

**Review of Motivational Internalism. Edited By
Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén
Olinder, John Eriksson, and Fredrik Björklund.
(Oxford: OUP, 2015. Pp. viii + 306. Price £41.99.)**

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Moral thinking has two central features. Our judgments appear to be more or less accurate and they also seem action-guiding. This collection of new articles focuses on one of the most important metaethical debates about the second, practical aspect of moral thought.

This debate has come to be known as the judgment internalism debate. At its heart is the question of how we should explain the process through which our moral judgments lead us to act. Imagine that Laura comes to learn about the climate change and as a consequence judges that it would be wrong for her to emit greenhouse gases. After this judgment, we would expect Laura to have at least some motivation to avoid making additional emissions. The question is: why would Laura have such motivation?

According to internalists, Laura acquires the new desire not to emit because there is an internal connection between moral judgments and motivation. Either moral judgments themselves are desire-like attitudes (i.e., states of motivatedness) or they have a direct power to produce desires in people at least insofar as they are rational. On these views, motivation thus has to follow from the judgment, which explains Laura's new desire. In contrast, according to the externalists, Laura's moral judgment will lead to a desire not to emit only if she, for instance, has a distinct standing desire to acquire desires to do what she thinks is right. Whether Laura has this desire is a contingent fact about her – it is external to her moral

judgment itself and also something Laura need not have in virtue of her rationality. At the heart of this debate is then the question of which one of these explanations is more plausible.

The editors of this collection have brought together an excellent set of philosophers to address the previous question. Roughly one half of the contributors are leading senior metaethicists who have already made important contributions to this debate whereas the rest are younger scholars who were selected through an open call for abstracts. The editors have also provided a helpful overview article and arranged the articles of the volume clearly under three distinct headings.

The articles of the first part address the arguments for and against internalism. Michael Smith investigates whether we can argue from the judgment-sensitive nature of desires and the so-called buck-passing theories of desirability to judgment internalism and concludes that such arguments are unlikely to work. Nick Zangwill argues that internalism fails to explain how the strength of our commitment to morality can vary even if we are instrumentally rational. Jesse Prinz claims that we should understand moral judgments as a natural kind. He then introduces a body of empirical evidence to suggest that motivation is a constitutive element of moral judgments because such judgments consist of emotional attitudes. In contrast, Daniel Eggers argues that the standard externalist thought-experiments involving various amoralist characters fail to rule out internalism because that thesis requires only that agents who make moral judgments have some motivation. He then claims that, once we design the thought-experiments more carefully to detect motivation, internalism will be vindicated. Finally, on the basis of empirical studies of psychopathy, Jeanette Kennett describes the role which the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance must play in the way we become motivated on the basis of our moral principles. She also thinks that being moved by

cognitive dissonance is constitutive of the acceptance of moral principles, which according to her suggests that internalism is true.

The articles of the second part explore the metaethical consequences of the internalism debate. Michael Ridge argues that the most plausible version of internalism supports hybrid theories of normative judgments according to which such judgments consist of both desire-like attitudes and beliefs. Teemu Toppinen tries to show that traditional first-order expressivist views can both accommodate internalism and leave room for weakness of will, whereas more complicated second-order views fail to explain the irrationality of weakness of will. James Dreier explains how the so-called Normative Question objection to non-naturalist forms of metaethical realism should be understood as the charge that these views are unable to explain why it is irrational to fail to be motivated by one's normative judgments. And, Jon Tresan claims that we can explain the truth of internalism by considering the functional role which moral concepts play in our moral practices. He then argues that this explanation is compatible with the view that moral concepts just represent the natural features of the world and even with theories according to which different groups employ concepts with different contents.

Finally, the last part of the book investigates different forms of internalism and externalism and especially how sophisticated externalist views can accommodate internalist data, and vice versa. Sigrún Svavarsdóttir defends externalism by arguing that, because we come to learn what is good through valuing things, it is no surprise that we tend to want what we judge to be good. According to Antti Kauppinen's interesting proposal both internalists and externalists are right about something. He argues that internalists are right about moral intuitions whereas externalists are right about our moral beliefs. The former attitudes include

motivatedness whereas the latter can fail to motivate us either when we fail to fully grasp their content or when we lack a conscientious desire. In contrast, Kate Manne introduces a new tempered form of internalism according to which moral judgments of an agent motivate her when she takes responsibility of her own agency whereas they can fail to motivate when she becomes a spectator of her own behaviour. Finally, in the last article of the collection, John Mumm argues that the amoralists are able to use moral language sincerely to keep track of the standard evaluations of the community even if we would not count their judgments to be genuine in another sense. This is because the amoralists' judgments fail to satisfy the function which moral judgments are meant to serve in the process of co-deliberation.

I can recommend this collection wholeheartedly to everyone who is interested in the judgment internalism debate. I can also recommend many individual articles to those metaethicists who are working on other important questions in metaethics and moral psychology. My only slight criticism of the volume is that many of the authors have unfortunately decided to play it safe. As many of the authors note, this debate has reached a standoff where the main positions are well-known and the main arguments for them have been exhausted. In this situation, little progress will be made by going through the earlier arguments again or by considering their finer details and additional side-effects. I would have preferred that more new unexplored terrain would have been opened for exploration with new bold arguments, but here not many authors attempted to do so.

The editors should, however, be thanked for bringing together for the first time the leading research on one of the most important metaethical questions. Hopefully their efforts will create further interest in this debate. In addition to this collection, we would also badly need a collection of the most important previously published articles on the topic and a thorough

book-length unified treatment of the debate. I can only hope that reading this collection will inspire the next generation to complete these projects too.

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