Tiebout with politics: Capital tax competition and constitutional choices

Kimberley Scharf

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

27 Citations (Scopus)


This paper examines how capital tax competition affects jurisdiction formation. We describe a non-cooperative locational model of public goods provision choices, where the levels of taxation and the local public good varieties provided within jurisdictions are selected by majority voting, and where equilibruim jurisdictions consist of consumers with similar tastes. We show that interjurisdictional tax competition results in an enlargement of jurisdictional boundaries, and even in the absence of intrajurisdictional transfers, can raise welfare for all memebers of all members of a jurisdiction.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)133-154
Number of pages22
JournalReview of Economic Studies
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2001

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


Dive into the research topics of 'Tiebout with politics: Capital tax competition and constitutional choices'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this