Temporal Parts and Time Travel

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

6 Citations (Scopus)


This paper argues that, in light of certain scenarios involving time travel, Sider's definition of 'instantaneous temporal part' cannot be accepted in conjunction with a semantic thesis that perdurantists often assume. I examine a rejoinder from Sider, as well as Thomson's alternative definition of 'instantaneous temporal part', and show how neither helps. Given this, we should give up on the perdurantist semantic thesis. I end by recommending that, once we no longer accept such semantics, we should accept a new set of definitions, which are superior in certain respects to Sider's original set.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)225-240
Number of pages16
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 1 Mar 2011


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