006), 9.

²⁷ Kemal Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 46.

1921.²⁸ However, when Kamal Atatürk abolished the Caliphate in 1924, the Khilafat movement quickly lost momentum in India.

These Pan-Islamist movements set the stage for Iqbal and Jinnah to encourage and promote the existence of a Muslim nation set apart from the hegemony of India's Hindu majority. Iqbal proposed a separate Muslim State in 1930 as the highest ideal and course of action.²⁹ Later, Jinnah adopted and promoted this idea with the creation of the Muslim League. Correspondence between Iqbal and Jinnah reveals that they thought that only a two-State system could liberate Muslims from non-Muslim majority.³⁰ In a speech to the Punjab Muslim Students Association in March 1944, Jinnah strongly promoted the creation of Pakistan as an implementation of Muslim ideals.

Turkey offers a different case of norm diffusion because the nation-building project was the direct outcome of tensions and conflicts within the Ottoman Empire around Pan-Islamic and Pan-Arabist trends. The last Ottoman Sultans, such as Abdulhamid II (1876-1909), used Pan-Islamic ideas to promote imperial unity and maintain their control over different parts of the Empire that had been penetrated by western political ideas.³¹ As Kemal Karpat suggests, "religious" activities were used to "nationalize" the millets³² of the Ottoman dynasty.³³ Abdulhamid repaired holy sites in Mecca, Medina, and Karbala, renovated mosques and schools throughout the empire, and

²⁸ Akbar Ahmed, *Jinnah, Pakistan, and Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin*, (London: Routledge, 1997), 70.

²⁹ Anwar Hussein Syed, *Pakistan: Islam, Politics, and National Solidarity*, (New York: Praeger, 1982), 42.

³⁰ Ibid, 50.

³¹ Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, 125.

³² Millets were religious communities regulated by their own civil rules. They were the cornerstone of the Ottoman political system.

³³ Ibid, 229.

gave priority to the printing and distribution of the Qur'an to his subjects.³⁴ These activities reinforced his position as the Caliph in the eyes of subjects for whom Islam was a significant marker of identity.

In the final years of the Ottoman Empire, the Young Turk movement (beginning in 1908) emerged as an alternative political project to the reinforcement of the Caliphate. Young Turk Ahmet Riza (1859-1930) was known for his attempts to reconcile Islam with western ideas. As suggested by Umat Azak, Riza's project was an "anti-clerical struggle to refashion Islam as a private matter and as a rational belief comparable with modernization."³⁵ In other words, the Young Turk movement was not necessarily anti-Islam but fought against the Caliphate's version of the religion-State relationship. Confronted with independence movements (Armenian, Greek, etc.) sprouting throughout the Empire, the Young Turks emphasized their own "Turkishness", spread the idea of a Turkish nation, and promoted a local form of Islam where prayers and sermons would be performed in the Turkish language.³⁶ With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I, the nationalist movement took complete ascendancy in the former provinces of the empire and led to the creation of modern Turkey.

In Tunisia, allegiance to the *Ummah* was manifested in a pervasive loyalty to the Caliphate as a way to resist reforms initiated by the modernist elite under French influence, such as Mohammad as-Sadiq Bey (1859-1881). From 1864 until 1881, after France became the official protector of the country with the Treaty of Bardo, Pan-Islamist ideals induced continuous unrest against the urban Westernized elites that asserted their

³⁴ Ibid, 231.

³⁵ Umat Azak, *Islam and Secularism in Turkey: Kemalism, Religion and the Nation State*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 5-6.

³⁶ Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, 305.

supremacy.³⁷ Subsequently, in the wake of the First World War, the sense of trans-continental Islamic belonging, stemming from solidarity with the Ottomans, persisted with the formation of the Destour Party in 1920. The leader of the party, Sheikh Abdelaziz Taalbi (1920-1934), spoke little French and was a student of the Salafiyya movement.³⁸ The party's membership drew from the educated elite who were fluent in Islamic and Arabic cultures (in contrast to the elite that drew its references from the west). Although it ultimately accepted the existence of the French Protectorate, the party elite viewed European influences as obstacles to a Muslim renaissance.

Destour was the predecessor to the Neo-Destour Party that arose in 1934 and spearheaded the nationalist movement under Habib Bourguiba (1957-1987). With the formation of the Neo-Destour Party, many of the Islamic connections to nationalism were minimized and thus began to fade. However, although Bourguiba would later be known for his secular orientation and his dismantling of Islamic institutions and political neutralization of the *ulama* during the anticolonial movement, he was often referred to as *al-Mujahid ul-Akbar* (the great warrior).³⁹ Moreover, Bourguiba relied on Islamic institutions and symbols to mobilize the masses in the anticolonial jihad. For instance, his party held meetings in mosques and *zawiyas* (Sufi meeting places), and urged the public to pray five times a day for the national martyrs.⁴⁰ This treatment of Islam is in stark contrast with his policy after Tunisian independence in 1956, as the Personal Status

³⁷ Signed on May 12, 1881 between France and Mohammad as-Sadiq Bey, by which Tunisia became a French protectorate.

³⁸ Clement Henry Moore, *Tunisia Since Independence: The Dynamics of One-party Government*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956), 27.

³⁹ Interestingly, he was also known as *Combattant Suprême*, which reveals the French connotations of Bourguiba's anticolonial character, while *al-Mujahid ul-Akbar* reflects "the Islamic associations of the other of these ostensibly synonymous terms." Michael Brett, Review of Norma Salem, *Habib Bourguiba, Islam and the Creation of Tunisia*, in *African Affairs*, 87.346 (1998): 126-128, accessed April 26, 2011, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/722820>.

⁴⁰ Marion Boulby, "The Islamic Challenge", *Third World Quarterly*, (1988): 592.

Law of 1957 abolished *Shari'a* courts, banned the *hijab*, and restricted polygamy. This brought into focus Tunisia's French influences and a secular-nationalist identity over an Arab-Islamic identity (see chapter on Islam in the Legal System).⁴¹ In other words, during the fight for Tunisian independence, Islam was part of the rhetoric against colonial powers, but after independence, Islam was typically painted as a symbol of the past; westernization was deemed representative of the newly formed country's future.

Nation-Building and Framing of New Norms

Advocates for new norms use language that is familiar to the local community that "names, interprets, and dramatizes them" to better adapt these new norms to local norms.⁴² These processes often occur simultaneously and cannot be entirely pulled apart. That is, framing may lead to adoption of a new norm, and adoption of a new norm may in turn lead to more framing.

The nation-building process in Muslim countries resulted in a decisive re-organization of the society-State-religion nexus that was unknown in the pre-modern era. Under the Caliphate, Islamic institutions and clerics had not been subordinated to political power. Most scholars of political history⁴³ argue that divisions of labor and hierarchies of power between temporal and spiritual authorities were fairly well established by the tenth century. In the medieval period, there were certainly "official" *Ulama* working on behalf of political rulers and providing religious justification for their policies, which is similar to the modern period. However, the major difference with the

⁴¹ John Esposito, *Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

⁴² Amitav Acharya, "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism," *International Organization*, 58 (2004): 243.

⁴³ See Hamid Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought*, New York, I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., 2005. And Ira M. Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies*, Second Ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002.

modern time is that religious authorities and institutions were financially and organizationally independent from the political power.

The Caliphs also acknowledged the cultural and religious diversity of society, although it did not translate into an egalitarian legal and political status for all religions and ethnicities. The *Ummah* was defined as the sum of the territories and populations under the Caliphate rule, hence encompassing an extensive distribution of ethnic, cultural, and linguistic groups, including: Muslims, Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, Bahais, and Druzes. Even though the Caliphate represented the example of the original community that followed the message of the Prophet Mohammad, in reality its power was limited by geography and comparable to that of any secular dynasty ruling multiple ethnic and religious groups.⁴⁴ This tension between the ideal (of a community following the model of the Prophet) and the political reality was apparent in the distinction between *Shari'a* and *Syar* forged by the juris consultes. *Shari'a* referred to the laws that apply to Muslims, while *Syar* designed the laws that apply to non-Muslims living under Caliphate rule, or to the relations between the Caliphate and the non-Muslims at the international level.⁴⁵ In contrast, the modern vision of the *Ummah* is removed from this imperial definition; the consensus among Muslim scholars is that the *Ummah* refers to a spiritual, non-territorial community distinguished by the shared beliefs of its members. The *Ummah* is therefore often seen as a type of citizenship that all Muslims have independent

⁴⁴ Albert Habib Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 12.

