Spinozan Doxasticism About Delusions

Federico Bongiorno

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Abstract

The Spinozan theory of belief fixation holds that mentally representing truth-apt propositions leads to immediately believing them. In this paper, I explore how the theory fares as a defence of doxasticism about delusions (the view that they are beliefs). Doxasticism has been criticised on the grounds that delusions typically do not abide by rational standards that we expect beliefs to conform to. If belief fixation is Spinozan, I argue, these deviations from rationality are not just compatible with, but supportive of, their status as beliefs.
Original languageEnglish
JournalPacific Philosophical Quarterly
Early online date23 Jun 2021
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 23 Jun 2021

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

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