This study sheds light on the following fundamental gaps in the current literature. First, formulated by the increasing problem of the family’s controls of executive position, and the circumstances of “divided powers” and “gap power” in the Vietnamese corporate governance mechanism, this research can contribute in a very fresh view of family analysis in the new context of an emergent Asian country, so-called Vietnam. Second, in terms of “prospect theory”, illustrated by the situation of the “risk aversion” attitude, it is undeniable to clarify the interaction between volatility and family ownership on Vietnamese firm performance. Third, lean on the “risk-adverse” reaction, this study will provide the new aspect of volatility since it can re-direct the main effect of family ownership on performance. Finally, specifying the “reinforcements of family powers” and the increasing presence of family’s power on Vietnamese firms, this study provides the profound evidence of indirect effects of specific risk on corporate performance. Regarding a sample of 289 listed firm Vietnam’s stock exchange in 2013, we confirmed the adverse effects of family ownership toward performance again. It reveals the phenomenon of the extensive existence of family ownership, their sharing responsibility, and the issue of “divided powers” and “gap power” among the administrative level. However, it is surprised then that there is a positive link to the return, as there is the interaction between family ownership and volatility. What is more, this reveals that the higher level of specific risk can foresee the likelihood of the existence of family members, who hold the executive positions, leading to exacerbate the business failure.