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Dugguh, Lilian dooshima

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## Political Disillusionment and the Fine Line Between Independence and Neo-colonialism in Early Post-colonial Africa: A Literary and Historical Perspective from Senegal with Aminata Sow Fall

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# Political Disillusionment and the Fine Line Between Independence and Neo-colonialism in Early Post-colonial Africa: A Literary and Historical Perspective from Senegal with Aminata Sow Fall

Lilian Dooshima Dugguh

University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK

## ABSTRACT


Focusing on the role of the French empire in the emergence of political disenchantment in the early post-independence Francophone African society, this paper draws from Aminata Sow Fall's literary texts *La Grève des bàttu* (1979) and *L'ex-Père de la nation* (1987) to examine the political history of Senegal. Analysing these texts, we highlight two key aspects in this political history: the continuous external influence and contemptuous complicity of the former colonial power in various aspects of governance in post-independent Francophone African countries, and the complicity of the post-colonial leaders whose limited conceptualisation and interpretation of independence create conducive conditions for disenchantment. I argue that these dynamic influences which impact the validity of independence in Senegal, also represent the reality of many francophone African societies. To foreground the arguments in this article, I shall employ the post-colonial theory which facilitates the understanding of the impact of imperialism on ex-colonies, and sociological criticism which articulates the relationship between these texts and the social realities of the society from whence they emanate, drawing out specific insights about how they align with the interpretation of the chosen literary sources. In conclusion, I proposed that a re-evaluation of the role of internal and external political players is needed for the advancement and genuine emancipation of post-colonial African societies.

## KEYWORDS

Political disenchantment; neocolonialism; post-independence Africa; governance; political power

The colonial authority, however, still watched over the grains. We were in the regime of autonomy of course! Yet, the colonial authority had solid interests to protect within the country. Controlling the key sectors, they had at first observed the leaders with the snide eye of the adult who waits for the call for help from his son:

– Dad, the toy is spoiled!

**CONTACT** Lilian Dooshima Dugguh  [liliandoodugguh@outlook.com](mailto:liliandoodugguh@outlook.com)

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– Ah, ah, ah! ... I told you that it is too complicated for you and you wanted it at all costs.<sup>1</sup>  
Aminata Sow Fall, *L'Ex-père de la nation*, 1987.

## Introduction

For many Francophone African countries, the late 1950s marked the start of a new political trajectory, with the formal independence of many French colonies on the continent. Nations such as the Republic of Senegal, which shared a brief merged federation with the French Soudan called the Mali Federation, broke away from the Federation and became fully independent in 1960. According to the Clinton Whitehouse National Archives, in January 1959, Senegal and the French Soudan merged to form the Mali Federation, which became fully independent on June 20, 1960, as a result of the independence and the transfer of power agreement signed with France on April 4, 1960. Due to internal political difficulties, the Federation broke up on August 20, 1960. Senegal and Soudan (renamed the Republic of Mali) each proclaimed separate independence. Leopold Sedar Senghor, an internationally renowned poet, politician, and statesman, was elected Senegal's first president in August 1960.<sup>2</sup>

Other nations, such as the Republics of Togo, Cote d'Ivoire, and Congo, to mention a few, also experienced domination by French, German, British, Belgian, and Portuguese forces and gained independence in 1960, respectively.<sup>3</sup> This independence was characterised by a huge optimism for economic and socio-political growth and freedom for many African nations. In Senegal, for example, it was consequently celebrated amongst the citizens, particularly the subalterns – the citizens of lower status who suffered from marginalisation and various forms of oppression during the era of colonisation. According to the political scientist Crawford Young, the major trigger for such optimism was the belief that 'with independence and new leaders controlling the abundant resources, they could better meet the expectations of the people.'<sup>4</sup> Considering this general optimistic perception, Augustine Assah notes that 'the accession of the African people to independence marked a decisive turning point in their evolution, giving them the right to create modern states and offering them a chance to become the masters of their destinies.'<sup>5</sup> This meant freedom from the chains of colonialism which, as Assah subtly alludes, was responsible for the many social-political and socio-economic woes experienced by the local population. In other words, the setback Senegal experienced was the result of colonialism and the plundering of the country's resources by the French colonial authorities. Agreeing with Assah's perspective, Jean-Francois Bayart points out that:

The end of the colonial occupation lifted a number of political, economic, and administrative constraints that undermined the aspirations of African capitalists. This allowed them to take control of real estate registration, credit, taxation, marketing boards, public investments, and negotiations with private capital and import.<sup>6</sup>

This opinion suggests that independence created a firm base for the prospective construction of successful economies for the newly independent nations. However, as our analysis will reveal, independence itself was not the sole condition for the realisation of these expectations. This drastic turn in events marked the birth of postcolonial academic approaches, as scholars, activists, journalists, writers, and novelists set out to examine various aspects of the social, economic, and political progress of the independence period with a focus on African leaders and governance in the post-independence era. Emphasising these authors' literary engagement and the use of fiction, Patrick Corcoran in his interview with Ahmadou Kourouma on his novel *Les Soleils des indépendances*, revealed that 'whenever he [Kourouma] picked up his pen, it was to denounce political practices and situations that he considered intolerable'.<sup>7</sup> It is worth noting that while some female writers such as Mariama Ba, Calixthe Belaya, Fatou Keita, and Veronique Tadjó also criticised aspects of the society that affected women, particularly patriarchy, Aminata Sow Fall's approach adopted a holistic approach that interrogated both social and political issues as influenced by both African leaders and the ex-colonial authority. For example, when analysing *L'Ex-père de la nation*, which we shall henceforth refer to as LEPN, we agree with Peter Hawkins, who notes that Sow Fall 'highlights the fragility of democratic situations in post-independence Africa, the problems of corruption, the unscrupulous lust for power, and the cynical complicity of the former colonial ruler'.<sup>8</sup>

Foregrounding this perspective with the problems of corruption and the complicity of the colonial ruler as factors responsible for disenchantment in post-independence in French-speaking Africa, Kourouma explains that this was, for him, an inspiration when he wrote *Les Soleils des indépendances*:

I wanted to write something to testify, to say that my comrades were unjustly arrested. Having said that, I could have given a true account, but such an essay on Houphouët at that time could not have been possible because Houphouët was very powerful and supported by French and Western politics. So that would not have been the best option. Thus, I wrote it in the form of fiction.<sup>9</sup>

Kourouma's concerns above align with Sow Fall's literary engagement in Fall's *La Grève des bàttu*<sup>10</sup> and *L'ex-père de la nation*, which highlights three main aspects: first, the dominance of African leaders, second, the influence of France and its politics in the French-speaking region of Africa, and third the role of literary fiction in criticising these social and political realities. This is why we have chosen the above-named corpus to carry out an in-depth analysis of the first twenty years post-independence in Senegal. The corpus not only provides key evidence to foreground and establish how the ex-colonial powers and post-colonial leaders were active influencers of political disenchantment experienced during the early years after independence but also allows us to focus on how the literary readings capture the experience and character of

the fine line which highlights colonial influences and irresponsible governance in post-colonial Senegal. These texts help to deepen the arguments posed by this paper as they allow us to establish the complex dynamics that exist between independence, neocolonialism, and the current precarious socio-political situation of Francophone African countries. The arguments presented by this paper will fall under the following headings: (1) theoretical approach (2) understanding independence and the two-factor approach (3) a fine line between independence and neo-colonialism: the impoverishment of Africa and the role of France (4) political disenchantment in post-independence Senegal: the role of post-colonial leaders. In making these arguments, I respond to the established historiography presented by researchers such as Serge Michel and Michel Beuret, Frederick Cooper, Antoine Glaser and Stephen Smith, and Jean-Pierre Bat.<sup>11</sup> I further develop and build on their critical concepts and ideas regarding independence, exploring how these notions are not only applicable to post-colonial Senegal but also extend to other Francophone African nations. Engaging with the works of Mathieu Petithomme<sup>12</sup> and Albert Memmi<sup>13</sup>, I critique the policies and governing approaches of post-colonial African leaders who, in the post-independence era, have replicated and reproduced colonial practices.

