Abstract
Proponents of the duty to vote (DTV) argue that in normal circumstances, citizens
have the moral duty to vote in political elections. Discussions about DTV analyze
what the duty is, who has this duty, when they have it, and why they have it. Miss-
ing are answers to the Specification Question: to which elections does DTV apply?
A dilemma arises for some supporters of DTV—in this paper, I focus on Julia
Maskivker’s work—because either answer is problematic. First, I argue that it is
implausible that DTV applies to all elections because this makes the duty too costly
for the voter. Second, I argue that there are no good reasons why under normal cir-
cumstances DTV applies only to some elections. I consider objections but conclude
that the dilemma is successful and therefore the case for DTV is incomplete.
have the moral duty to vote in political elections. Discussions about DTV analyze
what the duty is, who has this duty, when they have it, and why they have it. Miss-
ing are answers to the Specification Question: to which elections does DTV apply?
A dilemma arises for some supporters of DTV—in this paper, I focus on Julia
Maskivker’s work—because either answer is problematic. First, I argue that it is
implausible that DTV applies to all elections because this makes the duty too costly
for the voter. Second, I argue that there are no good reasons why under normal cir-
cumstances DTV applies only to some elections. I consider objections but conclude
that the dilemma is successful and therefore the case for DTV is incomplete.
Original language | English |
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Number of pages | 19 |
Journal | Res Publica |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 30 Oct 2023 |
Keywords
- Duty to vote
- Political samaritanism
- Voting ethics