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**Austerity and Anti-Austerity:
the political economy of refusal in ‘low resistance’ models of capitalism¹**

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¹ This article presents a summary and analysis of findings from fourteen cases of austerity proposals in two countries (Japan and the UK). For reasons of space we discuss here only the summary findings, alongside the more interesting cases that illustrate some of the key findings. However, we present each of the narratives in full in a website that accompanies the article, thereby allowing both transparency and replicability. The website is available here: <https://antiausteritylowresistancecapitalism.wordpress.com/>. Earlier versions of the paper were presented at the CPERN mid-term conference 2014 (Vienna) and 2016 (Ljubljana), EISA Annual Conference 2015 (Sicily), BISA-IPEG Annual Conference 2015 (Manchester), Warwick New Directions in IPE 2015, SPERI conference 2016, Colloquium on European civil society, politics and democracy (University of Jyväskylä 2015), Leiden Political Economy Group 2016, and the Workshop on Resistance and Alternatives to Austerity, Centre for Urban Research on Austerity (CURA) at De Montfort University 2016. We are grateful for comments from André Broome, Ian Bruff, Phil Cerny, Mònica Clua-Losada, Adam Fishwick, Niilo Kauppi, Nicholas Kiersey, Markku Lonkila, Phoebe Moore, Len Seabrooke, Liam Stanley, Wanda Vrasti, and Matt Watson. The four anonymous reviewers each provided extremely helpful and detailed comments, and Hugh Ward assisted us enormously in his editorial guidance. All remaining errors are our own.

Abstract. In contrast to much of the political economy literature, this article explores acts of refusal that obstruct attempts to impose austerity upon advanced industrial democracies. It thereby complements a literature that has thus far focused far more upon the (apparently unobstructed) imposition of austerity. In doing so, it looks to two typically ‘low resistance’ countries – Japan and the UK - selected as crucial least-likely cases. It finds that austerity is rarely uncontested. Using fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) it highlights the ‘causal recipes’ sufficient both for anti-austerity activity to have a significant impact upon proposals for austerity, and for the smooth (unobstructed) imposition of austerity. The politics of austerity is shown to be better understood as an iterative interaction between proposals for austerity and the acts of refusal that they encounter. These obstacles to austerity appear more straightforward to activate effectively in Japan’s coordinated model of capitalism; whilst the UK’s liberal market economy tends to generate more innovative forms of dissent which (if they are sufficiently militant) provide an alternative route towards the obstruction of austerity.

Key words: austerity, anti-austerity, political economy, UK, Japan, fsQCA

We live in a so-called ‘age of austerity’. The period prior to 2008 had already been termed the ‘silver age of permanent austerity’²; and the advance of austerity and welfare retrenchment accelerated following 2008 as states in advanced industrial democracies sought to reduce the public debt that they incurred in responding to the global economic crisis.³

² Ferrera 2008.

³ Bermeo and Pontusson 2012; Blyth 2013; Stanley 2014.

Accounts of this move into the post-crisis ‘age of austerity’ have focused on the policy consensus built in favour of austerity and the impact that this has had upon democracy and social inequality. As Streeck puts it, ‘in order to behave ‘responsibly’, as defined by international markets and institutions, national governments will have to impose strict austerity, at the price of becoming increasingly unresponsive to their citizens’.⁴ Whilst austerity has indeed become the order of the day, the present article argues that existing contributions to the austerity literature have focused too greatly on the imposition and impact of austerity. In contrast, we also need to understand and explain the impact of the range of opposition and acts of refusal of austerity that have emerged during the post-crisis context. This article explores anti-austerity activity in two countries – the UK and Japan – both of which are typically considered to be ‘low resistance’ models of capitalism. It finds that austerity is rarely contested. Using fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) it highlights two ‘causal recipes’ that are sufficient for anti-austerity activity to have a significant impact upon proposals for austerity, along with one route to the smooth (unobstructed) imposition of austerity. From this perspective, the politics of austerity is shown to be better understood as an iterative interaction between proposals for austerity and acts of refusal, rather than the consensus view within the political economy literature which depicts a relatively smooth and straightforward imposition of austerity enabled by a context of crisis.

Austerity politics: what role for resistance?

Since 2008, we have witnessed a consistent and near-universal attempt across the advanced industrial democracies to reduce public debt and deficits through a decrease in welfare

⁴ Streeck 2011, 26.

spending.⁵ A burgeoning literature has also emerged to discuss this ‘age of austerity’.⁶ We seek here to make an alternative contribution to the austerity, and anti-austerity, literature. In doing so, we recognise that austerity itself is a contested term, referring sometimes to reduced welfare spending, welfare generosity, the move towards privatisation, and/or the de-democratisation of public service provision.⁷ For the purposes of this discussion, we follow Konzelman in defining austerity as a process whereby public spending is reduced and/or tax revenues are increased, often in an attempt to improve the fiscal health of the government.⁸ As Heald and Hood point out, however, ‘austerity’ can sometimes refer to the financial outcome of policymaking processes, not the political effort itself that goes into promoting and achieving, in their terms, a ‘fiscal squeeze’.⁹ Austerity might be better considered, therefore, the attempt to reduce or remove the provision by the state of resources that supplement those allocated through market exchange, or to increase the costs to the taxpayer (normally in a regressive way) of funding those supplementary resources, all in the context of (perceived) heightened pressures to be competitive and therefore reduce costs.¹⁰ In this sense, ‘austerity’ is the opposite of Esping-Andersen’s well known definition of ‘decommodification’.¹¹ This might, therefore, be viewed as part of the broader project of neoliberalism, although we view austerity measures as part of (but not exhausted by the definition of) neoliberalism. Neoliberalism in this sense is a broader project that also includes an ever-greater emphasis upon the market, a move towards financialisation, the disarticulation of institutions

⁵ Bermeo and Pontusson 2012; Vis et al. 2011.

⁶ See, for instance, Schäfer and Streeck 2013.

⁷ See, for instance, the discussion in Bramall et al. 2016.

⁸ Konzelman 2010: 703.

⁹ Heald and Hood 2014: 4-5.

¹⁰ For similar definitions, see Taylor-Gooby 2002; Huber and Stephens 2001.

¹¹ Esping-Andersen 1990.

representing the ‘left’ or ‘labour’, a more explicitly disciplining role for the state, and a consistent espousal of the need to accept the (substantial) limits of democracy.¹²

The austerity literature has focused, we claim, on the imposition and impact of austerity, and in some cases on the normative and/or empirical question of whether austerity was the right decision for policymakers to adopt. Debates have focused on whether austerity is necessary,¹³ ethically sound¹⁴ and/or likely to have an expansionary¹⁵ or contractionary¹⁶ effect. It has also considered the importance of identifying and discussing alternatives to the dominant austerity agenda,¹⁷ especially those alternatives that focus on growth rather than austerity.¹⁸ We have also witnessed discussions of the communicative method and effectiveness with which the austerity agenda has been sold to the public,¹⁹ and the impact that this has upon the electoral popularity of its advocates.²⁰ In addition to domestic politics, we have seen a number of attempts to chart and explain the degree to which international institutions,²¹ including the European Union,²² have contributed to the imposition of austerity upon national welfare states. Accounts have also highlighted the role of historical and national political

¹² For discussions on the broader meaning of neoliberalism, see Harvey 2005; Peck et al. 2012; Wacquant 2010.

¹³ Streeck 2013.

¹⁴ Edmiston 2014.

¹⁵ Alesina et al. 2015.

¹⁶ Guajardo et al. 2014; McMenamin et al. 2015.

¹⁷ Blyth 2013.

¹⁸ Hay 2013.

¹⁹ Stanley 2014; Dow 2015; Mercille 2014; König forthcoming.

²⁰ Whiteley et al. 2015; Karyotis and Rüdiger 2015.

²¹ Ban 2015.

²² Dukelow 2015; Pavolini et al. 2015.

economy traditions,²³ and motives of statecraft.²⁴ The effect of austerity has also been assessed in terms of its impact upon party systems, and especially populist parties,²⁵ public administration,²⁶ welfare and redistributive policies,²⁷ and its detrimental effect upon gender,²⁸ class²⁹ and/or racial³⁰ inequality.

What unites much of this literature is the claim that the post-2008 crisis has witnessed the smooth imposition of austerity measures, despite what critics consider to be a lack of evidence that austerity is necessary, desirable or indeed likely to produce sought-after effects.³¹ Rather than being based on sound evidence or reason, the age of austerity is considered to reflect the interests of those empowered by neoliberal capitalism.³² Put briefly, the consensus view is that the post-2008 crisis provided a golden opportunity to consolidate (rather than challenge) neoliberalism, creating a fiscal crisis that has been seized upon by political and economic elites as an opportunity to further hollow out the welfare state.³³

Whilst these trends and observations are clearly of importance in understanding and questioning the push for austerity measures throughout the post-2008 period, also of interest – but which have received considerably less attention – are the obstacles that have been

²³ Clift and Ryner 2014.