### ***Theoretical Approach***

To support our analysis, we will refer to two relevant bodies of theory, post-colonial theory and the theory of sociological criticism. According to Kathleen Wininger, 'post-colonialism emerged as an umbrella term conceptualising processes of reconstituting economic and cultural health in the period after colonial occupation.'<sup>14</sup> The post-colonial theory, as elaborated by Bill Ashcroft et al. in *The Empire Writes Back*, is known as one of the most significant published works analysing the relationship between postcolonial texts and their relationship with bigger issues of postcolonial culture.<sup>15</sup> It facilitates the understanding of the impact of imperialism on ex-colonies, exposing the depth of the harm caused by the colonising process and suggesting a variety of strategies to be employed in rebuilding post-colonial culture. Further developing this perspective that hinges on colonialism and its damages, Groden et al. state that the post-colonial theory also engages with the impacts and the consequences of 'the continuous preoccupations between the colonial and postcolonial periods'.<sup>16</sup> From Groden's perspective, although ex-colonial territories now live in the post-independence era, there exists significant influence from the ex-colonial authorities. It is worth noting that key post-colonial theorists such as Ashcroft, Bayart, and Young, via critical engagements, affirm the notion of the fine line as they investigate the impact and influence of colonialism and neo-colonialism on post-independent Africa as we shall see later in the article. This influence, which is mostly negative and felt across various sectors of society, is highlighted in fiction as authors, through literary engagement,

criticise and call for the end of such neo-colonial relationships. The role played by these writers is best analysed through the lenses of sociological criticism.

According to Kennedy and Gioia, sociological criticism ‘examines literature in the cultural, economic and political context in which it is written or received.’<sup>17</sup> Elaborating on this perspective, Zeydel notes that; ‘if we wish to study an individual writer with regard to race, society, and environmental influence upon a generation, we must determine first the nature of the collective life which surrounded him and which explains the “influence” of his work.’<sup>18</sup> This perspective enables us to frequently resort to literature for evidence when we study the social realities of a given community, as we do in this article, which examines the political history of Senegal during the early years of independence. The application of these two theories will provide us with theoretical instruments to understand our analysis as we highlight the roles of the major political actors of the period, as demonstrated in Aminata Sow Fall’s *L’Ex-père de la nation* (LEPN) and *La Grève des battû* (LGDB).

### ***Understanding Independence and the Two-factor Approach***

Independence in 1960, according to Young, ‘was celebrated as a mood of optimism’<sup>19</sup>, and for many nations such as Senegal, it provided an opportunity for African leaders to control the nation and provide better social and economic conditions for the people. Moreover, with the resources available, there was hardly any possibility of failing in the duty of building the African nations that had been exploited by colonisation. This explains why in LEPN, Madiama’s election was widely celebrated because:

His election was a sign of the triumph of the trade union movement and the guarantee of safeguarding the interests of workers and the rights of all citizens. They heralded an era of social justice where work and the moral qualities of the individual would be the only criteria for promotion. ‘No more scheming, no more nepotism, no more tricks, no more privilege, and no more handouts as experienced during the previous era.’<sup>20</sup>

The above quotation, which underscores the people’s jubilation, underlined three main aspects: their experience during the colonial era, the hope that accompanied the new administration, and the responsibilities of the new leaders such as Madiama. Similarly, in LGDB, a similar responsibility is expected of Mour Ndiaye’s as the director of public health, particularly because less privileged and poorer citizens also hoped to live under improved conditions in the post-independence Senegal. However, as our analysis will reveal, independence itself was not the sole condition for the realisation of these expectations.

Influenced by diverse socio-political situations, as we shall see, the anticipated outcome of independence in most Francophone African countries took two unprecedented directions. Firstly, the colonial authority continued to interfere in the socio-political affairs of the former colonies, and secondly, the new

post-colonial regimes plunged into the abyss of political corruption and the mismanagement of resources. The continuous colonial presence, as examined in LEPN, significantly affected Madiama's administration, which was already experiencing financial and socio-economic crises. This caused an irreconcilable difference between his policies for the development of the country and those indirectly introduced by the former colonial power. The indirect introduction of policies implemented by the former colonial authority was made possible through the exploitation of the problems experienced by the new leadership, a situation that presents the chicken and egg dialectic<sup>21</sup> which seeks to identify which aspect should be considered the cause, and which can be considered the effect. According to Fenwick:

While England wanted to exploit resources and create a profitable environment for its settler communities, France espoused an additional goal of transforming the African populations within its sphere of influence into French citizens. Nowhere is this effort epitomized better than in Senegal. These different approaches affected the type of colonial rule and the postcolonial relationship in an elemental way. As reflected in the case of Senegal.<sup>22</sup>

Elaborating on the case of Senegal, in LEPN we discover that Madiama's administration was confronted with, and gravely affected by drought. Sow Fall's ability to capture this in LEPN, reflects my position on sociological criticism, where I argue that literary texts enable writers to represent their society, allowing them to link societal realities to the literary work produced. For example, focusing on the drought in Senegal, Roquet notes that, 'Senegal, which is, for part of its territory, a Saharan country, is regularly subjected to severe droughts.'<sup>23</sup> The drought experienced in Senegal, also impacted other neighbouring Sahel-Saharan countries as highlighted in LEPN. As a result of the drought, the people suffered greatly from a range of drought-related problems such as poor harvests, lack of potable water, negative health impacts, and serious financial difficulties. Thus, Madiama was obliged to seek international aid:

The drought had persisted. Two consecutive years without a harvest. This is hard on a country that relies almost exclusively on rainfall for its livelihood. The south of the country had not been dried as elsewhere but, had recorded a significant drop in rainfall that had seriously compromised food crops. International assistance was needed to keep the state alive and to provide a minimum food supply for the rural population.<sup>24</sup>

Examining the explanation above, one question that comes to mind is: as a ruler of an independent nation, why did Madiama resort to foreign aid to keep the state alive and to provide for the people? In an attempt to respond to this question, Moustafa (2010) reveals that there are two types of independence: political independence and economic independence. The dependent relationship between these two aspects means a country's political independence is



insufficient to make the desired impact on the growth and stability of any nation. He argues that:

If there is one area that Africa in general, and French-speaking Africa in particular, abandoned in the aftermath of independence, it is that of money, that is, the economy. Today, Africa is in search of its economic independence [...] without which political independence would be but mere words.<sup>25</sup>

Emphasising the above, Laura Fenwick<sup>26</sup> and Yunusa Salami<sup>27</sup> state that in reality, many African nations remained under the economic, political, and cultural control of their former rulers. As evident in the history of many African countries, the achievement of political or flag independence did not automatically translate into economic or cultural independence.<sup>28</sup> Building on this and on Moustafa's argument, it is important to explain why the economic aspect of most African countries – especially Francophone countries seem to suffer the most and this can be linked to the Negritude movement.<sup>29</sup>

This movement and the collective ideologies that accompanied the struggle for independence greatly influenced the post-independence leaders, and to many, independence meant a political force based on national liberation, the proclamation of otherness, and the rejection of all that is not African. According to Wilder, Negritude, whether embraced or criticised, was treated as an affirmative theory of Africanity rather than a critical theory of modernity.<sup>30</sup> Although this was a necessary step to eliminate the culture of assimilation and colonial influence, early post-colonial leaders were preoccupied with this aspect. As a result, other aspects of development, such as financial stability and growth, were neglected. It is worth noting that there were also Negritude pioneers, such as Nkrumah, who strongly advocated for key development policy interventions. Nkrumah's perspective on the capitalist global economy<sup>31</sup> as a means to achieve complete independence served as a foundation for his advocacy.

Linking this Negritudian perspective of Africanness mentioned above to both the argument we have just made and to LEPN, we understand that the lack of financial strength triggered the need for foreign aid and this is why Madiama had to rely on foreign aid for support. Following this financial setback, anti-colonial leaders began to renew ties and build relations with the former colonial authorities in order to benefit from financial support. Elaborating on this point of view, Mathieu Petithomme, highlighting Verschave and Hauser's observations,<sup>32</sup> states that:

Houphouët Boigny, the first president of the independent Ivory Coast, is an example that particularly highlights how an important anti-colonial leader nevertheless became one of France's main allies on the African continent, allowing for the intensification of interpersonal partnerships at the highest level of the state, and leading France to the unconditional support of the latter in exchange for privileged investment opportunities such as in the case of cocoa exploitation.<sup>33</sup>

These new alliances provided a perfect backdrop for the *Françafrique* platform. This *mot-valise* which was created by Verschave in 1998,<sup>34</sup> is also attributed to Houphouët Boigny and has been used, to sum up the relationship and plans between France and its ex-colonies after the 1960s. According to Bat<sup>35</sup>, the term 'Françafrique' is attributed to Ivorian President Félix Houphouët Boigny, who is said to have coined the expression to testify to the unique quality of the links and common objectives between Ivory Coast and France.<sup>36</sup> It should be noted that Houphouët Boigny was a highly respected leader in the Francophone African region and was seen by many as a model for other leaders of this region, especially for his anti-colonial policies. Thus, given that he became favourably disposed towards a new relationship with the former colonial power, other Francophone leaders followed his example and began forging relationships with their ex-colonial masters within the framework of what has been described as *Françafrique*. This perspective that highlights these foreign ties has been elaborated by Frederick Cooper's work on the gatekeeper state<sup>37</sup> where he employs the term gatekeeper state to refer to a form of government in which the leaders of weak states survive via the interface and relations between their nation and ex-colonial powers. According to Dorman, 'the "gatekeeper" model has proved particularly useful because it identifies the distinctive linkages between politics and economics in African states.'<sup>38</sup>

Taking these new links into consideration, we understand why in LEPN, the ex-colonial government pledges friendship and support to Madiama and the people: 'through our friendship, we are obliged to offer you advice [...] With Madiama we will be by your side in case of difficulties'.<sup>39</sup> We shall discover that this mutual friendship and act of benevolence created a system of chronic dependence in the colonies and opened new pathways for subsequent domination. This led the colonies to unexpected immobility which would later become responsible for the second wave of disenchantment experienced in post-independence Africa.

### ***A Fine Line Between Independence and Neo-colonialism: The Impoverishment of Africa and the Role of France***

Engaging with the role of France in Africa, it is imperative to mention the *Françafrique* platform. *Françafrique* is concerned with relations between France and Sub-Saharan Africa, specifically those between France and French-speaking Sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>40</sup> According to Ba, the expression France-Afrique can be attributed to Ivorian President Félix Houphouët-Boigny, who allegedly invented it to attest to the unique quality of the links between Côte d'Ivoire and France, and their community of objectives.<sup>41</sup> These links, as we shall see, quickly transformed into an opportunity for Sub-Saharan African to be exploited, ultimately benefitting France which gained control over crucial sectors of the economy: defence, politics, and finance.

These international ties maintained by France and its ex-colonies have continued to be investigated in recent times with critiques such as Charbonneau who have questioned investigate whether 'French involvement in Africa is really in the interest of Africa or whether French interventions have continued to deny Africans political freedom and sustain their current social, political, and economic conditions.<sup>42</sup> Researchers such as Glaser and Smith note that in terms of security, there was a strong influence of the French army in Francophone African countries even after the Cold War. They assert that:

The presence of large 'pre-positioned' forces was a key element of the French shield. At the end of the Cold War, Paris maintained nearly ten thousand men permanently in sub-Saharan Africa: Gabon, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Chad, Central African Republic, and Djibouti.<sup>43</sup>

Apart from an active military presence, France, in its capacity as the ex-colonial authority, largely influenced the choice and succession of some political regimes of the Francophone African region. Michel and Beuret, accentuating the influence of President Charles de Gaulle in a number of coups that took place in Africa, note that:

Jacques Foccart's 'Françafrique' network, 'Mr. Africa' since de Gaulle, has applauded the winners of the state's coup. General Gnassingbé Eyadema in Togo in 1967. General Lansana Conté in Guinea in 1984. Captain Blaise Campaoré in Burkina Faso, who signed 'The Land of Men of Integrity' and its president Thomas Sankara in 1987 with the support of France. In 1990, the putschist Idriss Deby came to power in Chad under the influence of Paris.<sup>44</sup>

Reflecting this dominance in LEPN, Madiama presents the situation in the following words: 'Actually I was not governing. The army, defence, finance, all key sectors were still controlled by the colonial authority as in the time of autonomy.'<sup>10</sup> Precisely speaking, he reveals that 'the colonial authority, however, still looked after the grain. We were in a regime of autonomy, [...] and the colonial authorities still had very strong interests to protect in the country.'<sup>45</sup> By mentioning the period of autonomy, Madiama alludes to the era marked by the policy of decentralisation that preceded independence. Providing some context regarding the Senegalese society during the period of autonomy, Gerti Hesselning<sup>46</sup> states that:

In 1956, Senegal was provided for the first time with organs similar to the French ones: a government council and a parliament. Both still functioned in a context of dependence. In 1959, almost all of France's African colonies gained internal autonomy within the federal framework of the French Community.<sup>47</sup>

