The Transparent Failure of Norms to Keep Up Standards of Belief

Ema Sullivan-Bissett, Paul Noordhof

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)
177 Downloads (Pure)


We argue that the most plausible characterisation of the norm of truth—it is permissible to believe that p if and only if p is true—is unable to explain Transparency in doxastic deliberation, a task for which it is claimed to be equipped. In addition, the failure of the norm to do this work undermines the most plausible account of how the norm guides belief formation at all. Those attracted to normativism about belief for its perceived explanatory credentials had better look elsewhere.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages15
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Early online date14 Feb 2019
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 14 Feb 2019


  • Belief
  • Function
  • Norms
  • Standards
  • Transparency

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy


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