²⁴ Gamble 2014.

²⁵ Magalhães 2014; Leon et al. 2015; Thomas and Tufts, forthcoming.

²⁶ Ladi 2014; Hlepas forthcoming.

²⁷ Dukelow and Considine 2014; Matsaganis and Leventi 2014; Beatty and Fothergill 2015.

²⁸ Karamessini and Rubery 2013.

²⁹ Crotty 2012.

³⁰ Ali 2011.

³¹ Boyer 2012.

³² Konzelmann 2014, 735.

³³ Mirowski 2013.

experienced by advocates of austerity. As a result, we argue, the so-called ‘age of austerity’ has been discussed in terms that suggest its smooth and unproblematic imposition upon advanced industrial democracies and societies. Research that has been conducted into obstacles to austerity suggests that social opposition, trust (or its absence) and clientelistic linkages all have an effect upon the likelihood of austerity measures being implemented.³⁴ However, there remains a general sense that austerity has been successfully imposed in most contexts. Strike action and industrial disputes have also been identified as potential factors that might have an effect upon welfare reform; although they have tended to be considered ineffective against austerity,³⁵ as have other, more non-traditional, forms of protest, such as the Occupy movement.³⁶ This is surprising, especially as much of the broader literature on welfare reform - outside of the post-2008 ‘age of austerity’ - has tended to highlight a range of obstacles that austerity advocates are likely to encounter, including electoral vulnerability,³⁷ fear of protest,³⁸ partisan opposition,³⁹ mobilisation by welfare state beneficiaries,⁴⁰ and the lack of institutional capacity, especially when institutional fragmentation and larger numbers of institutional veto points exist.⁴¹ It is also surprising because post-2008 austerity proposals have clearly not gone unopposed⁴² and we can expect

³⁴ Culpepper 2015; Afonso et al. 2015; Exadaktylos and Zahariadis 2014.

³⁵ Nowak and Gallas 2014.

³⁶ Worth 2013.

³⁷ Immergut and Abou-Chadi 2014; Vis forthcoming.

³⁸ Bailey 2015.

³⁹ Klitgaard and Elmelund-Præstekær 2013.

⁴⁰ Pierson 1994.

⁴¹ Plümpert et al 2009.

⁴² Bailey 2014; Huke et al. 2015; Shibata 2016.

that advocates of neoliberalism have been affected by these instances of opposition.⁴³ The aim of the present article, therefore, is to shift our attention more towards the refusal of austerity, the obstacles to austerity policymaking that this creates, and the outcomes that result from this concrete interaction between proposals for austerity and the acts of refusal which they encounter.

Refusal and obstacles to austerity

We draw on insights from the comparative political economy, critical political economy and political sociology literatures to develop a framework through which to consider the iterative interaction between proposals for austerity and the refusal that these encounter. The central assumption underpinning the research is that opposition, contestation and refusal is an unavoidable aspect of unequal social relations. This draws on the insights of the autonomist Marxists of the 1960s and 1970s and also echoes some of the insights made by James C Scott.⁴⁴ From this perspective, it is not the case that opposition to domination is sometimes mobilised and other times replaced with consent. Rather, the control or consent of subordinated classes, groups and minorities is never fully achieved, leaving open the opportunity for different ‘weapons of the weak’ to disrupt concrete socio-economic and political configurations. In following this approach, we seek here to consider a range of forms of refusal, in order to ascertain the type of outcomes with which they are associated. It is in the light of different forms of opposition to austerity, therefore, that we should understand the final form that proposals for austerity eventually result in. In particular, we seek to understand the conditions under which proposals for austerity are substantially modified or

⁴³ Jordana 2014.

⁴⁴ See Huke et al. 2015; Scott 1990.

reversed as a result of the opposition that they encounter, as well as the conditions under which they appear to be implemented smoothly and without significant obstruction.

Socio-economic content and context matters

Before we turn to the effect of different types of refusal, we also consider the socio-economic content of particular austerity proposals and the context within which they are made. In terms of content, we expect that proposals for austerity vary in terms of both the degree to which they represent a retrenchment of the welfare state, as well as the degree to which they target ‘insiders’ (and are therefore potentially progressive in terms of their net effect), ‘outsiders’ (and are therefore regressive), focused on specific sectoral groups, or whether they have a more universal impact.⁴⁵ We anticipate that those groups that are most targeted by welfare retrenchment measures will be those who are most likely to mobilise in opposition,⁴⁶ although the degree to which particular groups are able to mobilise will also be influenced by their socio-economic status.⁴⁷

In addition, the socio-economic context will matter. We therefore make the distinction between how austerity proposals proceed within liberal market economies and coordinated market economies, with the latter likely to experience a stronger tendency towards policy stasis and stability, with a greater number of organised and in-built veto points obstructing the process of austerity-focused welfare reform. In doing so, moreover, we select our cases from two country-contexts – the UK and Japan – which are typically viewed as exemplary cases of LME and CME contexts, respectively. This allows us to compare the different

⁴⁵ Gingrich and Ansell 2015; Lindvall and Rueda 2013.

⁴⁶ Bernburg 2015.

⁴⁷ Naczyk and Seeleib-Kaiser 2015.

effects that different forms and institutions of market coordination (liberal and negotiated) might have upon the process of austerity policymaking. Whilst the use of only two country-contexts clearly does not allow us to control for other country-level differences (for instance, electoral system, party system, and so on), and nor does it allow us to separate out country-specific effects from the effect of the particular variety of capitalism within that country. Nevertheless, we choose to distinguish between different varieties of capitalism (rather than alternative types of national difference), on the grounds that this is both most relevant and of most interest, due to the centrality of issues related to political economy in contemporary debates on austerity and welfare restructuring. Put simply, we expect that, of the national differences of relevance, in terms of both the proposal for, and contestation of austerity measures, it is the difference in the way in which relations of political economy (especially firm-state-employee relations) are structured that will be of most interest, and that this is best encapsulated by the distinction between different varieties of capitalism.⁴⁸

Varieties of refusal, and obstacles to austerity

We identify four types of refusal discussed within the political sociology literature: imperceptible dissent; non-disruptive public opposition; disruptive public opposition; and militant refusal.

Imperceptible forms of dissent include everyday acts of opposition and resistance, such as foot-dragging, ‘hidden transcripts’ and other ways in which the authority of those with power are denigrated, attempts are made to identify escape routes, and routine forms of insubordination occur.⁴⁹ These forms of refusal are involved in the everyday contestation of

⁴⁸ See, for instance, the discussion in Hermann 2014.

⁴⁹ Johansson and Vinthagen forthcoming.

hierarchies and relations of control and domination, yet only sometimes will solidify into more widespread and/or organised forms of refusal. Nevertheless, such acts of refusal are likely to produce significant effects upon policymakers, albeit in more difficult ways to perceive than more visible forms of dissent. Thus, we might expect that everyday imperceptible forms of dissent are associated with issues of non-compliance, minor acts of rebellion, insubordination and criminality, refusal to adequately follow instructions, and a breakdown of the trust in and support for elites that might otherwise enable more straightforward instances of policymaking. Each of these forms of everyday refusal, moreover, is likely to make it difficult to implement policies, and/or secure smooth policy change, as intended policy consequences become increasingly unlikely to be realised in a context in which everyday levels of obedience and the predictability of individual-level behaviour are both low.⁵⁰

Public opposition (non-disruptive and disruptive). In addition to imperceptible forms of dissent, acts of refusal also tend under certain circumstances to be more organised, more public, and more specifically focused on raising grievances against authorities and demanding that those in authority comply with the demands being made. Through these more organised and visible forms of refusal, subjugated actors seek to make their demands heard, in order that they might be met. This might include public demonstrations and attempts to highlight and make visible particular acts or processes of injustice. Sometimes these forms of opposition are conducted in a form that coheres with the established and accepted routines for expressing preferences (*non-disruptive public opposition*), whilst on other cases protesters use methods that transcend established rules in order to increase the likelihood of being noticed and/or listened to (*disruptive public opposition*).⁵¹ Public demonstrations of

⁵⁰ Papadopoulos et al. 2008.

⁵¹ For more on this distinction, see Bailey 2015; Briscoe et al. 2015.

grievances are difficult for policymakers to ignore, especially if they threaten the popularity of the government. Most obviously, unpopular decision-makers face problems in terms of re-election. But beyond that, a context of high levels of public and visible dissent can be associated with questioning of the legitimacy, wisdom or efficacy of the political elite.