Analysing this point of view in comparison to the political state of affairs in the post-independence era, we argue that the Senegalese society of the post-independence era is zero different. The new reality seemed to extinguish the real achievements/potential of independence as people had experiences that were

not different from what they had had during the period of autonomy. Foregrounding this view, in relation to post-colonial theory, we understand that with the presence of colonial authority and their control of the major sectors of the nation, as earlier reported by Madiama, it was indeed impossible for African leaders to meet the expectations that accompanied independence. Based on this, we can safely assume that independence was more or less a trap, a conscious deceptive step that was taken by the colonial authorities to keep the colonies under their control. This argument is based on the hypothesis that the ex-colonial authority knew that without full control of key sectors as mentioned above, the new leaders were, sooner rather than later, going to seek the aid of the ex-colonial authorities. This sequence of events plays out in LEPN in Madiama's narrative, in which he compares the colonial authority to a parent berating a child (21) as captured in the quotation at the opening of this article. Indeed, as emphasised by Madiama, 'but a country is not an innocent toy. The colonial authority knew this and had foreseen the upheavals that were likely to result from the plundering of the country's resources at an accelerated pace.'<sup>48</sup>

Countering the arguments of France plundering resources from Africa and influencing the underdevelopment of Francophone-African countries, some critics have attempted to exonerate France from the contemporary legacy and impacts of its colonial history. One example of such an approach is the argument offered by Glaser and Smith that:

France does not have the intentions and influence it is accorded. According to Nicolas Sarkozy, nor does not cling to a zone of exclusive French influence on the continent. It is, therefore, necessary to reject 'this obsessive idea that the relationship between Africa and France would be one of exclusivity.' [...]! However, there is no question of burdening France with all the ills of Africa.<sup>49</sup>

Furthermore, when referring to Raymond Aron's opinion in two of his works, *La Tragédie Algérienne* (1957)<sup>50</sup> and *L'Algérie et la République* (1958),<sup>51</sup> Glaser and Smith explain that: 'Neither the wealth, nor the greatness, nor the future of France depends on Africa', because 'rebuilding the strength of France means building housing, laboratories, factories, or, alternatively if you will, an atomic bomb.'<sup>52</sup> Irrespective of these opinions, recent research by Pickett notes that even though France has alluded to not owing its wealth to its colonies, the relations between France and its ex-colonies have remained one-sided.

Speaking of a small country like Gabon, that might not be surprising, but for a country, the size of Côte d'Ivoire to be highly reliant on goods manufactured in Europe. Attempts to attract investment into manufacturing industries have been made in both countries to no avail, but investment into raw resource extraction has been consistent.<sup>53</sup>

It would be safe to allude to President Macron's recent visits to Francophone Africa and proposal for equal partnership in economic affairs, as a strategy to

maintain ties in order to continue benefiting from these nations' resources. For example, Faure notes that in African nations such as Senegal, there is:

the presence of large French multinationals, which have quasi-monopolies and are sometimes awarded public contracts in opaque circumstances. This has not only sparked tensions in countries like Senegal, it has also fed frustration among citizens who feel their country has achieved political independence, but has yet to emancipate from France economically.<sup>54</sup>

These dominant ties would be the birth of continuous dependency in Africa. African leaders and their continued dependence on the wealth and support of the ex-colonial authority had a negative impact on French-speaking African countries. In fact, these would be the factors that strategically impoverished and also facilitated the non-fulfilment of the objectives of independence for these nations. Illustrating this in LEPN, Madiama highlights that the financial aid and the debt he receives from its Northern partners (which in this case represents the former colonial power) was nothing compared to what he repaid. Madiama's administration, by relying on the ex-colonial authority for economic aid, ended up in the strong grip of the ex-masters, resulting in a failure to achieve the goals and objectives of his administration. In addition, because every resource was being exploited to offset the debt accumulated over time, and given that the debt attracted a huge amount of interest, this ended up impoverishing the nation. As Madiama explains:

[...]For the last three or four years, we have been operating painfully thanks to the money they are willing to lend us on their terms... We are now at over six hundred million dollars. Can we ever pay them back! It feels like we are caught in a spider's web.<sup>55</sup>

In Dugguh's analysis of Madiama's case as presented above, we note that while Madiama needed Western help to solve the problems he encountered, the aid from the West was rather a kind of exchange that gradually led the country to an economic and political immobility.<sup>56</sup> This situation which we call in this article 'active instrumentalization of neocolonialism' created and amplified the new system of dependency. According to Ardant:

Neocolonialism designates, in accordance with etymology, new forms of colonialism. It characterizes a policy pursued by the former colonial powers in their relations with their former colonies, which had become sovereign, tending to maintain or restore these territories in a certain dependence, generally through economic links. It differs from colonialism in that it brings together politically sovereign states and that the domination sought is mainly in the economic domain.<sup>57</sup>

Ardant's definition above provides a reflection of Madiama's situation vis-à-vis the reality of post-independence as we have just examined in the previous page. Elaborating on how this touched the wider Francophone society, we note that existed during the first 30 years after Senegal's independence, certain monetary

laws were put in place by the former colonial power which drastically affected the economic growth of French-speaking regions. An example of one of these laws is the devaluation of CFA (the West African CFA franc). According to Michel and Beuret, 'in January 1994, the CFA was devalued by half in fourteen countries (including Senegal). This act which was a shock for an Africa unprepared for global competition caused massive impoverishment of the population.'<sup>58</sup>

Further to this, It is fair to say that in recent years the advocates of monetary liberation have won the intellectual debate around the CFA franc. Most of those interested in the subject acknowledge its anachronistic and colonial nature, the severe restrictions imposed on its users, and its fairly disastrous long-term economic performance.<sup>59</sup> The disastrous long term effect directly links to the birth of dependency which Ashcroft and Griffith's opine that it offers an explanation for the continued impoverishment of colonised 'Third World' countries on the grounds that underdevelopment is not internally generated but a structural condition of global capitalism itself.<sup>60</sup> Examining the post-colonial French relations in post-colonial francophone Africa vis-a-vis global capitalism, one can deduce that the role of francophone nations was and continues to be the provision of the necessary resources needed by the world powers – France to thrive as it is in this case. Foregrounding this perspective, Matunhu notes that.

Europe capitalized has capitalised on its encounter with Africa. As such, organized herself, accumulated capital gained from her colonies in Africa, shrewdly invested the surplus in productive economy, steadfastly increasing national wealth and riches for its people. Africa was and continues to be dominated economically as well as politically by external centres of power. Most noticeable here is the economic, political and cultural dependence of the continent upon America and Europe.<sup>61</sup>

This parasitic relationship as seen in Madiama's case, further underscores the complex post-colonial relationship that post-colonial theorists such as Young, Bart Moore, have engaged with in their critical writings. These collective opinions validate the fact that there is no denying the impact of neocolonialism in Africa. However, the article has thus far proposed that the very first error made by the post-colonial African leaders was to have either accepted or extended an invitation to the ex-colonial power for international collaboration as we have seen in relation to the France-Afrique platform. This gesture as we would analyse, represents the dusk of the complicity of post-independence leaders and in the underdevelopment and political disenchantment of their respective countries. This will therefore represent the centrepiece of our analysis in the next section.