⁴⁵ The concept of *Syar* was developed in the early centuries of Islam by Al-Shaybānī (748-805) and later codified by Al-Sarakhsī (d. 1101): "The *syar*... describes the conduct of the believers in their relations with the unbelievers of enemy territory as well as with the people with whom the believers had made treaties, who may have been temporarily (*musta'mins*) or permanently (*dhimmīs*) in Islamic lands; with apostates, who were the worst of the unbelievers [...] and with rebels." Michelle Burgis, "Faith in the State? Traditions of Territoriality and the Emergence of Modern Arab Statehood," *Journal of the History of International Law*, 11 (2009): 40.

of territory.⁴⁶ Contemporary theologian, Yusuf al Qaradawi, in the context of the Palestinian national movement, illustrates this more contemporary and predominant vision of the *Ummah* as a transnational alliance of Muslims that excludes non-Muslims: "Supporting the Palestinian people in Gaza is a religious duty on every Muslim individual [from Morocco to Indonesia] according to his capabilities, and no one is exempted from that duty."⁴⁷

As the Ottoman Empire collapsed, the emergence of the State as the central political institution went hand in hand with the homogenization of the different national communities. That is, nation-building systematically omitted and sometimes eradicated particular ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups in order to create one nation defined by one religion and one language. This homogenization process also led to a politicized narrative of religion, i.e. political Islam. In this regard, Muslim countries are not exceptional; with the advent of the modern Nation-State, the rules of engagement between religion and politics have been redefined everywhere. However, this does mean that contrary to the dominant liberal narrative, religion has not become politically irrelevant.⁴⁸

At the same time, the architects of the new Nation-States outside of the western

⁴⁶ Riaz Hassan, *Faithlines: Muslim Conceptions of Islam and Society*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 94.

⁴⁷ Ibid, 94.

⁴⁸ This dominant political narrative does not necessarily reflect the cultural and political evolution even in the West. For example, in France, which is typically presented as the paradigm of political modernization associated with the disappearance of religion, the Jacobin phase of the French Revolution and its accompanying "Cult of Reason" went beyond the notion of "civil religion" that Rousseau had defined earlier. That is, modern secularism, as it is generally understood, has introduced substitutes for theistic religion. These substitutes have taken a bewildering variety of forms; for example, dedication to charismatic leaders, such as Mao and Stalin, resemble behavior exhibited by religious movements. As Mircea Eliade said, "The great majority of the irreligious are not liberated from religious behavior, from theologies and mythologies." Mircea Eliade, *Myths, Dreams and Mysteries: The Encounter Between Contemporary Faiths and Archaic Realities*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), 205-206.

world had to determine to what degree the “core” collective identity of the country should be sacrificed in exchange for the western institutions and technologies necessary to strengthen the State both militarily and economically.⁴⁹ Each State that faced this dilemma has responded differently. In the case of Nations built on the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the diffusion of international norms of Statehood was decisive in the fabrication of Islam as a political religion. The emergence of new political norms tied to nationalism generally resulted in State narratives that either referenced Islamic terminology or were diversely articulated within an Islamic framework. Localization of these norms occurred as State actors employed strategies of entrepreneurship and reframed it using local vocabulary.⁵⁰ As noted above, both Pan-Islamism and Pan-Arabism contributed to the broad appeal of nationalist discourse.⁵¹ In other words, Islamic references and norms were used to “localize” the nation-building process and legitimize State actors and policies. The outcome of such localization was the redefinition of Islam within the new State institutions.

The adoption of outside norms into local contexts also involved both grafting and pruning, two tactics often employed by local actors to institutionalize external norms by associating them with preexisting ones. Here, linkages have to be constructed and carefully articulated by proponents of new norms, because the links are not always intuitive or seemingly natural. In Muslim countries, pruning and grafting have primarily taken place through three mechanisms: references to Islam in the Constitution,

⁴⁹ Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). The adjective “core” refers to an essentialized vision of culture and identity, but most of the time, such essentializations drove political reforms at the time.

⁵⁰ Amitav Acharya, “How Ideas Spread,” 239-275.

⁵¹ Malik Mufti, *Sovereign Creations: Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).

nationalization of Islamic institutions, and the incorporation of Islam in the legal system.

In sum, the localization phase has entailed the marshaling of four domains to appropriate Islam as a tool for the elaboration of the Nation-State. These domains include:

- 1) The Constitutional inscription of Islam
- 2) The nationalization of Islamic institutions and clerics
- 3) Islam in the legal system
- 4) The integration of Islam in public education

2) Political Islam as political culture

With the creation of a State education system, the curricula and textbooks of public education have socialized new generations to the idea that national identity and Islamic identity are two sides of the same coin. By inscribing Islam within the public education system, the State posits itself as the protector of the Islamic heritage, and assumes “the responsibility to provide children and youths with trustworthy religious guidance.”⁵²

National unity comes from two sources: the first is the cultivation of national brotherhood (internal cohesion) against outsiders, including external and internal threats and enemies, and regardless of sectarian divisions. Because nationalism is about

⁵² “Groups claiming independent authority to interpret Islamic scriptures and transmit Islamic culture undermine one of the basic foundations of the state’s moral legitimacy: its protection of the Islamic heritage, including the responsibility to provide children and youths with trustworthy religious guidance. Islam, the official religion of the Egyptian state, is a matter of vital government interest.” Gregory Starrett, *Putting Islam to Work: Education, Politics, and Religious Transformation in Egypt*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1998, pp. 5.

difference, “the imagined community cannot be all-inclusive.”⁵³ As a result, the second source is the exclusivist discourses of nationalism, which have implications for citizenship, access to political power, and the allocation of resources.⁵⁴ This means that the State excludes those who do not belong to the dominant group within its discursive project of establishing ideological hegemony and constructing the national identity through education.

But the underlying and more pervasive source of exclusion is the use of Islam within the education system to homogenize the nation. Despite more recent initiatives to focus on tolerance in the curricula, religious minorities are still neglected and discriminated within most of the curricula of public education. Also, because the concept of tolerance is only promoted in the religious context, other parts of the curricula (history/social studies) that are also influenced by Islamic terms such as *jihad* remain within a militant context and continue to instill ideas of Islamic supremacy and uniting against “infidels”.

In this regard, it is important to note that Islamic references are not limited to religious education, but are also incorporated throughout the entire public school curriculum. They permeate history, social studies, civics textbooks, and even appear in mathematics.⁵⁵ Such a “functionalization of religion,” as Gregory Starrett terms it,⁵⁶

⁵³ Naureen Durrani and Mairead Dunne. “Curriculum and national identity: exploring the links between religion and nation in Pakistan”, *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 2, 2010, pp.215-240, Retrieved 11 June 2011 from <<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00220270903312208>> pp.218.

⁵⁴ Ibid, pp.230.

⁵⁵ Pittman and Chishtie examine how Islam has penetrated the mathematics curriculum in Pakistan apparent in the provided examples and explanations based on Islamic law and traditions. For example, a typical mathematics exercise deals with the issue of inheritance and distribution of an eState. In these problems, the widow is given an eighth of the eState and the sons and daughters receive the rest of the eState with the sons receiving twice the shares as the daughters. The final piece of information becomes learned and assumed knowledge for other exercises thereafter. (Holger Daun and Geoffrey Walford

illustrates the socialization process at work, where the State exerts social control and assumes the moral authority by promoting a “proper Islamic identity”, and by extension, cultivation of “good social behavior” (*âdâb ijtîmâ’îya*) of “good” citizens. For example, in primary school Egyptian textbooks, the school is portrayed as the source of the child’s moral learnings, which the child will then share with his/her family.⁵⁷ Thus, while Egyptian textbooks focus on responsibility and duty as main Muslim values,⁵⁸ these are virtues taught by the schools (and thus, by the State), not by independent groups. Similarly in Turkey, the Directorate of Religious Affairs was created under the office of the prime minister, and its responsibilities include administering Islamic affairs with the objective “to create ‘good citizens’ with civic responsibility toward the State.”⁵⁹ In this way, the Turkish State has tried to control Islam and through public education, disseminated Islam towards its own nationalizing and secularizing goals.

