Unintentional perspective-taking calculates whether something is seen, but not how it is seen

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Abstract

A long established distinction exists in developmental psychology between young children's ability to judge whether objects are seen by another, known as "level-1" perspective-taking, and judging how the other sees those objects, known as "level-2" perspective-taking (Flavell, Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 1981a; Flavell, Flavell, Green, & Wilcox, 1981b). Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, and Bodley Scott (2010) provided evidence that there are two routes available to adults for level-1 perspective-taking: one which is triggered relatively automatically and the other requiring cognitive control. We tested whether both these routes were available for adults' level-2 perspective-taking. Explicit judgements of both level-1 and level-2 perspectives were subject to egocentric interference, suggesting a need for cognitive control. Evidence of unintentional perspective-taking was limited to level-1 judgements.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)97-105
Number of pages9
JournalCognition
Volume148
Early online date2 Jan 2016
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2016

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