### **Political Disillusionment in the Post-independence Era: The Role of Post-colonial Leaders**

This article has thus far suggested that the very first error made by the post-colonial African leaders was to have either extended an invitation to the ex-

colonial power for international collaboration, especially on the France-Afrique platform, or to have either accepted such proposals. These relations have been identified to mark the beginning of the complicity of African leaders in the failure and non-realisation of goals of independence. It also paved the way for the neo-colonial experience which brought about the second wave of disenchantment experienced in the history of the Francophone African people. Developing this argument with regard to the neocolonial experience and appeals for foreign aid, Memmi reveals that:

The world's emerging nations have been independent for fifty years; they have had time to reform and eliminate, if they really wanted to, the negative sequela of their earlier state of subjection. [...] why haven't these nations found, or tried to find in themselves the necessary strength to advance? [...] why do they continuously beg for aid from the ex-colonizer? How can a country demand independence and at the same time ask for continued subsidies from the former colonizer?<sup>62</sup>

The pertinent questions raised by Memmi are pointers to the possibility that the new leaders can and could have resisted neocolonialism, rejected dependency, and sought to explore inner strength or even regain control of all the key sectors of the economy that were hijacked by the ex-colonial authorities. However, we note that failing to do so, they like the colonial authorities, were caught up by diverse interests and priorities that did not include the well-being of their people. Elaborating on this perspective, Petithomme reveals that:

In general, postcolonial political culture has witnessed the clear failure of nationalist and independent emancipation ideologies. Rather than trying to promote the economic development and political democratization of their countries through an authentic national project, many post-colonial elites have relegated their ideals of emancipation and progress, while taking advantage of their positions of power to obtain personal benefits<sup>63</sup>

Foregrounding the opinion above, in LEPN, Sow Fall provides an explanation of the new dimension of governance which was adopted by the new leaders stating that:

like hungry people on whom the manna had fallen, the new leaders had rushed on the goods of the country to satisfy their whims, those of their families, and those of their friends. The ministerial cabinets were family or regional cells where privileges were shared in secretive affinities.<sup>64</sup>

Highlighting the aspect of sharing privileges with close affinities, Gudayi in her analysis of LEPN, reveals that pioneers of such ideologies are family members as she points to Madiama's wife, Yande, who emphasises that he prioritises the wellbeing of his family over that of the citizens.

Madiama had better think of his own while he is alive and in charge of the affairs of the country, grabbing public goods, in order to preserve a better future for his family, instead of wasting time trying to improve the daily life of the people.<sup>65</sup>

These collective opinions above lead us to realise that the misplacement of priorities represents one of the principal features of post-independence leaders, and sets the stage for the institution of underdevelopment policies. Referring to Memmi's perspective on this aspect of misplaced priorities, we share his personal experience meeting with an African ambassador. According to him:

A few years ago, during a friendly meeting with an ambassador of a third-world nation, we happened to ask about his country's efforts to fight poverty. It seemed to us that this would be a priority. We were naive. He answered us, with some embarrassment, by listing the other efforts equally important as far as he was concerned, that his government was responsible for. We had just discovered much to our astonishment that for a number of third-world governments, the elimination of poverty was not their major concern.<sup>66</sup>

Drawing from this experience, we infer that gaining independence and having new leaders is not a ticket to growth and liberation. We argue that in addition to those, is the calibre of leaders elected and so far, none has prioritised the well-being of the citizens. For example, in LGDB, Sow Fall draws our attention to the situation of the people, a large population who experienced abject poverty and resorted to begging. Given that the city was overrun with beggars and the situation continued to make headlines in the news, Mour Ndiaye the Director of Public Health in LGDB considers this a major problem and decides to rid the city of the beggars as we see below:

This morning again the newspaper wrote about it; these beggars, these talibés, these lepers, these physically diminished, these rags, constitute human encumbrances. It is necessary to rid the city of these men – shadows of men rather – human waste.<sup>67</sup>

Examining the passage above whilst considering the year this literary piece was produced we understand that more than twenty years after independence, post-colonial leaders had not yet put in place the modalities to address the issue of poverty. Instead, conditions continued to worsen. Although at independence, it was hoped that with the African leaders in control of the continent's abundant resources, they would prioritise the needs of the subaltern and consciously seek the means to fundamentally improve their conditions. However, as exemplified by the case of the beggars, the reverse is the case. To attend to the beggars, the Director of Public Health Mour Ndiaye decided to proceed with a project he called 'decluttering the city of human waste'. That is to say, to keep all beggars away from the city. According to Mour Ndiaye, these beggars were undesirable parasites who must be driven out of the city in case they undermine economic development. In LGDB he insists on the following:

We have to do the right thing to make these people disappear. [...] their presence undermines the prestige of our country; it is a wound that must be hidden, at least, in the city. [...] we cannot let them invade us, threaten public health and the national economy.<sup>68</sup>



From Mour Ndiaye's perspective, first of all, we see the implementation of policies of underdevelopment by the leaders who by their actions promote the neglect and marginalisation of the subaltern. At this point, therefore, the subaltern has now experienced disenchantment two times in a row: during the colonial era, and now the post-independence era as they are once again subjected to the same conditions from which they sought to free themselves in the colonial and neo-colonial periods respectively. Given that these problems of domination, oppression, abuse of power, and disrespect for democracy have defiled time leaving the subaltern in a disadvantaged position, it brings us to Gayatri Spivak's arguments on post-independence discourses where she demonstrates concern for the subalterns and wonders 'can the subaltern speak'?<sup>69</sup> This is a fundamental question because both in LEPN and LGDB, there is a clear manifestation of oppression and alienation of the subaltern which Sow Fall has criticised immensely. Analysing the aspect of alienation in LGDB whilst highlighting the complicity of post-independence leaders, we note that Keba Dabo, the deputy director of public health who was given the task to rid the town of all beggars, criticises Mour Ndiaye's decision stating that:

He was shocked to see human beings – however poor they were – undermining their dignity by begging in such a shameful and shameless way. He forgot the hunger and misery that drove some of them to remind the haves that they too exist.<sup>70</sup>

Keba Dabo's criticism of Mour Ndiaye not only highlights the negligence of post-independence leaders, which can be seen in the suffering of the masses, but it also stresses the misplaced priorities of leaders. Taking the case of Mour Ndiaye as an example, we understand that instead of ensuring beggars are fed, housed, and possibly hired to carry out small jobs to earn a living, he insists that they rather be removed from the city to avoid disrupting the tranquillity of the tourists. According to him:

this year, the number of tourists has dropped significantly compared to last year, and these people certainly have something to do with it. [...] these tourists spend large sums of money to come to us ... when these tourists visit the city, they are besieged by beggars, and they may not come back or create negative propaganda to discourage those who would like to come.<sup>71</sup>

This submission falls under the aspect of promoting a Tourist economy and underscores the misplacement of priorities by the new leaders who continue to prioritise the well-being of foreigners yet neglect the needs of the citizens. Ndiaye's position above can also be likened to the figure of speech called the vaccine which has been analysed by Roland Barthes in *Mythologies* (1957).<sup>72</sup> The vaccine, according to Barthes, consists of deliberately admitting, and drawing attention to some more superficial flaw in order to detract from the more significant one. Aligning this explanation with Ndiaye's demonstration of misplaced priorities, we see that the *superficial flaw* in Ndiaye's case is

hunting and banning ‘undesirable’ beggars from the city, while the *significant flaw* which he tries to detract from, is his failure to implement policies that directly aim to tackle and eradicate the root causes of mendicity – poverty and unemployment.

