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An organisational life cycle approach to exploring the elite sport legacy of Summer Olympic host nations: The cases of China (Beijing 2008) and Australia (Sydney 2000)

Shushu Chen, Jinming Zheng, and Geoff Dickson

This paper investigates the elite sport legacies of hosting the Summer Olympics for China (Beijing 2008) and Australia (Sydney 2000). The classic organisational life cycle approach provides the conceptual framework for this retroductive study. The data for both cases is sourced from official publications, academic research, and documents from various government departments and organisations. Additional data is drawn from three semi-structured interviews with key Chinese stakeholders. The analysis provides clear evidence that governments and their stakeholders use the opportunities afforded by a home Olympics to boost Olympic performance. China and Australia experienced a similar four-phase pattern of elite sport legacy life cycle: start-up, growth, maintenance, and decline. Both countries also shared many similar policy and management factors throughout each stage. An increased awareness of the sequential nature of elite sport legacy can help Olympic host countries make a more informed decision about their long-term strategies for elite sport success.

Keywords: elite sport, Olympic legacy, life cycle, China, Australia

Introduction

There is considerable research interest in the relationship between the Olympics and the generation of any kind of legacy within the host community. Many authors give primacy to economic impacts,¹⁻⁴ whilst others concern themselves with the social, urban, environmental, and political impacts of the Games.⁵⁻⁸ Of particular interest are the debates about the sport development legacies of the Olympics.⁹⁻¹² According to a systematic review of the Olympic Games legacies,¹³ sport-related studies often focus on the legacy of *participation*,^{14, 15} rather than the legacy for *elite sport*. Whilst several studies have directed their attention to analysing elite

sport policy changes as a result of hosting the Olympics,¹⁶⁻¹⁸ their analyses have often treated policy as a single factor for analysing changes. This approach neglects other organisational and managerial factors (e.g. planning, decision-making and configuration). Moreover, in the broad literature of elite sport studies,¹⁹⁻²² no studies have considered elite sport as a legacy dimension. This study seeks to address these issues.

In this paper, the evidence and pattern of elite sport legacy of hosting the Summer Olympic Games are explored through a case study of China and the 2008 Olympics. Then these findings are applied to Australia and the 2000 Olympics. Specifically, the paper addresses the following questions: 1) Is there evidence of the existence or emergence of elite sport legacy planning and development as a result of hosting the Olympics? 2) If such evidence exists, what are the organisation and management factors that contribute to the development of such legacy? 3) Is the evidence and pattern of elite sport legacy identified in the case of China, applicable to Australia, and to what extent is it applicable? A reverse chronological structure was adopted because there was primary and secondary data available for the China study. There were other reasons to focus heavily on China. The Chinese government has had a much heavier emphasis on elite sport. As noted by Xu, China has an ‘obsession’ with the Olympics.²³ After China won the bid to host the 2008 Summer Olympic Games in 2001, the Chinese Government and the General Administration of Sport of China (GAS) explicitly linked hosting the 2008 Olympics to a desire to improve China’s Olympic *gold* medal performance and the creation of an elite sport *legacy*.²⁴ Such an assertion was perhaps the first time that the concept of ‘elite sport legacy’ was explicitly used by a host nation. This study was prompted by the concerted effort of China to create an elite sport legacy from hosting the 2008 Olympics.

Literature review

Olympic legacy

The concept of legacy is often conflated with words such as impact, effect and benefit. For example, the IOC suggests that Olympic legacies are ‘lasting benefits which can considerably change a community, its impact and its infrastructure ... covering not only sport but also social, economic, environmental and urban gains’.²⁵ A widely-used definition of legacy, emphasising the change of structure, is provided by Preuss, namely ‘irrespective of the time of production and space, legacy is all planned and unplanned, positive and negative, tangible and intangible structures created for and by a sport event that remain longer than the event itself’.²⁶ Legacies can therefore be both planned and unplanned, positive (e.g. economic boosts, urban and environmental transformation) and negative (e.g. high opportunity costs, property rental shortages, resident relocations), and both tangible (e.g. new sport structures and traffic infrastructure) and intangible (e.g. building business networks, ‘feel good’ factors, cultural ideas, and enhancing destination image).

Cashman divides Olympic legacies into six general categories, including 1) sport, 2) economics, 3) infrastructure, 4) information and education, 5) public life, politics and culture, and 6) symbols, memory and history.²⁷ Other legacy research highlights the complexity of the legacy process and that legacies can start not just before the event, but also as early as the bid’s preparation.²⁸ Measuring Olympic legacy is challenging because of the need to assess the net legacy over time.²⁹ More recently, Preuss proposes a legacy framework consisting of six fundamental elements: time, new initiatives, value, tangibility, space, and intention.³⁰ The framework also encourages researchers to study legacy over a more extended time frame.

Sport legacy

The concept of sport legacy is not new. Cashman considers sport legacy to be ‘the first strand of Olympism and is the core business of the Olympic festival’.³¹ Surprisingly, sport legacy is not routinely investigated. As Cashman notes, ‘a legacy of sport seems to rate less than economic legacy’.³² Until more recently, a considerable amount of literature has been published on the themes of sport participation, health and physical activity-related impacts.^{33, 34} For example, using data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics, Veal and Toohey identified an increase in sports participation following the Sydney 2000 Games.³⁵ It is important to note that changes to the survey methods compromised greatly the validity of the research. In the case of the London 2012 Olympic Games, Girginov and Hills concluded that a sustainable sport participation legacy requires a national policy and long-term investment strategy.³⁶ As concluded by a systematic review of the topic in question, there is very little academic evidence to confirm the causal link between elite sporting success and population-level participation.³⁷

Some studies allude to an elite sport legacy. For example, Wilson investigated the sports infrastructure legacy of the Los Angeles 1984 Olympics.³⁸ He identified that the United States Olympic Committee established the explicit goal ‘to develop elite athletes who would win Olympic medals’. A proportion of the financial surplus of the event was distributed to facility establishment or refurbishment, which would also benefit elite athlete training and competitions.³⁹ Sotiriadou and Shilbury examined how the elite athlete development programmes of 35 national sports organisations in Australia evolved before and after Sydney 2000.⁴⁰ Although the research did not focus on the elite sport legacy of hosting the 2000 Olympic Games, the changes prompted by Sydney 2000 were clearly discernible. Contreras and Corvalan examined quantitatively the performance of host nations at subsequent Olympics between 1948 and 2012.⁴¹ They found that host nations’ medal performance deteriorated soon after their

respective home Games, prompting the conclusion that there is no elite sport legacy. The underlying policy and management factors and interventions were not considered. Nevertheless, this study encouraged future research to investigate these factors.