Militant refusal and the active prevention of austerity. Under certain circumstances acts of refusal can become more active than either everyday levels of dissent and disobedience or the visible attempt to express and demonstrate particular demands. Rather than seeking to dissuade political decision-makers from implementing austerity measures, these more militant forms of opposition represent an attempt to actively and directly prevent such outcomes from occurring. This might include, for instance, sustained strike action to prevent wage cuts from taking place, or the physical prevention of housing eviction orders from being implemented.⁵² These forms of militant refusal are relatively rare, especially within the ‘low resistance’ models of capitalism such as those that we examine in the present paper. Indeed, in the cases selected and discussed below, we find only two instances where substantial levels of militant refusal have been displayed. This poses a number of potential problems, particularly in terms of the conclusions that we can draw from our comparative analysis and the degree to which we can reach dependable conclusions with such a limited number of ‘positive’ cases. Nevertheless, we consider it important to include consideration of this condition, due both to the heightened interest amongst citizens increasingly interested in more innovative, radical and prefigurative forms of political participation (perhaps most obviously exemplified by movements such as Occupy), and due to recent research suggesting

⁵² Carter 2005; Doherty et al. 2003.

that this type of political mobilisation has a degree of efficacy that has largely gone unnoticed within the relevant literature.⁵³

Indirect obstacles to austerity. In addition to the range of obstacles discussed above, a number of indirect obstacles can also be identified. These arise indirectly out of the interaction between proposals for austerity and instances of refusal. They often occur when political elites experience difficulties in responding to instances of refusal that austerity proposals encounter. For instance, inter-elite disagreements, institutional inertia, institutional incapacity, and unintended consequences might all occur as a result of the attempt to respond to resistance (albeit not as a direct result of that resistance).⁵⁴

There exists, therefore, a complex interaction between proposals for austerity, instances of resistance and opposition, obstacles that stand in the way of welfare reforms, the final outcome of those reforms, and any subsequent consequences that arise following their adoption. It is this complex process which the research presented herein seeks to explore.

Methods and data

We employ a qualitative case study approach to compare the impact of different types of refusal upon fourteen attempts to impose austerity measures in the case of post-2008 Japan and the UK. In each case we seek to explore the process through which proposals for austerity were made, the types of acts of refusal observed, responses witnessed to those acts of refusal, and the outcomes and effects of this interaction between refusal of austerity measures and responses to those acts of refusal. The approach adopted is therefore one of qualitative process tracing, which following Bennett and Checkel we view as ‘the analysis of

⁵³ Bailey 2015.

⁵⁴ For a good overview of the potential problems that state actors face, see Schuck 2014.

evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events within a case for the purposes of either developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms that might causally explain the case'.⁵⁵ Here we seek to explore the impact of the mechanisms of refusal noted above, as well as the responses to them by those advocating austerity. The country-contexts from which the cases are selected are typically considered to have low levels of refusal – either due to the longstanding construction of a relatively obedient and passive workforce (Japan) or due to a more recent process whereby subordinate groups (especially organised labour) have been quietened through a process of disorganisation, disarticulation, and repression (the UK). Both country contexts therefore allow us to select a series of 'least likely crucial case studies', in the sense that evidence of significant impact of refusal upon austerity proposals in these contexts would suggest that similar and more pronounced effects will exist in contexts where levels of refusal are typically considered to be higher. That is, if refusal of austerity produces a significant impact upon the outcome of the austerity process in 'low resistance' countries, then we can plausibly expect that such instances of refusal and their impact will also be likely to occur in 'more likely' cases, with typically higher levels of refusal. The fourteen cases that we focus on are the key proposals for austerity measures witnessed in both countries between 2010 and 2015, under both the DPJ (2009-12) and Abe (2012 onwards) governments in Japan, and under the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government in the UK (2010-15). The period since 2010 is chosen as this was when austerity measures were initiated in most OECD countries, following the initial post-2008 increase in public spending that was undertaken in order to avoid the collapse of the financial industry.⁵⁶ In the Japanese context we have included a number of measures which represent market liberalisation measures (both labour market and agricultural market

⁵⁵ Bennett and Checkel 2015: 7.

⁵⁶ Cameron 2012; Bermeo and Pontusson 2012.

liberalisation) on the grounds that these represent significant attempts to reform the Japanese welfare model, which is commonly noted to be built around both the firm and the extended (rural) family as a provider of welfare. In Estevez-Abe's terms, 'Japan uses industrial policy as a form of social policy' and this includes 'functional equivalents' to conventional welfare, such as 'public works, subsidies to rural farmers, market-restricting regulations, and employment protections'.⁵⁷ Austerity measures in such a context therefore include attempts to remove these forms of market regulations and practices that protect certain groups. We rely on a combination of official documents and journalistic reports to present a narrative that traces the process of austerity policymaking, based upon the following stages: austerity proposal, instances of refusal, obstacles, the outcome, and subsequent consequences for those implementing austerity measures. For reasons of space we discuss here only the summary findings, alongside the more interesting cases that illustrate some of the key findings. However, we present each of the narratives in full in a website that accompanies the article.⁵⁸ Each of these online narratives, moreover, present a detailed explanation of our evaluation and scoring for each of the conditions and outcomes studied. The results are therefore both transparent and replicable.

Summary of findings

As table 1 shows, each of the fourteen proposals for austerity experienced at least some form of refusal. As such, any narrative of austerity policymaking that excludes some reference to instances of refusal is lacking in that it fails to pay due attention to the experience of opposition that austerity proposals seem destined to encounter. As can be seen, non-disruptive public opposition was by far the most popular form of refusal adopted in the face of proposals for austerity. All of the proposals experienced some non-disruptive public

⁵⁷ Estevez-Abe 2008, 1-3.

⁵⁸ <https://antiausteritylowresistancecapitalism.wordpress.com/>

opposition. In ten of the fourteen cases (71.4%) this was of a substantial nature, including in response to all of the proposals in Japan. This higher proclivity to undertake non-disruptive forms of public opposition in Japan is perhaps unsurprising given its coordinated market economy (CME) status. CMEs tend, by their very nature, to have more formal institutional means through which to incorporate subordinate groups into the political decision-making process. This includes trade unions as institutions with both relatively higher membership rates than in LMEs, and more established channels for political input. For this reason, we might expect public opposition to be expressed through these existing formal (non-disruptive) channels. Indeed, as we shall see, most of the instances of non-disruptive public opposition witnessed in the Japanese case were coordinated by the formal trade union organisation, *Rengo*, or by the formal organisation representing farmers (JA) in the case of agricultural reforms.

Alternative forms of refusal (apart from non-disruptive public opposition) were much more likely in the case of the UK than Japan, with all proposals except for the benefit cap experiencing at least one other form of refusal besides non-disruptive public opposition. Moreover, the severity of the proposal was the best indicator of the likelihood of alternative forms of refusal occurring in the UK case. Thus, the three proposals that experienced the most substantial opposition (in terms of range and scale of forms of refusal) – university tuition fees, workfare, and the switch from RPI to CPI – were all ‘high severity’ cases.

Table 1: main findings

Proposal	Severity	Target	Refusal				Obstacles				Concessions	Consequences of adoption?	Outcome (impact of refusal)
			Imperceptible – signs of visible effects?	Public opposition (non- disruptive)	Public opposition (disruptive)	Militant refusal	Indirect	Non-compliance	Governing problems	Direct prevention			
JAPAN													
<i>Agric. Reforms</i>	moderate	insiders		substantial			X	X		moderate	moderate	patchy, partial and problematic adoption (4)	
<i>DWL</i>	moderate	universal		substantial	limited		X	X		substantial	mild	patchy and limited adoption (5.5)	
<i>Pension reforms</i>	moderate	universal	substantial	substantial			X	X	X	substantial	substantial	very patchy, limited and	

very
problematic
adoption (8)

patchy,
partial and

very
problematic
adoption (5)

patchy,
problematic
and limited
adoption (6)

capitulation
(9)

<i>Tax Hike I</i>	high	outsiders		substantial	X	X	moderate	substantial
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<i>Tax Hike II</i>	high	outsiders	substantial	substantial	X	X	substantial	moderate
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<i>Zero overtime payment</i>	high	insiders/ universal		substantial	X			
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UK

<i>Bedroom tax</i>	high	outsiders (highly targeted)		substantial	limited	limited	X		limited	mild	slightly patchy, but almost full adoption (2)
<i>Benefit cap</i>	high	outsiders (highly targeted)		limited			X		limited	none	slightly patchy, but almost full adoption (1.5)
<i>Child benefit</i>	mild	insiders/ universal	limited	limited			X	x	substantial	none	slightly patchy, and only limited adoption (4.75)

<i>Public sector pay</i>	moderate	sectoral (public sector employees)	moderate	limited	limited		X	X	none	mild	patchy and slightly problematic, but full adoption (1.5)	
<i>Switch from RPI to CPI</i>	high	universal	moderate	substantial	moderate		X	X	none	mild	patchy and slightly problematic, but full adoption (1.5)	
<i>University tuition fees</i>	high	universal	substantial	substantial	substantial	substantial	X		X	substantial	substantial	patchy, very problematic and only partial adoption (7)
<i>VAT tax</i>	moderate	outsiders	limited	limited	limited				mild	none	adopted	

increase

almost in

full (0.5)

very patchy

workfare

high

outsiders

substantial

substantial

substantial

substanti
al

X

X

X

substantial

none

and only

limited

adoption (6)