We collected and analyzed primary and secondary school textbooks from Iraq, Egypt, Turkey, Tunisia and Pakistan used over the period of 2000-2003. The textbooks we focused on were Islamic education textbooks (reflected in a variety of names: “Islamic Insight”, “Religious Studies”, “Islamic Culture and Religious Studies”, etc.) and history and “National and Civic Education” textbooks. We performed a content analysis to discover the association between Islamic religious terms (*jihad*, *ummah*) and political

(eds.), “Education Strategies Among Muslims in the Context of Globalization: Some National Case Studies”, *Muslim Minorities*, Vol. 3, 2004, pp.113.)

⁵⁶ Gregory Starrett, *Putting Islam to Work: Education, Politics, and Religious Transformation in Egypt*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1998, pp. 10.

⁵⁷ Gregory Starrett, *Putting Islam to Work: Education, Politics, and Religious Transformation in Egypt*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1998, pp. 143.

⁵⁸ Johana Pink, “Nationalism, Religion and the Muslim-Christian Relationship: Teaching Ethics and Values in Egyptian Schools”, *Center for Studies on New Religions*, 2004 Retrieved 11 April 2011 from <http://www.cesnur.org/2003/vil2003_pink.htm>.

⁵⁹ M. Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 49.

terms (nation, state, citizen); the connotations linked to other religions; and the conception of the West.

A) Ummah Vs. Nation

References to the *Ummah* in textbooks show that the legitimization of the national community builds on the concept of the *Ummah*. As a result, however, such a reference complicates issues of citizenship and national identity because while religious identity bolsters national unity, it also undermines national distinctiveness because of the sense of allegiance to the larger Islamic community. Naureen Durrani and Mairead Dunne sum the topic up capably: “religious identity transcends national boundaries but national identity requires identification with a particular geographical place.”⁶⁰ The idea of Islam as central to one’s identity places priority on the *Ummah* over the nation, and as a result, the State grants symbolic supremacy to the *Ummah* in terms of religious solidarity. Especially in the case of public education in Pakistan, identification with the *Ummah* and Pakistan are used interchangeably.

In the case of Egypt, religious educational texts have gone through two phases: the Pan-Arabist focus under Nasser and Sadat, and the nationalist/Egypt-first emphasis under Mubarak. The first phase under Sadat illustrates the political instrumentalization of the *Ummah* under nation-State regimes while also asserting the primacy of the Egyptian

⁶⁰ Naureen Durrani and Mairead Dunne. “Curriculum and national identity: exploring the links between religion and nation in Pakistan”, *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 2, 2010, pp.215-240, Retrieved 11 June 2011 from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00220270903312208> pp.229.

“The fourth aspect of national identity is that it connects a group of people to a particular geographical place...ethnic or religious identities often have sacred sites or places of origin, but it is not an essential part of having the identity that you should permanently occupy that place...A nation, in contrast, must have a homeland.”

From – 1995: David Miller. *On Nationality*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 24.

identity. As shown by Olivier Carre, 72 percent of the content of religious education was devoted to political and social matters.⁶¹ The texts showed that the *Ummah* is superior to the Arab nation and to the country of Egypt; however, the Arab nation and culture should work for the good of the Muslim *Ummah*, as Arab unity is regarded as an essential article of the Islamic faith. One text quoted in Carre gives this invocation: “O God! Bring to us unity! O God! Re-unite the Arabs in one nation. When that happens [...] they will form the most powerful, the richest, the most knowledgeable and the most important of nations!”⁶² The Muslim *Ummah* and the Arab nation inter-mesh and reinforce each other. Carre concludes, “The texts call young Egyptians to feel and think of themselves as Arabs above all and to apply to their Arabism and their sense of identity with the Muslim *Ummah*.” Moreover, while the textbooks emphasized Arab socialism, Saeed points out that the books and curricula of the Nasser period were marked by a façade of secularism, but are in fact very much influenced by fundamentalist Islamic beliefs.⁶³

In the second phase, the national identity takes precedence. Even religious textbooks focus on allegiance to Egypt as the *watan* or homeland, and in the 2002/2003 textbooks, there is almost no reference to Arabism or the Islamic *Ummah*. For instance, the first-year primary textbook tells a tale of how Allah saved the *watan* or homeland of the Meccans from the “Ashab al-Feel” (the People of the Elephant) and concludes with a poem that goes, “And you, Muslim student, have to love your homeland (*watan*) / And

⁶¹ Olivier Carre, "L'Ideologie politico-religieuse nasserienne a la lumi&re des manuels scolaires," *Politique Etrangere*, Paris, Vol. 37, 1972, pp. 536. See excerpts from *Islamic Socialism*, by Mustafa al-Sibai, in Sami A. Hanna and George H. Gardner, *Arab Socialism*, Leiden, Brill, 1969, pp.66-79. For the complete text, see *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 26, Winter 1972, pp.55-68. See also Joseph P. O’Kane, "Islam in the New Egyptian Constitution: Some Discussions in al-Ahram," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 26, Spring 1972, pp.137-148.

⁶² Olivier Carre, "L'Ideologie politico-religieuse nasserienne a la lumi&re des manuels scolaires," *Politique Etrangere*, Paris, Vol. 37, 1972.

⁶³ Javaid Saeed, *Islam and Modernization: A Comparative Analysis of Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey*, Wesport, Connecticut, Praeger Publishers, 1994, pp.138.

defend it if it is attacked by any aggressor/ Because you live in it and eat from its food / And drink from the water of its blessed Nile.” The focus on the iconic Nile River clearly promotes the national identity, which is in direct contrast to the first phase when education revolved around the central idea of Arab nationalism in order to reinforce the Arab identity over the Egyptian identity.

Because the modern State has politicized Islam by conflating national identity with religious identity, the supremacy of the *Ummah* is tempered by the textbooks’ promotion of allegiance to the State and the State’s version of Islam. At the same time, there is still a tension between the *Ummah* and the nation in national identity formation in the varying levels of reference to the *Ummah* among the different countries’ curricula. Even when the textbooks depict the *Ummah* as the point of reference, it is important to note that they also propagate each particular State’s version of Islam as the true Islam of the *Ummah*. Moreover, the tension between the *Ummah* and the nation is simultaneously manipulated and manifested by many Islamists’ rivaling political agendas to the State and the competing nationalist (modernist) and Islamist (traditionalist) approaches to education.⁶⁴ Islamists believe and criticize that ‘Islamic education’ has been confined to a separate subject instead of rightfully defining the outlook of the entire educational system.

Thus, each State propagates a unique representation of the Muslim identity tailored to forge the national identity, promote national unity and cement State authority. Furthermore, each country’s curriculum reflects local histories, the degree of Islamist clout in the educational policy as well as the specific policy interests of the State. However, the textbook representations of Muslim identity do share four common

⁶⁴ The leader of the Islamicization agenda in education has often been the Muslim Brotherhood.

characterizations of Islam, which further promote unity and reinforce State authority: (a) blurring of sectarian divisions to promote a singular and unified Islam; (b) fostering national “uniqueness” through a master narrative of victimization to inculcate a sense of unity against oppressors and representations of conflict, which often includes discussion of *jihad*; (c) building this uniqueness on the implicitly or explicitly proclaimed superiority of Islam; and relatedly, (d) misrepresenting or omitting Christians and Jews.

B) Islam as Singular and Monolithic

No country is religiously homogenous, but textbooks in Muslim-majority countries essentialize Islam as a monolithic religion and deny through omission, the existence of Islamic sects. Since Christian minorities are often acknowledged by State laws, Christian students are exempted from Islamic education or are sometimes offered alternative Christian education. However, Islamic sectarian minorities are not exempted from Islamic education class, which teaches a tradition that is not their own. Although each country’s curricula espouses a different version of Islam, they all avoid sectarian distinctions by simultaneously promoting a singular representation of Islam and scrupulously not mentioning any Islamic sect by name. As a result, Islamic references are used to forge a fictitious and homogenous community within the State and in the *Ummah*.

In all countries studied, religious education is compulsory, and for adherents of all Islamic sects, the Sunni tradition of the dominant group is taught as the sole version of Islam.