Other research provides important insights into China's political context and administrative structure of elite sport system,^{42, 43} and its relationship with the Olympics and the Beijing 2008 Olympics in particular.⁴⁴⁻⁴⁶ Fan, Wu and Xiong examined how the Chinese elite sport system was transformed to significantly increase China's share of the gold medals at the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games.⁴⁷ Hu investigated the development of Chinese elite sport policy after the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games.⁴⁸ Hu concluded that elite sport performance was no longer the only criterion for defining Chinese sport success. Mass sport participation and a vibrant sport industry were also necessary for China to lay claim to being a world sports power. Such findings are consistent with Tan's analysis of the transformation of China's national fitness policy after the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games.⁴⁹

Concerning the case of Australia, there are several studies examining Australia's elite sport policy development,⁵⁰⁻⁵² as well as some discussions on the 2000 Sydney Games' contributions to elite sport development.⁵³⁻⁵⁵ Although this range of studies described how Australia's sport policy changed as a result of hosting the Olympics, the studies did not investigate specifically how an elite sport legacy emerged, nor did the studies examine how the new policies impacted medal performances.

The concept of elite sport legacy

It is important to present a clear understanding of what an elite sport legacy is in this research. Despite the availability of various definitions of Olympic legacy noted above, the existing approaches are broad. Using Preuss' and IOC's legacy interpretations as a basis,^{56, 57} we define

an elite sport legacy as:

The effects of changed policy and strategy, structure, and management approaches to the development of Olympic elite sport, attributable to hosting the Olympic Games; these effects are *directly* evidenced by the host country's performance at the Olympics, with the changed number of gold medals won at each Olympics being as a *primary* indicator, supplemented by the changed number of medals and positions in the gold medal table.

The underlying premise is that hosting the Olympics will enhance the capacity of elite sport system of the host country, leading to improved Olympic performances. We caution that the elite sport legacy of hosting an Olympics can be both positive and negative. Equally importantly, the effects here refer to elite sport development *generally*. It is certainly possible that the policy impacts can vary between sport (and even disciplines). The definition also recognises that an elite sport legacy can include a variety positive outcomes (e.g. more elite sporting facilities and more funding for elite). However, the definition gives priority to improving the number of medals, gold medals and overall position in the gold medal table as the indicators of an elite sport legacy.

Conceptual framework

Within the research examining elite sport development, the most noteworthy conceptual framework is the 'Sports Policy factors Leading to International Sporting Success' (SPLISS) model.⁵⁸ The SPLISS model is a meso-level framework underpinned by nine elite sport policy factors: financial support, participation in sport, scientific research, talent identification and development system, athletic and post career support, integrated approach to policy development, international competition, and training facilities. Although the SPLISS model provides a comprehensive framework for identifying the factors contributing to international success, the

model is not sufficiently nuanced to incorporate the host nation effect in context-specific ways.⁵⁹ Therefore, the organisational life cycle approach provides the conceptual framework for this research.

Research in organisational life cycle has been in vogue for several decades.⁶⁰⁻⁶³ The basic assumption in any life cycle model is that regularities occur in the process of development, which can be segmented into distinct stages.⁶⁴ Each stage is different because its emphasis and operating contexts vary,⁶⁵ and organisational strategies and structures change as stages change.⁶⁶ Although different models contain varying numbers of life cycle stages, there is a general consensus on the camel-back-shaped trend.⁶⁷⁻⁷⁰

Despite criticisms that the life cycle framework is oversimplified and lacks validity,⁷¹⁻⁷³ the life cycle framework details various stages, each representing a contingency or driving force to which appropriate organisational responses can correspond.⁷⁴ Bonn and Pettigrew's organisational life cycle model is adopted in this study.⁷⁵ The model has been applied to a variety of organisational contexts,⁷⁶⁻⁷⁸ and is particularly useful because it not only offers a framework to examine the development of organisations over time, but also acknowledges the dynamic and changing nature of organisations.⁷⁹ Significant problems change because of this dynamic process; and these different life cycle stages emerge from specific historical, organisational and environmental contexts.⁸⁰ The life cycle stages are therefore 'a set of patterns which emerges from a specific historical, organisational and environmental context that logically follows an earlier set, but is not predetermined by that set'.⁸¹ The organisational life cycle model directs the identification of evidence supporting an elite sport legacy in this study, and the effects of various policy and management changes of a key organisation on the extent and duration of this legacy.

The model also offers a framework for detailed analysis of the priorities and focuses, structure and strategies, contexts, and decision-making *modus operandi* of relevant organisations.

In this study, we adapt Bonn and Pettigrew's life cycle model, incorporating the stages of *start-up*, *growth*, *mature* and *decline*,⁸² to align with the peculiarities of elite sport and its social context. The turning point of each stage is based on a country's gold medal performances at the Olympics. There are two adapted terms of the stages. First, the *start-up* stage for elite sport performance is different from those in traditional life cycle models (i.e. the start of an organisation). In this research, the *start-up* stage refers to a nation's initiation of a new round of elite sport development process after securing the rights to host an Olympics. Second, the *mature* stage is replaced with *maintenance* as linguistically the term maintenance is more compatible in this context of elite sport. The other two terms (i.e. growth and decline) remain the same. Consistent with the life cycle model's focus on organisations, the GAS and the Australian Sports Commission (ASC) are the focus of the study. Chinese elite sport is largely controlled and managed by the GAS, a government department directly affiliated to the State Council.⁸³ GAS governs all sports-related issues in China at the national level, and is regarded as the engine of China's elite sport development and Olympic medal success.⁸⁴ The ASC is the 'Australian Government's leading sport agency that develops, supports and invests in sport at all levels'.⁸⁵ The ASC is the most powerful organisation in the Australian elite sport system.

Method

Research design

Guided by the retroductive research strategy,^{86, 87} the study starts with the identification of the organisational and management factors that explain the change of China's elite performance at

the Olympics since acquiring the rights to host the 2008 Games. A pattern of elite sport legacy is subsequently constructed and then applied to Australia and their hosting of the 2000 Olympics.