Source: For full details see the online appendix

Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis

In order to assess the impact of particular types of refusal, we conduct a fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) of the fourteen proposals for austerity which we identify as the key measures for austerity proposed during the 2010-15 period in the UK and Japan. The fsQCA method was developed by Ragin as a means by which to perform configurational analysis, meaning an exploration and identification of the causal conditions that produce particular outcomes.⁵⁹ It has subsequently been the subject of considerable discussion and development as the method has been revised, refined and improved.⁶⁰ In contrast with standard linear quantitative analysis, fsQCA enables the researcher to consider the complex interaction of different causal conditions, including when the number of cases under investigation is relatively small.⁶¹ It is therefore well suited to in-depth case study research, in which the researcher relies upon knowledge of the complexities of particular cases to produce accounts and explanations of concrete outcomes. In-depth case study research often considers causality to be a process whereby multiple conditions combine in a particular way to produce particular configurations of conditions that in turn give rise to particular outcomes. This level of qualitative complexity oftentimes cannot be dealt with through quantitative analysis. However, in conducting qualitative research there is also often something lost in terms of the systematicity of the research and especially its consideration of whether conditions are present or absent in particular contexts, and how they combine. Fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis therefore offers something of a 'middle ground', in that it is both able to

⁵⁹ Ragin 2008.

⁶⁰ For useful overviews, see Schneider and Wagemann 2012; and Marx, Rihoux and Ragin 2013.

⁶¹ See Vis 2012 for a useful comparison between fsQCA and regression analysis.

consider the configuration and combination of multiple conditions, and retains a degree of systematicity that is often absent from qualitative research. This, moreover, is especially well-suited to our present research, in that we seek to uncover the impact of, and complex inter-relationship between, four different types of refusal as well as the socio-economic context and content of the austerity proposals under investigation.

In contrast to much qualitative research, fsQCA relies upon explicitly comparing cases in terms of the degree to which they are located within the set of cases displaying particular causal conditions and outcomes (whereas this is often implicit within much qualitative research). The method requires that the researcher develops a 'score' for each case, in terms of the degree to which they are located within the set of cases displaying potentially causal conditions and the outcome of interest. This relies in part upon a process of calibration that requires the researcher to use their own substantive and theoretical knowledge to assess the degree to which a case should be considered to be a member of a particular set of cases in which the conditions/outcome of interest in question are present. This is subsequently used to consider whether a (configuration of) causal condition(s) is/are necessary for the occurrence of the outcome (i.e. whether the degree of membership in the set of cases in which the outcome of interest occurs is equal to or smaller than the degree of membership in the set of cases in which a particular causal condition or configuration of conditions is present) and/or sufficient (i.e. whether the degree of membership in the set of cases in which the outcome of interest occurs is equal to or greater than the degree of membership in the set of cases in which a particular causal condition or configuration of conditions is present, and therefore constitute a so-called 'causal recipe', the sum of which constitute a 'solution').

One of the main advantages of fsQCA is that it is able to deal with both the fact that case studies are causally complex, and that causation in social science is typically asymmetrical (i.e. claims regarding the efficacy of causal conditions are not negated by the existence of multiple routes to a particular outcome, nor by the fact that the non-occurrence of a particular configuration of conditions need not coincide with the non-occurrence of an outcome in question in order for the configuration's causal efficacy to be verified). Further, fsQCA (in contrast to crisp-set QCA) recognises that cases can be partially in (or out) of a particular set of cases, and therefore calculates the *degree* to which any one case is a member of any one set of conditions or outcomes. This is subsequently used to calculate the extent to which the degree of membership of a case in any one configuration of conditions is equal to or smaller than its membership in the set of cases that displays the outcome of interest (in the case of sufficiency), or equal to or greater than its fuzzy-set membership in the set of cases displaying the outcome of interest (in the case of necessity).⁶²

Our discussion of the fourteen selected instances of austerity in the present paper is therefore well suited to fsQCA on the grounds that we have a limited number of cases (14) in which causality is complex and involves multiple conditions of interest. Table 2 presents the fuzzy scores for each of these conditions/outcomes, and the online appendix provides information on how each score was calculated. Ragin recommends combining conditions where possible and especially when doing so does not produce theoretically perverse indicators.⁶³ The *scale* condition therefore represents a combination of severity and targeting (see table 1), and is a measure of the degree to which the austerity proposal in question threatens socially regressive

⁶² Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 66-76.

⁶³ Ragin 2008, 142.

outcomes. The *outcome of interest* is a measure of the degree to which acts of refusal have a substantial impact on the eventual policy outcome. It combines a measures of the impact of refusal in terms of obstacles, concessions and consequences.

Table 2: fuzzy set data: austerity and anti-austerity

<i>Scal</i>	<i>CM</i>	<i>impercep</i>	<i>non-</i>	<i>disrup</i>	<i>militant</i>	<i>outcome</i>	<i>case</i>
<i>e</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>disrupt</i>	<i>t</i>			
0.05	1	0	1	0	0	0.54	Agric. Reforms (JP)
0.57	1	0	1	0.05	0	0.91	DWL (JP)
0.57	1	1	1	0	0	1	Pension reforms (JP)
1	1	0	1	0	0	0.83	Tax Hike I (JP)
1	1	1	1	0	0	0.95	Tax Hike II (JP)
0.84	1	0	1	0	0	1	Zero overtime payment (JP)
1	0	0	1	0.05	0.05	0.05	Bedroom tax (UK)
1	0	0	0.05	0	0	0.02	Benefit cap (UK)
0.01	0	0.05	0.05	0	0	0.77	Child benefit (UK)

0.57	0	0.95	0.05	0.05	0	0.02	Public sector pay (UK)
0.95	0	0.95	1	0.95	0	0.02	Switch RPI to CPI (UK)
0.95	0	1	1	1	1	0.99	University tuition fees (UK)
0.95	0	0.05	0.05	0.05	0	0	VAT tax increase (UK)
1	0	1	1	1	1	0.95	workfare (UK)

The fsQCA 2.0 software developed by Ragin et al. enables us to conduct fuzzy set analysis of the relationship between causal conditions and the outcome of interest, in terms of both necessity and sufficiency.⁶⁴ The figures presented in table 3 measure both the consistency and the coverage for each condition, in terms of their necessity for the outcome of interest to occur. As is conventional, we set the necessity threshold at 0.9 consistency,⁶⁵ meaning that a very high proportion of the cases meet our definition of necessity (that is, for each case, membership in the set with the causal condition is invariably equal to or greater than its membership in the set with the outcome of interest).⁶⁶ As table 3 shows, only non-disruptive public opposition was found to be necessary in order for an austerity proposal to be substantially impacted upon. This has a coverage score of 0.72, indicating that it is a


⁶⁴ Ragin et al. 2006.

⁶⁵ See Shahidi 2015.

⁶⁶ See Ragin 2008: 45-54 for the calculation.

potentially relevant finding. However, as Schneider and Wagemann highlight, the degree of relevance can be more firmly established by consulting an XY plot of the relationship. As figure 1 shows, there is a considerable degree of clustering around the vertical right axis, which calls into question whether this is a trivial necessary condition.⁶⁷

Figure 1: XY Plot: Condition, non-disruptive public opposition; Outcome, substantial impact upon proposal for austerity



We can use Schneider and Wagemann's alternative formula to calculate the relevance of necessity. This yields a value of 0.56 (on a scale of 0 to 1). Whilst there is no clear benchmark below which a necessary condition is considered irrelevant, clearly this is lower than the coverage score and therefore suggests that non-disruptive public opposition might not be a relevant necessary condition (that is, it might be an effect resulting from the

⁶⁷ On the interpretation of relevance, see Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 144-7.

commonly high values of non-disruptive public opposition). Put differently, given that most forms of austerity experience some kind of non-disruptive public opposition, it is relatively unsurprising that a significant share of those instances in which austerity proposals are substantially impacted upon are also those which experience non-disruptive forms of protest. That said, the XY plot shows that there are also instances in which non-disruptive opposition does not occur and correspondingly low levels of impact occur, as would be expected for a necessary condition. Again, therefore, on a case-by-case basis there seems to be an intuitive reason to retain an interest in this finding, not least due to the high frequency of non-disruptive public opposition and the ongoing question within the literature regarding its efficacy (or otherwise).⁶⁸ The degree to which non-disruptive acts of public opposition are necessary for substantial impact upon austerity to occur would therefore benefit from further research with additional cases.

Table 3: Analysis of necessary conditions for substantial impact upon austerity

Condition	Consistency	Coverage
Scale	0.72	0.56
CME	0.65	0.87
Impercept	0.49	0.66
non-disrupt	0.91	0.72
disrupt	0.26	0.66
militant	0.25	0.97

⁶⁸ See, for instance, Bailey 2015.