Perhaps most interesting is the case of Turkey, which as a “secular” State promotes Islam as primarily Turkish, “existing in a vacuum apart from its Middle Eastern

context, oblivious to existing sectarian or minority differences, and serving as a locus of identity for feelings of Turkish nationalism.”⁶⁵ Hakan Yavuz terms this Turkification of Islam as “internal secularization” because the State imagines and promotes this vision of Islam in terms of modern concepts like nationalism.⁶⁶ On the flipside, Islamic intellectuals and movements engage in the “vernacularization of modernity,” which means redefining the discourses of modernity (such as nationalism and secularism) in their own Islamic terms.⁶⁷ Thus, the contradiction of a secular State and compulsory religious education is reconciled by the fact that “Islamic knowledge is reformulated and presented in a way that functionalizes Islam, equating religious study with any other subject.”⁶⁸ Religious instruction is advertised as necessary and obligatory because Islamic values are practical and useful to society. Moreover, religion acts as divine legitimization “for the pillars of the official ideology of the ‘secular’ State’.”⁶⁹

According to Article 24 of the Turkish Constitution, “Education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conducted under State supervision and control. Instruction in religious culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary schools. Other religious education and instruction shall be subject to the individual’s own desire, and in the case of minors, to the request of their legal representatives.”⁷⁰ While the last part of Article 24 is an important caveat, it is clear that

⁶⁵ Ozlem Altan, “Turkey: Sanctifying a Secular State”, in Abdella Doumato, Eleanor and Starrett, Gregory (Eds.), *Textbooks and Religion in the Middle East*, pp. 197-214, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007, pp.212

⁶⁶ M. Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 5.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid, pp.202.

⁶⁹ Ibid, pp.212.

⁷⁰ “The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey”, Retrieved 28 June 2011 from

<http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/images/loaded/pdf_dosyalari/THE_CONSTITUTION_OF_THE_REPUBLIC_OF_TURKEY.pdf>.

it is not upheld especially towards Alevi students who are required to attend lessons in Religious Culture and Ethics promoting Sunni Islam.⁷¹ Thus, the teaching of religion allows the State to further its vision of a Turkish-Sunni society by using the compulsory religious education classes to teach Islam as a Turkish religion reflecting the Sunni Islamic interpretation. As a result, the textbooks emphasize the conflation of Turkishness and Islam by including pictures of mosques and holy shrines in Turkey and presenting all Muslim scholars as Turkish, while cutting off Islamic history after the Turks accepted Islam.⁷² In addition to inculcating the idea of Turkish Islam, textbooks do not mention sectarian divisions within Islam or religious minorities of Turkey, implying that there is no alternative to the Turkish-Sunni identity.

Pakistan, Egypt, Tunisia, and Iraq all constitutionally declare Islam as the State religion, but the teaching of Islam in each country varies according to the social and religious features of the society as well as of the political orientation of the regime. As further detailed below: in Pakistan, a “ritualistic” approach of Islam is propagated using “religious symbolism to counter economic discontent, political dissent, and ethnic nationalism.”⁷³ In Tunisia and Egypt under authoritarian rulers, the compulsory religious education was aimed to discredit Islamists within their own societies. During Saddam’s

Religious education was actually reintroduced into the curriculum in 1949, and it “consisted of two hours of instruction on Saturday afternoons, but was restricted to those children whose parents had explicitly requested such education.”

Mustafa Kocak, “Islam and National Law in Turkey,” *Sharia Incorporated*, Jan Michiel Otto (eds.), Amsterdam, Leiden University Press, 2010, pp.245.

⁷¹ “Compulsory Religious Education and Abuse of Human Rights, Says European Court”, *National Secular Society*, 12 October 2007, Retrieved 10 November 2011 from <http://www.secularism.org.uk/compulsoryreligiouseducationanab.html>.

⁷² Ozlem Altan, “Turkey: Sanctifying a Secular State”, in Abdella Doumato, Eleanor and Starrett, Gregory (Eds.), *Textbooks and Religion in the Middle East*, pp. 197-214, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007, pp.203.

⁷³ Naureen Durrani and Mairead Dunne. “Curriculum and national identity: exploring the links between religion and nation in Pakistan”, *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 2, 2010, pp.215-240, Retrieved 11 June 2011 from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00220270903312208> pp.216.

regime in Iraq, textbooks emphasized homogeneity and denied the Sunni-Shi'a sectarian divide in order to impose unity on Iraqi society.

The official curriculum of the Pakistani State equates Islam with the national identity by teaching that Muslim identity and Pakistani identity are synonymous, thus ignoring religious, ethnic, linguistic, and regional diversity.⁷⁴ As a result, students defined 'being Pakistani' as 'being Muslim,' which meant their complete adherence to Islamic rituals, as a result of their education emphasizing religious symbols and rituals such as "namaz, recitation of the Qu'ran, etc."⁷⁵ In this way, the State is able to promote national unity through the concept of Islamic unity despite its multi-ethnic and linguistic nature.⁷⁶ Especially, after the secession and creation of Bangladesh in 1974, ethnic diversity was targeted as the biggest threat to national unity and sovereignty. In these conditions, the "ritualistic" version of Islam serves as the unifying ideology to downplay and domesticate sectarian, ethnic, and provincial sentiments, which in turn promotes homogeneity, solidarity and unity through Islam.

While Pakistani education does not favor the Sunni or Shi'a tradition, the curriculum teaches that there is a distinction between "good" and "bad" Muslims, and by

⁷⁴ Naureen Durrani and Mairead Dunne. "Curriculum and national identity: exploring the links between religion and nation in Pakistan", *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 2, 2010, pp.215-240, Retrieved 11 June 2011 from <<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00220270903312208>> pp.222.

Although non-Muslims are not required to participate in the Islamic studies classes, they are generally not offered religious teaching of their own beliefs. Some schools do offer Ethics classes for non-Muslim students, but it is not widespread.

"Pakistan", *International Freedom Report*, 2010, Retrieved 13 November 2011 from <<http://www.State.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148800.htm>>.

⁷⁵ Naureen Durrani and Mairead Dunne. "Curriculum and national identity: exploring the links between religion and nation in Pakistan", *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 2, 2010, pp.215-240, Retrieved 11 June 2011 from <<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00220270903312208>> pp.223, 231.

⁷⁶ Pakistan is divided into four provinces: NWFP, Punjab, Sindh, and Baluchistan, and each province roughly represents a different major ethnic group within the State. Ibid, pp.219.

extension “good” and “bad” Pakistanis.⁷⁷ The “good” Muslims are those who are pious or those who follow Islamic rituals and customs, while the “bad” Muslims are those who follow “un-Islamic customs”. As a result, no acknowledgement or recognition of multiple ways of being Muslim is possible. For example, Muslims students must declare in writing that they believe that the Prophet Muhammad is the final Prophet, with no exemption for Ahmadis do not share such a belief.⁷⁸

While both Islam and Christianity are taught in Egyptian public schools, parents cannot choose the religion their children are taught at school. According to Article 19 of Egypt’s constitution: “Religious education shall be a principal subject in the courses of general education.” If one of the parents is Muslim, the child is considered Muslim and will be placed accordingly. The tradition of Islam taught at schools is Sunni Islam, without distinction between the different schools or any mention of Shi’ism.⁷⁹ According to Toronto and Eissa’s study on Islamic education in Egypt, “the curriculum, from beginning to end, leaves Muslim students with the impression that Sunni Islam is the only and correct version of Islam in existence.”⁸⁰ Such a teaching contradicts the reality that

⁷⁷ Ibid, pp.231.

⁷⁸ This educational treatment of the Ahmadi contradicts Article 22 of the constitution which States in Part II, “Safeguards as to educational institutions in respect of religion, etc. (1) No person attending any educational institution shall be required to receive religious instruction, or take part in any religious ceremony, or attend religious worship, if such instruction, ceremony or worship relates to a religion other than his own.”

“The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan”, Retrieved 8 May 2011 from

<<http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/>>.

“Pakistan”, *International Freedom Report*, 2009, Retrieved 13 November 2011 from

<<http://www.State.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/127370.htm>>.

⁷⁹ Sami Aldeeb, “Religious Teaching in Egypt and Switzerland”, *Text sent to the symposium organized by The Movement for Human Rights Beyrouth*, 2000.

⁸⁰ James A. Toronto and Muhammad S. Eissa, “Egypt: Promoting Tolerance, Defending Against Islamism”, In Eleanor Abdella Doumato and Gregory Starrett (eds.), *Teaching Islam: Textbooks and Religion in the Middle East*, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007, pp.44

Egyptian students live in. Although there aren't many Shi'ites in Egypt, there are several mosque-shrines dedicated to Shi'ite figures that are visited and celebrated by Sunni and Shi'ite alike. Additionally, the lack of information on Sufism in public religious education is in stark contrast to the Sufi influence and presence at all levels of Egyptian society.⁸¹ Nowhere are sectarian identities discussed lest they induce fragmentation and subsequent instability of the national identity, and instead, the majority Sunni Islamic tradition is offered as "the" Egyptian norm.