China and Australia are suitable cases for a number of reasons. First, China and Australia both hosted the Summer Olympic Games recently (i.e. Beijing 2008 and Sydney 2000 respectively). Second, the Olympics legacy debate only emerged from the early 2000s.^{88,89} These two Olympics were among the first to be conducted in the legacy era. Third, China and Australia are two distinct cases with vastly different political systems and priorities (i.e., east vs west). Fourth, both China and Australia are successful Summer Olympic nations. This is different from Greece, the 2004 host nation. Fifth, both nations have government agencies/departments responsible for funding and developing policy for elite sport (i.e., GAS and ASC). While Great Britain also meets these criteria, it is too early to assess its post-home Olympic legacies because there has been only one Olympics after London 2012. Therefore, the elite sport legacies from London 2012 for Great Britain are not investigated, but remain relevant for future research.

Data collection

China

Legacy identification requires a long-time span, starting from when hosting rights were awarded, through to the years after the home Olympics.⁹⁰ This extended time frame encourages the use of archival and other secondary data, including government policy and strategies, management documents and other relevant political, academic, and media commentary and interpretation. GAS' policy documents provided the most important sources of data. These documents were complemented by published works of leading sports researchers in China and domestic media such as Xinhua News Agency and China Central Television. The details of key documents and materials reviewed are provided in Appendix 1. The print and online documents were sourced

from the state or from private sources (i.e. leading sport scholars who maintain close relationships with key sport organisations and the media). The vast majority of these documents were written in Chinese, the remainder were in English.

Three in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted to supplement the secondary data.⁹¹ Purposive sampling approach identified potential interviewees. Interviewees included a leading sport researcher/policy-making consultant of GAS, two previous (retired) department heads of GAS who were key policy makers until the London Olympiad (see Appendix 2). It is worth clarifying that one participant worked in various GAS departments and elite sport-related organisations, and was heavily involved in the decision making of elite sport development and Olympic strategy. Another interviewee was the former head of the Sports Culture Department, which is responsible, amongst other things, for archiving elite sport documents. These participants, now retired, provided rich insight into elite sport development in particular in the lead-up to Beijing 2008 and four years after Beijing 2008. More recent data was sourced from the secondary data.

These interviews ranged between 50 minutes to two hours as part of a wider study examining elite sport development in China. All the interviews were digitally recorded and conducted in Chinese. The questions explored any evidence of elite sport legacy planning and development, ranging from GAS' agenda, organisational structure, operating contexts (including wider political, economic and cultural environment), human resource management, and detailed strategies in terms of coaching, athletes, training, science, competition and international rivalry. Copies of interview transcripts were provided to interviewees for verification and correction. To ensure linguistic consistency, back translation was completed before the interview data were subjected to formal coding and analysis.

Australia

The sources of secondary data for Australia included the ASC, the Australian Government and its various departments with at least partial responsibility for sport in Australia (e.g. Department for the Arts, Sport, the Environment and Territories, Department for the Environment, Sport and Territories), Australian Institute of Sport (AIS), and published academic works done by researchers studying elite sport policy in Australia (see Appendix 1). These sources covered key documents issued by key government departments and national sports organisations in Australia.

Given the changes of political leadership at both the political and organisational level during the relevant timeframe (i.e. 1993-2016), identifying potential interviewees for qualitative data collection was problematic. However, the absence of interview data was not detrimental because a) the secondary data provided substantial information, with no further ‘variability’ to the ASC’s strategy,⁹² and b) China is the focus *vis-à-vis* Australia. The analyses of China and Australia are somewhat unbalanced in this research, because of the nature of this paper to extract and develop an elite sport legacy stages model from the more in-depth case study of China, and then test the applicability of this China-derived model to Australia.

Data analysis

Thematic analysis was applied to analyse both document and interview data collected and NVivo 10 was deployed. The process began with the transcription of data and a careful first-round reading. Prior to data coding, the Chinese material was translated into English. Themes were specified as per Ryan and Bernard’s suggestions,⁹³ including the elements of research questions, repetitions, indigenous typologies or categories, metaphors and analogies, transitions: Similarities and differences, and theory-related material underpinned by the theoretical framework selected. Five nodes with various detailed themes were identified based on an initial

clustering of both Chinese and Australian data. These include (1) Nations: Australia and China; (2) Organisations: ASC, GAS, others in Australia and others in China; (3) Stages: Start-up, growth, maintenance, and decline; (4) Issues at each stage: Policy focus, operating contexts, organisational structure, and human resource management; and (5) Detailed management approaches: Start-up, growth, maintenance, and decline. Data were reread and assigned to thematic categories, following which patterns and explanations in the themes were probed to identify any general and causal relationship between different themes (for example, causal relationship between stages, nations, and elements and approaches at each stage). The data analysis process ended with ‘selective’ coding, which aimed to provide explanations of certain concepts and to extract both contradictory and confirmatory information.

Findings – China

In the following sections, the discussion is structured according to the life cycle framework, detailing key characteristics for each stage in relation to elite sport legacy development during the period 2001-2016.

China’s medal performance pattern

A review of China’s medal performance at the Olympics in the past 20 years indicates that China experienced significant improvement prior to the 2008 Games, achieved its best-ever performance at the home event, before sliding down gradually – a cyclical pattern that resonates strongly with the concept of the organisational life cycle (see Figure 1).




Figure 1. A summary of China's performance at the six most recent Summer Olympic Games (from Sydney 2000 to Rio 2016).

Start-up (2001-2004)

China's case is one of much closer links with strategic planning against the background of the consistent political salience of elite sport success. A senior official of GAS explained:

In comparison to many other areas which are also heavily invested by government (for example, science and film), elite sport is one of the very few areas in which we can be confident enough to argue that China is one of the most successful in the world against a universal rather than self-defined criterion and this enhanced the legitimacy and political 'attractiveness' of elite sport success to the Central Government which has long valued international prestige and ideological superiority.⁹⁴

The operating context was favourable for the development of Olympic sports and disciplines in and out of GAS in this stage. The then President, Jiang Zeming, soon expressed his congratulations on Beijing's successful bid and more importantly, guaranteed substantial policy and financial support from the Central Government for Olympic preparation. In addition, China's economic take-off in the 2000s (with an average annual 0.43% increase in GDP growth between

2001-2004), the globalisation campaign, and membership of the World Trade Organisation in 2001 provided a healthy wider background for GAS to achieve the goal of (gold) medal successes at Beijing 2008.^{95, 96}