Examining another perspective of Keba Dabo’s criticism of Ndiaye’s policies, we are shown that Dabo is an ornamental deputy who lacks the courage to openly share his reservation with his superior, an approach that makes him complicit in the implementation of policies that negatively impact local citizens. Stressing the complicity of deputies in the failed state of post-independence francophone nations as highlighted in LEPN, we observe that Madiama’s administration is also affected by the actions and inactions of his associates and advisors. Considering Andru the special adviser, for example, we can see that he is an agent of the ex-colonial authority and, thus, a vessel through which the ex-colonial power monitored and implemented policies in the form of advice. Those policies, sought above all, to advance the cause and the will of colonial power to the detriment of the people. Taking into account another example in the character of Bambi, the Minister of Agriculture, we note that in his reports following Madiama’s inquiry into the impact of drought on food distribution and crop storage, he masks and manipulates the real state of affairs, emphasising that:

Everything is fine, Excellency. Nobody will suffer from this drought. The farmers have more foresight than we think. They still have cereals and also animals from which they can draw substantial resources. Famine does not threaten them, although they always take advantage of such circumstances to demonstrate extreme poverty.

– Is this what you really think!

–Yes, Excellency, I have examined the situation on the ground. Nothing to worry about ... [...] (47)<sup>73</sup>

Following Bambi’s submission, Andru adds that ‘There are enough reserves to last until the next winter’ (48). With the statement that ‘everything is fine’, both Bambi and Andru cynically suggest that Madiama should impose taxes on the crops, even if the people have not reaped anything: ‘That’s why I even thought that to help them we could, for example, allow them to pay the tax in two or three tranches. This would lessen the tax burden.’<sup>74</sup> The financial oppression and suffering of the people, Bambi and Andru, worsened the situation of the people, who were already complaining: ‘Tiey Allah! Where are we going with the reign of Madiama! It has barely begun, and it looks so “hot”. Even in the days of the White man, we were not plucked like pigeons. Where are we going?’<sup>75</sup> Moving beyond the statesmen, this example raises the complicity of the leadership class, and underscores the calibre of egoistic leaders who would neither provide the right counsel to the statesmen nor provide them with the relevant opportunities to experience the reality of the people in

order to better meet their needs. The relationship between power and leadership as seen here not only greatly influences the rate of dependence in the independence era, but has also enabled the construction and maintenance of destructive political structures that are reflective of colonial dynamics in post-independence thereby underscoring our opinion of the fine line between both eras.

The old man's exclamation and question above is one that continues to resonate with citizens more than 60 years after independence, as the people have continued to wonder what the future holds for the country, its leaders, and its citizens. This is evidenced in Senegal where in recent times between 2007–2008, the nation experiences protests and civil demonstrations, riots, and strikes over many issues such as deteriorating economic conditions and food price hikes. Many called for the resignation of President Abdoulaye Wade whose regime seemed not to cater to the people's wellbeing. These crises escalated in 2010–2011 during the general elections when Abdoulaye Wade attempted to change electoral rules in his favour.<sup>76</sup> A period that also birthed the 'Y'en a Marre' youth movement which actively fought against poor governance, and also called for the total cessation of colonial authorities in the affairs of its ex-colonies.<sup>77</sup> This civic awareness leads us to agree that Sow Fall's literary works were not only a critical representation of the early post-colonial Senegalese society but, also a reminder that political disenchantment has lived from colonial times to the post-colonial period and there remains a lot to be done to be free of neocolonialism and poor governance.

## Notes

1. Sow Fall, *L'ex-père de la nation*, L'autorité coloniale, cependant, veillait encore au grain. On était en régime d'autonomie, pardi ! et elle avait encore des intérêts bien solides à protéger dans le pays. Contrôlant les secteurs névralgiques, elle avait d'abord laissé faire avec l'œil narquois de l'adulte qui attend l'appel au secours de son fils: Papa, le jouet est gâté ! Ah, ah, ah ! ... je t'avais bien dit que c'est trop compliqué pour toi et tu le voulais coûte que coûte. (21) [All translations from French in the article were undertaken by the author of this paper]
2. National Archives, US Department, 3.
3. The republic of Togo, the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 3.
4. Young, *The African Colonial State*, « avec l'indépendance, et les nouveaux leaders contrôlant les abondantes ressources, ils pouvaient mieux répondre aux attentes de la population » 15.
5. Assah, 'Les déboires des indépendances dans les deux premiers romans d'Ahmadou Kourouma', « l'accession du peuple africain à l'indépendance, marque un tournant décisif dans son évolution donnant le droit à la création des États modernes et offrant aux Africains la chance de devenir les maîtres de leurs destins » 205.
6. Bayart, *The State in Africa*, « La fin de l'occupation coloniale a permis de soulever un certain nombre de contraintes, politiques, économiques et administratives, qui ont nui aux aspirations des accumulateurs africains. Cela leur permettait de prendre à

la fois le contrôle de l'enregistrement immobilier, le crédit, la fiscalité, les offices de commercialisation, les investissements publics et les négociations avec le capital privé et les importations » 24.