The educational system was one of the main arenas of tension and competition between the State and the Islamists.⁸² Thus, while the Egyptian State's education focuses on national identity over the idea of belonging to the greater *Ummah*, the Islamists argue, the focus in Islamic education should not be to reinforce national identity but rather to uphold the nation-transcending Muslim community (*Ummah*).⁸³ However, school textbooks in Egypt maintain the State's religious legitimacy because they reflect adherence to traditional methods of education: memorization and oral recitation, and source materials such as the Qu'ran, Hadith, biographies of prominent Muslims, and *Shari'a*. Additionally, the objectives of the curricula include teaching the proper recitation of the Qu'ran, rituals, and correct Islamic dress and behavior.

Despite this traditionalist approach, the main purpose of the curricula is not to teach the Islamic tradition but to provide religious legitimacy to the State policies. For example, at some specific political periods, textbooks were directed toward fighting and discrediting extremist Islamist groups in an attempt to win the hearts and minds of the

⁸¹ Ibid, pp.45

⁸² Ibid, pp.30

⁸³ Javaid Saeed, *Islam and Modernization: A Comparative Analysis of Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey*, Wesport, Connecticut, Praeger Publishers, 1994, pp.224.

people. Hence, public education in Egypt aims to construct an identity based on the preeminence of Sunni Islam as a source of values for a national identity.⁸⁴ For example, textbooks stress the importance of “loving the homeland which God bestowed on us.... Our noble religion commands us to develop it, to work for its glory and to defend its land and people.”⁸⁵ In a lesson to first graders about the topic of love, the textbook offers a row of illustrations about recommended objects of love; the first being “the flag of my country”, followed by the teacher, family, and friends.⁸⁶

Under Saddam Hussein, a Sunni version of Islam was promoted in Iraqi textbooks, despite the fact that the majority of the population is Shia. It included Sunni prayer stances and a certain bias towards the Sunni version of Islamic history. Further, most books contained Saddam’s image, and all social studies, civics, history books—as well as Islamic history—included substantial content on the history and ideology of the Baath party. Students were instructed in the importance of “loyalty to the (Arab) people and to the leadership of ‘the Party’ and the revolution.”⁸⁷ Islam was used consistently in support such indoctrination: the party’s history was presented in the context of early Islamic history (lessons on the first Muslims were taught alongside that of modern-day Iraq),⁸⁸ while the party’s ideology was presented within that of Islamic teachings. For example, modern Iraqi and Baath party history were taught alongside early Islamic

⁸⁴ James A. Toronto and Muhammad S. Eissa, “Egypt: Promoting Tolerance, Defending Against Islamism”, In Eleanor Abdella Doumato and Gregory Starrett (eds.), *Teaching Islam: Textbooks and Religion in the Middle East*, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007.

⁸⁵ *Seventh year, second semester Islamic education textbook*, 2002-2003 School Year, pp.30

⁸⁶ Johana Pink, “Nationalism, Religion and the Muslim-Christian Relationship: Teaching Ethics and Values in Egyptian Schools”, *Center for Studies on New Religions*, 2004 Retrieved 11 April 2011 from <http://www.cesnur.org/2003/vil2003_pink.htm>.

⁸⁷ *tarbiyya wataniyya saf chamis ibtidaiya*, 2001, pp.29.

⁸⁸ *tarikh al-arabi al-islami lil saff al-khamis al-ibtidait*, 1988, pp. 33.

history, with Saddam depicted as their champion. The Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988, for instance, was presented in Arab and Islamic history textbooks as a modern version of the 7th century Arab-Islamic victory over the Persians in the battle of Qaddisiyya:

The battle of Qaddisiyya of our ancestors was repeated by the champion of Arabism and Islam, our leader Saddam Hussein (may Allah protect and guide him) against the Persian enemy.⁸⁹

The Saddam curriculum also aimed to indoctrinate students with the belief in a homogeneous Iraqi society. Ethnic and cultural diversity was downplayed and little mention was made of any distinct groups. On the other hand, proclamations of coexistence and cooperation were frequent. Students were told that “Iraqis feel unified; they cooperate and are proud of their deep connection to one another.” This so-called camaraderie, a common theme especially at the primary level, was taught by way of discounting distinct characteristics and maintaining an appearance of an homogenous Iraq. The theme in the excerpt below, taken from a seventh grade social studies book is echoed throughout the curriculum:

The people of Iraq are a single firm unit—from the north to the south...Living together for thousands of years generated unity between (the Iraqi) people. Iraqi blood was fused in its defense.⁹⁰

Despite the proclaimed secularism of Baathist ideology, Islamic references were often used to facilitate its legitimation. Quotes from the Qu’ran were interspersed throughout lessons highlighting Baath principles. A lesson instructing students to limit their materialistic consumption for the sake of their country and nation (*umma*) is accompanied by the Qu’ranic saying, “Those who squander are the brothers of Satan.” By conserving

⁸⁹ *tarikh al-arabi al-islami lil saff al-thani al-mutawasat*, 1999, pp.58.

⁹⁰ *al-tarbiyya al-wataniyya lil saff al-khamis al-ibtidai*, 2001, pp.12.

and avoiding materialism, students were taught, they will “triumph against the greed of the American, British, and Zionist enemies.”⁹¹

After the United States invaded Iraq and ended Saddam regime in 2003, the new Ministry of Education’s General Curriculum Directorate, in partnership with UNESCO and USAID, established a committee for curriculum development in order to drastically change the nature and content of the religious teaching. The committee was comprised of Iraqi educators and education experts chosen by the US, who consulted with other local leaders in education, particularly Islamic education⁹² The massive endeavor to provide Iraq’s 16,000 schools with revised study materials began with the removal of all images of Saddam Hussein and Baath content from textbooks. A subsequent step involved the introduction of new materials that would promote tolerance, respect, and appreciation for a pluralistic Iraqi society by recognizing its religious and ethnic components rather than discounting them.

In a broad sense, the prevalence of abstract concepts of tolerance in the Saddam-era curriculum was likely a factor in the decision to continue the use of some old textbooks, with revisions, in the new curriculum (this is especially the case with regard to Islamic studies). A significant shift however, is evident in the new curriculum with regard to specific Iraqi social groups, which were conspicuously ignored in the Saddam-era textbooks. This shift includes revisions in civics, social studies, and history texts teach

⁹¹ Ibid, pp.37.

⁹² Hadithi A., “Shaikh Dr. Hamid Abd El Aziz, the Director of the Department of Islamic education, in an interview with Al-Raed.” *Al-Raed Magazine*, Iraq, 2010, pp.58.

A New History of Iraq”, *The Guardian*, 24 November 2003, Retrieved 19 June 2011 from <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2003/nov/25/schools.schoolsworldwide>>.

students about Iraq's "ethnic and religious diversity,"⁹³ mentioning different Iraqi ethnic and religious groups by name, such as Kurds, Turkmen, Yazidis, Sabians, and Christians.⁹⁴ While Saddam-era textbooks also mention Christians, they do so only in the context of ancient Islamic history and Jesus as a Muslim prophet. Jews, despite having been a significant component of Iraqi society for centuries, are mentioned in a limited sense in both old and new curricula, in the context of relations with Mohammad in ancient Islamic history and with regard to the Zionist movement and Palestine.

One of the major revisions in Iraqi textbooks has been the recognition of Shi'a groups, as opposed to the original textbooks, which contained a Sunni bias. This recognition of religious and sectarian diversity, while being a goal in of itself, is also the basis for a unified, stable Iraq and has been out of reach since the end of the Saddam Hussein era. Since 2003, the curriculum has undergone continuous change and several revised versions have been printed only to be retracted due to public opposition. Many claim that the changes have been politically motivated, and a significant number of politicians, along with religious authorities, have been at the center of what has become a high profile debate.⁹⁵ And while most opponents claim that the new texts promote Shi'a interpretations of Islam at the expense of Sunni Islam, complaints run the gamut of the political and religious spectrum: some feel that Sunnis are being discriminated against, while others assert that not enough has been done to rectify Sunni bias against Shias.⁹⁶

⁹³ *Sixth grade Social Studies*, pp. 14. Retrieved 11 April 2011, Available at: <http://www.iraqicurricula.org/>.

⁹⁴ *Seventh grade Civics*, pp.8. Retrieved 11 April 2011, Available at: <http://www.iraqicurricula.org/>.