Two long-term fundamental policy documents and two landmark projects were formulated and launched by GAS in this start-up period. They were *The Outline of the Strategic Olympic Glory Plan: 2001-2010*,⁹⁷ *The 2008 Olympic Glory Action Plan*,⁹⁸ *119 Project* (GAS restricted internal document), and *Preliminary recruitment of foreign coaches and organisation of overseas training: The inception of the 'Invite In and Go Out'* (GAS restricted internal document). In particular, a comparison of the three *Olympic Glory Plans* suggests that the 2001-2010 plan was notably different from the other two plans. The 2001-2010 plan had explicit targets for Beijing 2008, whereas the other plans provided vague statements about medal tally position. The 2001-2010 plan addressed administrative issues, whereas the other plans were focussed on *operational matters*. According to Hu's discourse analysis of these documents, winning the bid for the Beijing 2008 Games was an opportunity for the GAS to develop further China's elite sport system.⁹⁹

Moreover, GAS carried out a series of actions for reconfiguration, focusing on ensuring that the mechanisms in each stage of the strategic process were right. As GAS self-summarised:

Since Beijing was awarded the right to host the 2008 Olympic Games, various Central Government organisations including government ministries and departments, have increased the number of sports system organisations and administrative positions of the national adult and reserve teams, elevated Olympic-specific training subsidies and specific investment in Olympic preparation, enhanced the national team training base system, improved elite athletes' training and living facilities and perfected their education and post-retirement arrangements and training allowance, scientific services and guarantee systems.¹⁰⁰

Such strategic management actions are qualitatively different in the start-up stage than they are in later stages. First, it was that the power of some sports management centres and the national teams affiliated with these management centres was strengthened and centralised. This ensured that the national teams were more powerful than their provincial-level counterparts, and provincial organisations were more cooperative.¹⁰¹ Examples included increased resources for the National Aquatics Management Centre and the establishment in 2002 of a regular National Swimming Team, which replaced the previously loosely federalised national team.¹⁰² Another example was the establishment of a regular national team for women's short-distance track cyclists, the top priority of the National Cycling Team.¹⁰³ The successful management of national-provincial relation can be partly credited to the establishment of regular National Teams and Big National Teams.¹⁰⁴ This 'Big National Team' approach transcended national-provincial boundaries, and strengthened the relationships between national and provincial organisations.¹⁰⁵ Second, to create a cohesive workforce with high morale,¹⁰⁶ substantial rewards, including material (e.g. money and real estate) and non-material (e.g. political advancement) were provided to athletes, including those who won medals in 2004. Third, freedom to embrace professionalisation and commercialisation in some non-collective sports was tentatively and conditionally offered by GAS. The decision of the National Tennis Management Centre and the Chinese Tennis Association to allow elite tennis players to appoint their own coaches and scientific support staff whilst on the professional tours was pioneering.

At Athens 2004, China displaced Russia as the second most successful nation in the gold medal table, and won their first-ever gold medals in a number sports (e.g. tennis, canoeing, and wrestling). Athens 2004 was a preparation for 'battle' at Beijing 2008.¹⁰⁷ Interview data

confirmed that Athens 2004's role was to enable a strategic assessment of China's seven-year plan:

Most people think that the success at Beijing 2008 would be taken-for-granted because of the home advantage. However, what we thought and did was to maximise this 'advantage' through careful, deliberate, and proactive planning as early and holistic as possible. If we did not launch these programmes in the Athens Olympiad, then we might have lost a good opportunity to seize the market in many sports and understand the efficiency and effectiveness of some approaches and the necessity of reforms, for example, in artistic gymnastics. It would be impossible for us to win 51 gold medals at Beijing if there were no such early and proactive approaches. The number could have been 40, 45, or even 35, which could have been better than Athens 2004, but not so 'shockingly' impressive to both domestic and international audience.¹⁰⁸

Drawing on Porter's competitive force model,¹⁰⁹ it is argued that there are three distinct opportunities during the start-up phase. The first is to assess emerging opportunities offered by the decline of other nations to acquire new medal-potential sports/disciplines and/or to penetrate new Olympic medal 'markets'. The decline of Eastern European nations, most notably Russia (in weightlifting, shooting, trampoline and later artistic gymnastics), provided China with the opportunity to increase its market share in corresponding sports/disciplines at Athens 2004 and beyond. The second is to assess the intensity of competition posed by past and future Olympic hosts. Australia, as the former Olympic host, was at the maintenance stage where aggressive reform seemed unlikely. Moreover, there was a lack of overlap in the sports where China and Australia excel. As for the latter Olympic host, the UK had not yet entered its start-up stage at the Athens 2004. The third is to identify any potential medal-market opportunities offered by the IOC. For example, the competition intensities for newly introduced Olympic (or relatively new) sports/disciplines (e.g. women's weightlifting, women's wrestling, taekwondo, and synchronised

diving events) were weaker in comparison with other existing sports/disciplines. GAS deliberately targeted women's sport and water sports as part of their new medal strategy.¹¹⁰

Growth (2005-2008)

The key concern of GAS, and the Chinese Government, during this period was to host a successful event and maximise the number of gold medals won on home soil.¹¹¹ As the Head of GAS, Liu Peng, explicitly pointed out in the Meeting for 2008 Preparation and 2005 Winter Training, 'there are many criteria measuring the success of an Olympic Games among which hosting nation's excellent elite sport performance is the most concrete, straightforward and vivid'.¹¹¹

In the exogenous political context, there was an escalation in Communist Government's interest in the event. Their 'Beijing ambition' was facilitated by an unprecedented level of political legitimacy and salience,¹¹² government support, government expectations, and 'gold medal fever'.¹¹³ In particular, there was an extra RMB 2.7 billion (0.41 billion USD) allocated to GAS, as well as another RMB4 billion (0.6 billion USD) for specific Olympic preparation programmes.^{114, 115}

GAS directed substantial resources to develop China's capacity in non-traditional sports/disciplines. As warned by Bonn and Pettigrew,¹¹⁶ this expansion is likely to make management more complex and more difficult. This is because the expansion process requires systematic, long-term planning and the establishment of structure, procedures and processes that facilitate communication and coordination among departments.¹¹⁷ Confronted with this issue, GAS signed contracts with each national sport management centre, detailing medal targets and the rewards (or sanctions) associated with success (or failure).

