Spinozan Doxasticism About Delusions

Federico Bongiorno

doi:10.1111/papq.12373

Spinozan Doxasticism About Delusions

Federico Bongiorno

Philosophy, Theology and Religion

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Abstract

The Spinozan theory of belief fixation holds that mentally representing truth-apt propositions leads to immediately believing them. In this paper, I explore how the theory fares as a defence of doxasticism about delusions (the view that they are beliefs). Doxasticism has been criticised on the grounds that delusions typically do not abide by rational standards that we expect beliefs to conform to. If belief fixation is Spinozan, I argue, these deviations from rationality are not just compatible with, but supportive of, their status as beliefs.

Original language	English
Journal	Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Early online date	23 Jun 2021
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12373
Publication status	E-pub ahead of print - 23 Jun 2021

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Philosophy

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https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/papq.12373

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Spinozan Doxasticism About Delusions

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