Abstract
Opponents of abortion are commonly said to be inconsistent in their beliefs or actions, and to fail in their obligations to prevent the deaths of embryos and fetuses from causes other than induced abortion. We have argued that these ‘inconsistency arguments’ conform to a pattern which is susceptible to a number of objections, and that consequently they fail en masse. In response, Joshua Shaw argues that we misrepresent inconsistency arguments, and that we underestimate the extent to which our opponents have anticipated and addressed counterarguments. In this essay we draw on aspects of Shaw’s alternative formulation of inconsistency arguments to present an improved inconsistency argument structure. While we agree with Shaw that inconsistency arguments must each be examined on their merits, we reject Shaw’s assertion that our objections are dependent on misrepresentations. Our initial objections remain largely successful, therefore, in dealing with the inconsistency arguments of which we are aware.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 139-151 |
Number of pages | 13 |
Journal | The New Bioethics |
Volume | 28 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 9 May 2022 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:The author(s) reported there is no funding associated with the work featured in this article. We are grateful to the anonymous reviewer who provided some very helpful feedback.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
Keywords
- Embryos
- abortion
- inconsistency arguments
- prolife
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Issues, ethics and legal aspects
- Reproductive Medicine
- Health Policy
- Genetics(clinical)