To develop a more formalised organisation structure,¹¹⁸ and more coordinated internal systems,¹¹⁹ GAS first created the 2008 Olympic Preparation Leader Team. This entity coordinated and integrated sports-related authorities and teams at the national and provincial level. Second, GAS launched an even more extensive range of initiatives,¹²⁰ particularly in the areas of elite athlete development. For example, more sports adopted the Big National Team approach to expand the talent base and more effectively bridge the national team and provincial teams. The number of teams was expanded by developing a national team, a youth team and a reserve team for some key events.¹²¹ In addition, elite athletes' education, living facilities, and post-retirement arrangements were enhanced by GAS,¹²² together with the elevation of their Olympic-specific training subsidies. Domestic competition opportunities offered to elite athletes were further escalated.¹²³

An expansion of initiatives was also notable in coaching. The recruitment of leading foreign coaches was a key approach of many sports, in response to the endogenous and exogenous expectations to enhance medal performance at Beijing 2008.¹²⁴ According to Duan, GAS required non-traditional sports with limited coaching capacities to embrace the *Invite In and Go Out* strategy.¹²⁵ The scale of recruited foreign coaches was therefore unprecedented with 37 foreign coaches from 16 nations serving 18 sports/disciplines.^{126, 127} In the end, China won more gold medals than any other nation at the home Olympics.

Maintenance (2009-2012)

In the maintenance stage, there should be an array of relatively stable medal-winning sports. Organisations often take a less proactive approach in terms of decision-making than in the previous stages.¹²⁸ The evidence suggests that the elite sport system became more stabilised in this stage and GAS was less aggressive and ambitious compared to its preparation for Beijing

2008. Strategically, there was only one elite sport-specific document published by GAS, namely *The Outline of the Strategic Olympic Glory Plan: 2011-2020* in 2011, as opposed to the four documents and projects in the build-up to Beijing 2008. This ten-year strategic document, for the first time, explicitly emphasised the *quality* of Olympic gold medals, aiming to particularly develop capacity in athletics, swimming, and other water sports traditionally dominated by Western nations. To date there have been three versions of *The Outline of the Strategic Olympic Glory Plan* published by GAS. The underlying philosophy of each of the strategic plan can be summarised as follows: ‘*Shortening the battle line and emphasising the focus*’ (Plan, 1994-2000) prior to the 2000s, ‘*seeking new sources of Olympic gold medals*’ (Plan, 2001-2010) in the 2000s and ‘*raising the quality and value of Olympic gold medals*’ (Plan, 2011-2020) after Beijing 2008.

In this stage, GAS began to face challenges in balancing the development of interests between elite sport and mass sport. A leading sports researcher in China and policy-making consultant of GAS revealed:

I think for any host nation, a major challenge is to maintain the momentum of investment and coherent approach in the aftermath of the home Olympics. This also applies to China. Some officials and sports insiders were complacent, some argued it was finally mass sport’s turn and the profile of elite sport should be downgraded, and some just experienced ‘inertia’ by which I mean they suddenly lost their objectives and morale when their longstanding pursuit of Beijing 2008 success came to an end.¹²⁹

Although the proposal to reduce the emphasis on elite sport was rejected, there was a lack of further proactive approaches by GAS to support non-traditional sports after 2008. Most non-traditional sports provided examples of ‘being static or even “retrogress”’.¹³⁰ For example, the recruitment of foreign coaches and overseas training in some water sports (e.g. rowing, canoeing) ceased. As the policy-making consultant of GAS reflected, ‘all these led to China’s seemingly

“natural” medal count decrease at London 2012, yet this was only the beginning of more severe crisis in the long run’.¹³¹

On the other hand, there were initiatives to maintain the development of strategically important sports (as defined by the Plan 2011-2020, such as athletics and swimming). For example, the 2008 Olympic Preparation Leader Team was maintained to ensure regular dialogues between stakeholders at provincial and national levels. Overseas training was retained and expanded for swimming, cycling and athletics.^{132, 133} Overall, China cemented its top two position in the gold medal table at London 2012 and more importantly, its gold medal and medal performance was better than Athens 2004, which indicated only a modest drop in comparison to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games.

(Temporary) Decline (2013-2016)

At the Rio 2016 Games, China won 26 gold medals (12 fewer than at London 2012), dropped to 3rd position in the gold medal table and was overtaken by Great Britain. In this stage, the decline of total Olympic medal won is a direct result of changing strategic focus, as well as failing to maintain the competitive advantage established in traditional sports/disciplines.

First, organisations in the decline stage often carry out strategic activities which lead to financial and organisational structure changes.¹³⁴ The publication of the No. 46 Document signalled a drastic strategic reorientation post London 2012.¹³⁵ This document, entitled *Opinions of the State Council on Accelerating the Development of Sports Industry and Promoting Sports Consumption*, was a watershed moment in the policy status of mass sport in China. The policy signalled a clear government desire to develop sport-for-all and the sports industry.¹³⁶ The agenda of developing sport-for-all became a state strategy with the fundamental goal of addressing health-related concerns.¹³⁷ This change was consistent with another two documents,

namely the No.37 document,¹³⁸ and the *13th Five Year Plan for Sports Development in China*,¹³⁹ which has effectively projected ‘retrenchment’ for the development of elite sport activities.¹⁴⁰ Elite sport was no longer the solitary focus for sport policy in China.

Second, other countries eroded China’s long-standing competitive advantage in some sports. As Olympic host nations, the rise of Great Britain and Japan threatened China at Rio 2016. In particular, Japan and China are direct competitors in some sports (e.g. swimming, men’s artistic gymnastics, badminton, and table tennis). The Olympic market that China used to occupy started to shrink, with artistic gymnastics, shooting, weightlifting and badminton being the most notable examples at Rio 2016. In addition, as per the stages of elite sport life cycle, the Rio Olympic period (i.e. 2009-2012) was the maintenance stage for Britain, and the start-up stage for Japan. The implication of overlapping elite sport legacy development stages is that Great Britain’s maintenance stage and Japan’s growth stages coincided with the decreased emphasis on elite sport success in China.

In summary, elite sport legacy life cycle for China consists of four stages, *start-up* (three years after the host country won the bid), *growth* (four years prior to the home Olympics), *maintenance* (one Olympics after the home Olympics), and (temporary) *decline* (two Olympics after the host Olympics). Table 1 summarises the key organisational and management factors attributable to the development of elite sport legacy in each stage of the life cycle.

Table 1. Key organisation and management factors attributable to the development of elite sport legacy in each stage for China.

