The (un)desirability of hybrid managers as ‘controlled’ professionals: comparative cases of tax and healthcare professionals

Graeme Currie, Nicola Burgess, Penelope Tuck

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8 Citations (Scopus)
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In this review, focusing upon comparative cases of tax inspectors and nurses, we address debate about whether development of hybrid manager roles represents controlled professionalism or organizing professionalism. We evaluate whether the activities of hybrid managers are desirable in broader terms, whether the actions of hybrid managers transcend executive managers’ or policy-makers’ interests to serve a broader societal interest, thereby retaining a hallmark of professionalism. We argue that tax inspectors enact the hybrid role in a way characteristic of controlled professionalism. Meanwhile hybrid nurse managers enact their role characteristic of controlled professionalism in a poor performing organization, but more characteristic of organizing professionalism in a high performing organization. Despite our mixed analysis of how this plays out on the ground, we remain optimistic that managerial practice of hybrids can be managed from within professional ranks, and in a way that meets organizational and public interest simultaneously.
Original languageEnglish
JournalJournal of Professions and Organization
Early online date5 Jul 2016
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 5 Jul 2016


  • hybrid managers
  • public sector
  • public interest
  • strategic contribution
  • controlled professionalism
  • organizing professionalism


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