In order to assess which conditions or configurations of conditions are sufficient in order for the outcome to occur we use the fuzzy set truth table algorithm developed by Ragin et al.⁶⁹ This identifies the configuration(s) of conditions that are sufficient for an outcome of interest to occur, based on the systematic comparison of cases in terms of the degree to which they are members of particular sets with a presence/absence of particular conditions and outcomes of interest across the range of cases under investigation. Table 4 presents the results of the fuzzy truth table algorithm. The results displayed are all ‘intermediate’, in the terms of the algorithm.⁷⁰ This refers to the way in which so-called counterfactuals or ‘logical remainders’ (the permutations of conditions/outcomes that are not included in our range of case studies) are dealt with. The intermediate analysis includes only ‘easy’ counterfactuals; that is, those non-occurring instances of conditions/outcomes which do not represent a surprise on the basis of existing knowledge. For the present analysis the assumption is that the occurrence of each of the four types of refusal is associated with a greater likelihood of impact upon austerity proposals. The fuzzy truth table algorithm involves a process whereby each configuration of conditions is assessed in terms of its consistency with and coverage of a particular outcome. This shows that two configurations of conditions are sufficient to produce

⁶⁹ Ragin et al. 2006.

⁷⁰ The parsimonious and conservative (or in Ragin’s terms, ‘complex’) solution are also reported in the appendix. In contrast to the intermediate solution, the conservative solution makes no assumptions about the logical remainders; whereas the parsimonious solution is the one produced by altering the assumptions in such a way that produces the least number of conditions and logical operators. Whereas the parsimonious solution makes assumptions which might not be tenable, the conservative solution can be overly complex and therefore produce unhelpful or uninteresting findings (for more on this see Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 175).

the outcome that we are interested in (substantial impact). As we expect, non-disruptive public opposition is present in both configurations (as it is a necessary – albeit potentially trivial - condition), but in both cases additional conditions are also required. In particular, in both routes to impact, the proposal for austerity must be substantially regressive in order for subsequent impact to occur. Two alternative routes to impact then exist: either when non-disruptive public opposition to substantially regressive austerity occurs in the CME context, or when it occurs in combination with all of the other three types of refusal.⁷¹ As we can see, each of these two alternative routes to impact have a consistency of at least 0.95, meaning that we can say with near certainty that when one of these two causal recipes occur then austerity will be substantially challenged in the cases under investigation. Further, the coverage of this solution (0.71), means that 71 percent of the outcome is covered (or explained) by the solution. We can also use the parameters given for unique coverage of each of the different routes to impact to see that the *non.disrupt*cme*scale* route is nearly twice as empirically important as the alternative route.

⁷¹ This contrasts with the parsimonious solution (*cme*scale+militant*) which suggests, on the basis of unsupported assumptions (or so-called ‘difficult counterfactuals’), that substantial impact upon austerity measures can be achieved with considerably less forms of refusal (and potentially none at all). It also contrasts with the conservative solution (*non.disrupt*cme*scale*~disrupt*~militant+militant*disrupt*non.disrupt*impercept*scale*~CME*) which suggests (unconvincingly) that the *absence* of certain forms of refusal is required for one of the paths through which substantial impact is achieved. For each of these results, see the online appendix.

Table 4: Intermediate analysis of sufficient conditions for substantial impact upon proposals for austerity⁷²

Solution	<i>non.disrupt*cme*</i> <i>scale</i>	+	<i>militant*disrupt*non.disrupt*impercept*</i> <i>scale</i>
cases	Tax hike I (JP), Tax hike II (JP), zero overtime (JP), DWL amendment (JP), pension reform (JP)		workfare (UK) , university tuition fees (UK)
raw coverage	0.47		0.24

⁷² The logical remainders that were included as ‘easy counterfactuals’ in order to calculate the intermediate solution are as follows: *CME*scale*non.disrupt*~disrupt*militant* + *CME*scale*non.disrupt*disrupt* (calculated using the method set out in the ‘How to...’ document that accompanies Schneider and Wagemann 2012). It should be noted, however, that whilst this algorithm appears to suggest that only two logical remainders were used to calculate the intermediate solution, the two paths referred to in the algorithm in fact account for six logical remainder rows. That is, the first path accounts for the rows that include the conditions stated in the algorithm, plus both imperceptible dissent and the absence of imperceptible dissent (two different rows); and the second path accounts for the rows that include that include the conditions stated in the algorithm, plus both imperceptible dissent and its absence, and militant refusal and its absence (four different rows).

unique	0.42	0.24
coverage		
consistency	0.95	0.97
solution		0.71
coverage		
solution		0.95
consistency		

bold cases will be discussed in more detail below.

Figure 2: XY Plot of Routes to Substantial Impact




Table 5 turns to consider the necessary conditions for no impact upon proposals for austerity, or what we term ‘unobstructed austerity measures’. As the table shows, an absence of militant refusal is necessary in order for austerity to be smoothly imposed, although this only covers around 45 percent of those instances (with a value of 0.25 according to Schneider and Wagemann’s alternative formula for the relevance of necessity), suggesting that this is a trivial finding. In addition, an LME context (\sim CME) is also close to being a necessity for the smooth imposition of austerity to occur. Finally, table 6 presents the results of the fuzzy truth table algorithm for the intermediate analysis of sufficient conditions for unobstructed austerity measures to be adopted. Here the assumptions made are that absence of significant levels of any of the four types of refusal (\sim refusal) is likely to be associated with a greater likelihood of austerity being imposed unobstructed. As can be seen, only one route to unobstructed austerity was found in our fourteen cases: this is the configuration of cases where we see instances of significantly regressive austerity being proposed in LME contexts, with an absence of militant refusal. This has a consistency of 1, meaning that with these conditions there is a certainty that austerity will be unobstructed in our observed cases. Put differently, militant refusal in LME contexts is necessary if there is to be a chance of having an impact upon austerity measures. With a coverage score of 0.74, this is an empirically important finding.

Table 5: Analysis of necessary conditions for unobstructed austerity measures

Condition	Consistency	Coverage
Scale	0.81	0.46

~Scale	0.22	0.37
CME	0.13	0.13
~CME	0.87	0.65
~Impercept	0.66	0.49
~non-disrupt	0.52	0.81
~disrupt	0.82	0.45
~militant	0.99	0.45

Table 6: Intermediate analysis of sufficient conditions for unobstructed austerity measures

Solution	<i>~militant*scale*~cme</i>
cases	benefit cap (UK), bedroom tax (UK), RPI to CPI (UK) , VAT tax rise (UK), public sector pay (UK)
raw coverage	0.74
unique coverage	0.74
consistency	1
solution coverage	0.74
solution consistency	1

bold cases will be discussed in more detail below.

Alternative Routes to Obstructed and Unobstructed Austerity

We turn now to consider in more detail the concrete cases that display each of the causal recipes (or discrete part of each solution term), as discussed above. This allows us to consider the mechanisms and processes through which each of the routes to the two outcomes of interest have operated in concrete circumstances. We consider three cases, each displaying one of the routes to impact/non-impact identified in the analysis above. That is, a case with greater than 50% membership in the first part of the solution for impact (*non.disrupt*cme*scale*), the second part of the solution for impact (*militant*disrupt*non.disrupt*impercept*scale*), and the solution for no impact (*~militant*scale*~cme*). First, we consider the case of the zero overtime payment in Japan, as an instance of a case with non-disruptive public protest, in a CME context, in response to a proposal of significant scale, and which resulted in substantial impact upon the proposal for austerity (*non.disrupt*cme*scale*). Here, in the face of considerable (non-disruptive) public opposition we witness Japan's Abe administration capitulate on its attempts to impose austerity in the form of significant labour market reforms. Second, we consider the movement against workfare in the UK, as an instance of a case displaying each of the different forms of refusal, in response to a proposal of significant scale, and which resulted in substantial impact upon the proposal for austerity (*militant*disrupt*non.disrupt*impercept*scale*). Here, we witness widespread opposition, resulting in considerable obstacles, modification and consequences for the Coalition Government. Finally, we turn to consider the UK Coalition Government's decision to switch from RPI to CPI in calculating inflation indexes for the

purposes of pensions and benefits, as an instance of a case witnessing no militant refusal, in an LME context, in response to a proposal of significant scale, and which resulted in no substantial impact upon the proposal for austerity (*~militant*scale*~cme*). In each case, therefore, we see in more concrete terms the way in which the ‘causal recipes’ discussed above result in particular processes and outcomes in the cases studied.