	Start-up	Growth	Maintenance	Decline
Trigger(s) for change	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Acquisition of hosting rights 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Expectation of best-ever performance at home Olympics 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Realization that best-ever performance is unsustainable after home Olympics 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Decline in Olympic performance
Outer contextual challenges and opportunities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A strong national economy Strong political support 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ongoing economic growth Strong political support A minimum threat from medal competitors with similar gold medal-winning capacity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Internal pressure to use sport for economic, health and social outcomes The ensuing Olympic host nation placing emphasis on elite sport success 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Possible reduced economic growth Strong performances from subsequent home nations IOC's attempt to limit a nation's dominance in certain sports
Strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No preference for any particular strategy Elite sport development plans often loosely structured, less strategic and exploratory 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Proactive and deliberate plans to develop elite sport The emergence of the effectiveness of strategies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No significant change to strategies Some increased emphasis on non-traditional sports/disciplines 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prioritising mass participation /non-elite areas The necessity of a prospector strategy to maintain success
Organizational features	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Some specialization (i.e. medal potential sports/disciplines) More centralized structure and decision making 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased specialisation and formalisation Functional structure (clear formality) Possible restructuring Analytical decision making 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Core specialisation being established Divisional structure Decision making more sophisticated 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Too many sports to target Moderate centralization Defensive decision making style
Content of change	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Flexibility, innovation and growth being the top priorities Securing financial support Identifying priority sports/disciplines Creating larger talent pool Developing coaches and sports scientists Increased access to elite competition opportunities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unprecedented levels of elite sport funding More centralised organization of elite sport Increased stakeholder cooperation Further development of talent identification structure, coaches, and sports science Identification of other areas within elite sport system requiring further support Increased competition opportunities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The beginning of development controls Funding of targeted/prioritized sports/disciplines A certain degree of maintenance of the development of talent identification structure, coaches, and sports science 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Decrease in financial input to elite sport Shifting strategic focus on non-elite/mass participation sport Emergence of inefficiencies External challenges to success in traditional sports/disciplines

Findings – Australia

This section centres on Australia and its home Olympics in 2000. Specifically, the following analysis aims to identify elite sport legacy evidence, as well as to explore the utility of the proposed elite sport legacy life cycle model to the case of Australia.

Australia's medal performance pattern

Australia's medal performance between 1993 and 2016 mirrored China's medal performance between 2001 and 2016. The same camel-back trend is evident (see Figure 2).




Figure 2. A summary of Australia's performance at the six most recent Summer Olympic Games (from Barcelona 1992 to Rio 2016).

Start-up (1993-1996)

The successful bid in 1993 provided an impetus for the establishment and development of government 'domination' in sports policy.¹⁴¹ The start-up stage began. As a department within

the ASC, AIS was Australia's strategic high performance sport agency with responsibility and accountability for leading the delivery of Australia's international sporting success. The relationship between the ASC/AIS on the one hand, and the national sport organisations (NSOs) on the other, could be characterised as both cooperative and resource-dependent. The ASC/AIS were able to use the NSOs to deliver elite sports objectives through the leverage of funding allocation. In 1993, the National Elite Sports Council (NESC) was established to systematically promote AIS elite programme and centralised co-ordination of elite organisational resources at elite level.^{142, 143} In 1994, the Olympic Athlete Programme (OAP) was launched with a \$135 million budget to promote sports science and medicine and research, to fund athletes to participate in international competitions, and to provide athletes with direct payments (i.e. living allowances). These actions, including the reshaped organisational structure, the increased level of centralisation in sport governing system and coordination between the key agents, and particularly the decisions on adopting federal government-funded administrative structure, propelled Australia's improved Olympic performance at the Atlanta 1996 Games, moving up to 7th in the gold medal table from the 10th at the Barcelona 1992 Games.

Growth (1997-2000)

To maximise (gold) medal performance at the 2000 Olympics, emphasis was placed on improving cooperation with the central governing body and funding escalation. Through the OAP, the relationships between the AIS, NSOs, and state academics and institutes were improved. The interaction between the NESC and the AIS created a national network for the development of elite sport.¹⁴⁴ In addition, as Stewart calculated,¹⁴⁵ in comparison with only approximately AUS\$90 million per year of sport funding in the 1980s, national government budget for sport increased to more than AUS\$150 million per year in the lead-up to Sydney

2000, to an extent that the Commonwealth (Federal) government, in combination with the Australian Olympic Committee (AOC) and State Governments, provided a total of AUS\$1.2 million each week to Olympic sports in final preparation for the Sydney Games in 2000. The sources of Olympic (gold) medals were significantly enriched (referring to the ‘expansion of specialisation’) at Sydney 2000. The number of sports/disciplines which contributed at least one gold medal to Australia galloped from six at Atlanta 1996 to eleven at Sydney 2000, and Australian athletes won at least one medal in 20 sports/disciplines *vis-à-vis* 14 at Atlanta 1996. Australia achieved its peak medal performance at its home Olympics. Thus, the period of 1997-2000 is considered the growth stage.

Maintenance (2001-2008)

After the Sydney Games, decision making was more complex. There were concerns about the continuity of government funding for elite sport, e.g. *Shaping Up* recommended that OAP funding should be terminated and more money should be directed to community sport.¹⁴⁶ In preparing for the Athens Games, the elite sport budget was not curtailed yet: 77% of the total money for sport (AUS\$556 million) was distributed to elite sport.¹⁴⁷⁻¹⁵⁰ During the Beijing Olympiad, however, this figure dropped to 66% (of the total AUS\$736.076 million for sport).¹⁵¹⁻

¹⁵⁴ The development of talent identification structure, coaches and sports sciences remained relatively stagnant. At the Beijing 2008 Games, Australia’s ranking dropped to sixth, at which Australia’s advantage sports started to be challenged and threatened by major rivals (Great Britain in cycling) and its position in the gold medal table was overtaken by Great Britain and Germany. Thus the eight years after Australia’s home Olympics (2001-2008) represent the maintenance stage of the life cycle.

