Team Incentives and Leadership

Michalis Drouvelis, Daniele Nosenzo, Martin Sefton

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)
219 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We study, experimentally, how two alternative incentive mechanisms affect team performance and how a team chooses between alternative mechanisms. We study a group incentive mechanism (team output is shared equally among team members) and a hierarchical mechanism (team output is allocated by a team leader). We find that output is higher when a leader has the power to allocate output, but this mechanism also generates large differences between earnings of leaders and other team members. When team members can choose how much of team output is to be shared equally and how much is to be allocated by a leader they tend to restrict the leader’s power to distributing less than half of the pie.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)173-185
JournalJournal of Economic Psychology
Volume62
Early online date13 Jul 2017
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Oct 2017

Keywords

  • Team Production
  • Leadership
  • Reward Power
  • Delegation
  • Experiment

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