Understanding individual differences in theory of mind via representation of minds, not mental states

Jane R. Conway; Caroline Catmur; Geoffrey Bird

doi:10.3758/s13423-018-1559-x

Understanding individual differences in theory of mind via representation of minds, not mental states

Jane R. Conway^*, Caroline Catmur, Geoffrey Bird

^*Corresponding author for this work

Psychology

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

29 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The human ability to make inferences about the minds of conspecifics is remarkable. The majority of work in this area focuses on mental state representation (‘theory of mind’), but has had limited success in explaining individual differences in this ability, and is characterized by the lack of a theoretical framework that can account for the effect of variability in the population of minds to which individuals are exposed. We draw analogies between faces and minds as complex social stimuli, and suggest that theoretical and empirical progress on understanding the mechanisms underlying mind representation can be achieved by adopting a ‘Mind-space’ framework; that minds, like faces, are represented within a multidimensional psychological space. This Mind-space framework can accommodate the representation of whole cognitive systems, and may help to explain individual differences in the consistency and accuracy with which the mental states of others are inferred. Mind-space may also have relevance for understanding human development, intergroup relations, and the atypical social cognition seen in several clinical conditions.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	798-812
Number of pages	15
Journal	Psychonomic Bulletin and Review
Volume	26
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-018-1559-x
Publication status	Published - 15 Jun 2019

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
The authors are very grateful to Dr Michel-Pierre Coll for helpful discussion of earlier drafts of this manuscript. A brief version of this paper was presented at “A Penny for Your Thoughts: A Workshop on Social Cognition,” University of London, 25 September 2017 (https://www.sas.ac.uk/videos-and-podcasts/philosophy/penny-your-thoughts-workshop-social-cognition-1). This work was supported by an Economic and Social Research Council studentship [Ref: 1413340] awarded to J.R. Conway.

Funding Information:
Acknowledgements The authors are very grateful to Dr Michel-Pierre Coll for helpful discussion of earlier drafts of this manuscript. A brief version of this paper was presented at BA Penny for Your Thoughts: A Workshop on Social Cognition,^ University of London, 25 September 2017 (https://www.sas.ac.uk/videos-and-podcasts/philosophy/penny-your-thoughts-workshop-social-cognition-1). This work was supported by an Economic and Social Research Council studentship [Ref: 1413340] awarded to J.R. Conway.

Publisher Copyright:
© 2019, The Author(s).

Keywords

Face-space
Individual differences
Mind-space
Social cognition
Theory of mind

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Developmental and Educational Psychology
Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)

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10.3758/s13423-018-1559-x

Cite this

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abstract = "The human ability to make inferences about the minds of conspecifics is remarkable. The majority of work in this area focuses on mental state representation ({\textquoteleft}theory of mind{\textquoteright}), but has had limited success in explaining individual differences in this ability, and is characterized by the lack of a theoretical framework that can account for the effect of variability in the population of minds to which individuals are exposed. We draw analogies between faces and minds as complex social stimuli, and suggest that theoretical and empirical progress on understanding the mechanisms underlying mind representation can be achieved by adopting a {\textquoteleft}Mind-space{\textquoteright} framework; that minds, like faces, are represented within a multidimensional psychological space. This Mind-space framework can accommodate the representation of whole cognitive systems, and may help to explain individual differences in the consistency and accuracy with which the mental states of others are inferred. Mind-space may also have relevance for understanding human development, intergroup relations, and the atypical social cognition seen in several clinical conditions.",

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Understanding individual differences in theory of mind via representation of minds, not mental states

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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