Decline (2009-2016)

At the London 2012 Games, Australia was back to seven gold medals and 10th in the gold medal table as where it was in 1992. The elite sport legacy from the Sydney Olympics had all but dissipated. Here Great Britain is central to understanding Australia's decline. The London quadrennial (i.e. 2009-2012) was the growth stage for Britain that was characterised by unprecedented levels of government investment in elite sport. Great Britain's investment surpassed that of Australia. As pointed out by John Coates, the increased investment in British sport was compounded because these two countries are strong in many of the same sports (e.g. cycling, rowing, and sailing).¹⁵⁵ Moreover, the later Olympic host nation, namely China's rise in swimming, to some extent, eroded Australia's advantage in swimming in general and in men's middle and long distance freestyle and women's individual medley in particular at London 2012. In London, Australia won one gold only in swimming, which contributed to five, seven and six gold medals at Sydney 2000, Athens and Beijing 2008 respectively. The niche Olympic market that Australia used to occupy started to languish. In addition, the federal government's reluctance to significantly increase the funding level is worth noting, evidenced by Youth and Sport Minister – Kate Ellis' non-committal attitude towards Australian Olympic Committee President – John Coates' request to increase funding. Her preference for the improved efficiencies that could be achieved by restructuring the system and avoiding duplication and waste was underpinned by the philosophy that Australia's economy is much smaller than many of the nations it is competing against at the Olympic Games and that any increases in funding would necessarily be at the expense of other areas of public policy.¹⁵⁶

In the aftermath of the poor performance at London 2012, despite ASC's proactive remedy, including the oft-quoted strategy of *Australia's Winning Edge 2012-2022* and the

ruthless application of a result-contingent funding strategy, *Sports Tally*,¹⁵⁷⁻¹⁶¹ Australia failed to achieve the goal of recovery at Rio 2016. Australia's 2016 performance was on the same level as London 2012 (i.e. eight gold and 10th position, Rio2016, 2016).

As Figure 3 demonstrates, the general trend of elite sport legacy cycle extracted from the Chinese case study seemed to apply to Australia, mirroring Bonn and Pettigrew's organisational life cycle model.¹⁶² When compared to China, elite sport legacy development in Australia was proven to be less apparent and less strategic (particularly in terms of long-term legacy planning). Thus it perhaps explained its sharp fall at London 2012. Although the length of the *maintenance* stage was slightly longer than China's, the triggers for changes, key decision making, major exogenous contextual opportunities and challenges faced in each stage of the cycle were similar.




Figure 3. Elite sport legacy cycles for China and Australia.

Discussion

The analysis of the two selected cases suggested clear evidence of an initial positive elite sport effect but also the possibility that the sustainability of this positive effect can be vulnerable in the absence of sustained government strategic planning and investment. The peak performance achieved at the home event was not a ‘one-off show’ of elite Olympic success, rather it was an output of a seven-year phase of elite sport development. The political prominence of sport was significantly elevated after Beijing was awarded the 2008 Summer Olympics in 2001. This led to an immediate reshaping of the organisational structure and governance (to various degrees) from the top level, enhanced cooperation and heavy degrees of resource dependency at the meso level, and eventually peak performances at the home Olympics.

Whilst evidence collected from Australia scored closely with the key factors identified in the China’s elite sport legacy model to a large degree, differences can still be found: China has long valued elite success at the Olympics since the 1980s and has also had a clearer national elite sport policy and vision. In contrast, Australia experienced constant changes in government policy for elite sport and this volatile political environment made long-term planning difficult. Australia adopted a more ‘conservative’ attitude towards elite sport development. Australia engaged in little or no strategizing about creating an elite sport legacy prior to the Games. Consequently, one decade after the home Olympics, Australia’s Olympic performance declined notably. The number of Olympic medals won dropped from 59 at the home Olympics to 29 at Rio 2016 – marginally ahead of the 27 medals won at the 1992 Barcelona Olympics.

China and Australia experienced a similar pattern of medal performance before and after their home Olympics. This pattern is characterised by four developmental stages: *Start-up*, *growth*, *maintenance*, and *decline*. These stages, corroborating the findings of Lavoie and

Culbert, are sequential in nature.¹⁶³ The findings of this research confirm that strategic priorities vary according to organisations' life cycle stages.¹⁶⁴ The analysis of both nations' elite performances in the decline stage revealed both nation's vulnerability to non-domestic factors, namely challenges posed by other nations in sports that have been historically successful for China and Australia (i.e., Great Britain vs. Australia in cycling, rowing and sailing, and China vs. Japan in artistic gymnastics and women's combat sports). In specific terms, the sustainability of a previous nation's Olympic elite sport legacy is increasingly constrained by both the approaches taken by later nations and their degree of overlaps of advantage sports/disciplines. It is also worth noting the possibility that some states may go directly from growth to decline, skipping maintenance, if the government does not sustain its level of investment. This applies to the case of Greece, which declined abruptly and significantly immediately after Athens 2004, failing to win any gold medal at Beijing 2008 and London 2012 (vs. six gold medals in 2004).

Conclusion

This study attempts to identify and explain the elite sport legacy from hosting an Olympics. Although there was some arbitrariness involved in the categorisation of the life cycle stages, the study explains the process of elite sport legacy development. In general, the application of the life cycle approach helps comprehend the long process of elite sport legacy development. It also has utility in understanding how and why variations in different stages generate variability in the observed performance outcomes.

The findings have a number of practical implications. First, the fundamental nature of competition at the Olympics is changing. The traditional governance mind-set is unlikely to create a competitive advantage, let alone a sustained competitive advantage. States are advised to adopt a new approach that can promptly react to the challenges that evolve from the life cycle

process. Strategic, proactive and deliberate planning can maximise elite sport legacy and its sustainability. Second, future host countries are encouraged to consider developing strategies for each phase of the life cycle. There is no formula here, because host countries face different threats and opportunities in varying life cycle stages. Strategic planning has the potential to shape structure and governance systems. In particular, in later life cycle stages, certain changes are likely to be so critical that if they are not undertaken, the elite sport performance will decline dramatically.

The findings of this study are subject to at least two limitations. First, the sample size of interviews was small. This is almost unavoidable when conducting policy-related research about China, unless the researchers have very good networks. The extensive use of secondary data ameliorated this limitation. Second, the selected case studies have distinctive features. Both China and Australia are major elite sport nations on the Summer Olympic stage with a reasonably strong competitiveness and great medal success, which thus necessitate cautions in generalising findings to other settings. This research generates many questions in need of further investigation. For example, further empirical investigations in relation to the changes of funding pattern during the elite legacy life cycle for China's case are strongly recommended. Researchers are advised to pay close attention to the Olympic (gold) medal performance of the Great Britain, Brazil and Japan in the future to examine and further our findings. Another possible area of research in the future would be to explore sport-specific legacies for Olympic host nations.

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Appendix 1. Key documents and materials reviewed in the data analysis.

