Strategic behavior under partial cooperation

S Chakrabarti, RP Gilles, Emiliya Lazarova

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

9 Citations (Scopus)


We investigate how a group of players might cooperate with each other within the setting of a non-cooperative game. We pursue two notions of partial cooperative equilibria that follow a modification of Nash's best response rationality rather than a core-like approach. Partial cooperative Nash equilibrium treats non-cooperative players and the coalition of cooperators symmetrically, while the notion of partial cooperative leadership equilibrium assumes that the group of cooperators has a first-mover advantage. We prove existence theorems for both types of equilibria. We look at three well-known applications under partial cooperation. In a game of voluntary provision of a public good we show that our two new equilibrium notions of partial cooperation coincide. In a modified Cournot oligopoly, we identify multiple equilibria of each type and show that a non-cooperator may have a higher payoff than a cooperator. In contrast, under partial cooperation in a symmetric Salop City game, a cooperator enjoys a higher return.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)175-193
Number of pages19
JournalTheory and Decision
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 1 Aug 2011


  • Cooperation
  • Non-cooperative games


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