Strategic Complements, Substitutes and Ambiguity: The Implications for Public Goods

David Kelsey, J Eichberger

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

35 Citations (Scopus)


We examine the effect of ambiguity in symmetric games with aggregate externalities. We find that ambiguity will increase/decrease the equilibrium strategy in games with strategic complements/substitutes and positive externalities. These effects are reversed in games with negative externalities. We consider some economic applications of these results to Cournot oligopoly, bargaining, macroeconomic coordination, and voluntary donations to a public good. In particular we show that ambiguity may reduce free-riding. Comparative statics analysis shows that increases in uncertainty will increase donations, to a public good. Journal of Economic Literature C72, D81, H41.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)436-466
Number of pages31
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 1 Oct 2002


Dive into the research topics of 'Strategic Complements, Substitutes and Ambiguity: The Implications for Public Goods'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this