Since the early 1990s the European Union (EU) has actively supported a two-state solution to the Israeli–Palestinian confl ict via a multitude of bilateral agreements with the two parties, the facilitation of regional frameworks for dialogue, fi nancial assistance to the Palestinian Authority, and participation in the Quartet, alongside the United States (US), Russia and the United Nations (UN). However, given the long-established diplomatic, political and economic links with both Israel and the Palestinian Authority on one hand, and in the absence of a viable peace ‘process’ for several years now on the other, the EU is invariably caught between its promising rhetoric on the desirable peaceful ending of the confl ict and its lack of clout to turn words to tangible actions on the ground. This chapter begins with a brief background of the Israeli–Palestinian/Arab confl ict and the role of the EU and other third parties in trying to bring it to a peaceful resolution. The analysis of EU capabilities and the context of this confl ict show that ultimately the EU has failed to make the necessary transition from rhetorical commitments to peace and stability in the confl ict to meaningful actions on the ground which could change the stakes or impact on the disputants’ positions.
|Title of host publication||The European Union as a Global Conflict Manager|
|Publisher||Taylor and Francis|
|Number of pages||12|
|Publication status||Published - 1 Jan 2012|
Bibliographical notePublisher Copyright:
© 2012 Karen Scott.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Social Sciences(all)