Significant impact I: Non-disruptive public opposition in the CME context – the case of the zero overtime payment

A proposal to introduce a so-called ‘Zero Overtime Payment’ Bill was originally mooted by Abe during his first period as prime minister in 2007, originally under the title ‘white-collar exemption’. This sought to introduce a system of zero overtime payment in order to flexibilize working hours for high-income workers and enable employers to avoid their legal obligation to pay overtime to those workers. Abe was, however, forced in 2007 to abandon the proposal due to lack of support from members of the public, opposition parties, trade unions and his own LDP members.⁷³ Upon his second election to office in 2012, however, Abe again sought to introduce a bill to remove employers’ responsibility to pay overtime payments (*Zangyoudai Zero*, or Zero Overtime Payment) as part of a more general attempt to liberalise Japanese labour markets. This was a move supported by business interests, including the national business association, *Keidanren*. Following a series of deliberations within the administration, the Cabinet eventually adopted a formal proposal to introduce the necessary legislation for the scheme on 2 April 2015. It was to apply to all those earning an annual income of 10.57 million yen, thereby limiting its impact to those on higher incomes

⁷³ *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 23 January 2007, 17 January 2007. For this, and subsequent sources on Japan, the Japanese version of the reports have been used to inform the analysis.

(or so-called ‘insiders’). The regressive impact of the proposal would have been substantial. The removal of overtime payment would represent a considerable reform to the Japanese labour market, where the practice of working for long hours is part of the working culture. Further, whilst the proposal targeted high income earners (insiders) there was concern that once the proposal was adopted it would require little effort for future governments to remove or lower the threshold of higher income above which people needed to pass before the measure applied to them.

In response to the proposal, the Abe administration faced a wave of public opposition, largely undertaken by workers and coordinated by trade unions. This was mainly non-disruptive in nature, taking the form of regular public demonstrations, usually as part of the annual May Day union demonstrations. The scale of the public opposition, however, was exceptional in terms of both numbers of participants and frequency. 2014 saw large-scale protest events across Japan – with *Rengo* for the first time organising simultaneous rallies in all 47 prefectures to oppose the government’s proposal – with an estimated 22,000 people taking part in the protests across the country. Demonstrations focused especially on the way in which the *Zangyoudai Zero* (Zero Overtime Payment) would contribute to a worsening of the working environment.⁷⁴ As part of May Day 2015 protests continued across the country. 3,500 people joined a rally in Aichi protesting against the Zero Overtime Payment and the flexibilization of working hours).⁷⁵ Similar events took place in Nara, Osaka, and Ehime.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ *Asahi Shinbun*, 27 April 2014.

⁷⁵ *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 2 May 2015.

⁷⁶ *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 2 May 2015, 1 May 2015.

Perhaps one of the clearest consequences of these protests was the way in which it highlighted declining public support for the Abe Government and especially its economic policies.⁷⁷ It also exposed divisions within the Government itself, with the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW) being the most vocal department opposing the scheme.⁷⁸ This was one of the key indirect effects of the resistance – creating division within the government over how it should respond to opposition to the reform. In particular, it led to an exacerbation of the concern already present within the MHLW over the level of workplace discontent – with the number of labour disputes rising in 7 consecutive years from 2008 onwards to more than 1 million cases. In part as a result of these developments, by June 2015 the Abe government had reached its lowest level of popularity since entering office (41%); and in July 2015 a survey showed that 47% disapproved of Abe's handling of the economy (compared with 40% who approved). This was largely put down to the decline in real wages that had been felt by Japanese workers as a result of Abenomics.

In seeking to respond to the opposition and obstacles faced by the Abe Government in its proposal for Zero Overtime Payment, Abe initially tried to persuade critics of the benefits of the move. Notably, in 2014 he attended *Rengo's* May Day event in Yoyogi Park in Tokyo – the first time in 13 years that a Prime Minister had attended the event – where he appealed to workers on the grounds that Abenomics was contributing to a recovery in the Japanese economy⁷⁹. A range of concessions were also announced in an attempt to appease critics.

⁷⁷ *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 6 May 2015.

⁷⁸ *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 5 May 2013.

⁷⁹ *Asahi Shinbun*, 26 April 2014.

These included encouraging firms to voluntarily increase wages and proposals to increase the threshold above which zero overtime payments would begin.⁸⁰

Despite these attempts to improve public support, however, public opposition continued throughout 2015 and eventually the Abe government announced in July 2015 that it would be abandoning the scheme. This was largely due to the large scale public protests conducted by *Rengo* in May 2015, which itself drew attention to (and acted to consolidate) the decline in support for the Abe Government within the opinion polls.⁸¹ The case therefore clearly highlights the impact of non-disruptive forms of public opposition upon austerity measures in the Japanese (CME) case. Moreover, the fact that this opposition was largely conducted by institutionalised trade unions – utilising a form of opposition that had become part of the country’s coordinated model of capitalism (the May Day rallies are a standard feature of both the annual pay negotiations and visible expression of formal organised labour in Japan) – highlights the impact that the ongoing coordinated nature of the Japanese model of capitalism has upon the prospect for change and the capacity for instances of refusal to oppose those measures which threaten to bring about substantial welfare retrenchment.

Significant Impact II: the full spectrum of refusal – the case of anti-workfare

Upon its election in 2010 the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government adopted a ‘Workfare’ scheme that consisted of three main initiatives: the Work Programme; the Work Experience Scheme; and the Community Work Placement Scheme. The Work Programme

⁸⁰ *Asahi Shinbun*, 17 July 2015.

⁸¹ *Asahi Shinbun*, 26 September 2015.

was launched in June 2011 by the Department for Work and Pensions. It represented both a privatisation and intensification of the previous workfare (Welfare-to-Work) scheme introduced by the preceding New Labour Government.⁸² It was a form of privatisation in that it made private sector providers, such as A4e, Serco, G4S, and Avanta, responsible for finding work placements. It was also an intensification of the previous workfare scheme in that it increased the use (or threat) of sanctions for those who refused to participate. In addition, the Work Experience Scheme was launched as a voluntary scheme of short term unpaid voluntary placements for people between 16 and 24 and unemployed for between three and nine months, with a sanction of two weeks' non-payment of benefits for those who finished the placement early.⁸³ As the final element to the workfare scheme, in April 2014 an additional Community Work Placement scheme began. This required the long-term unemployed to do unpaid voluntary work placements in order to receive unemployment benefits. In addition to these schemes, the Government's Welfare Reform Act 2012 considerably tightened up the sanctions system used to punish those suspected of purposefully avoiding work. In sum, therefore, the Coalition Government's workfare programme introduced a range of measures that would significantly increase the compulsion placed upon the unemployed to take up work placements (regardless of the degree to which they were suitable in terms of career progression), leading some critics to describe the scheme as a form of forced labour. Further, the use of sanctions ensured that some of the poorest members of society would be targeted for punitive measures. The measures therefore represented a highly regressive form of austerity, both in terms of severity and the way in which it targeted those who were especially vulnerable.

⁸² Rees et al. 2014, 224.

⁸³ Ball 2012.

The workfare programmes were highly controversial, sparking instances of refusal across the full range of types that we discuss above. In terms of imperceptible forms of dissent, the most obvious instances were with regard to the activity of those most stubbornly resistant to accepting new work placements. Thus, those unemployed workers who proved most difficult to place in the scheme often found themselves ‘parked’ by private placement firms who sought to maximise the ratio of long-term placements (which they were financially rewarded for) to effort. It therefore became possible for those who sought to refuse work placements to ‘game’ the system, creating sufficient obstacles to placement firms so that they would effectively be left alone.⁸⁴

In addition, the scheme experienced a substantial amount of militant refusal. Workfare became increasingly notorious throughout the course of its implementation. Instances of militant refusal included a series of attempts to publicly disrupt the retail employers who were taking part in the scheme in an attempt to directly discourage their participation and therefore prevent the operation of the scheme. One high-profile incident included the occupation of the Tesco Express near to Parliament. As a result of the publicity arising from this event (and in combination with the fallout arising from an online advertisement for an unpaid job) Tesco began to put pressure on the Government to ensure that the scheme would be genuinely voluntary. Holland and Barrett also pulled out of the scheme following similar disruption of its stores by protests organised by Boycott Workfare, a group formed directly to coordinate anti-workfare protest.⁸⁵ The work placement scheme also prompted some high-profile individual acts of militant refusal. For instance, John McArthur, 59, refused to attend

⁸⁴ Rees et al. 2014.

⁸⁵ Malik 2012a.

his work placement in 2014 on the grounds that it was a job he had previously been paid to do. In protest, and as an act of direct refusal of the instruction he received to attend the placement, he paraded outside the company for 2 hours a day for 3 months, with signs saying “Say no to slavery”.⁸⁶

The scheme also attracted both disruptive and non-disruptive forms of public opposition. This included a week of action in July 2012 that saw protest events in cities across the country, some of which involved barricading the entry to, or entering the premises of, participating businesses. Perhaps the most high-profile form of public opposition to the Government’s Workfare programme, however, was the legal challenge brought against it by two benefit claimants who were forced to do unpaid work in order to continue to receive their benefits. Cait Reilly was forced to give up her voluntary work placement in order to work in Poundland, and Jamie Wilson was required to do unpaid cleaning and renovation work. In bringing their challenge against the Government they sought to challenge the legislative basis under which the scheme had been introduced, and also argued that it represented a human rights violation because it constituted forced/compulsory labour.⁸⁷ Despite losing their initial claim, upon appeal the scheme was deemed unlawful (although the claim of forced/compulsory labour was not upheld by any of the courts).