⁹⁵ "Throwing Old Textbooks Out", *Niqash*, 2010, Retrieved 11 May 2011 from <http://www.niqash.org/content.php?contentTypeID=74&id=2688&lang=0>.

⁹⁶ *In Arabic (translated citation)*: Google Answers. "What are Iraqi students learning in regards to Islamic classes and history?", Retrieved 3 November 2010 from

Still others claim that despite years of revisions, the curriculum still closely resembles that of the Saddam-era.⁹⁷ Many also felt that the US was overstepping its boundaries with regard to Iraq's internal affairs, especially in 2003 following reports in 2003 that USAID had demanded that religious reference be limited or banned from certain texts.⁹⁸ Some Islamic religious authorities, already wary of US interference, saw the curriculum project as an American plan to westernize Iraqi schools. Sheikh Abdul Settar Jabber, who headed a leading Sunni religious group at the time, called the curriculum project a US attempt to "break Iraqi identity".⁹⁹ At the time of this writing, the debate continues and no consensus has been reached on the content of the curriculum.¹⁰⁰

One of the most contentious points of the debate has been over the way in which prayer is taught at the primary level. Though prayers under Saddam followed Sunni doctrine, the instructional images that accompanied them were ambiguous and could not be identified with either the Sunni or Shia sects.¹⁰¹ Elements that would distinguish the prayer as belonging to either of the two were conspicuously missing—a decision that was perhaps made with the regime's authoritarian aims in mind.¹⁰²

The new curriculum has addressed the imbalance in a number of ways. A revised Islamic studies textbook that was in circulation in 2008 depicted both ways of praying.

<http://ejabat.google.com/ejabat/thread?tid=43b24a057f3f8293&hl=ar&table=/ejabat/label?lid%3D0b1f3766f29f0a9a%26hl%3D&pli=1>

⁹⁷ Personal conversation with Dr. Jalal

⁹⁸ "Rewriting the Textbooks: Education Policy in Post-Hussein Iraq," *Harvard International Review*, 2006, Retrieved 17 July 2011 from <<http://hir.harvard.edu/energy/rewriting-the-textbooks?page=0,0/>> (refers to London Financial Times source).

⁹⁹ "A New History of Iraq," *The Guardian*, 2003, Retrieved 17 July 2011 from <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2003/nov/25/schools.schoolsworldwide>>.

¹⁰⁰ "Iraqi Schoolbooks Criticized for Sectarian Bias", *Institute for War and Peace Reporting*, 2010, Retrieved 4 June 2011 <<http://iwpr.net/report-news/iraqi-school-books-criticised-sectarian-bias>>.

¹⁰¹ *al-Tarbiya al-islamiya lil-saff al-awal al-ibtida'i*, First grade Islamic Studies, Iraqi Ministry of Education, 2001, see also: *al-Tarbiya al-islamiya*, Islamic Studies Grade 2-6, Iraqi Ministry of Education, 2000-2002.

¹⁰² "Young Iraqis Are Losing Their Faith in Religion," *New York Times*, 2008, Retrieved on 15 July 2011 from <<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/03/world/africa/03iht-youth.4.10662930.html>>.

Yet another textbook depicted two brothers, Mohammad and Ahmad, praying according to Sunni and Shia guidelines alongside one another.¹⁰³ While a more inclusive approach to Islamic studies was the stated reason for the change, the move backfired and triggered a wave accusations that the changes were politically motivated and that the Shiite-led government was deliberately “fostering injustice and sectarianism” by differentiating between the Sunnis and Shiites.¹⁰⁴ Parents and teachers accustomed to instruction under the Saddam regime, especially Sunnis, expressed concern that “teaching more than one way of praying might confuse children and “lead to discrimination and sectarianism.” They said they hoped children would be taught about Islam in a more general way that “did not differentiate between sects” since Muslims were “one people with one religion and one God.”¹⁰⁵

Politicians and religious authorities immediately joined the dispute, fueling even more the suspicions that changes to the curriculum were politically motivated.¹⁰⁶ Sunni politicians criticized the Shiite-led Ministry of Education of fomenting sectarianism, and Shiite leaders responded in kind. Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani stated publicly that he supported changes, and that a single curriculum should reflect “all the beautiful colors of Iraqi society” rather than being separate for Shias or Sunnis.¹⁰⁷ Statements by Internet commentators followed that Sistani was “colluding the (US) occupiers” to develop the

¹⁰³ “Sectarian change programs influence Iraqi curricula”, *Al-Raeed*, 2010, Retrieved on July 15, 2011 from <<http://www.al-raeed.net/raeedmag/preview.php?id=1807>>.

¹⁰⁴ *In Arabic (translated citation)*: Google Answers. “The Changing of the Islamic Studies curriculum in Iraq to teach prayer based on Shia practice ... with pictures”. *Hanin Network*, Retrieved 16 November 2010 from <http://www.hanein.info/vb/showthread.php?t=106760&page=1>

¹⁰⁵ “Widespread Criticism from Parents and Teachers Over Iraqi Curriculum,” *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat*, 2009, Retrieved 15 July 2011 from <<http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=548076&issueno=11336>>.

¹⁰⁶ “Throwing Old Textbooks Out”, *Niqash*, 2010, Retrieved 11 May 2011 from <<http://www.niqash.org/content.php?contentTypeID=74&id=2688&lang=0>>.

¹⁰⁷ “Shiite Authorities Demand Changes to Iraqi Curricula”, *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat*, 2008, Retrieved on 15 July 2011 from <<http://aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=494568&issueno=10942>>.

curriculum, since they “sought sectarian strife” in Iraq.¹⁰⁸ And though most complaints were lodged by Sunnis who felt they were discriminated against by Shias, the new books were also denounced by one of Iraq’s leading Shia clerics, the Grand Ayatollah Bashir al-Najafi, who said that they fostered sectarianism by imposing one sect’s control over another.

A Sunni member of parliament and Chairman of the Committee on Education, Alaa Makki, also said that the new curriculum could worsen sectarian relations, and that it should focus instead on “the shared aspects (of Islam).”¹⁰⁹ Makki accused the Education Ministry of distributed the books without his knowledge. The charge was vehemently denied by Iraq’s Minister of Education at the time, Islamic Dawa Party member Khudayr al-Khuzai. Al-Khuzai (who currently holds the controversial position of the country’s third vice-president under Prime Minister al-Maliki) was later accused by Internet commentators of facilitating undue Iranian influence in the revision process by having the new textbooks published in Iran rather than Iraq. Some secular leaders have since criticized the involvement of religious figures. For example, Mithal al-Alusi, a former independent Sunni legislator argued against what he claimed was undue Shi’a influence, arguing that the curriculum should not be decided by clerics and politicians, but by education experts.¹¹⁰

The lessons were eventually retracted. Those that replaced them were redistributed for the first time in 2010-2011, and, ironically, relied on images nearly

¹⁰⁸ “Sistani and What I Learned from Him”, *Al 3 Nabi*, retrieved on 15 July 2011
<http://www.al3nabi.com/vb/f2/t45544.html>.

¹⁰⁹ “Iraqi Schoolbooks Criticized for Sectarian Bias,” *Institute for War and Peace Reporting*, February 2010, Retrieved 16 July 2011 from <<http://iwpr.net/report-news/iraqi-school-books-criticised-sectarian-bias>>.

¹¹⁰ “Iraqi Schoolbooks Criticized for Sectarian Bias,” *Institute for War and Peace Reporting*, February 2010, Retrieved 16 July 2011 from <<http://iwpr.net/report-news/iraqi-school-books-criticised-sectarian-bias>>.

identical to those used during the Saddam regime that could not be identified with either sect. In addition, parents were instructed to teach their children how to pray. In some revised lessons, however, both Shia and Sunni prayers accompanied the ambiguous images. Still other books included Shia, rather than Sunni versions, with notes to students that only “some Muslims” follow the specific tradition depicted.¹¹¹ The impasse clearly remains unresolved and in some ways was a prefiguration of the violences between Sunni and Shia brought upon Iraq by ISIS.

More generally, this nationalization of Islam at the core of social identities has also refashioned the Islamist project from pan-Islamist to national, at least until the rise of global movement like Al Qaeda.¹¹² As a result, Islamist opposition groups constructed political Islam as a national project, as a tool to achieve what they see as social justice, by fighting corrupted rulers.