7. Corcoran, 'La genèse des soleils des indépendances » dans *Sous les Soleils des indépendances* 12.  
« s'il prend la plume, c'est pour dénoncer certaines pratiques et politiques et situations qu'il considère comme intolérable » 12.
8. Hawkins, 'An Interview with Aminata Sow Fall', 420.
9. Ibidem., « j'ai voulu écrire quelque chose pour témoigner, pour dire que mes camarades étaient injustement arrêtés. Cela dit, j'aurais pu écrire un essai, mais un essai sur Houphouët à cette époque ne pouvait pas passer parce que Houphouët était très puissant et appuyé par la politique française et la politique de l'Occident. Donc un essai ne pouvait pas passer. Alors j'ai écrit un essai avec une fiction » 12.
10. Sow Fall *La Grève des bâtus*.
11. Michel, Serge et Michel Beuret. *La Chinafrique : Pékin à la conquête du continent noir*. Nlle. ed. Paris : Editions Grasset & Fasquelle, 2008; Cooper, Frederick. *Africa since 1940: The past of the Present New Approaches to African History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002; Glaser, Antoine and Stephen Smith. *Comment la France a perdu l'Afrique*. Paris: Editions Autrement, 2005; Bat, Jean-Pierre. *Le syndrome Foccart : La politique française en Afrique de 1959 à nos jours*. Paris: éditions Gallimard, 2012.
12. Petithomme, Mathieu. *Les élites postcoloniales et le pouvoir politique en Afrique subsaharienne : La politique contre le développement*. Paris: Edition L'Harmattan, 2009.
13. Memmi, Albert. *Decolonisation and the Decolonised*, tr. par Robert Bononno. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2006.
14. Wininger, 'Post-Colonialism', 883.
15. Ashcroft et al, *L'Empire vous répond : Théorie et pratique des littératures postcoloniales*, 14.
16. Groden et al, *Literary and cultural Theory*, 374.
17. Kennedy and Gioia, 'Literature', 2036.
18. Zeydel, 'Some Sociological Aspects of Literary Criticism', 463.
19. Young, 'Post-colonial State in Africa', 11.
20. Sow Fall, *L'ex-père de la nation*, « était le signe du triomphe du mouvement syndical et la garantie de la sauvegarde des intérêts des travailleurs et des droits de tous les citoyens. Ils annonçaient une ère de justice sociale où le travail et les qualités morales de l'individu constitueraient les seuls critères de promotion. « Plus de magouilles, plus de népotisme, plus de combines, plus de privilège et de passe-droits comme on en a connu au temps de l'autonomie » 20.
21. Plutchik, *On emotion*, 1985.
22. Fenwick, *British and French Styles of Influence*. 2.
23. Roquet "Partir pour mieux durer" ? « Sénégal qui est, pour une partie de son territoire, un pays du Sahel est régulièrement soumis à de graves sécheresses » 1.
24. Sow Fall, *L'ex-père de la nation*, « La sécheresse avait persisté. Deux années consécutives sans récoltes. Dur pour un pays qui ne compte pratiquement que sur ses pluies pour vivre. Le sud du pays n'avait pas été à sec comme ailleurs mais avait enregistré une baisse notable de pluviométrie qui avait gravement compromis les récoltes vivrières. Il avait fallu faire appel à l'aide internationale pour maintenir l'Etat en vie et pour assurer le minimum alimentaire aux populations rurales » 65.
25. Moustafa, "Le cinquantenaire des indépendances en question", « S'il y a un domaine que l'Afrique en général et plus particulièrement l'Afrique francophone a abandonné

- aux lendemains des indépendances, c'est bien celui de la monnaie, c'est-à-dire celui de l'économie. Aujourd'hui, l'Afrique est à la recherche de son indépendance économique. [...] sans laquelle l'indépendance politique serait un vain mot » 2.
26. Fenwick, Laura. *British and French Styles of Influence in Colonial and Independent Africa: A Comparative Study of Kenya and Senegal*, SIS 419 OOOZ: Honors Capstone, 2009.
  27. Salami, Yunusa. "The Political Economy of Nigeria and the Continuing Agenda of Re-colonization: A Challenge for Critical Knowledge Production." *The Journal of Pan African Studies*, Vol. 3, no.3, (2009):131-41.
  28. Salami, *The Political Economy of Nigeria*, 134.
  29. Négritude mettait l'accent sur le retour aux sources africaines, la revalorisation de la culture et de la tradition africaine, et la prise du pouvoir au détriment des autorités coloniales. Le mouvement étant à la fois politique et culturel, il s'est enraciné dans la conscience collective et a influencé l'idée de l'indépendance et le concept de la gouvernance après l'indépendance.
  30. Wilder, Freedom time, 19.
  31. Ayelazuno, et.al, 'Kwame Nkrumah's Political Economy of Africa', 172.
  32. Verschave, and Hauser, *Au mépris des peuples*, 40.
  33. Petithomme, *Les élites postcoloniales et le pouvoir politique*, « Houphouët Boigny, premier président de la Côte d'Ivoire indépendante est un exemple qui souligne particulièrement comment un important leader anticolonial est malgré tout devenu l'un des principaux alliés de la France sur le continent africain, permettant l'intensification de partenariats interpersonnels au plus haut niveau de l'État, et conduisait la France au soutien inconditionnel de celui-ci en échange des possibilités d'investissement privilégiés comme dans le cas de l'exploitation de cacao »83.
  34. Verschave, *La Françafrique, le plus long scandale*.
  35. Bat, Jean-Pierre. *Le syndrome Foccart : La politique française en Afrique de 1959 à nos jours*. Paris: éditions Gallimard, 2012.
  36. Bat, *Le Syndrome Foccart*, « France-Afrique est attribuée au président ivoirien Félix Houphouët Boigny, qui l'aurait inventée pour témoigner de la qualité unique des liens entre la Côte d'Ivoire et la France, et de leur communauté d'objectifs » 30.
  37. Cooper *Africa since 1940*.
  38. Dorman, 'Beyond the Gatekeeper state?' 311.
  39. Sow Fall, *L'ex-père de la nation*, « notre amitié pour vous nous commande de vous conseiller [...] Avec Madiama nous serons à vos côtés en cas de difficultés » 11.
  40. Traore, *La françafrique en 2018*,18.
  41. Bat, *le syndrome Foccart*, 30.
  42. Charbonneau, France and the New Imperialism,1.
  43. Glaser and Smith, *Comment la France a perdu l'Afrique*, « La présence d'importantes forces « pré-positionnées » était un élément clé du bouclier français. A la fin de la guerre froide, Paris maintenait près de dix mille hommes en permanence en Afrique subsaharienne : au Gabon, au Sénégal, en Côte d'Ivoire, au Tchad, en Centrafrique et à Djibouti » 82.
  44. Michel and Beuret, *La Chinafrique*, Le réseau « Françafrique » de Jacques Foccart, « Monsieur Afrique » depuis de Gaulle, a consacré les lauréats du coup d'Etat. Le général Gnassingbé Eyadema au Togo en 1967. Le général Lansana Conté en Guinée en 1984. Le Capitaine Blaise Campaoré au Burkina Faso, qui fera signer « Le pays des hommes intègres » et son président Thomas Sankara en 1987 avec l'appui de la France. En 1990, le putschiste Idriss Deby accède au pouvoir au Tchad sous l'impulsion de Paris » 158.