The high level of opposition to Workfare, including substantial levels of each of the types of refusal, caused a number of problems and obstacles for the scheme. The legal ruling that went against the Government in the case of Cait Reilly required the introduction of emergency legislation and prompted a significant decline in the popularity and perceived acceptability of

⁸⁶ Malik 2014.

⁸⁷ Adkins forthcoming, 3-4.

the scheme. The implementation of the scheme also became increasingly problematic. In response to several of the rounds of protest, both physical and online ‘twitter storms’, many firms pulled out of the scheme – including Sainsbury’s, Waterstones, Matalan, Holland and Barrett, and TK Maxx. In the case of Holland and Barrett, the firm directly cited ‘bad press and in-store protests’ as its reason for pulling out of the scheme.⁸⁸ A number of charities which had initially participated in the scheme, including the British Heart Foundation, Cancer Research, Age UK, and Scope, also each chose to publicly announce their disengagement from the scheme on the grounds that it forced the unemployed and/or disabled to do unpaid work.⁸⁹

The impact of this adverse publicity on the operation of the scheme was also indirectly acknowledged by the Government itself. In seeking to avoid a legal instruction to make public the names of participating businesses, the Government claimed that ‘if the public knew exactly where people were being sent on placements political protests would increase, which was likely to lead to the collapse of several employment schemes and undermine the government’s economic interests’. Moreover, at the same tribunal the DWP confirmed that some of the UK’s biggest charities, ‘including the British Heart Foundation, Scope, Banardo’s, Sue Ryder, and Marie Curie’ had withdrawn from the scheme, causing a significant loss of placements.⁹⁰ Indeed, Boycott Workfare consistently sought to add to this pressure, by submitting freedom of information claims in an attempt to make the names of the organisations benefiting from the employment of unpaid benefit claimants publicly known,

⁸⁸ Malik 2012a.

⁸⁹ Malik 2012b.

⁹⁰ Malik 2014.

prompting the almost immediate withdrawal of Scarborough council from the scheme.⁹¹ The Government was eventually forced to capitulate in 2012 over its commitment to sanctions for its work experience scheme, as a result of pressure from employers that didn't want to be associated with the sanctions and the associated compulsion to undertake unpaid labour.⁹²

In sum, therefore, the Coalition Government's workfare scheme represented a highly regressive austerity proposal. Thus, whilst non-disruptive public demonstrations proved sufficient to prompt substantial modification in the CME context of Japan, an alternative route to impact is one in which the full range of refusal – imperceptible, public opposition (disruptive and non-disruptive), and militant refusal – are each present and act to produce the significant implementation problems, concessions and consequences detailed above.

No impact: the absence of militancy in an LME context - the switch from RPI to CPI

Early into its period in office, in June 2010, the Coalition Government announced in its Emergency Budget its decision to switch from the Retail Price Index (RPI) to Consumer Price Index (CPI) as a means of calculating inflation. This was subsequently to be used to calculate spending on inflation-linked benefits, state pensions and public pensions. As Timmins notes, this was 'by far the biggest cut [of the 2010 Emergency Budget], though almost a silent one in terms of its public impact' – a silence that in part resulted from the complexity involved and the stealthy way in which it systematically skimmed money off benefits over a number of years without the need for public announcements or policy

⁹¹ Boycott Workfare 2014.

⁹² Boycott Workfare 2013.

decisions.⁹³ By the end of the Coalition's period in office, the IFS estimated that the CPI-indexation resulted in a £4.26bn reduction in public spending for 2015/16, which was one-quarter of the entire net savings produced as a result of the Coalition's benefit reforms, as well as having a substantial impact on public (and private) pensions.⁹⁴ The proposal to switch from RPI to CPI therefore represented a substantial instance of welfare retrenchment, with a broad (universal) impact upon all benefit recipients and upon pensions.

The response to the measure was, however, relatively muted. As noted, the fact that this was a relatively technical change in part explains the fact there were few direct challenges or opposition to the move. Indeed, it was felt by many that the technical nature of the changes were such that they weren't perceived (at least not directly) by the benefits/pensions recipients that were affected by the move. The technical nature of the change, moreover, was such that any opposition which did occur tended to come from similarly technical quarters – for instance, the Royal Statistical Society wrote to the independent UK Statistics Authority in 2010 warning that the CPI “is not necessarily the best index for all purposes”, and calling for more prominence to be given to alternative inflation measures.⁹⁵ Through the course of the Coalition Government, however, opposition began to grow as trade unions and pensions groups began to more fully appreciate the impact of the move. In particular, the proposal encountered significant levels of all three types of refusal *except for acts of militant refusal*. Thus, moderate levels of imperceptible dissent were experienced, in the form of growing

⁹³ Timmins 2015, 328.

⁹⁴ Browne and Elming 2015, 5.

⁹⁵ Pimlott and Briscoe 2010.

recruitment problems resulting from worsening pay differentials with the private sector from 2010 onwards.⁹⁶

In addition, the proposal to switch from RPI to CPI experienced both non-disruptive and disruptive forms of public opposition. In particular, opposition was voiced by public sector trade unions and other associations representing public sector employees, including the Forces Pension Society, the Civil Servants Pensioners' Alliance, and the National Federation of Occupational Pensioners. Further, in 2012 an e-petition was launched by PCS member, Jim Singer, calling on parliament to discuss the switch. The petition drew attention to the fact that the switch to CPI would 'mean a steady reduction in spending power for pensioners as they progress into their retirement' and demanding that 'the RPI measure should be reintroduced without delay to ensure that the spending power of these Public and Private pensioners is maintained'. The e-petition rapidly reached the 100,000 votes needed in order to force a request for a parliamentary debate. The Government also faced a legal challenge by public sector trade unions – including Unison, Unite, the Fire Brigades Union, teachers' union NASUWT, the National Union of Teachers, the National Association of Retired Police Officers and the Civil Service Pensioners' Alliance – although the challenge was unsuccessful.

Disruptive public opposition was also witnessed in the form of the public sector pay dispute of 2011 – with the switch from CPI to RPI regularly noted by public sector unions as part of the reason for considering, balloting for, or undertaking strike action – for instance, by the NUT, FBU, the Chartered Society of Physiotherapy, and the FDA. Further, in welcoming the

⁹⁶ For more discussion on recruitment problems within the public sector, see our discussion at:

<https://antiausteritylowresistancecapitalism.wordpress.com/con-dem-coalition-public-sector-pay/>

strike action scheduled to take place in November 2011, and which included several unions striking at the same time – including Unison, UCU, Unite, RMT, PCS, and the teaching unions (it was estimated that up to 2 million people took part in the strike) – the TUC made a direct reference to the RPI/CPI switch, highlighting objections (in the negotiations prior to the strike action) to the “proposed contribution increases, increases in the pension age, *and the impact of the indexation change from RPI to CPI* on which the government’s position remains unchanged” (emphasis added). Similarly, in announcing strike action the TUC stated that, “without any negotiation, the government decided to change the indexation method for pensions – from the RPI to the CPI inflation measure, wiping 15 per cent off the value of public sector pensions at a stroke”.⁹⁷ This strike action was, however, more of a disruptive form of public opposition than it was a militant act of refusal. Militant refusal would have involved an attempt to impose a major and direct impediment to the operation of the government, yet the strike actions were always of the nature of a one or two day strike that posed little substantial threat to the operation of the government and instead represented an attempt to draw attention to the demands being made by those going on strike.

In response to the instances of refusal outlined above, the Government was largely intransigent. It fought the legal challenge raised by the trade unions (and won). It also consistently claimed that the proposal was merely a technical change – that is, the best way in which to measure inflation (and not an attempt to reduce costs). For instance, in defending the move, Pensions Minister Steve Webb argued that, ‘what you want is not a high number or a low number, but the right number, a fair number that reflects the inflation experience of the

⁹⁷ TUC 2011.

people you are indexing for.’ Similarly, in the half-day parliamentary debate held in response to the e-petition, Webb claimed that,

One of the big differences between CPI and RPI in regard to the basket of goods is that the CPI does not include mortgage interest. It is worth pointing out that only 8% of pensioners have a mortgage. Why would we insist on using a basket that gives huge weight to mortgages for a population that hardly ever has a mortgage?⁹⁸

Without instances of militant refusal occurring, which would have signalled a more general level of public anger at the switch, and without any sign that the move could be effectively opposed (such as that which was witnessed with the direct acts of refusal against the workfare scheme), the switch was ultimately successful in being imposed without being significantly obstructed. Much of the opposition to the switch from RPI to CPI was ineffectual; opposition that did occur focused largely on the impact that it would have on pensions and tokenistic one-off strikes, neither of which were able to pose a significant problem for the Government.

