Successive monopolies and regulation in a spatial model

John Heywood; D Pal

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9957.2004.00386.x

Successive monopolies and regulation in a spatial model

John Heywood
, D Pal

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

Abstract

A government authority regulates an upstream monopolist only if there is a sufficient welfare increase to justify doing so. A downstream firm strategically increases costs in order to force regulation upstream. The decision to regulate increases profit downstream, reduces profit upstream and reduces welfare relative to a model with no possibility for welfare-enhancing regulation.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	167-178
Number of pages	12
Journal	Manchester School
Volume	72
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2004.00386.x
Publication status	Published - 1 Mar 2004

Access to Document

10.1111/j.1467-9957.2004.00386.x

Cite this

@article{e696630285ab44daa77ca70bb8afbf1b,

title = "Successive monopolies and regulation in a spatial model",

abstract = "A government authority regulates an upstream monopolist only if there is a sufficient welfare increase to justify doing so. A downstream firm strategically increases costs in order to force regulation upstream. The decision to regulate increases profit downstream, reduces profit upstream and reduces welfare relative to a model with no possibility for welfare-enhancing regulation.",

author = "John Heywood and D Pal",

year = "2004",

month = mar,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1111/j.1467-9957.2004.00386.x",

language = "English",

volume = "72",

pages = "167--178",

journal = "Manchester School",

issn = "1467-9957",

publisher = "Wiley",

number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Successive monopolies and regulation in a spatial model

AU - Heywood, John

AU - Pal, D

PY - 2004/3/1

Y1 - 2004/3/1

N2 - A government authority regulates an upstream monopolist only if there is a sufficient welfare increase to justify doing so. A downstream firm strategically increases costs in order to force regulation upstream. The decision to regulate increases profit downstream, reduces profit upstream and reduces welfare relative to a model with no possibility for welfare-enhancing regulation.

AB - A government authority regulates an upstream monopolist only if there is a sufficient welfare increase to justify doing so. A downstream firm strategically increases costs in order to force regulation upstream. The decision to regulate increases profit downstream, reduces profit upstream and reduces welfare relative to a model with no possibility for welfare-enhancing regulation.

U2 - 10.1111/j.1467-9957.2004.00386.x

DO - 10.1111/j.1467-9957.2004.00386.x

M3 - Article

SN - 1467-9957

VL - 72

SP - 167

EP - 178

JO - Manchester School

JF - Manchester School

IS - 2

ER -

Successive monopolies and regulation in a spatial model

Abstract

Access to Document

Fingerprint

Cite this