45. Sow Fall, *L'ex-père de la nation*, « En réalité je ne gouvernais pas. L'armée, la défense, les finances, tous les secteurs clés étaient encore contrôlés par l'ancienne autorité comme au temps de l'autonomie [...] l'autonomie coloniale, cependant, veillait encore au grain. On était en régime d'autonomie, pardi ! et elle avait encore des intérêts bien solides à protéger dans le pays » 21.
46. Hesseling, Gerti. *Histoire politique du Sénégal : institutions, droit et société*. Paris : Editions Karthala, 1985.
47. Hesseling, *Political history of Sénégal*, « En 1956, le Sénégal fut pourvu pour la première fois d'organes semblables aux organes français : un conseil de Gouvernement et un Parlement. Ces deux organes fonctionnèrent encore dans un contexte de dépendance. En 1959, presque toutes les colonies africaines de la France obtinrent l'autonomie sur le plan interne dans le cadre fédéral de la Communauté française » 177.
48. Sow Fall, *L'ex-père de la nation*, « Contrôlant les secteurs névralgiques, elle [l'autorité coloniale] avait d'abord laissé faire avec l'œil narquois de l'adulte qui attend l'appel au secours de son fils : -Papa, le jouet est gâté ! – Ah, ah, ah ! ... je t'avais bien dit que c'est trop compliqué pour toi et tu le voulais coûte que coûte. - ... mais un pays n'est pas un jouet innocent. L'autorité coloniale le savait et avait pressenti les bouleversements que risquaient d'occasionner le pillage des ressources du pays à un rythme accéléré » 21.
49. Glaser and Smith, *Sarko en Afrique*, « la France n'a pas les intentions et l'influence qu'on lui prête. Selon Nicolas Sarkozy, elle ne s'accroche pas non plus à une « chasse gardée » sur le continent. Il faut donc récuser « cette idée obsessionnelle que la relation entre l'Afrique et la France serait une relation d'exclusivité. » [...] ! Cependant pas question de charger la France de tous les maux de l'Afrique » 32.
50. Raymond Aron, *La Tragédie algérienne*.
51. Raymond Aron, *L'Algérie et la République*.
52. Glaser and Smith, *Comment la France a perdu l'Afrique*, « Ni la richesse, ni la grandeur, ni l'avenir de la France ne dépendent de l'Afrique », parce que « refaire la force de la France, c'est construire des logements, des laboratoires, des usines, subsidiairement, si l'on veut, une bombe atomique » 48.
53. Pickett, 'French political-economic interests in francophone Africa' 83.
54. Faure, 'The future of France-African Relations', 13.
55. Sow Fall, *L'ex-père de la nation*, « Quelque chose de très subtil, en dehors même de la conjoncture difficile que nous vivons et des humiliations qu'il faut subir de la part de nos partenaires du Nord tout en étant obligés de sourire. Depuis trois, quatre ans nous ne fonctionnons péniblement que grâce à l'argent qu'ils veulent bien nous prêter. A leurs conditions ... Nous en sommes maintenant à plus de six cents millions de dollars. Pourra-t-on jamais les rembourser ! On a l'impression d'être pris dans une toile d'araignée » 79.
56. Dugguh, 'Le desenchatement politique', «Madiama, il fallait de l'aide occidentale pour résoudre le problème. Cependant, cette aide de l'Occident était plutôt une sorte d'échange [...] qui a conduit le pays peu à peu à une immobilité économique et politique »101.
57. Ardant, *le néocolonialisme*, « Le néocolonialisme désigne alors, en accord avec l'étymologie, des formes nouvelles de colonialisme. Il caractérise une politique, poursuivie par les anciennes puissances coloniales dans leurs rapports avec leurs anciennes possessions devenues souveraines tendant à maintenir, ou rétablir, ces territoires dans une certaine dépendance, généralement par l'intermédiaire de liens économiques. Il se distingue du colonialisme en ce qu'il met en présence des États politiquement souverains et que la domination recherchée se situe principalement dans le domaine économique » 838.

58. Michel and Beuret, « en janvier 1994, le CFA a été dévalué de moitié dans quatorze pays (y inclut le Sénégal). Ce traitement de choc sur une Afrique impréparée à la compétition mondiale provoque un appauvrissement massif des populations » 159.
59. Roape, 'Economics and politics', 8.
60. Ashcroft, Griffiths et Tiffin, *Postcolonial Studies Key Concepts*, p. 56
61. Matunhu, 'A critique of modernization', 68.
62. Memmi, *Decolonisation and the Decolonised*, 22.
63. Petithomme « D'une manière générale, la culture politique postcoloniale a témoigné de l'échec patent des idéologies nationalistes et indépendantes d'émancipation. Plutôt que de tenter de promouvoir le développement économique et la démocratisation politique de leurs pays grâce à un authentique projet national, de nombreuses élites postcoloniales ont relégué leurs idéaux d'émancipation et de progrès, tout en profitant de leurs positions de pouvoir pour obtenir des bénéfices personnels» 91-92
64. Sow Fall, *L'ex-père de la nation*, « comme des affamés sur qui serait tombé la manne, les nouveaux chefs s'étaient précipités sur les biens du pays pour satisfaire leurs caprices, ceux de leurs familles et ceux de leurs amis. Les cabinets ministériels étaient des cellules familiales ou régionales où on se partageait les privilèges dans le secret des affinités » 21.
65. Gudeyi, *Les mécanismes de la représentation du pouvoir*, « Madiama ferait mieux de penser aux siens pendant qu'il est en vie et aux commandes des affaires du pays, en s'accaparant des biens publics, question de préserver un meilleur avenir à sa famille, au lieu de perdre inutilement le temps à vouloir améliorer le quotidien du peuple. »37.
66. Memmi, *Decolonisation and the Decolonised*, 5.
67. Sow Fall, *La grève de battu*, « Ce matin encore le journal en a parlé ; ces mendiants, ces talibés, ces lépreux, ces diminués physiques, ces loques, constituent des encombrement humains. Il faut débarrasser la ville de ces hommes-ombres d'hommes plutôt- déchets humains » 13.
68. Ibid., « Il faut y mettre les moyens pour que ces gens-là disparaissent. [...] leur présence nuit au prestige de notre pays ; c'est une plaie que l'on doit cacher, en tout cas, dans la ville. [...] on ne peut tout de même pas les laisser nous envahir, menacer l'hygiène publique et l'économie nationale » 14.
69. Spivak, *les subalternes, peuvent-elles parler ?* trad. Jérôme Vidal, Paris, Editions Amsterdam, 2009.
70. Ibidem, « Il était choqué de voir des êtres humains - si pauvres fussent-ils- porter atteinte à leur dignité en quémandant d'une manière si honteuse et effrontée. Il oubliait la faim et la misère qui poussaient certains d'entre eux pour rappeler aux nantis qu'eux aussi ils existent » 13.
71. Ibid., « cette année, le nombre des touristes a nettement baissée par rapport à l'année dernière, et il est certaine que ces gens-là y sont pour quelque chose. [...] ces touristes dépensent de grosses sommes d'argent pour venir chez nous [...] quand ces touristes visitent la ville, ils sont assaillis par les mendiants, et ils risquent de ne plus revenir ou de faire une mauvaise propagande pour décourager ceux qui voudraient venir » 39.
72. Barthes, *Mythologies*.
73. Sow Fall, *L'ex-père*, « Tout va bien, Excellence. Personne ne souffrira de cette sécheresse. Les paysans sont plus prévoyants qu'on ne le pense. Ils ont encore des céréales et aussi des bêtes dont ils peuvent tirer des ressources substantielles. La famine ne les guette pas bien qu'ils profitent toujours de telles conjonctures pour afficher l'extrême dénuement.
- C'est ce que tu penses vraiment !

- Vraiment, Excellence, j’ai examiné la situation sur place. Rien d’inquiétant ... [...] Andru remarque ainsi « il y a assez de réserves pour tenir jusqu’à l’hivernage prochain » 47–48.
74. Ibid., c’est pourquoi même j’avais pensé que pour les aider on pourrait par exemple leur permettre de payer l’impôt en deux ou trois tranches. La charge fiscale serait ainsi moins lourde. 48.
75. Ibid., « Tey Allah ! où allons-nous avec le règne de Madiama ! ça a à peine commencé et ça s’annonce si « chaud ». Même au temps du Blanc on ne nous plumait pas ainsi comme des pigeons. Où allons-nous » 28.
76. Demarest, ‘Staging a “Revolution”’
77. Sajjani, ‘The African HipHop Movement: Y’en a Marre’s Political Model’.

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