Conclusion

This article has sought to shift our attention away from the unobstructed imposition of austerity in the post-2008 crisis context, and towards the acts of refusal that austerity proposals have attracted. As we have sought to document, proposals for austerity have rarely gone unchallenged, and in a number of cases austerity proposals have been substantially impacted upon by instances of different types of refusal. In selecting what are typically considered to be ‘low resistance’ models of capitalism, moreover, we suggest that the impact

⁹⁸ Hansard, 1 Mar 2012, Column 486.

of acts of refusal upon proposals for austerity is likely to be more substantial still within contexts where resistance is more commonplace. As such, the process of austerity policymaking would warrant greater attention being paid to the impact of anti-austerity activity across a broader range of cases. Whereas the political economy of austerity policymaking has thus far focused predominantly on the injustices, irrationality and/or ineffectiveness of the ‘age of austerity’, therefore, there is a risk that this mode of analysis overplays the smoothness with which austerity and welfare retrenchment has been imposed upon advanced industrial democracies. Instead, we argue, there is much to be gained from adopting a viewpoint which stresses the iterative relationship between proposals for austerity and the obstacles that acts of refusal place in their way. In doing so, moreover, we are able to gain more fine grained insight into the impact of different types of refusal. As the present article highlights, obstacles to austerity appear more straightforward to activate in what are typically referred to as coordinated models of capitalism, although (perhaps as a consequence of this) liberal market economies tend to generate more innovative forms of dissent, which - provided they are sufficiently militant - provide an alternative route towards obstructing austerity.

Specifically, we find that in order for substantial impact upon austerity proposals to occur, it is necessary for non-disruptive public opposition to occur. Further, within the CME context of Japan, substantially regressive austerity measures experienced substantial impact as a result of non-disruptive public opposition. In addition, when we see all four forms of refusal in combination – imperceptible, non-disruptive and disruptive opposition, and militant refusal – witnessed substantial impact upon the initial proposal for austerity. In contrast, the smooth imposition of austerity measures required an absence of militant refusal, and when this was

coupled with substantially regressive austerity proposals in the LME context the combination was sufficient to ensure that this smooth imposition would occur. One objection to this argument that might be made is that those who advocate austerity will already include a consideration of likely opposition when making their proposals for austerity. Indeed, this is the case.⁹⁹ We have sought to take this possibility into account through our inclusion of the ‘scale’ condition. Thus, we might anticipate that advocates of austerity will adjust the scale of their proposals depending upon the level of refusal anticipated. One possibility is that ‘ambitious’ proposals for austerity are advanced, with the expectation that these will be subsequently downscaled in the light of predictable episodes of refusal – in which case the ‘success’ of refusal might be considered to be somewhat less than the present study appears to suggest. In contrast, however, as the present study shows, it is an absence of militant refusal (in LME contexts) that results in austerity measures going ahead unimpeded. As such, those advocating austerity appear to push ‘ambitious’ austerity measures through to completion if there is a lack of militant opposition. That is, even if refusal is anticipated, its non-activation (and therefore also its activation) nevertheless appears to have an impact upon the final outcome of the austerity process.

Finally, with regard to the potential for further research, there remains a question of both limited diversity and generalisability. With fourteen cases and six causal conditions there is unavoidably an issue with limited diversity and a relatively large number of logical remainders in the comparative analysis. This is, in part, dealt with through the use of theory-guided expectations regarding so-called ‘easy counterfactuals’, which enables us to achieve a

⁹⁹ On this issue, and the impact that it has upon our ability to measure the effect of resistance to austerity, see especially Bailey 2015.

plausible 'intermediate' solution that is neither excessively complex (as in the conservative solution) nor based on unfounded assumptions (as in the parsimonious solution). Nevertheless, extension of the study to a greater number of cases or country-contexts would clearly improve the analysis further still. It is unclear, moreover, the degree to which the findings represent country-specific or variety of capitalism-specific effects. That is, whether we could expect the same kind of processes to occur in other CMEs, such as Germany, or LMEs, such as the US. In a comparison of only two country-contexts this limitation is unavoidable, and therefore also suggests that further research of alternative country-contexts would be warranted. The considerably more vibrant experience of innovative movements such as Occupy in the US case suggest that there might be similarities across particular varieties of capitalism. But this would require that we engage in further and more sustained qualitative comparative analysis into the process of austerity, and especially the acts of refusal that constitute the process of anti-austerity.

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Online Appendix: Calibration

The following sets out the scoring system for each of the indicators discussed in the article.

Scores are presented in parentheses.

Outcome of interest: substantial impact of refusal?

This was made up of the following elements:

1. Obstacles?

One obstacle experienced – mild (0.5)

Two obstacles – moderate (1)

Three obstacles or more – substantial (2)

2. Adopted?

With no concessions (0)

With minor concessions (1)

With moderate concessions (2)

With substantial concessions (4)

3. Consequences?

Mild (0.5)

Moderate (1)

Substantial (2)

In cases where the proposal for austerity was not adopted, we considered the proposal for austerity to have been capitulated upon, and therefore marked it with the highest mark possible (9).

The total score for the impact of refusal was subsequently calculated by adding together the figure for each of these three elements.

The calibration of the impact score was subsequently assessed as any outcome with a total score of 4 and above was considered to be a case where substantial impact had occurred as a result of the acts of refusal experienced (that is, any austerity that was adopted was done so only with substantial concessions, or with moderate concessions and substantial obstacles and consequences as a result of the refusal experienced). For the purposes of the fsQCA, we considered a score of 6 to be fully in the set of outcomes in which substantial impact had occurred as a result of acts of refusal, 2 to be fully out, and 3.9 to be the turning point.

Condition 1: substantial proposal for austerity? (scale)

This was calculated by combining two of the conditions in table 1, as follows:

Severity:

Mild (1)

Moderate (2)

High (3)

Target:

Insiders (1)

Universal/sectoral (2)

Outsiders (3)

The *scale* condition was then calculated by adding the two scores together – giving a total score for the scale of the austerity measure that combined the degree to which it could be considered to have an impact in terms of welfare retrenchment, and the degree to which the measure would have a regressive effect.

The calibration of the *scale* score was subsequently assessed so that any score of 4 or above was considered to be a case where the proposal for austerity was substantial.

For the purposes of the fsQCA, we considered a score of 5 to be fully in the set of proposals where the proposal for austerity was substantial, 3 to be fully out, and 3.9 to be the turning point.

Condition 2: coordinated model of capitalism? (CME)

Each of the Japanese cases were scored 1 (fully in the set of CMEs) and each of the UK cases were scored 0 (fully out).

Conditions 3, 4, 5, 6: significant refusal?

Each of the four different types of refusal (*impercept, non-disrupt, disrupt, militant*) were given a score as follows:

No such acts of refusal (0)

Limited acts of such refusal (1)

Moderate levels of acts of such refusal (2)

Substantial levels of acts of such refusal (3)

The calibration of the score for each type of refusal was subsequently assessed so that any score above 1 was considered to be a case where the proposal for austerity was substantial. For the purposes of the fsQCA, we considered a score of 2 to be fully in the set of cases where the level of refusal of that particular type had been significant, 1 to be fully out, and 1.5 to be the turning point.

Table A.1: Fuzzy-set truth table: Substantial impact on austerity proposals

Scale	Imper- ceptible dissent	Non- disruptive public opposition	Disruptive public opposition	Militant refusal	CME	No.	Impact	raw consist.	PR con
1	0	1	0	0	1	3	1	0.930894	0.9
1	1	1	1	1	0	2	1	0.974359	0.9
1	1	1	0	0	1	2	1	0.968153	0.9
1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0.02551	0
1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0.038095	0
1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.047619	0
1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0.103448	0
0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0.733766	0.5
0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.752381	0.6

Table A.2. Parsimonious analysis of sufficient conditions for substantial impact upon proposals for austerity

Solution	<i>cme*scale</i>	+	<i>militant</i>
cases	Tax hike I (JP), Tax hike II (JP), zero overtime (JP), DWL amendment (JP), pension reform (JP)		workfare (UK), university tuition fees (UK)
raw	0.47		0.25
coverage			
unique	0.47		0.25
coverage			
consistency	0.95		0.97
solution			0.72
coverage			
solution			0.95
consistency			

Table A.3. Conservative analysis of sufficient conditions for substantial impact upon proposals for austerity

Solution	$non.disrupt*cme*$ $scale*~disrupt*~$ $militant$	+	$militant*disrupt*non.disrupt*impercept*$ $scale*~CME$
cases	Tax hike I (JP), Tax hike II (JP), zero overtime (JP), DWL amendment (JP), pension reform (JP)		workfare (UK), university tuition fees (UK)
raw	0.47		0.24
coverage			
unique	0.47		0.24
coverage			
consistency	0.95		0.97
solution			0.71
coverage			
solution			0.95
consistency			