Islamism as a National or Counter-National Project

As mentioned above, Islamism was, at the time of its inception at the end of the Ottoman Empire, opposed to nationalism, perceived as a Western imported concept. However, after the de-colonization process, the nation framework became the "natural" political space, instead of “foreign” or Western concepts. Thus, Islamist opposition movements gradually used Islam more as an alternative to the secular nationalism promoted by State elites, and less as a way to promote a pan-Islamic Caliphate. In this

¹¹¹ “Islamic Studies,” *Accelerated Learning Track*, Level 3, pp.81. Retrieved 11 April 2011, Available at: <http://www.iraqicurricula.org/>

¹¹² Nicola Pratt, *Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Arab World* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 2007), 167.

sense, they have increasingly operated within the context of the newly defined national political community.

In Egypt, the Muslim Brothers believed they held the key to the "true" Islam, and therefore to the rightful authority, whereas the State policies were impure. Hassan al-Banna argued that the purest period of Islam was during the "Golden Age" when Muhammad and his successors, the Four Rightly-Guided Caliphs, ruled the *Ummah*. Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood's ultimate political goal was to create an 'Islamic Order' or *al-nizam al-islami*, which emphasized a foundation in *Shari'a*. While al-Banna advocated the implementation of *Shari'a*, the Brotherhood's program also recognized the non-legal aspects of their vision—and worked to improve the social, economic, and political aspirations of the Egyptian people.

That is why the Muslim Brothers declared, "Egypt was the logical and historically right place for Islam to base itself... Egypt had a unique role to play in Islam's resurgence."¹¹³ Al-Banna illustrates this point in the following argument:

The Muslim Brothers, true to the faith, plead that the nation be restored to Islam. Egypt's role is unique, for just as Egyptian reform begins with Islam, so the regeneration of Islam must begin in Egypt, for the rebirth of 'international Islam', in both its ideal and historical sense, requires first a strong 'Muslim State' (*dawla muslima*).¹¹⁴

In sum, it appears that although Hasan al-Banna's project was to build an Islamic political system, his vision was not entirely a pan-Islamic one; and it explains why the Muslim Brotherhood would operate more and more within the national Egyptian framework.

¹¹³ Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 217.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 232.

As a result, domestic politics had strong effects in shaping Muslim Brotherhood ideology over time. After the death of al-Banna in 1949 and the Free Officers' coup in 1952 to remove the monarchy from power, the relationship between the Brotherhood and the State changed from one of cooperation to mistrust. At first, the Muslim Brotherhood was allowed to continue as an organization under Gamal Abdel Nasser despite the abolishment of existing political parties in 1953. However, the MB's refusal to grant legitimacy to a regime that did not implement *Shari'a* soon led to organized demonstrations against the regime. In October 1954, a young member of the Muslim Brotherhood allegedly attempted to assassinate President Nasser and the Brotherhood was subsequently outlawed. Members were arrested, jailed, and some even received death sentences. Such a political change modified the Muslim Brotherhood's strategy to directly oppose the State. This event also accounted for the divides in the movement on how to approach the nation's government.

In the same vein, the turn towards radicalization, largely caused by the increased repression of the State, reinforced the nationalization of the Islamist strategy by focusing on the fight against the ruler. Sayyid Qutb's (1906-1966) redefinition of jihad as the fight against the unjust ruler was instrumental in such an evolution. In *Milestones* (1964), Qutb argued that the Egyptian society was steeped in *jahiliyyah*, or ignorance.¹¹⁵ Therefore,

¹¹⁵ *Jahiliyyah* in the Islamic tradition refers to the pre-Islamic stage, which ended with the Prophet Muhammad. Qutb gives the term a very different meaning: because Egyptians do not live under *Shari'a* law, they experience in his view, a situation comparable to the pre-Islamic period and live in *jahiliyya*, hence justifying the fight against the ruler, even if this ruler is a Muslim.

Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones*, 1964, trans. Create Space (2005), 23.

Egypt was living under a *takfir* regime, or a regime that had renounced Islam.¹¹⁶ Qutb called for *jihad* to battle the *jahiliyyah* of the Nasser regime because to Qutb, the Egyptian State was standing in direct opposition to the ideal Islamic political community. However, Qutb's vision led to several schisms within the Muslim Brotherhood, as several groups such as the Islamic Jihad, and al-Takfir al-Hijra¹¹⁷ adopted the jihad against the unjust ruler strategy as their priority.¹¹⁸

Muhammad abd al-Salaam Faraj (1954-1982), the founder of the Islamic Jihad, which assassinated Anwar Sadat in 1981, went even further in his national *jihad* approach. In his text, *The Absent Obligation*, Faraj argues that the present Egyptian rulers had been "brought up over colonial tables be they Christian, Communist or Zionist. What

¹¹⁶ Barbara H.E. Zollner, *The Muslim brotherhood: Hasan al-Hudaybi and ideology* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 86.

¹¹⁷ Of the violent groups that formed under Qutb's form of *jihad*, the offshoot group Takfir Wal-Hijra is of particular importance because it still has a presence in Egypt today, as well as roots in Syria and Lebanon. It was formed in the 1960's by Shukri Mustafa, who in prison became part of a MB splinter group called Jama'at al-Muslimeen (Society of Muslims), and was inspired by Sayyid Qutb's text *Milestones*. Like many Salafist groups, Takfir Wal-Hijra aspired to the Golden Age of Islam under the first Four Rightly Guided Caliphs, and their main goal was to establish a renewed universal Islamic ummah under a true Caliph. Takfir believed that the present condition of the world is *jahiliyya* (ignorance), and that all four schools of Islamic jurisprudence were "puppets" of corrupt rulers that were using Quranic interpretations to their own advantage. Following the *takfiri* ideology of Qutb and expanding on it, Takfir wal-Hijra declared the Egyptian State itself infidel, and denounced all symbols of legitimacy, including government services, laws, conscription to the army, and the legal and educational systems. As a result, Takfir wal-Hijra members were dedicated to living a life apart from Egyptian society. Further, this State of *jahiliyya* justified their interpretation of jihad as a physical and violent resistance of the State, but also one that was delayed and not immediate. This delay was mostly due to the Takfir members' beliefs that their leader, Mustafa, was the Mahdi, and would lead the new Muslim community as Caliph as part of God's final reign on earth.

See David Zeidan, "Radical Islam in Egypt: A Comparison of Two Groups", *Middle East Review of International Affairs* Vol. 3, No. 3 (September 1999): 1-10, accessed October 10, 2011, <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1999/issue3/zeidan.pdf>.

¹¹⁸ Barry Rubin, *Islamic Fundamentalism in Egyptian Politics* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 56.

they carry of Islam is nothing but names, even if they pray, fast and claim to be Muslims.”¹¹⁹ Furthermore, Faraj argued that the time to restore the Caliphate of Islam was immediate, and it was “obligatory upon every Muslim to do his utmost to implement [it].”¹²⁰ Faraj promoted jihad as a sixth pillar of Islam, meaning that every Muslim was obligated to immediately undermine the State and replace it with a Caliphate. This conception of *jihad* became global when some of these radical opponents, including Ayman al-Zawahiri, left Egypt to join the *jihad* in Afghanistan, which led to the formation of Al-Qaida in 1998.¹²¹

In contrast, the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood operated under the guidance of Hasan al-Hudaybi (1891-1973),¹²² who in his book *du'a la quda* (Preachers, Not Judges), published after his death, explicitly criticized the *takfiri* ideology of Qutb.¹²³ Al-Hudaybi *directly* questions Qutb's idea of *jihad*, and instead preaches faith, patience, and perseverance. He argued that the duty of all Muslims is “to enact all of God's orders and statutes and to pave the way for the establishment of His religion.”¹²⁴ More specifically, under Hudaybi, the Muslim Brothers began to discuss (1) their involvement in Egyptian

¹¹⁹ Muhammad abd al-Salaam Faraj, *Jihad: The Absent Obligation*, (Maktabah al Ansaar: 2000), 25.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 17.

¹²¹ See Fawaz Gerges, *The Far Enemy: Why the Jihad Became Global* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

¹²² Al-Hudaybi was the second “General Guide” for the Society of Muslim Brothers, and is best known for *Preachers, Not Judges (Du'at la Qudat)* which is a refutation of Sayyid Qutb's *Milestones*. He was trained as a lawyer and a judge, and was known for his careful scholarship. In 1965, he was imprisoned in a crackdown against the Brotherhood by Nasser, but he was released in 1971 by successor Sadat,

¹²³ Barbara H.E. Zollner, *The Muslim Brotherhood: Hasan al-Hudaybi and Ideology* (Taylor & Francis, 2009), 63.