Author(s) / Organisation(s) and Year	Document / Book Title	Publisher
China		
GAS (2002)	<i>2001-2010 Nian Aoyun Zhengguang Jihua Gangyao [The Outline of the Strategic Olympic Glory Plan: 2001-2010]</i>	Beijing: GAS
GAS (2003a)	<i>2008 Nian Aoyun Zhengguang Xingdong Jihua [2008 Olympic Glory Action Plan]</i>	Beijing: GAS
GAS (2003b)	<i>Gexiangmu Aoyun Zhengguang Xingdong Jihua Juti Shishi Fangan [Specific Implementation Scheme of Olympic Glory Action Plan for Each Sport]</i>	Beijing: GAS
GAS (2006)	<i>Tiyu Fazhan 'Shiyiwu' Guihua [The 11th Five-Year Plan for Sport Development in China]</i>	Beijing: GAS
GAS (Ed.) (2008)	<i>Gaige Kaifang Sanshinian de Zhongguo Tiyu [Chinese Sport in Thirty Years of Reform and Opening Up]</i>	Beijing: People's Sports Publishing House of China
GAS (Ed.) (2009a, b, c)	<i>Pinbo Licheng Huihuang Chengjiu: Xinzhongguo Tiyu Liushinian [A Hard-Fighting Journey and Brilliant Achievements: A Sixty-Year History of Sport in New China] - Three Volumes</i>	Beijing: People's Publishing House
GAS (2011a)	<i>2011-2020 Nian Aoyun Zhengguang Jihua Gangyao [The Outline of the Strategic Olympic Glory Plan: 2011-2020]</i>	Beijing: GAS
GAS (2011b)	<i>Tiyu Fazhan 'Shiserwu' Guihua [The 12th Five-Year Plan for Sports Development in China]</i>	Beijing: GAS
GAS (2016)	<i>Tiyu Fazhan 'Shisanwu' Guihua [The 13th Five-Year Plan for Sport Development in China]</i>	Beijing: GAS
Liang Xiaolong, Bao Mingxiao and Zhang Lin (2006)	<i>Juguo Tizhi [The Whole Country Support for Elite Sport System]</i>	Beijing: People's Sports Publishing House of China
Policy, and Laws and Regulations Department of General Administration of Sport of China (Ed.) (2010)	<i>Guojia Tiyu Zongju Tiyu Zhexue Shehui Kexue Yanjiu Chengguo Huibian (Jingji Tiyu Juan, 2001-2006) [A Collection of Achievement in Sports Philosophy and Scientific Research of General Administration of Sport of China (Elite Sport Volume, 2001-2006)]</i>	Beijing: People's Sports Publishing House of China

Policy, and Laws and Regulations Department of General Administration of Sport of China (Ed.) (2011)	<i>Tiyu Shiye 'Shierwu' Guihua Wenjian Ziliao Huibian [A Collection of documents and Material regarding Sports Projects and Plans of China in the '12th Five Years']</i>	Beijing: People's Sports Publishing House of China
Sports Ministry of China (1995)	<i>Aoyun Zhengguang Jihua Gangyao (1994-2000) [The Outline of the Strategic Olympic Glory Plan: 1994-2000]</i>	Beijing: SMC
The Central Committee of the CCP (2002)	<i>Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan Guanyu Jinyibu Jiaqiang he Gaijin Xinshiqi Tiyu Gongzuo de Yijian [Further Strengthening and Progressing Sport in the New Era]</i>	Beijing: The Central Committee of the CCP
Xu Guoqi (2008)	<i>Olympic Dreams: China and Sports 1895-2008</i>	London: Harvard University Press
Yang Hua (Ed.) (2012a, b)	<i>Woguo Aoyunhui Beizhan Cansai de Lilun yu Shijian [Theory and Practice of China's Olympic Preparation and Participation] - Two Volumes</i>	Beijing: China Legal Publishing House
Australia		
AOC (2009)	<i>The AOC's Response to the Crawford Report</i>	Canberra: AOC
ASC (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016)	<i>Annual Reports: 1999-2000; 2000-2001; 2001-2002; 2002-2003; 2003-2004; 2004-2005; 2005-2006; 2006-2007; 2007-2008; 2008-2009; 2009-2010; 2010-2011; 2011-2012; 2012-2013; 2013-2014; 2014-2015; 2015-2016</i>	Canberra: ASC
ASC (1999)	<i>The Australian Sports Commission: Beyond 2000</i>	Canberra: ASC
Bloomfield, John. (2003)	<i>Australia's Sporting Success: The Inside Story</i>	Sydney: University of New South Wales Press
Commonwealth of Australia (1999)	<i>Shaping Up: A Review of Commonwealth Involvement in Sport and Recreation in Australia – A Report to the Federal Government</i>	Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia
Commonwealth of Australia (2001)	<i>Backing Australia's Ability: An Innovation Action Plan for the Future</i>	Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia
Department for the Arts, Sport, the Environment and Territories (1992)	<i>Maintain the Momentum: Australian government sports policy 1992-1996</i>	Canberra: DASET
Department for the	<i>Olympic Athlete Programme: Making Great Australians:</i>	Canberra: DEST

Environment, Sport and Territories (1994)	<i>Australian Government Sports Policy</i>	
Department of Health and Ageing (2008)	<i>Australian Sport: Emerging Challenges, New Directions</i>	Canberra: DHA
Department of Health and Ageing: Independent Sport Panel (2009)	<i>The Future of Sport in Australia (Crawford Report)</i>	Canberra: DHA
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Ferguson, Jim. (2006)	<i>More than Sunshine and Vegemite: Success the Australian Way</i>	London: Routledge
Green, Mick and Houlihan, Barrie (2005)	<i>Elite Sport Development: Policy Learning and Political Priorities</i>	London: Routledge
Houlihan, Barrie (1997)	<i>Sport Policy and Politics: A Comparative Analysis</i>	London: Routledge
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for the Environment, Sport and Territories, *Olympic Athlete Programme: Making Great Australians: Australian Government Sports Policy* (Canberra: Department for the Environment, Sport and Territories, 1994).

Appendix 2. Profiles of the interviewees.

Interviewee	Organisation(s)	Position(s)	Interview date
1	Beijing Sport University	Professor of Sport Studies, the Editor of the Chinese Version of Olympic Encyclopaedia, one of the most renowned sports researchers in China and policy making consultant of GAS	08/05/2013
2	GAS, China Institute of Sport Science (CISS), The National Basketball Management Centre and Chinese Basketball Association (CBA)	A previous senior official of GAS and former director of CISS, former director of the National Basketball Management Centre and the vice director of CBA (retired)	15/05/2013
3	China Sports Culture Development Centre of GAS, China Sports Museum and China Olympic Museum	Former Director of China Sports Culture Development Centre of GAS, China Sports Museum and China Olympic Museum (retired)	03/06/2013