¹²⁴ David L Johnston, “Hassan al-Hudaybi and the Muslim Brotherhood: Can Islamic Fundamentalism Eschew the Islamic State?” *Comparative Islamic Studies* 3.1 (2007): 43.

political life (2) their compromise with the Egyptian State, and (3) the acceptance of democratic rules, including women and minorities.

The creation of A Quaida is the most recent evolution of the islamist project and is the outcome of the combination of the jihadi guerrilla of Qtib and Faraj and the salafi doctrine of Islam from Saudi Arabia. Today, the conditions for communication and the circulation of people and ideas make the Ummah all the more effective as a concept, especially considering the fact that nationalist ideologies have been on the wane. The Imagined Ummah takes a variety of forms. The most influential of these forms are fundamentalist in the sense that they place an emphasis on the revealed Text. The Most successful globalizations are the wahabism/salafism and global Jihad movements.

What all of these movements indicate is the emergence of fundamentalism as a global phenomenon. Global fundamentalism is defined, above all, by an exclusive and hierarchical vision of the world, as well as by a taxonomy of religions that places Islam at the top. The expanded use of the term 'kafir' (infidel, heretic), for example, is very common among Wahhabis (more than among Tablighis). In the classical Islamic tradition, this term is used only for polytheists, not for members of competing monotheistic faiths. In globalized fundamentalist groups, however, it has been extended to include Jews, Christians, and sometimes even non-practicing Muslims (see Cesari, 2004). Thus the world is divided into Muslims and infidels, and the image of the West, automatically associated with moral depravity, is always a negative one. Also common to these movements is a worldview that separates the various aspects of life —family, work,

leisure—and classifies everything according to the opposition between haram (forbidden) and halal (permitted). Everything that did not already exist or happen during the time of the Prophet is an innovation, thus haram. All share the vision of homogenous, superior Islam now denationalized and globalized to the Ummah.

Conclusion: Modern Islam is Political Islam

The outcome of the homogenization process described above is a politicized narrative of religion, or political Islam. Under these conditions, the dominant Western narrative of modernization cannot help explain this process because it contains an inherent assumption that secularization leads to the decline of religion in the political sphere. The invention of Islam as a modern religion is closely associated with the building of the Nation-State. The efforts by these “secular” States to limit the social influence of religion actually led to a nationalization of religious identities and therefore, to their politicization, defying the expectations of earlier modernization theories.¹²⁵

From the time of nation-building, Islam has been acknowledged in most constitutions and has often been inscribed into the constitutional foundations as the religion of the country. Thus, it is recognized as the religion of the State, and such recognition occurred even when the State founders maintained a very secular orientation. What followed, as explained in the previous chapters, are the nationalization of Islamic institutions, State-ordained religious education in public schools, and the enduring

¹²⁵ Lawson, 2006, pp. 1-2, 7, 12; Burgis, 2009, pp. 76-77.

legacies of *Shari'a* law in the legal system. As a result, the political development of Muslim Nation-States leads to a more complex approach to secularity than the separation of Church and State principle.

In this regard, political and social modernization in Muslim countries stands in stark opposition to the dominant Western narrative according to which, the religious identity of the individual departed from national identity and became increasingly privatized with the expansion of political and civic rights (even though this story does not reflect the diversity and nuances of such historical processes that took place in European and American nations, as we shall argue in the conclusion of this book). In other words, there is often a correlation of national and religious identities in present day Muslim countries. As a result of this fusion, a moral hierarchy is established, in which the national government intervenes in the personal lives of its citizens on topics that range from dress, social relations even to culture.

Charles Taylor has superbly demonstrated¹²⁶ that Western secularity is the culmination of a historical progression of ideas about religion, such that “authentic” religiosity became increasingly associated with personal commitment and a conception of the world as immanent. The separation of the “worldly” from the “transcendent”, led to the private vs. public disjunction. This separation was accelerated through the Reformation and laid the groundwork for the ascendance of a neutral, self-sufficient secular order, leading to the contemporary situation where belief in God is considered to be one among many viable spiritual options. An environment where private and public are separated in this way does not necessarily prevent believers from enjoying the right to full expression of their religious identity, although they can occasionally face challenges

¹²⁶ Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2007.

in this regard that non-believers do not. For instance, *The Satanic Verses* or Danish cartoons crisis are signs that some Muslims who live in Western secular democracies are struggling with this framework of the immanent at the personal level.¹²⁷

In contrast, modern religion in Muslim countries is positioned on the platform of the State with the consequence that the latter has defined modern Islam as a code of public morality. In all of the countries surveyed, a combination of culturally constructed values (*adab*) and Islamic Law create social customs, which emphasize the social over the individual being. In other words, daily interactions reinforce the idea that the self is subdued to social obligations. This standard extends to the very definition of equality. Whereas in the West equality is defined by uniform sets of individual rights, in the countries studied, equality is the equal obligation of individuals to promote communal welfare. Hence, the moral obligation of the family allows no room for the “promotion of self” above the interests of the community. Any conceptions of female emancipation, therefore, are regarded as dissonant with the cultural values of the nation often defined in religious terms. A case in point is the controversy created by Prime Minister Erdogan in May 2012, when Mr. Erdogan told a gathering of the women's branches of his Justice and Development party that “each abortion is one Uludere” – a reference to air strikes on a village on the Iraqi border that killed 34 civilians in December. Abortions, said the PM, were, “a sneaky plan to wipe the country off the world stage”.¹²⁸ The same rhetoric is also

¹²⁷ Jytte Klausen, *The Cartoons That Shook the World*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009.

¹²⁸ Justin Vela, ““Abortions are like air strikes on civilians’: Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s rant sparks women’s rage,” *The Independent*, May 30, 2012, accessed July 14, 2012, <http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/health-news/abortions-are-like-air-strikes-on-civilians-turkish-pm-recep-tayyip-erdogans-rant-sparks-womens-rage-7800939.html>.
[It should be noted that abortions are currently legal in Turkey.](#)

present in western democracies as shown by the political agenda of Christian fundamentalist groups in the United States. But these claims do not operate (until now) within the same legal and political environment.

Generally speaking, gendered roles in the family reflect a hierarchy of social positions and purposes that directly impact on women's lives in both the private and public spheres. For example, at the core of the nationalist ideology of the countries surveyed, there is an element of self-preservation, in order to secure moral capital in a rapidly Westernizing world. Globalization and consumerism both pose threats to the social composition of these respective regions of the Muslim world, which, in their instability, regard this trend as one of moral depravity. This globalizing cultural setting, in which the terms and values of social relations are mutating, the reflex in most Muslim countries is to subordinate the rights of individuals, frequently women, in favor of the general social cohesion and political welfare. Government officials, therefore, have relied upon the pre-established moral capital of religion and familial structure to control the social upheaval stirred by Western influences. Consequentially, women's behavior and sexuality often become restricted.

Presently, the control of women's bodies and sexuality has guaranteed both continuity and stability in the public sphere. Securing a gendered moral hierarchy in the private sphere likewise safeguards social harmony and political stability. Religious and political leaders alike reinforce this presumption of the women's role in family and society. The result is continuous tensions over the legitimate definition of women rights, opposing the advocates of the empowerment of self to the protectors of the political community defined in Islamic terms.

It is important to note that the body is a topic through which many Islamic religious authorities and institutions have critiqued postmodern society.¹²⁹ In this light, Islam serves as a countercultural voice that simultaneously rebukes Western cultural hegemony and serves the respective political interests of Islamic religious authorities. In other words, Islam is conveniently used by both politicians and religious authorities in Middle Eastern countries to critique Western and secular values with the woman's body being the major site of this cultural and political tension between: the West and Islam; past and present; and individual versus collective rights.

At the same time, religious norms and references cannot be completely controlled by the States, especially at a time of facilitated global communication and expedited circulation of ideas that increase the debate on Islamic orthodoxy. In other words, state policies are increasingly challenged by transnational ideas and agents who are currently deeply influencing the national contexts of Islamic religiosity, with consequences still unknown.

¹²⁹ See for example, the religious positions of Salafi groups that define moral positions through control of the body. See Roel Meijers (ed), *Global Salafism: Islam New Religious Movement*, New York, Columbia University Press, 2009.